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Abstract
Long ago, in Keywords, Raymond Williams remarked with some justification that
"Empirical and the related empiricism are now in some contexts among the most
difficult words in the language." That difficulty has yet to be fully recognised or
elaborated by contemporary criticism. In an era when discontinuity, difference and
heterogeneity have become privileged tenets of criticism, empiricism has come to
be regarded as the other of contemporary thought and synonymous with positivism
or objectivism. Yet empiricism has rarely, if ever, had this philosophical
implication; Dr Johnson, we recall, kicked the stone precisely to expose
empiricism's baroque falsifications of commonsense. Focusing on the mid-
nineteenth century, this thesis argues that far from initiating a crude
representationalism, empiricism predicated its search for knowledge on a profound
instability, one embodied within the textual language through which it sought its
articulation. That instability stemmed from the dominant view that the self was
constructed in and through experience, and perforce restlessly alterable or
unfinished, while also being central to the methodology of observation underlying
the empiricists' view of the world. The contingent self was conceived
simultaneously as the route towards knowledge and its obstacle. In the work of
John Ruskin, G. H. Lewes, George Eliot, Alexander Bain and Herbert Spencer the
principle of relationality consistently shapes their view of reality and their
epistemological drive. By considering a variety of their writing—philosophical,
literary, psychological, scientific, critical—it will be argued that 'empiricism'
provides a useful rubric for their common, primary, deep-seated epistemological
impulse. In various self-conscious ways, their arguments unfold in destabilising
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narrative forms, dramatising the principles of limitation and provisionality so
crucial to their meaning. Rather like the reality they attempt to describe, works like
Bain's The Senses and the Intellect (1855) or Lewes's Problems of Life and Mind
(1874-9) adopt a sprawling, proliferating structure which seems to register a
restless struggle to unify knowledge, and by dramatising this resistance to the
synthesising will they acknowledge in and through narrative itself the impossibility
of some perfect (and therefore fixed) organisation. The many volumes and
reworked editions in which mid-Victorian empiricism appeared provide formidable
material evidence of this revisability principle, incorporating the theme of
multiplicity at a narrative level. Novels like Middlemarch (1871-2), to take a famous
example, not only make connective structures (networks, webs, tangles) a way of
describing the morphology of communal life, they assimilate this logic of
association into their narrative method. In all cases, associational possibility
becomes encoded in form. After historically retracing these questions to the figure
of David Hume, subsequent chapters explore different aspects of narrative and
knowledge in these writers: the aesthetic of realism, the problems of perception,
the knowing body, and the negotiation of relativism. To the extent that this
relational epistemology shapes these works—whether multi-volume treatises,
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Introduction
For life is but a dream whose shapes return,
Some frequently, some seldom, some by night
And some by day, some night and day: we learn,
The while all change and many vanish quite,
In their recurrence with recurrent changes
A certain seeming order; where this ranges
We count things real; such is memory's might.
—James Thomson, The City ofDreadfulNight1
Is't real that I see?
—William Shakespeare, All's Well That Ends Well2
In The Physiology of Common Life (1859), G. H. Lewes relates the story of a
suicidal Frenchman who decides to incorporate his own death into a scientific
experiment.3 The disillusioned man, M. Deal, we are told, seeks to remedy an
unremarkable life by dying a distinguished death. To this end, he resolves to
suffocate himself on the fumes of burning charcoal while recording in a narrative
the experience of his asphyxiation, imagining that the written testimonywill be "in
the interest of science" and so confer, albeit posthumously, the intellectual dignity
he craves. Accordingly, as Lewes relates, Deal orchestrates his suicide with
precision: "I place a lamp, a candle, and a watch on my table, and commence the
ceremony. It is a quarter past 10; I have just lighted the stove; the charcoal burns
1 James Thomson, The City ofDreadful Night. (1880) Edinburgh: Canongate, 1993, p. 29; 1.15-21.
2 William Shakespeare, The Complete Worlcs. eds. Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1988, p. 882; V.iii.309.
3 G. H. Lewes, The Physiology ofCommon Life. (2 vols) London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1859,
I, pp. 346-49-
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feebly." Having begun the macabre experiment, he then records his deterioration at
strict ten-minute intervals. Soon a think vapour fills the room, stimulating a violent
headache and an agitated pulse; as the effects intensify, there is acute stomach
pain, followed by an assault of "strange ideas" and what he calls the "symptoms of
madness." Eventually, after transcribing his experience faithfully for some forty-
five minutes, his capacities finally fail him: "I can scarcely write... My sight is
troubled... My lamp is going out... I did not think it would be such agony to die."
Next morning, Deal's body is found slumped on the floor, his suicidal narrative left
on the writing table for posterity, as intended. Upon hearing of his death, however,
his lover becomes inconsolable; overcome by grief, she decides to hurl herself into
the "dark and sullen" waters of the Seine and join him in suicide. By the following
day both corpses are lying exposed in the city's "dreadful Morgue."^
Lewes relates this gloomy case to illustrate a fragile fact upon which human
life depends: the "slight exchange of gases" that constitutes normal respiration. The
two suicides, he says, demonstrate this most basic of biological realities, for in each
case death is caused by the respiratory process being interrupted, either by noxious
fumes or rushing river-water. His story is meant to remind us that life, in all its
shades of existential (and tragic) complexity, ultimately comes down to a simple
substitution of carbon dioxide and oxygen which can be represented in an abstract
way, far from the world of human deeds and desires. Yet, while his purpose here is
to uncover the hidden mechanisms sustaining life from moment to moment—to
unveil them, as it weres—Lewes cannot at the same time avoid questioning the
possibility of a pure or neutral language of physiology. His story invites, perhaps
knowingly, anything but narrow anatomical curiosity, for its appeal has little
4 Lewes, Physiology, pp. 347-48.
5 "If for a moment we could with the bodily eye see into the frame of man, as with the microscope we
see into the transparent frames of some simpler animals, what a spectacle would be unveiled!" Lewes,
Physiology, I, p. 271. Kate Flint discusses this bodily sense of unveiling in "Blood, Bodies and The
Lifted Veil," Nineteenth-Century Literature 51, 4, 1997, pp. 455-473. The metaphor of unveiling in
mid-Victorian empiricist writing will be returned to throughout this study, as it is deployed with
crucial but ambiguous significance at both aesthetic and epistemological levels.
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directly to do with science. Far more fascinating than the dying man's respiratory
apparatus is the compelling drama of the case—that is, the unsettling contrast of
rational science and irrational desire that conspire in his death, the tragicomic
sense of discrepancy between the carefully arranged suicidal props and the
destructive urge behind their co-ordination, and the widening tragic circle which
claims the life of his lover, to whose drowning we respond with inevitable sympathy
rather than a cold, clinical diagnosis. In effect, the story's scientific meaning is
hugely overdetermined by its own dramatic structure as a narrative, obscuring and
even undermining the significance of the factual physiology supposedly at its core.
This story—brief, arresting, multi-layered all at once—offers us (and Lewes's
Victorian reader) a representation of a scientific practice, and more broadly an
image of empiricism. The experiment described in the story follows an almost
fanatical commitment to the idea that knowledge begins in the direct experience of
observable reality (Deal supposes that the knowledge of asphyxiation he seeks
should derive solely from the testimony of the unaided senses). In fact, its simple
narrative setting and sparse detail make the rudimentary empiricist acts of
observing and transcribing the focus of the story. Its 'plot' is the unfolding of an
empiricism pared down to its most basic and essential elements, where Deal—the
dedicated copyist of experience—plays out his role in the simple epistemological
drama to the point of self-sacrifice. But, as a narrative about knowledge and the
drive to know, its consequences are shown to be anything but simple or
straightforward. With remarkable brevity, the story manages to invoke
empiricism's surprising potential for arriving at uncertainty, contradiction and
absurdity. For as it begins to share a kinship with autobiography—a writing of the
sensory self—the empiricism dramatised in the story turns to reflect upon the
conditions of its own possibility. No matter how strongly he wills to stand outside
the events he experiences, Deal-the-narrator must move ever-closer to the suicidal
self over which he claims authority, culminating in a final, fatal union of perceiver
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and perceived. This convergence of selves marks the impossibility of
disinterestedness, the collapse of narrative stability and reliability. Yet, at the same
time, this instability lends the scene its legitimacy, for without it the whole
enterprise would lose its meaning as an experimental moment. That is to say,
without Deal's inherently unstable point of view, the experiment would lack
sufficient purchase on experience, as no other observer than Deal could inhabit his
singular phenomenology of dying.6 What guarantees him his unique observational
powers, and thus validates the testimony, is his unique relation to his own death,
which by definition nobody else could undergo or submit to on his behalf. What
compromises his perspective on the event also, paradoxically, authenticates the
kind of knowledge it produces. In this short empiricist drama, narrative
unreliability becomes a necessary condition of knowing.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, this kind of uncertainty
became a crucial feature of British empiricist epistemology, and one embodied
within the textual language through which it sought its articulation. As in Lewes's
odd story, where it manifests itself as a question of narrative structure and
authority, the uncertainty flowing from epistemologies grounded in the concejit of
experience meant that mid-Victorian empiricism predicated its search for
knowledge on a profound instability. That instability stemmed from the dominant
view that the self was constructed in and through experience, and perforce
restlessly alterable or unfinished, while also being central to the methodology of
observation underlying the empiricists' view of the world. The contingent self was
conceived simultaneously as the route towards knowledge and its obstacle.
Knowledge without such a self would be, quite literally, unthinkable; equally,
6 As Jacques Derrida has argued, the aporetic moment of death belongs uniquely to the subject—"no
one can die in my place or in the place of the other"—yet that which is named as 'my death' can never
be subject to an experience that would properly be mine, possessed as/in its unfolding eventfulness.
See Jacques Derrida, Aporias. trans. Thomas Dubtoit, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994, P-
22. In a slightly different but relevant discussion of the death/knowledge paradox in the nineteenth
century, George Levine argues that dying has been implied ever since Plato in the West's narrative of
knowing: "Dying is one consequence of the Faustian pact for knowledge: death both for the aspiring
knower, and for the world in which things get known." George Levine, Dying to Know: Scientific
Epistemology and Narrative in Victorian England. London: University ofChicago Press, 2002, p. 15.
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knowledge passing through the sensuous intelligence of an observer must always be
subject to the limitations imposed by the observer's position. While observation
based on immediate sensory access to reality would seem to furnish knowledge, it
also has the effect of binding the knower in some determinative way to place,
perspective and personality.
Mid-Victorian writers in the empiricist tradition were committed to the
classic experiential doctrine—that "experience is the sole origin of knowledge," to
use Herbert Spencer's phrase—while being increasingly aware of the problematic
nature of observation itself.7 To be an empiricist was at once to place trust in the
immediacy of one's encounter with reality, and also to seek a description of reality
which might hold beyond the vagaries and limitations of personal point of view. As
this contradiction implies, the relationship between observer and observed, knower
and object, was thus understood to be radically unstable. But it was not assumed by
empiricist writers that this instability could simply be resolved. They did not
envision a way of knowing that involved somehow neutralising the contingencies of
spectatorship, or attaining some flawlessly transparent perspective on observable
reality, or eliminating human error from practices of scientific observation, for
example by using magnifying aids and other visual technologies.8 The deficiencies
of the eye were not the primary question. It was not just a case of applying oneself
more and more diligently to the business of seeing until an accurate view of reality
was achieved—even if, as George Levine argues, the act of observation did not take
place in a moral vacuum and often entailed an ethics of knowing.9 Often, in fact,
7 Herbert Spencer, "The Genesis of Science" (1854) in Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative. (3
vols) London: Williams and Norgate, 1901, II, p. 10.
8 As Kate Flint suggests in her fine recent study, rather than having the simple effect of increasing the
accuracy of observation, the development of visual technologies like the microscope and telescope
during the nineteenth century tended in fact to expand, multiply and problematise observable reality
more than simply contain it. See Kate Flint, The Victorians and the Visual Imagination. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000.
9 He argues persuasively that the scientific ideal of disinterestness, which arose so forcefully in
Victorian culture, required an ethical move whereby personal interests were put aside, especially in
order that the amorality of the world be faced. Consequently, in the nineteenth-century "the power to
observe accurately becomes a moral as well as an epistemological virtue," Levine suggests, such that
"religious forms of resurrection are repeated in epistemological success deriving from the denial of the
selfwho seeks the knowledge in the first place." Levine, Dying to Know, p. 6.
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mid-nineteenth-centurywriting celebrated the incompleteness of our vision. As the
narrator comments in George Eliot's Scenes of Clerical Life: "Thank heaven, then,
that a little illusion is left to us, to enable us to be useful and agreeable—that we
don't know exactly what our friends think of us—that the world is not made of
looking-glass, to show us just the figure we are making, and just what is going on
behind our backs!"10 To see things as they are not, as this passage suggests, might
entail its own ethical and practical virtues.
Rather than tending to assume that observation was in principle correctible,
empiricists like Eliot did not think it was possible (or even desirable) to rectify or
perfect perception, because the instability was understood in terms of an
epistemological problem, not merely a practical one. For them, all human
knowledge is always necessarily circumscribed, conditioned by context, and
conceived in terms of relationship. One of the supremely important, overriding,
reiterated themes of empiricist discourse between 1840 and 1880, in its many
varied forms, is the idea that at all knowledge implies relational structures. In the
work of John Ruskin, G. H. Lewes, George Eliot, Alexander Bain and Herbert
Spencer—to take a representative group ofwriters, not an exhaustive list—the idea
or principle which consistently shapes their view of reality, and shapes the writing
in which that view materialises, is that of relationality. In its simplest form, this
pervasive theory said that we know things only by having them brought into
relation with consciousness, that knowledge of any kind means taking up an angle
to the world or occupying a relative position. As the critic Christopher Herbert has
said, "[t]o apprehend reality in a distinctively modern mode came in this period to
mean, in effect, apprehending it relativistically."11 Ruskin, for example, asserted in
Modern Painters IV that "our happiness as thinking beings must depend on our
10 George Eliot, Scenes ofClerical Life. (1857) ed. Jennifer Gribble, London: Penguin, 1998, p. 17.
11 Christopher Herbert, Victorian Relativity: Radical Thought and Scientific Discovery. Chicago and
London: Chicago University Press, 2001, p. 3.
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being content to accept only partial knowledge."12 His phrasing, here, explicitly
connecting thinking with partiality, expresses a relativistic commitment to
epistemology akin to that captured in Herbert Spencer's memorably bold slogan
(borrowed from the Scottish philosopher William Hamilton): "to think is to
condition"—by which he meant that the kind of activity we label as thought always
has, by default, exclusively relational implications. Knowledge, Spencer argued,
entails "the antithesis of a subject and object of thought, known only in
correlation."^ For Spencer and these other mid-century writers, it was held that
partiality and relativity are vital preconditions of thought and knowledge, not signs
of mediation which their epistemologies sought to eliminate in the quest for some
ideally indifferent, objective, judgment-free process of representation.
Alexander Bain, an influential moderniser of the traditional doctrine of
associationist psychology, declared in this radical spirit that we "know only
relations; an absolute, properly speaking, is not compatible with our knowing
faculty."14 For Bain, conscious life itself could be defined as an incessant stream of
differences, an unrelenting cognitive experience of contrast and comparison
amongst rapidly coursing mental impressions. Without the feeling of difference, he
argued, the mind does not consciously live. In The Emotions and the Will (1859),
for example, he explains that the "basis or fundamental peculiarity of the intellect is
Discrimination, or the feeling of difference between consecutive, or co-existing,
impressions":
Nothing more fundamental can possibly be assigned as the defining mark of
intelligence... When I am differently affected by two colours, two sounds, two
odours, two weights, or by a taste as compared with a touch or a sound, I am
12 John Ruskin, The Works of John Ruskin. (39 vols) eds. E. T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn,
London: George Allen, 1903-12, VI, p. 89.
'3 Herbert Spencer, First Principles. (1862) London: Williams and Norgate, 6th edn., 1904, p. 55. Both
phrases are taken by Spencer from Hamilton's essay "The Philosophy of the Unconditioned," sizeable
passages ofwhich are incorporated liberally into the fabric of Spencer's own text.
14 Alexander Bain, The Emotions and the Will. (1859) London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 2nd edn.,
1865, p. 589.
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intellectually conscious. By such distinctiveness of feeling am I prepared, in
the first instance, for imbibing that various experience implied in the term
knowledge, and essential even to the lowest forms of voluntary action... We
are awake, alive, mentally alert, under the discriminative exercise, and
accordinglymay be said to be conscious.1^
The rhetorical stress falling here on linkages, doublings and differences—on the
realm existing between elements in the mind rather than on the elements
themselves—quickly establishes the relational direction of Bain's thinking. The
passage, wholly characteristic of Bain's written style, pictures consciousness as a
constant dispersal of energy into connective and contrastive activity, wherein
mental ideas derive value or meaning only by being brought into relation with a
wider horizon of further ideas. To be intellectually alive means being forced into the
shifting space of differential experience, where identities are not prescribed, fixed
or intrinsic but relationally governed and negotiated. We must experience the
discriminative feeling arising from two varied shades of colour if we are ever to
arrive at, say, an idea of the colour red. And this emphatically expansive image of
cognition has important epistemological ramifications: Bain's theory of knowledge,
as we shall see, turns crucially on the relativistic psychology worked out in his
dynamically integrated vision of mind and body.
This characteristic trend towards the relational in mid-Victorian thought
led empiricists to hold increasingly sophisticated views of the nature of 'reality' and
its representation. If our knowledge claims must be made ultimately referable to
sense experience, then self, knowledge and reality soon threaten to shade into one
another. Their boundaries become drastically difficult to draw, as the categories
interpenetrate and blur. Reality, to the empiricist, becomes bound up inextricably
with its perception: how can a 'real' world be disentangled from subjectivity? In
what sense is the world more than the sum of its interpretations? Can a self be
« Bain, The Emotions and the Will, p. 566.
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cleanly distinguished from its own perceptual acts? Does the accretion of mental
data—feelings, impressions, ideas, and so on—have a fixed centre, or might they
comprise merely a Humean bundle, an illusion of unity? These were pressing,
urgent questions for mid-Victorian culture, a culture that it has become customary
to consider in terms of the related ideals of realism and objectivity. Empiricism, it
has to be remembered, certainly did not automatically initiate or undergird a naive
representationalism. Instead, it troubled the neat ontologies of self and world
implicit in such a view. As Bain put it, "the object, or extended world, is inseparable
from our cognitive faculties."16 In effect, this position denied there were any simple
external facts of reality. Outer and inner realms mutually construct one another,
somewhat arbitrarily. Spencer held a concomitant view. "No facts whatever are
presented to our senses uncombined with other facts," he realised, for example.17
Our sense of the real rather comes about in the complex assimilations, associations
and mutations of past and present ideas.
The stanza from James Thomson's poem The City of Dreadful Night
suggests as much. First published in its entirety in 1880, Thomson wrote the poem
during the 1870s, the decade of Daniel Deronda, Lewes's Problems of Life and
Mind, new editions ofmajor works by Bain and Spencer, and Ruskin's later, darker
miscellaneous writings. It looks, forward, however, in its richly bleak way, to the
modernity of The Waste Land. Indeed, the stanza excerpted above seems to make
an argument for grasping reality as a kind of sustained psychological effect, mixing
memory and desire. Experience is likened to a sequence of shadowy forms,
relentlessly shifting, combining, disappearing and returning. Thompson's lines
heavily stress these movements of recurrence, revival and interaction. It seems that
our impressions, once they consort with previously formed ideas and memories in
this dynamic way, can no longer be isolated from a consuming swell of
16 Alexander Bain, Logic. (2 vols) London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 2nd edn., 1873, II, p.
277.
17 Spencer, "The Genesis of Science," p. 65.
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associational energy. Where order can be found among them—a certain seeming
order, not an intrinsic or directly referential pattern—they acquire (one senses
somewhat arbitrarily) the term 'real'. The whole poem interrogates the 'reality' of
the London it wanders through, moving fluidly between different modes of
subjective apprehension, from the dreamy, the historical and the mythical, to the
knowingly aesthetic. Ever shifting, the threshold of outer and inner seems at times
perilously close to dissolution. Even the material solidity of Melencolia's statue
("The bronze colossus of a winged woman"), whose image closes the poem, seems
to lack a decisive or defined exteriority.18 A key part of the poem's effect, and one
source of its famed pessimism, is the threat this poses in turn to the integrity of the
empirical self: "When this poor tragic-farce has palled us long, / Why actors and
spectators do we stay?"19 Yet we do stay, the poem suggests, because perspective
itself—however fragile its grip on the world out there—nonetheless continues to
provide the only viable resource for conceiving of reality, even if weakly or woefully.
The speaker's anxieties filling out this despairing vision indicate the
distance Thomson has travelled from a simply rationalisable model of the real, and
from stable narrative point of view, and thus it is tempting to read The City of
Dreadful Night as pointing presciently towards literary modernism. Rightly or not,
we might be inclined to connect its mood and method more to T. S. Eliot than
George Eliot.20 But our rationale for reading Thomson in protomodernist terms,
rather than in Victorian ones, would most likely involve the belief that opening
these representational and philosophical questions was untypical of the nineteenth
century. It would depend on our assuming that the development of sceptically-
inflected, perspectivist, relational lines of thought was unVictorian. Similar issues
of knowability were, however, precisely those at stake in empiricist writing in
18 Thomson, The City ofDreadful Night, p. 66; XXI.6.
19 Thomson, The City ofDreadful Night, p. 66; XIX.22-23.
20 Edwin Morgan's introduction to the poem rightfully notes the 1874 correspondence between
Thomson and George Eliot, in which she made clear her admiration for his work. Thomson, The City
ofDreadful Night, p. 14.
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Thomson's own lifetime, and his poem's account of the perceiving mind resonates
strongly with the psychological theory of the 1860s and 1870s. But literary
criticism, in particular, has tended to see the propensity to ask these sorts of
searching, critical or radical questions of reality, and of its representation, as
almost exclusive functions ofmodernist culture.
One does not have to look very far to find instances of this tendency. Brian
McHale, for example, in attempting to distinguish between the cultural paradigm
or "dominant" at work within modernist and postmodernist literatures, decides
that "the dominant of modernist fiction is epistemological." His rationale for this is
that the modernist text "foregrounds such epistemological themes as the
accessibility and circulation of knowledge, the different structuring imposed on the
'same' knowledge by different minds, and the problem of 'unknowability' or the
limits of knowledge."21 However true of Joyce or Faulkner, this description would
serve just as well as a rubric for the nineteenth-century texts that constituted an
earlier cultural formation which this study is calling the discourse of empiricism.
McHale, in fact, is unwittingly apt in his phrasing: the term 'unknowability' (in
scare-quotes as though daringly recherche) takes us back directly to Herbert
Spencer's First Principles (1862), which opens with a lengthy reflection entitled
'The Unknowable' and deals logically and learnedly with the theoretical problem of
the limits of knowledge.22
Writers like McHale follow influential Marxist critics like Fredric Jameson
in identifying modernism as a historical moment when Western culture confronted,
ambivalently, its loss of the possibility of representing totality—not just social
totality, but, more philosophically, the totalised concept conceived inside
epistemological discourse of the world as uniform, continuous and integrated. For
Jameson, modernist art and philosophy "tend to confirm the idea that there is
something quite naive, in a sense quite profoundly unrealistic... about the notion
21 Brian McHale, Postmodernist Fiction. London: Routledge, 2nd edn., 1996, p. 7.
22 Spencer, First Principles, pp. 3-96.
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that reality is out there simply, quite objective and independent of us, and that
knowing it involves the relatively unproblematical process of getting an adequate
picture of it into our heads."23 If modernism arrives announcing that "the whole is
the false," in Theodore Adorno's phrase, the implication must be that these broadly
objectivist or mimetic assumptions held sway in the period immediately before it.24
For many, indeed, it is against such a background that modernism's fractured
epistemologies and estranging formal literary ventures demand to be understood.
Colin McCabe, for example, invokes this now familiar historical trajectory in his
influential James Joyce and the Revolution of the Word (1978), which takes the
exhilarating textual self-consciousness of Joyce not just as a way of demonstrating
the eclipse of the Victorian novel by newer modes of twentieth-century fiction, but
as evidence for the much larger inference that within modernist culture "[t] ruth is
no longer correspondence but struggle."25 Modernism, as McCabe sees it, ushers in
a profoundly new epistemological universe.26 Victorian realists like George Eliot,
who propose and appear to enact in fiction a "simple unravelling of the real,"
belong to a distant, seemingly unrelated time or phase of cultural history, if
McCabe's teleology is to be accepted.27 The emergence of the modernist scepticism
valorised throughout his reading of Joyce seems to lack any meaningful prehistory
in the ideas and debates of the previous half-century, which in fact had precisely
begun to register an increasingly widespread acceptance of differential notions of
'reality'.
23 Frederic Jameson, "Beyond the Cave: Demystifiying the Ideology of Modernism" in The Jameson
Reader, eds. Michael Hardt and KathiWeeks, Oxford: Blackwell, 2000, p.177
24 Theodore Adorno quoted in Stephen Baker, The Fiction of Postmodernity. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2000, p. 24.
25 Colin McCabe, James Joyce and the Revolution of the Word. London: Macmillan, 1978, p. 38.
26 "Whereas in Joyce's texts the division between signifier and signified becomes an area in which the
reader is in (and at) play-producing meaning through his or her own activity, in George Eliot's texts
this division is elided at the level of the metalanguage." McCabe, James Joyce, p. 35. Other critics of
modernism, implicitly or otherwise, share this kind of view. Derek Attridge, for example, offers a
more refined version of McCabe's argument that nonetheless retains its basic convictions: "Rather
than an absolute division between the Real and the Text, along which we are obliged to tread a
perilious path, rather than an irreversible progression from pure signification to an apprehension of
Necessity, we learn from Joyce an appreciation of difference, which resists the narrative of progress
and the claims of transcendence." Derek Attridge, Joyce Effects: On Language, Theory and History.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 84.
27 McCabe, James Joyce, p. 19.
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This thesis considers a variety of writing from the middle decades of the
nineteenth century—philosophical, literary, psychological, scientific, critical—
which it gathers together (in a necessarily flexible fashion) under the term
empiricism. It does so precisely in order to identify all of them with a common,
primary, deep-seated epistemological impulse. That impulse works itself out in a
variety of ways in the diverse body of texts written by Ruskin, Eliot, Lewes, Bain
and Spencer, but in an important sense they share a commitment to an experiential
theory of knowledge which, as it intersects with distinctively Victorian issues such
as evolutionary theory and nervous physiology, becomes more prone to ask critical
questions of the kind Brian McHale outlines—to ask what it means to know, and to
strive for knowledge from an always-limited consciousness, and to be situated yet
aspire to see more reality than one perspective allows, and to experience not
knowing. These writers display a relentless fascination with such questions.
Reflecting on the problematic construction of reality constitutes one of their
principal drives; epistemology preoccupies them. It also determines the texture of
the narratives themselves. In various self-conscious ways, the language embodying
their arguments for a relational epistemology unfolds in destabilising narrative
forms, dramatising the principles of limitation and provisionality which are so
crucial to its meaning.
Rather like the reality they attempt to describe, works like Bain's The Senses
and the Intellect (1855) or Lewes's Problems of Life and Mind (1874-9) adopt a
sprawling, proliferating structure which seems to register a restless struggle to
unify knowledge, and by dramatising this resistance to the synthesising will they
acknowledge in and through narrative itself the impossibility of some perfect (and
therefore fixed) organisation. The many volumes and reworked editions in which
mid-Victorian empiricism appeared to its readers provided formidable material
evidence of this revisability principle. In the voluminous textual corpus constituted
by Ruskin, Lewes, Bain and Spencer, questions or problems tend frequently to
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resurface after an initial examination, creating reiterative patterns in which ideas
are forced into new contexts and made to form new relationships in combination
with other ideas. This dramatic mobilisation incorporates the theme of multiplicity
at a narrative level. Novels like Middlemarch, to take a famous example, not only
make connective structures (networks, webs, tangles) a way of describing the
morphology of communal life, they assimilate this logic of association into their
narrative method. In all these cases, associational possibility becomes encoded in
form. To the extent that this shapes these works—whether multi-volume treatises,
novels or periodical essays—it might be thought of as determining the aesthetic of
empiricism.
The word empiricism itself requires an immediate effort of qualification,
however. Long ago, in Keywords, Raymond Williams remarked with some
justification that "Empirical and the related empiricism are now in some contexts
among the most difficult words in the language."28 That difficulty has yet to be fully
recognised or elaborated by contemporary criticism. Its misunderstood meanings,
in a historical and philosophical sense, supply one good reason for exploring it as
an intellectual position and narrative event. Empiricism's ambiguities are ancient,
however. Its Greek derivation empeiria (literally, experience), which fuses
empeiros (skilled) and peira (trial), carried a sense of quackery as well as meaning
experimentation, and in the case of the Empiriki school of Greek medicine it could
indicate being "sceptical of theoretical explanations."2? These conflicting meanings
persist in a modified way in the present day. On the one hand, empiricism can be
used to indicate something like common sense, an intuitive and unshakeable faith
in outward, concrete things, as well as a 'natural' grasp of the world recognisable
spontaneously within ourselves and in others. Here it would point to an intimate
connection with the ordinary, the quotidian—a word for the "data of everyday
28 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. London: Fontana, 1976, p.
98.
29 Williams, Keywords, p. 99.
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existence," to appropriate George Becker's phrase.30 In another sense, it speaks of
the discipline of the scientist (discipline as both the particular expertise or
standardised mode of enquiry typified by the scientist, and as the self-control or
detachment considered proper to that enquiry). In this connection, empiricism
comes close in meaning to objectivity; being 'empirical' implies the rigorous pursuit
of exactitude, verification, infallible accuracy, pure truth; a neutral and final
description of reality-as-given.31
These different senses of the word—the one quotidian, the other
hygienically professional—are not, of course, in conflict at all. If science can be
understood as a particularly organised, developed and rigorous application of
common sense then the two casual usages of empiricism need not contradict one
another. Both yield versions of the same view: that empiricism signifies a level¬
headed commitment to solid facts, a practical apprehension of reality as it actually
is, unmediated by the vicissitudes of language, interpretation or theory; a process
of pure or literal transcription. Regarded as common sense or science, empiricism
is thought to be a form of observation claiming to penetrate the structure of reality
'naturally'. Theories and frameworks, the empiricist supposedly thinks, intervene
problematically in this natural process by having a dangerous potential to distort
the observer's neutrality. Untrammelled by theoretical concerns, empiricism is said
to adopt a dogmatic, positivist attitude towards its referential objects. It would
seem, then, above all, to be an untheoretical (even anti-theoretical) position.
Such are the assumptions attending usage of the term in a great deal of
current criticism. Emptied of its philosophical force, empiricism and its cognates
have become effortlessly allied with concepts like positivism, scientism, objectivism
3° George Becker (ed.), Documents of Modern Literary Realism. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1963, p. 31.
31 A typical conflation of these different meanings occurs, for example, in the following passage,
interestingly in an affirming context: "Empiricism has many virtues. Its reliance upon direct
observation and the results of experiment, its closeness to practice, its preference for the facts, even at
times its distrust of far-flown abstractions in favor of sturdy commonsense judgment, are useful and
necessary qualities." George Novack, Empiricism and its Evolution: A Marxist View. New York:
Pathfinder Press, 1971, p. 98.
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and realism, all of which are viewed with undisguised suspicion by many positions
in contemporary criticism. These concepts are widely seen to be the products of a
particular politics of representation, which an era of posthumanist theory and
criticism has sought, often valuably, to expose as ideologically invested
metanarratives. Pierre Macherey, for example, uses the word empiricism pointedly
to refer to those naturalised strategies of observation (alike typifying common
sense and science) which aspire, speciously, to an ideal condition of neutrality:
This means that a rigorous knowledge must beware of all forms of
empiricism, for the objects of any rational investigation have no prior
existence but are thought into being. The object does not pose before the
interrogating eye, for thought is not the passive perception of a general
disposition, as though the object should offer to share itself, like an open
fruit, both displayed and concealed by a single gesture.32
Macherey's point comes from a longer passage cited by an approving Catherine
Belsey in Critical Practice (i98o).33 There, in an often reductive way, Belsey
similarly defines her own constructivist (and casually deconstructionist) position
against the Anglo-American tradition of empiricism. Once contrasted with her own
position, the word empiricism enjoys a remarkable flexibility in Belsey's argument,
receiving neither subtle definition nor qualification. On a single page of Critical
Practice, for example, she uses the phrase "Empiricist common sense" and
conflates empiricism with the aspiration for objectivity: "empiricism evades
confrontation with its own presuppositions, protects whatever procedures and
methods are currently dominant, and so guarantees the very opposite of objectivity,
the perpetuation of unquestioned assumptions."34 Only Belsey's own unquestioned
assumptions—that empiricism has always tended to efface its methodological
arbitrariness while pretending to some Empyrean point of objective clarity—lend
32 Pierre Macherey and Etienne Balibar, "Literature as an Ideological Form: Some Marxist
Propositions," Oxford Literary Review 3,1,1978, pp. 5-6.
33 Catherine Belsey, Critical Practice. London: Methuen, 1980, p. 138.
34 Belsey, Critical Practice, p. 4.
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meaning or force to this criticism. Lazily invoked, empiricism emerges as a
convenient label for the opposite of Belsey's own more modish outlook.
Empiricism, it transpires, is the other of a properly critical practice. The New
Criticism, for example, was methodologically hampered by its empiricist
assumptions, despite initiating a movement against the still ascendant ideology of
romantic humanism. The intentional fallacy performed the necessary step of
beginning to liberate textual interpretation from expressive models of reading, but
what impeded a full liberation was its own commitment to empiricism, by which
she means its "objective analysis of form."35 For Belsey, as for Macherey, recourse
to empiricism remains an unwanted temptation.
The phase of criticism with which Belsey identifies has looked mainly to
Continental philosophy—one seemingly antithetical to empiricism in style and
temperament—for its defining terms, concepts and language. That alignment or
affiliation has served only to strengthen the construction of empiricism as the other
of contemporary thought. "Most of us, on meeting the word 'empirisme' or
'empirique' in a work written in French," notes Marian Hobson, "will have had a
cultural shock—a shock comparable to looking in a mirror and not recognizing
what we see."36 Empiricism seems arrestingly at variance with the current critical
climate. After all, the flourishing of Anglo-American criticism in the last thirty
years has occurred largely under the influence of a transdisciplinary body of theory
whose genealogy can be retraced through French poststructuralism, not British
empiricism. Derrida and Deleuze massively overshadow Hume and Hartley in the
field of literary and cultural studies today.37 The critique of totalising systems,
35 Belsey, Critical Practice, p. 20.
a6 Marian Hobson, "Deconstruction, Empiricism, and the Postal Services," French Studies 36,1982, p.
290.
37 The genealogy of Deleuze's own project itself, however, can be retraced through the tradition of
British empiricism, especially Hume in his Empiricism and Subjectvity (1953). Elsewhere, Deleuze
candidly admits: "I've never renounced a kind of empiricism, which sets out to present concepts
directly." (Gilles Delueze, Negotiations, trans. Martin Joughin, New York: Columbia University Press,
1990, pp. 88-89.) Marcus Doel risks distinguishing Deleuze's "transcendental empiricism" from
deconstruction "on the basis of Deleuze's liking for empiricism and Derrida's ambivalence towards it."
But Doel does also contrast Deleuze with some vulgar empiricism: "Transcendantal empiricism does
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universal values, grand narratives of progress, order and unity, the decentring of
the subject, and the radicalisation of embodiment are all distinctive theoretical
moves made in Anglophone thought via its absorption of Continental anti-
foundationalism. If contemporary literary and cultural theory tends to identify the
most urgent areas of attention as those where it can privilege discontinuity,
disruption, difference, heterogeneity and locatedness, then rarely does it do so from
inside the intellectual frameworks supplied by the empiricist tradition.
Unsurprisingly perhaps, British philosophy is generally considered unrelated or
even resistant to such questions. Since not au courant, possible connections
between empiricism and theory after structuralism have largely been overlooked.
Reputedly incompatible with these newer premises of criticism, empiricism has
more regularly attracted attention for being complicit with earlier orthodoxies
whose authority theory seeks to demythologise.
Western science, in particular, has become widely understood as a
paradigm of objectification and control legitimating dominant forms of cultural
power. For the postcolonial critic Ziauddin Sardor, for example, science "is the
bastion of Eurocentrism par excellence."^8 The ideologies of science and empire
mutually reinforce one another. "The method of science is supposed to ensure strict
neutrality and objectivity by following a strict logic: observation, experimentation,
deduction and value-free conclusion.Imperialism, in return, supplies potent
metaphors of conquest and expansion for the nature of epistemological progress.
The crucial insight widely applied in criticism in the wake of Foucault's Discipline
and Punish (1975) is that these empiricist assumptions were never value-free or
neutral, but expressed a specific distribution of powerA0 The epistemology of
not arrest itself upon encountering so-called 'brutal' or 'primitive' facts, which are simply there," he
argues, as though earlier empiricisms inevitably did so. Marcus Doel, Poststructuralist Geographies:
The DiabolicalArt ofSpatial Science. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999, p. 40.
38 Ziauddin Sardor, Postmodernism and the Other: The New Imperialism of Western Culture.
London: Pluto Press, 1998, p. 202.
39 Sardor, Postmodernism and the Other, p. 208.
4° Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. (1975) trans. Alan Sheridan,
London: Penguin, 1991; see especially the 'Panopticism' chapter.
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scientific knowledge, always self-legitimating, naturalised the observational
authority of both scientist and ethnographer which flowed from their characteristic
functions of positioning, fixing and framing. Knowing on an empiricist model
always reinforced the assimilative and appropriative power of the knowing subject,
or the Western observer, whose task presupposed the passivity of the objectified
phenomenon before the instrumental power of the gaze.
For Sardor, this necessitated "the 'ontological' assumption of
separateness."41 Self and object were conceived as essentially divided, just as they
were within the pervasive discourse of Orientalism, which according to Edward
Said had to encounter the non-West "not only as actual people but as
monumentalized objects."42 In becoming a way of seeing upon which colonial
strategies of representation could be modelled, empirical science entailed a
dualistic structure that logically regulated its discursive power. It was committed to
a notion of "separability," Sardor argues, which encoded the sovereignty of the
knower—"separability of observer from the observed; parts from whole; organism
from environment; man from nature; mind from matter; science from religion—
separateness from one another of the 'fundamental particles' which are presumed
to comprise ultimate reality."43 Empiricism, Sardor assumes, could enact its pursuit
of knowledge only by taking for granted the essential stability of these binary
categories.
Feminist criticism and theory have drawn similar conclusions in their effort
to scrutinise the relationship of knowledge and power. At stake in many such
debates is the intrinsically gendered epistemological tradition of liberal humanism,
41 Sardor, Postmodernism and the Other, p. 205.
i' For Said, the West (especially in the nineteenth century) sought paradoxically to create mythically
essentialised (i.e. non-empirical) 'types' through legitimating discourses such as science: "It was
assumed that if languages were as distinct from each other as the linguists said they were, then too the
language users—their minds, cultures, potentials, and even their bodies—were different in similar
ways. And these distinctions had the force of ontological, empirical truth behind them." Edward W.
Said, Orientalism. (1978) London: Penguin, 2003, p. 233.
43 Sardor, Postmodernism and the Other, p. 205.
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which for Belsey supplied the "man-centred" worldview necessary to empiricism.44
Part of the argument made against observational epistemology is that the ideal of
objectivity served as a way of banishing questions of gender from the pursuit of
truth, which was conceived in transcendentally purified terms. Bonnie G. Smith, for
example, describing the professionalisation of scientific practices in the nineteenth-
century, claims that "[tjhese practices involved a commitment to objectivity above
such categories as class and gender. "4s Far more powerfully, feminist theory has
viewed the characteristic empiricist gestures of observation and measurement as
embedded in patriarchal codes of representation, and enacted through highly
eroticised metaphors (unveiling, penetration, possession, mastery). As an aim of
research, it is argued, dispassionate or neutral observation was culturally coded
masculine. In the words of one critic, "the eye came to symbolize the emotional
detachment necessary for hoisting the disembodied (but mostly male) observer out
of the reciprocal subject-object milieu and into a terrain of decidability and
independence that privileged a universalist subjectivity in which the world was
'there' for all to see."46 Once again, it is argued, ideological complicity occurred
structurally, by reinforcing the encoded separability of knower and known,
reproducing the dominant power relationship by securing the knowing subject's
phallic identification.
This critique emerges with particular force in accounts of feminism's
attempt to formulate its own alternative theories of knowledge. Kathleen Lennon,
for example, argues:
Feminist epistemologists, in common with many other strands of
contemporary epistemology, no longer regard knowledge as a neutral
transparent reflection of an independently existing reality, with truth and
44 Belsey, Critical Practice, p. 7.
45 Bonnie G. Smith, "Gender, Objectivity, and the Rise of Scientific History" in Objectivity and Its
Other, eds. Wolfgang Natter, Theodore R. Schatzki and John Paul Jones III, New York: The Guilford
Press, 1995, p. 52.
46 John Paul Jones III, "Making Geography Objectively: Ocularity, Representation, and The Nature of
Geography" in Objectivity and Its Other, p. 74.
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falsity established by transcendent procedures of rational assessment.
Rather, most accept that all knowledge is situated knowledge, reflecting the
position of the knowledge producer at a certain historical moment in a given
material and cultural context.47
Once again, the model of knowledge which the newer epistemology must be felt to
supplant is crudely realist, universalising and theoretically incurious. Lennon
contrasts a newly emancipated politics of representation with traditional (male)
epistemology, whose obsolescent premises supposedly typify older scientific
objectivity. It is a familiar kind of contrast, falling back upon an image of scientific
objectivity now widely associated with the Victorian period in particular. For the
second half of the nineteenth century is generally felt to be the historical moment
when objectivism reached its height, becoming culturally dominant or
paradigmatic across fields so varied as natural science and anthropology. According
to Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, it was the period when the phrase "'Let
nature speak for itself became the watchword of a new brand of scientific
objectivity."48 For Daston and Galison, truth to nature required above all the
effacement of subjectivity, which "dangerously" threatened to distort this natural
speech ("theory and judgment were the first steps down the primrose path to
intervention" in this ideally referential process).49 The sine qua non of mid-
Victorian empiricism was a mechanical and aperspectival "fidelity to fact," an
escape from locality, desire and interpretation: "Among these prohibitions are bans
against projection and anthropomorphism, against the insertion of hopes and fears
into images of and facts about nature: these are all subspecies of interpretation,
and therefore forbidden."50 Stern and ascetic, empiricist strategies of
representation took reality to be readily accessible and knowable; the task was to
eliminate signs of human and textual mediation with patience and perseverance.
47 Kathleen Lennon, "Feminist Epistemology as Local Epistemology," Proceedings of theAristotelian
Society 97,1997, p. 37.
48 Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, "The Image ofObjectivity," Representations 40,1992, p. 81.
49 Daston and Galison, "The Image ofObjectivity," p. 83.
s° Daston and Galison, "The Image ofObjectivity," p. 86; p. 122.
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Visual technologies therefore began to epitomise the aim of non-interventionist
spectatorship, for "the machine, in the form of new scientific instruments,
embodied a positive ideal of the human observer: patient, indefatigable, ever alert,
probing beyond the limits of the human senses."51 Mechanised observation, Daston
and Galison conclude, held out the promise of objectivity because it overcame the
empiricist's all-too-human intervention in the transcriptional enterprise.
Running through all of these accounts, more or less, is a persistent, often
overt, spirit of resistance to empiricism. Invoked usually in a gesture of critique,
empiricism denotes a set of ideologically bound, disingenuous, untenable—and
now historically exhausted—epistemological assumptions and practices. As T. S.
Eliot once said of 'tradition', seldom does it appear except in a phrase of censure.
Commonly stressed in all is empiricism's blindness to the way knowledge is shaped
by determinative contexts, its belief in the transparency of experience, its claim to
objectivity, its static ontological divisions of self and world. Yet empiricism has
rarely, if ever, had these philosophical implications. Dr Johnson, we recall, kicked
the stone precisely to expose empiricism's baroque falsifications of common sense.
Thomas Reid, too, the founder of the Scottish common sense tradition, complained
that empiricism threatened to turn the external world into a nonsensical and
insubstantial kind of mental theatre. "I see myself, and the whole frame of nature,
shrink into fleeting ideas," he protested upon reading David Hume, "which, like
Epicurus's atoms, dance about in emptiness."52 Hume's empiricism plunged Reid's
picture of the world into instability and doubt, as it did for many other of his ardent
opponents, because it allowed the realm of ideas—for Reid, an unnecessary tertium
quid between ourselves and things—to become the constitutive site of
epistemological inquiry, thereby opening the path to scepticism. Guaranteeing only
an acquaintance with ideas, it meant bracketing objects. For well-founded reasons,
51 Daston and Galison, "The Image of Objectivity," p. 121.
52 Thomas Reid,An Inquiry into the HumanMind on the Principles ofCommon Sense. (1785 4th edn.)
ed. Derek R. Brookes, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000, p. 22.
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empiricism was seen as a dangerous and counterintuitive opening in modern
philosophy.
Furthermore, viewed as a historical development, empiricism resembles
anything but a dogmatic body or consensus of thought. To the contrary, it has a
remarkably rich, flexible and accommodating intellectual lineage. In the modern
era, it has spawned varied and opposing worldviews—not just Hume's scepticism,
but also Hobbes's materialism and Berkeley's idealism—for the very reason that, as
the philosopher Stephen Priest has pointed out, "primafacie at least, empiricism is
logically consistent with any of these three ontologies."55 Amidst this flourishing,
however, the simple empiricism that Colin McCabe and others have in their sights
can rarely be found.
For one thing, objectivism entails commitments inimical to empiricist
thought. If one aspect of the concept of objectivity involves the attempt to eliminate
the "specifics of the individual's makeup and position in the world," as the
philosopher Thomas Nagel has argued, then empiricism, historically, has remained
mostly incommensurate with the strictures of objectivism.54 Its attitude towards
the senses may have often been ambiguous, even paradoxical to the point of
teetering on the edge of absurdity, as we have already seen in Lewes's example of
M. Deal, but still the contingency of the senses has never ceased being centrally at
stake to its philosophical claims. At once facilitating and limiting the availability of
knowledge, the specifics of our individual make-up and positioning have been for
empiricists precisely the ineliminable element in how we picture a real world.
Empiricism has invariably prioritised, even when critiquing, the mutable arena of
felt experience on which it depends. As George Levine argues: "Feeling, in
empiricist thought, is unquestionable fact; it is, indeed, knowledge itself. The
question running from Hume through Newman and George Eliot... is about the
nature of that knowledge, the kinds of inferences built upon it. Moreover,
53 Stephen Priest, The British Empiricists: Hobbes toAyer. London: Penguin, 1990, p. 105.
54 Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere. NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1986. p. 5.
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empiricism, while seeming to imply a commitment to the primacy of direct
experience in the quest for knowledge, has invariably led to confrontation with the
mysterious and unknowable."55
Daston and Galison note that nineteenth-century theorists like James
Martineau "detected an affinity between science and religion 'in a common distrust
of everything internal, even of the very faculties... by which the external is
apprehended and received'."56 The senses, they say, were treated by the likes of
Martineau as contemptible sources of unreliability, and so had to be overcome in a
quasi-religious attitude of self-reproach. Objectivity was all. Yet Martineau's own
words, which they quote here, remind us that however severe one's distrust of
"everything internal," it is only by virtue of those very sensory faculties that the
external world can be "apprehended and received" at all. Even if condemned in the
name of disinterest, the senses cannot be jettisoned altogether. Martineau, in fact,
points to the inescapability of the senses while appearing to Daston and Galison to
have successfully wrestled free of their limitations.
Philosophers, more than literary critics, have long acknowledged how
empiricism, far from signalling a commitment to transparent or pre-given facts,
has always had to negotiate an almost opposite kind of difficulty: how to move
knowledge-claims reliably outward from the essentially private realm of the senses,
perception and intellect, without contradicting its grounding principle that all
knowledge must be constituted by and within the mediating structures of
experience. As Ernan McMullin argues: "If one takes empiricism as a starting point,
it is tempting to push it (as Hume did) to yield to the demand not just that every
claim about the world must ultimately rest on sense experience but that every
55 George Levine, The Realistic Imagination: English Fiction from Frankenstein to Lady Chatterley.
London and Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981, p. 264.
56 Furthermore, they see this distrust as connected to a highly moralised disinterest, conferring on the
scientist a secularised version of priestly authority: "Like the priests whose celibacy, fasting, and vigils
purified them for direct contact with the godhead and made them fit vessels for divine truth and
worldly power, the self-restraint of the scientists purified them for direct contact with nature and
made them fit vessels for natural truth and worldly power." Daston and Galison, The Image of
Objectivity, pp. 121-22.
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admissible entity must be directly certifiable by sense experience."5? The threat it
entertains, unexpectedly perhaps, is precisely that of imprisonment in the
knowledge seeker's own consciousness. For the possibility can never finally be
eliminated that all an empiricist counts as knowledge of the world is really just a
plausibly lucid acquaintance with the contents of their own mind. In the words of
another philosopher: "The empirical axiom, if applied consistently and exclusively,
leads straight to solipsism... If all my knowledge comes through my senses, so does
my knowledge of other men, and 'other men' must be defined in terms of my
sensorial perceptions only."58 Far from being synonymous with objectivism, then,
empiricism "always threatens to pull back from reality to the sensation of reality to
a solipsistic self."59
Neither George Eliot, Ruskin, Lewes, Bain nor Spencer, it must be said,
considered themselves entrapped within a solipsistic prism of experience, or
genuinely doubted that we can talk meaningfully about an independent external
world. None took seriously the hypothesis that reality was some kind of intricately
detailed and extended illusion projected by a deceiving mind. If those well-worn
questions about the philosopher's tree falling unseen in the woods seem largely
irrelevant, even quaint, to us in the twenty-first century, they had already begun to
look relatively passe to the mid-Victorians. In Spencer and Bain, one finds such
debates consigned largely to footnotes or appendices, marginalised by the thrust of
more consciously modern arguments.60 In Lewes, the problem of the external world
virtually disappears altogether, displaced in his mature arguments by newer
57 Ernan McMullin, "A Case for Scientific Realism" in Jarrett Leplin, ed. Scientific Realism. Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University ofCalifornia Press, 1984, p. 19.
5® H. C. Plaut, "Empiricism, Solipsism, and Realism," The British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science 13, 51,1962, p. 217.
59 Levine, Dying to Know, p. 182.
60 Bain, in 1889, addressing the 'Perception of a Material World,' has the air of someone palpably
bored by the question, and impatient to move beyond it: "I can say nothing better respecting it than I
have already said" ("The Empiricist Position," Mind 14, 55, 1889, p. 384). See also, for example,
Alexander Bain, The Senses and the Intellect. (1855) London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts,
and Green, 2nd edn., 1864, pp. 631-4. See, too, Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Psychology.
London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1855, pp. 58-65 (in subsequent editions this
passage is replaced by a new discussion of the nervous system—tellingly, a more pressing mid-century
concern, epitomising the modernisation of these debates).
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epistemological models derived from psychology and evolutionary theory.61 What
remained crucial, however, at a time when scientific knowledge was importantly
gaining ground as a paradigm across the culture, was the issue of how 'reality' is
thought into being by constructive and imaginative effort. At the heart of the matter
was not whether objects vanish when unperceived, but rather the view that man
"cannot transcend the limits of his Consciousness," and a critical recognition of
how knowledge establishes itself inside mental, even physiological, structures.62
Bain, for example, in his earliest full-length study of psychology, clearly outlines
the determinative ground of subjectivity:
There is no possible knowledge of the world except in reference to our minds,
knowledge means a state of mind; the notion of material things is a mental
thing. We are incapable of discussing the existence of an independent
material world; the very act is a contradiction. We can speak only of a world
presented to our own minds. By an illusion of language, we fancy that we are
capable of contemplating a world which does not enter into our own mental
existence; but the attempt belies itself, for this contemplation is an effort of
mind.63
If for Bain we can speak only of a world presented to our own minds, then
for Ruskin we can only paint a world under the same subjectively led conditions.
"Great art is produced by men who feel acutely and nobly; and it is in some sort an
expression of this personal feeling," he writes unequivocally inModern Painters III
(1856). Artists must not be cold human mirrors, for then they are at their least
61 Lewes embarks on a self-conscious task of modernisation with regard to the way epistemological
questions are framed, so that under the new aegis of 'Metempirics' the old problem of the external
world will look meaningless. Dispensing with the familiar antagonism between sensationalism and
apriorism, Lewes tries to show it was really a problem of language all along; we must change the
metaphor from 'Nothing in the Intellect not previously in Sense,' to 'Nothing in the Organism not
previously in Food.' G. H. Lewes, Problems ofLife and Mind, 1st Series, The Foundations ofa Creed.
(2 vols) London: Triibner and Co., 1874, I, p. 217; see pp. 199-220. (The first two volumes of the
Problems, which deal mainly with methodological ground-clearing, are marked throughout by this
change of register, as will be discussed in more detail later on.)
62 Lewes, Problems ofLife andMind, 1st Series, The Foundations ofa Creed, II, p. 3.
63 Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, 2nd edn., pp. 378-79.
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realistic.64 Ruskin, who most admired paintings that somehow visually incorporate
the subjectivity of the viewer into the representation itself, developed an aesthetic
theory of realism closely resembling Bain's argument. His ideal painter, Turner,
becomes exemplary inModern Painters as a consequence of his striving on canvas
to communicatively embody a set of values almost identical to those Bain describes
here.65 At their best, Ruskin argues, Turner's paintings depict the very occurrence
of the world being brought inside the circle of sensation. They become vivid dramas
of perception.66 And central to Ruskin's argument is an epistemological view,
shared by Bain and these other writers, that any act of knowledge expresses
relationship, for it is the mode in which the world relates to us as thinking and
feeling subjects, and as such is determined by the limited and limiting sphere of
consciousness. Even the most scientific accounts of phenomena cannot shed or
transcend these necessary structural conditions of knowledge; and what Ruskin
calls the facts of nature are themselves very much meant as constructions, a form of
human culture.
George Eliot, too, was acutely aware of these conditions. Her novels give the
theme of the limits of knowledge a remarkably rigorous fictional expression. One
finds it developed into major turns of plot and character, where frequently
ignorance and egotism intersect to the detriment of specific human destinies, but it
informs her fiction at a micro-narrative level as well, by narrators constantly
drawing attention to the varied horizons of the knowable, whether personal, social,
cultural or environmental. Take this remark by the narrator of Daniel Deronda
(1876), for example: "The best introduction to astronomy is to think of the nightly
64 Ruskin, Works, V, p. 32.
65 Although Modern Painters makes no reference to Bain, Ruskin's view that Turner's paintings are
"dictated by a delight in seeing only part of things rather than the whole" establishes an important
point of convergence in their theories of epistemic representation, central to which is a view that
reality manifests itself as a set of knowable (or felt) relations. (Ruskin, Works, VI, p. 73.)
66 "[T]he distinction of his mind from that of others consists in his instantly receiving such sensations
strongly and being unable to lose them; and then he sets himself as far as possible to reproduce that
impression on the mind of the spectator of his picture." Ruskin, Works, VI, p. 33.
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heavens as a little dot of stars belonging to one's own homestead."67 It sounds a
fairly bland insight, evoking a kind of homespun sympathy with the rustic and cosy.
But the deliberate parochialism disguises a much more complex and modern grasp
of epistemology, one directly parallelling Lewes's view that "whatever things may
be... all they can be to us is what they are in knowable relations."68 Two points, in
particular, follow from it; first, that to be constituted as a knowable phenomenon,
the reality described by astronomy (a reality that is quite literally otherworldly) has
to be brought inside the circle drawn by the boundaries of our own creaturely
habitat or culture (one's "homestead"), in order that those boundaries can be
thought beyond in constructive ways. Secondly, it marks the importance of
understanding by analogy, or by forms of intellectual substitution, whereby one
phenomenon comes to be represented in terms proper to another—here the
narrator recommends that vast and distant galaxies should be interpreted as if
merely a local "little dot of stars." Both points imply a kind of relativism, and both
inevitably question our distinction between imagining and knowing. For Eliot's
narrator embraces, among other things, an understanding of knowledge as artifice.
Knowledge answers a human need and is a feature of human culture; it can never
exist or take a form entirely detached from these imperatives. What we know of the
world requires such conditions. It is cultural, not 'naturally' or spontaneously there.
Like Lewes and these other empiricists, Eliot was alive to the way knowledge
emerges and signifies only inside limited systems of meaning, especially those of
the mind, culture and language.
Thomas Nagel, once again, neatly formulates these kinds of problems in a
way that can illuminate mid-Victorian empiricism. Despite the widely accepted
notion that certainty requires leaving behind point of view, Nagel argues, there are
"things about the world and life and ourselves that cannot be adequately
understood from a maximally objective standpoint, however much it may extend
57 George Eliot, Daniel Deronda. (1876) ed. Terence Cave, London: Penguin, 1995, p. 22.
68 Lewes, Problems ofLife andMind, 1st Series, Die Foundations ofa Creed, II, p. 31.
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our understanding beyond the point from which we started. A great deal is
essentially connected to a particular point of view, or type of point of view, and the
attempt to give a complete account of the world in objective terms detached from
these perspectives inevitably leads to false reductions or to outright denial that
certain patently real phenomena exist at all."69 This is a position that the writers
under consideration here would have recognised, if not shared. All realised that a
view from nowhere would most probably be a view of nowhere, too—that is,
nowhere meaningful or open to evaluation. Even Herbert Spencer, who could talk
boldly of "our firm belief in objective reality," and whose work attempts earnestly to
erect a complete hierarchy of knowledge, segregated the knowable realm from the
ultimate ground of phenomenon unconnected to point of view, which it would be
contradictory to think or even name.70
Empiricism was, therefore, as we have seen, always a subject-centred
philosophical position. Crucial to its thinking since Aristotle was the notion that the
senses supplied a privileged point of access to reality. But what reinvigorated
epistemological debate in the mid-nineteenth century was the understanding of the
very subject at the centre of it. Defined as unfixed, mutable, ever in process, the
sensory self posited by mid-Victorian empiricism was conceived, in the wake of
Darwin and new theories of associationist psychology, in dynamic ways that
belonged distinctively to the grain of the period's intellectual culture. Individual
consciousness was by no means regarded as simply a stabilising point of
intelligibility. A quite different kind of self was imagined to that described, for
example, by Ian Watt in his now classic study The Rise of the Novel (1957), where
he links realism in eighteenth-century fiction to an empiricist philosophy which
"begins from the position that truth can be discovered by the individual through his
senses."71 For Watt, philosophical and literary narratives alike served to reinforce
69 Nagel, The View From Nowhere, p. 17.
7° Spencer, First Principles, p. 70.
71 Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel. (1957) London: Pimlico, 2000, p. 12.
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the principle that direct sensory contactwith the world promised a reliable pathway
to knowledge; to read Robinson Crusoe or Locke's Essay Concerning Human
Understanding was to find this view not merely confirmed but fully thematised.
Even if we accept Watt's characterisation of the eighteenth century, his argument
looks erroneously out of step with the mid-nineteenth, by which point Spencer, for
one, was arguing that "the inscrutableness of things in themselves results from
discovering the illusiveness of sense-impressions."72
For change and adaptation became key determinants in empiricist notions
of subjectivity. An assumption in all these writers is that possessing knowledge
transforms the knower. As Lewes put it: "We are a part of all that we have met."73
Experience, from the empiricist point of view, provides not only the foundations of
all knowledge, it also reciprocally modifies the contours of the knowing subject by
being assimilated into their emergent identity. To some extent, this sort of view had
always been advanced by the empiricist tradition, because it tended to privilege
environmental factors anyway when deciding between nature and nurture as
alternative explanations for the sources of the self. But at issue was no longer the
earlier (easily attackable) model of the mind as an inert empty vessel, passively
disposed to what Coleridge had scathingly called the "blind mechanism" of
association.7* Mid-Victorian empiricism shifted the psychological paradigm so that
it moved well beyond romanticism's charge of environmental determinism. Bain, in
1889, points out that "the mode of regarding the infant mind as a tabula rasa,
inscribed upon by sensible experience, and developed by conjunctions and
successions of mere sensations, is not now the received doctrine of any school."75
Newer, distinctively Victorian conceptual models radically refashioned the
intellectual landscape, rendering obsolete Hartley's eighteenth-century scheme.
72 Spencer, First Principles, p. 50.
73 Lewes, Problems ofLife andMind, 1st Series, The Foundations ofa Creed, I, p. 210.
74 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria. (1817) ed. George Watson, London: Everyman,
199L P- 73-
75 Bain, "The Empiricist Position," p. 370.
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Instead, for all these mid-century writers, "the mind is a thing of indefinite growth,
adaptation, acquisition; its first cast is greatly altered by the end," as Bain put it.?6
One context for this more modern empiricist subjectivity was supplied, at
least in part, by the view of the individual as an evolutionary organism. Bain argued
that the empiricist's "quarrel is with innate certainties," and Darwinism proposed a
powerfully modern framework in which to articulate that rejection of essentialised
definitions of the human.?? Looking back in his autobiography to the mid-i850s,
Spencer recalls how even then "an evolutionary view of Mind was foreign to the
ideas of the time, and voted absurd."?8 But it became for him, and also for Lewes, in
particular, a crucial aspect of the epistemological problem. Not only could it be
channelled into relativist arguments, for the reason that evolutionary theory
obeyed a historicising and contextualising impetus, but it made available an
argument for inherited human characteristics or mental powers which exceeded
the familiar nature/nurture dichotomy. If, as Lewes saw it, our "organism itself is a
product of its history: it is what it has become: it is a part of the history of the
human race," then the species as a whole, rather than the individual mind, could
carry the responsibility for explaining the provenance of complex psychological
functions.?9 On this view, our minds do not resemble empty vessels, but neither is
their organisation intrinsic or static. Evolutionary assumptions therefore added
plausibility and cutting-edge sophistication to the empiricists' constructivist views,
while deepening resistance to the metaphysical idea of the mind as a fixed entity or
substance.
More generally, evolutionary thinking fed sympathetically into a wider shift
in Victorian empiricism towards embracing the self—the knowing subject—in terms
of change and difference. The new psychological theory of Bain, Spencer and Lewes
pictures the mind as a restless network of transformational energy, marked
?6 Bain, Logic, II, p. 287.
77 Bain, "The Empiricist Position," p. 369.
78 Herbert Spencer, AnAutobiography. (2 vols) London: Williams and Northgate, 1904, II, p. 220.
79 Lewes, Problems ofLife andMind, 1st Series, The Foundations ofa Creed, I, p. 218.
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everywhere by evidence of constant dynamic activity. Our mental life, Bain argues,
is "a vast stream of spectacle, action, feeling, volition, desire, intermingled and
complicated in every way, and rendered adherent by its unbroken continuity."80
This revitalised associationism, by borrowing conceptual ideas from physiology and
incorporating the body, especially nervous structures, into the theory of
subjectivity. "Mind," Spencer remarked, "is not as deep as the brain only, but is, in
a sense, as deep as the viscera," very much following Bain's lead.81 To Bain, 'self
designated nothing more than the dynamic totality of corporeal tissue and all past
and present sensations and thought: "Everything of llie nature of a moving power
belonging to this totality is a part of self."82
Experience, then, that most crucial concept in empiricist philosophy,
carried with it by the middle of the nineteenth century an urgent new sense of
multiplicity and instability. Lewes speaks specifically in Problems ofLife andMind,
for example, of the "multiple unity" of experience.83 One finds a comparable sense
of excess in Ruskin's representation of landscape, which often he figures as a
compelling experience of proliferation: "nature is never distinct and never vacant,
she is always mysterious, but always abundant; you can always see something, but
you never see all."84 George Eliot, too, explores personal experience in terms of
broad, drastic and complicated shifts in modes of relations, such as Dorothea's
"hurrying, crowding vision of unfitting conditions" in chapter 50 of Middlemarch
(1871-2), after she grasps Casaubon's posthumous intentions regarding a possible
future marriage between her andWill Ladislaw:
Everything was changing its aspect: her husband's conduct, her own duteous
feeling towards him, every struggle between them—and yet more, her whole
relation to Will Ladislaw. Her world was in a state of convulsive change; the
80 Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, 2nd edn., pp. 459-60.
81 Spencer, An Autobiography, II, p. 418.
82 Bain, The Emotions and the Will, 2nd edn., p. 509.
83 Lewes, Problems ofLife andMind, 1st Series, The Foundations ofa Creed, I, p. 29.
84 Ruskin, Works, III, p. 329.
-32-
only thing she could say distinctly to herself was, that she must wait and
think anew. One change terrified her as if it had been a sin; it was the violent
shock of repulsion from her departed husband, who had had hidden
thoughts, perhaps perverting everything she said and did. Then again she was
conscious of another change which also made her tremulous; it was a sudden
strange yearning of heart towards Will Ladislaw.8s
Caught brilliantly here, in a passage that itself hurries and crowds with sudden
shifts of angle and perspective, is something like Bain's view that "the ordinary
mind [has] a great natural deficiency in the power of seizing the exact truth of any
phenomenon or incident."86 But, importantly, it is conveyed from Dorothea's point
of view as a vision of her own experience proliferating uncontrollably. It
dramatically asserts the multiplicity of experience, and the openness of its many
"aspects" or relations to utter transformation. Change, disruption and instability,
rather than unity, overwhelmingly result from the forces so vividly at work here,
hopelessly confounding Dorothea. We might say that Eliot's passage mobilises a
differential energy that refuses to allow experience to coalesce into a fixed
organisation. Casaubon may be dead, but Dorothea's past experience most
certainly is not; it lives on intensely in the present as a chaotic excess ofmeaning.
Lewes similarly preferred to cast experience as a kind of turbulence or
unsettling. Reviewing the newly published Jane Eyre in Fraser's Magazine, he
wondered: "Has the author led a quiet, secluded life, uninvolved in the great vortex
of the world, undisturbed by varied passions, untried by strange calamities?"8?
Vortex, of course, carries a conspicuously modern resonance. His own novel,
Ranthorpe (1847), an intriguing mixture of realism and romance, tells the story of
a young poet's fortunes as he is thrust into the vortex of literary London. Shortly
after the critics turn on Percy Ranthorpe, leaving the writer facing penury and
85 George Eliot, Middlemarch: A Study ofProvincial Life. (1871-2) ed. RosemaryAshton, London:
Penguin, 1994, p. 490.
86 Bain, The Emotions and the Will, p. 512.
87 G. H. Lewes, "Recent Novels: French and English," Fraser's Magazine 36,1847, p. 691.
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obscurity, the narrator notes wryly: "The knowledge of life is marvellously complex:
its materials are drawn from past experience, present observation, and prevision of
the future... [F]or men themselves are ever vacillating between new ideas and
ancient prejudices; between their interests and their passions."88 The novel
represents its hero's progress through life precisely as a movement towards
growing complexity and vacillation; experience, in the end, destabilises Percy
Ranthorpe's early identity as the youthful poet-genius. This recognisably modern
emphasis on the fluid and unstable is characteristic of all Lewes's writing. As Rick
Rylance has pointed out, William James's 'stream of consciousness' first appears in
Lewes as early as the 1860s.89 Like later writers, his work pushes open the
psychological multiplicity teeming beneath even apparently simple forms of
experience. It reveals how energy and interaction live vigorously at the heart of
everything we encounter through sensation and intellect. A passage from his
Principles of Success in Literature, describing the role played in the literary
imagination by the creative promptings ofmemory, captures this complexity:
A vivid memory supplies the elements from a thousand different sources,
most of which are quite beyond localisation—the experience of yesterday
being intermingled with the dim suggestions of early years, the tones heard in
childhood sounding through the diapson of sorrowing maturity; and all these
kaleidoscopic fragments are recomposed into images that seem to have a
corresponding reality of their own.?0
A modern, perhaps even modernist, blur of cognition is summoned quite strikingly
here. As we saw in the Middlemarch passage, unsettling shifts of focus create a
dramatic impression of dispersal; that is, the sense of a movement from unity to
88 G. H. Lewes, Ranthorpe. (1847) ed. Barbara Smalley, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1974, pp. 85-
86.
89 See Rick Rylance, Victorian Psychology and British Culture 1850-1880. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000, pp. 10-13.
90 G. H. Lewes, The Principles of Success in Literature, ed. T. Sharper Knowlson, London: Walter
Scott Ltd, 1897, p. 78.
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plurality. Boundaries are breached, or spill over; limits are exceeded; properties
ceaselessly blend. Nothing quite holds its position. The keynote motifs and
metaphors—intermingling, dimness, recomposition—all stand as the rhetorical
figures for this pattern of destabilisation.
What should be noted, too, is how this runs against F. R. Leavis's view of
experience as "a growing stability of organization."91 The concept of experience has
long been central to the way literary criticism has regarded George Eliot's work,
and to her hallowed induction into his Great Tradition. For a generation of critics
still under Leavis's influence, experience was said to be at the heart of Eliot's
profoundly moral aesthetic, and identifiable with the wisdom of her narrators'
humane insight. According to Isobel Armstrong, for example, George Eliot's
achievement relies upon "her capacity to move beyond the moral universe of the
novel, turn outwards towards the reader and to invoke a general body of moral and
psychological knowledge or, rather, experience, which can be the corporate
possession of both writer and reader; this shared experience is continually being
brought to bear on the novel."92 Experience stands out as the keyword in this
essentially formal judgment. It is a consensual category here: it marks a settling of
differences, the concordance of points of view. This Leavisite argument, which
assumes a seamless continuity between author, text and reader, between the
narrated and the extratextual worlds, seizes upon 'experience' as a unified medium
cleansed of all marks of difference. Thus conceived, it assists in the attempt to
stabilise or universalise value, because at the heart of this idea of experience is its
transmission across potentially different human contexts. Yet, as the narrator of
Ranthorpe reflects, it is precisely "one of the sad conditions of life, that experience
is not transmissible."93
91 F. R. Leavis, The Common Pursuit. London: Chatto and Windus, 1958, p. 214.
92 Isobel Armstrong, "Middlemarch: A Note on George Eliot's 'Wisdom"' in Critical Essays on George
Eliot, ed. Barbara Hardy, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979, pp. 120-21. Original emphasis.
w Lewes, Ranthorpe, p. 99.
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For Eliot and these writers, it is an ethical condition of life, too. The
particularity of different selves, societies, cultures, readers and texts cannot be
transcended, and recognising another's interests requires us to acknowledge these
modes of differentiation. The epistemological limits of knowledge thereby enjoin an
ethical positioning. Armstrong argues that "George Eliot's procedure depends upon
the constant corroboration and assent of the reader to her sayings," overlooking the
ethical dimension of writing that entails recognising the otherness of both the
textual medium and the reader.94 The scepticism in Eliot's fiction itself, and in the
empiricist culture to which she belonged, casts significant doubt over the validity of
the Leavisite judgment. Quite simply, experience to these writers always entails
difference and instability. Experience in this sense is much closer to the way
Adorno describes the complex, tangled web out of which knowledge emerges:
"Knowledge comes to us through a network of prejudices, opinions, innervations,
self-corrections, presuppositions, exaggerations, in short through the dense, firmly
grounded, but by no means ultimately transparent medium of experience."95
The following chapters develop this argument, with particular reference to a
cluster of interrelated problems or issues configured around epistemological self-
consciousness in writing by Ruskin, Eliot, Lewes, Bain and Spencer: the aesthetic of
realism, the theory of perception, the consequences of embodiment in relation to
knowledge, and the tension in relativism between situatedness and the aspiration
for transcendence. These problems are addressed in turn, chapter by chapter, in
relation to one writer specifically, but they involve all of them and cut across their
writing without neat separation. Each writer therefore provides a focal point for a
particular problem, around whose work it can be concentrated, not a necessary or
biographical relationship with it. The problem of perception, for example, is really
no more or less a pressing question for Lewes than it is for the others (and indeed it
94 Armstrong, "Middlemarch: A Note on George Eliot's 'Wisdom'," p. 118.
95 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott,
London: New Left Books, 1978, p. 80. Quoted in John Richetti, Philosophical Writing: Locke,
Berkeley, Hume. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983, p. 27.
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is pressing), nor is it claimed that his work represents its definitive treatment or
resolution in writing of the period. But his particular engagement with perception
as a theory gives us a convenient starting point for examining an issue central to all
five writers. The aim is as much to explore these radiating lines of connection as it
is to illuminate Lewes, say, individually.
The notion of connection implies a guiding methodological assumption
that should be clarified openly. Briefly, the movement of ideas across boundaries of
genre is crucial to the way this study tries to establish its view of empiricism as a
cultural formation, and crucial, too, to the nineteenth century. So vibrantly open is
the intellectual context, in fact, that mid-Victorian culture itself could be worth
describing as highly interdisciplinary (predisciplinaiy might be a more satisfactory
term, historically). The first justification for assuming that extremely porous
boundaries connect philosophy, fiction and criticism, then, is a historical one. All
five writers were formidably versatile. The long and astonishingly varied
intellectual life of John Ruskin (1819-1900) is particularly well known. As a recent
biographer says: "No great Victorian was so little confined to one field as Ruskin."96
Also remarkable, if now less widely known, was G. H. Lewes (1817-78), who worked
in the theatre, translated plays for the stage, wrote novels, regularly reviewed for
liberal periodicals, and published work which combined aesthetics, psychology,
physiology and sociology. Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), himself an impressive
polymath, attempted through his Synthetic Philosophy to integrate psychology,
biology, sociology, politics and evolutionary theory. George Eliot (1819-80) was not
narrowly a novelist; as well as editing the Westminster Review and contributing
essays and reviews to other important periodicals, she translated Spinoza, Strauss
and Feuerbach before embarking on her fiction. Similarly, Alexander Bain (1818-
1903) wrote for popular, liberal, generalist magazines such as Blackwood's,
Fraser's and Chamber's, before eventually being appointed to the Chair in Logic
96 Tim Hilton, John Ruskin: The Later Years. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000,
p. 252.
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and English at the University of Aberdeen. And while his most important and
pioneering work was in scientific psychology, his writing extends diversely into the
fields of pedagogy, rhetoric, grammar and logic. Collectively, they all belonged to a
vibrant mid-Victorian culture, which in the words of Eliot's husband, J. W. Cross,
represented "the most fearless and advanced thought of the day."97 For them, and
for this wider culture, intellectual commerce between the arts, humanities and
sciences was, arguably, relatively unrestricted by specialised methodologies and
practices, at least in our sense of them today.
One may think of George Eliot's novels as commentaries on, as well as
interventions in, this predisciplinary nineteenth-century culture. Famously, for
example, Middlemarch styles itself as 'A Study of Provincial Life', as if to pose as a
formal intellectual enquiry, while refusing to accept the terms and methods of any
discipline in particular. For it is unclear exactly what sort of study Middlemarch
aspires to be: the subtitle prepares the reader, perhaps, for an exercise in social
science, but this promise is broken repeatedly by its narrator (a paradigmatic
versatile intellectual) who performs in a number of different guises-
anthropologist, scientist, historian—in much the same way as these living writers.
By turns, the novel assumes the form of a historical narrative ("We belated
historians... have so much to do in unravelling certain human lots"), an
investigation illuminated by the "serene light of science" (whose gaze is likened to a
"careful telescopic watch" or a "microscope directed on a water-drop"), and a
symbolic narrative told by a storyteller ("whatever has been or is to be narrated by
me... may be ennobled by being considered a parable").98 InMiddlemarch, as in the
period generally, discussion moves freely across a spectrum of discourses rather
than narrowly within specialised disciplines.
F. R. Leavis, unlike Eliot herself, it is interesting to note, upheld the idea of
disciplinary impermeability. Critic and philosopher dealt in different realms, he
97 J. W. Cross, George Eliot's Life. London: Blackwood, 1885, p. 256.
98 Eliot, Middlemarch, p. 141; p. 264; p. 59; p. 341.
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argued, and necessitated quite distinct modes of analysis. In fact, he virtually
baulked at the idea of their crossing over: "It would be reasonable to fear—to fear
blunting of edge, blurring of focus and muddled misdirection of attention:
consequences of queering one discipline with the habits of another. "99 This raises a
second justification of method, also anti-Leavisian: that philosophy can be opened
validly "as a kind of writing," as Richard Rorty iconoclastically put it.100 It is more
than just proper for historically founded reasons to discuss these writers as if in
conversation between and across genres, for that very possibility is itself also a
theoretical point of principle. In the wake of deconstruction, it has become
inconceivably naive to suggest, like Leavis, that the philosophical and the literary
confine themselves to independent spheres. One of the most enriching aspects of
the emergence of deconstruction (which, for Derrida, began principally as a
strategy for re-reading philosophical texts, not literature per se) has been its effort
to re-identify a forgotten or repressed literary moment in the text of philosophy. As
Geoffrey Hartman has said: "The separation of philosophy from literary study has
not worked to the benefit of either. Without the pressure of philosophy on literary
texts, or the reciprocal pressure of literary analysis on philosophical writing, each
discipline becomes impoverished. If there is the danger of a confusion of realms, it
is a danger worth experiencing."101
Rather than a licence to ignore all distinctions between texts or genres,
Rorty's argument, for all its bracing overstatement, at least allows for philosophy to
be acknowledged as a richly verbal enterprise. It makes it possible to address the
narrative structures of philosophical writing without meeting disciplinary pressures
internal to philosophy as such. Thus he argues: "there is no way in which one can
isolate philosophy as occupying a distinctive place in culture or concerned with a
99 Leavis, The Common Pursuit, p. 213.
100 Richard Rorty, "Philosophy as a Kind ofWriting: An Essay on Derrida," New Literary History 10,
1978, p. 142.
101 Harold Bloom, Paul de Man, Jacques Derrida, Geoffrey Hartman and J. Hillis Miller,
Deconstruction and Criticism. NewYork: Continuum, 1999, p. ix.
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distinctive subject or proceeding by some distinctive method... Philosophy is best
seen as a kind of writing."102 One could modify Rorty slightly: philosophy might
well be said to have a distinctive place in the culture, after all, just as the institution
of literature and criticism have their distinctive place; but allowing for that specific
placing does not mean seeing it as a foundational discourse with privileged claims
to establishing either 'truth' or method. It does entail opening ourselves critically to
the textual medium where philosophy has always happened—where it has had to
happen, even when gesturing towards its own effacement—and in which its
specificity is always constituted. Whatever else it may be, philosophy indeed
comprises a body of writing. This interpretation would represent fairly accurately
the manner in which this study approaches the 'non-literary' prose of Ruskin,
Lewes, Bain and Spencer. Far from accidental or superstructural, the writtenness of
their work cannot be considered separable from the arguments these empiricists
make, not least because their relativism implies it. The aim, therefore, is to engage
critically with the dramatic textures ofVictorian epistemology, and above all to see
these instances of empiricism as specific literary occasions, embodied in/as
narrative.
Unlike Rorty, the outcome of analysing different kinds of writing here will
not be some absolute pantextualism, or an argument that opens out onto a flat
horizon of pure textuality. Differences and distinctions prevail, most importantly
the recognition that George Eliot is unique among the group in being principally a
literary writer, which is to say, concerned with creating imaginatively coherent but
nonexistent worlds. Despite what Hartman says, the intention certainly is not to
recast or reclaim her as a 'philosopher'—though that label has been attached to her
on several occasions.103 We could risk, at best, the claim that her work becomes art
102 Rorty, "Philosophy as a Kind ofWriting," p. 142.
103 A recent biographer ofGeorge Eliot argues that "Writing novels was, for her, a moral activity, more
akin to producing philosophy than telling stories." Kathryn Hughes, George Eliot: The Last Victorian.
London: Fourth Estate, 1998, p. 289. In her own century, Anthony Trollope, Leslie Stephen and
Henry James commented on the philosophical dimension of Eliot's fiction; see Dorothy Atkins,
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"that finds itself in the condition of philosophy," to borrow a phrase from Stephen
Mulhall.104 But, even so, it cannot be denied that fiction belongs to a different order
of representation than the treatise, the textbook or the essay (different though they
are, too, from each other), and it has specific narrative freedoms, even
irresponsibilities, which are unavailable to those forms of propositional or
persuasive argument. Most importantly, the novel as a genre engenders a
hypothetical imaginative plane central to its open identity and sheer formal
elasticity. Accepting that logical arguments also depend upon narrative structures
should in no way diminish our recognition of this special property of literary
fiction. One might say it is a function of criticism to recognise it.105 For this reason,
examples from Eliot's work are drawn upon throughout, not only as reflections on
philosophical or psychological or critical ideas established by the others, but as
instances of how fiction generates, extends and reconfigures those ideas in its own
terms via resources specific to its medium. However, there is no attempt to
translate Eliot's writing into a decontextualised 'philosophy' or secure position, by
reconstituting it somehow as systematic argumentation of the kind found in the
other writers.
Instead, her relatively mobile presence throughout the following chapters
will constitute, in part, an attempt to mark the different narrative terms in which
fiction has to be recognised, if not its very flexibility and mobility. Eliot's work still
thinks through the problem of knowledge in robust and rigorous ways, with a
similar epistemological self-consciousness to Ruskin, Lewes, Bain and Spencer;
George Eliot and Spinoza. Salzburg: Institut Fur Englische Sprache Und Literatur, Universitat
Salzburg, 1978, pp. 1-3. For a more recent study of the philosophical structure of Eliot's novels see
Kenneth Newton, George Eliot: Romantic Humanist. London: Macmillan, 1981.
104 The phrase, taken from an entirely unrelated discussion on film, connects with a view that "films
can be seen to engage in systematic and sophisticated thinking about their themes and about
themselves." They are not 'philosophy' as such, but do acquire its condition. Mulhall's background as
a philosopher specialising in the work of Stanley Cavell informs his development of this general set of
claims. Stephen Mulhall, On Film. London and New York: Routledge, 2002, pp. 6-7.
1Q5 "If there is a difference between the novel and other kinds of narrative, it is related in crucial ways
to the sense of actuality, or truth, or 'realism', that readers obtain from a story. We believe it, yet we
don't believe it, in a sincere and duplicitious manner." Martin Wallace, Recent Theories ofNarrative.
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986, p. 59.
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and it does so without being merely a passive mirror of the others' supposedly more
philosophical rumination. Consequently, there are no fixed assumptions about
textual priority or hierarchy here. The direction of analysis does not move causally
from their work to hers, for example. But its fictionality is a vital and enlivening
dimension of Eliot's work, differentiating it in one important respect from the
majority of the other texts under consideration. With those provisos and
qualifications in place, we shall turn to the body of nineteenth-centurywriting itself
to examine more closely how empiricism confronted the very instabilities on which
it was predicated. But that examination requires first establishing the sources of
mid-Victorian scepticism in the eighteenth century, which means summoning the
ghost of David Hume.
-42-
Chapter One
'The Ghost ofDavid Hume':
Backgrounds to Mid-Victorian Empiricism
In a collection of essays published in 1890, the Victorian critic W. E. Henley
summarised some contemporary assessments ofGeorge Eliot's novels: "It has been
said of her books... that 'it is doubtful whether they are novels disguised as
treatises, or treatises disguised as novels'... and that 'they seem to have been
dictated to a plain woman of genius by the ghost of David Hume'."1 Regardless of
its place in her fiction, the spectre of Hume undoubtedly haunts mid-Victorian
discussions of self, knowledge and reality. The psychologistic tendency in British
empiricism, which culminated in the mid-nineteenth century in the work of G. H.
Lewes, Alexander Bain and Herbert Spencer has its source in Hume's belief that the
proper starting-point for philosophical, scientific and moral enquiry should be the
analysis of consciousness. As he wrote in the introduction to A Treatise ofHuman
Nature (1739): "all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature...
[and] are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN."2 One could argue
that its attention to sensations, impressions and ideas—that is, to the basic
elements of mental experience—has always given empiricism a fundamentally
psychological character, but Hume more than any previous British thinker gave
empirical philosophy what F. H. Bradley would describe scathingly in the 1880s as
1W. E. Henley, Views and Reviews: Essays in Appreciation. London: David Nutt, 1890, p. 132.
2 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. (1739) eds. D. F. Norton and M. J. Norton. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 4.
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its "psychological attitude."5 In admittedly different ways, Lewes, Bain and Spencer
shared Hume's belief that "the science of man is the only solid foundation for the
other sciences," and their own systems of knowledge reflect this organising
principle.4
Hume's place in the prehistory of mid-century mental philosophy is by no
means straightforward, however. Spencer's 'transfigured realism', for example, was
as much a refutation of scepticism as it was an attack on transcendentalism, as will
be discussed later on.5 More significantly, three of the philosophical traditions
which comprised psychological discourse in the second half of the nineteenth
century were derived mostly from Hume or from others' readings of Hume:
associationism, common sense faculty psychology and German idealism. While
essentially forward-looking, Bain and Spencer (less so Lewes) belonged to a
tradition of associationist psychology which extended back to Hume, whose theory
of association, by accounting for all levels of mental organisation, was the most
thoroughgoing of its kind before David Hartley's Observations on Man (1749).6 At
the same time, the common sense tradition of the Scottish Enlightenment, which
had begun in the 1760s with Thomas Reid's response to Hume, continued to be
influential during the nineteenth century as way of defending innate psychological
faculties. Thirdly, Hume's huge impression on Kant led, indirectly, to the critical
philosophy which became so crucial for the development of German idealism and,
via F. H. Bradley and T. H. Green, the revival of idealism in Britain in the last
quarter of the century. The complex intersection of these three traditions, rather
than any simple scientific realism, forms the philosophical background to the
culture that produced Ruskin, George Eliot and these other writers. Associationism
3 Bradley quoted in L. S. Hearnshaw, A Short History of British Psychology 1840-1940. London:
Methuen, 1964, pp. 129-30.
4 Hume, Treatise, p. 4.
5 For a discussion of this see also Rick Rylance, Victorian Psychology and British Culture 1850-1880.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 241-5.
6 Locke had discussed the association of ideas in his Essay Concerning the Human Understanding
(1690), but had not given it the central place in his thcoiy of mind that Hume was to in his own
Treatise.
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is Hume's strongest legacy, but faculty psychology and idealism were influential,
too, if for the very reason that these mid-Victorian empiricists tended to define
their own epistemological arguments in tension with them. It will be convenient to
discuss all three in reverse order.
The Idealist Revival
The ascendancy of an anti-Humean idealism in Victorian Britain, propelled by
growing interest in Hume's own German successor, Kant, is usually associated with
the last decades of the nineteenth century. Indeed, T. H. Green's command in 1876,
"Close yourMill and your Spencer, and turn to Kant and Hegel," suggests itself as a
symbolic turning point.? The purpose of Green's philosophy was to reassert a
religious metaphysics which had been undermined in the middle of the century by
discoveries in the natural sciences, most dramatically by theories of evolution that
seemed to deny any substantial distinction between human and animal categories.8
Tellingly, an exemplary idealist critique of the associationist tradition appears in
Green's lengthy introduction to his 1874 edition of Hume's Treatise? In 1886 the
publication of James Ward's article on psychology in the Encyclopaedia Britannica
represented another symbolic shift away from the empiricist and associationist
tradition. Against the Humean understanding of the mind as ontologically
constituted out of its sensations, Ward asserted an active, unified self over and
above the level of its mental representations. Furthermore, he challenged the
traditional model of consciousness as a succession of perceptions, and more
generally opposed the atomistic belief that complex mental concepts, such as
reason and imagination, are capable of being analysed into simpler and simpler
7 T. H. Green quoted in Hearnshaw, A Short History ofBritish Psychology, p. 126.
8 See Andrew Vincent (ed.), The Philosophy ofT. H. Green. Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company
Ltd, 1986, pp. 1-20.
9 Other classic statements of late-Victorian anti-associationism include Green's Prolegomena to
Ethics (1883), Bradley's Principles ofLogic (1883) and Bernard Bosanquet's Psychology of the Moral
Selfi1897).
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elements.10 Where Lewes, Bain, Spencer and other empiricists had shown human
consciousness to be subject to a variety of determinations, evolutionary, biological,
associative, social, and so on, the idealism of Ward and others offered a means of
conceptualising a unified moral subject transcending these kinds of environmental
determination.
Ward's influence at the end of the century on particularly Bradley, William
James and G. F. Stout, and on a generation in the next century, suggests the revival
of idealism in Britain and its interest in Kant and Hegel came at the tail end of the
Victorian period. But Kantian-influenced views, in conflict with the 'experience
school', were present in the wider culture well before the 1880s, and their overlap
explains why empiricists like Lewes talked of the "deep-seated unrest" of
intellectual debate.11 As Maurice Mandelbaum has argued, the idealist movement
took hold when British culture was supposedly at its most 'scientific' and anti-
metaphysical:
When one recalls that it was in 1850 that Mill could regard Coleridge as one
of the two recent thinkers (the other being Bentham) whose thought had left
the greatest impress on the age, and that it was in 1865 that Stirling
published his Secret ofHegel and in 1866 that Edward Caird took up his post
in Glasgow, one can recognize that in spite of the dominance of the
Utilitarians and the furors of Darwinism, idealism took root within British
philosophy in the middle years of the nineteenth century. To be sure, the
development of this idealism was slightly different from that which was
characteristic of Germany and France... [But] the aim and upshot of the
idealist movement was in all three cases the same.12
10 Ward asked "whether 'association' should be regarded as the bedrock of all mental complexity and
unity, or whether it was a minor affair dependent on some larger and deeper conception of unity." G.
S. Brett, A History ofPsychology. (3 vols) London: George Allen and Unwin, 1921, III, p. 229.
11 G. H. Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, 1st Series, The Foundations of a Creed. (2 vols) London:
Trubner and Co., 1874,1, p. 1.
12 Maurice Mandelbaum, History, Man, and Reason: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Thought.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971, pp. 9-10.
-46-
There are good reasons for sharing this view. In addition to Coleridge and
Carlyle, William Hamilton had introduced a basic grasp of Kant to British
philosophy as early as 1836 and was "the first to incorporate Kantian teachings into
the corpus of his own thought."^ Less important figures whose work demonstrated
a Kantian influence included James Martineau and the liberal Anglicans F. D.
Maurice and Julius Hare, all of whom shared a broadly theological purpose.1''
Lewes and Eliot were themselves familiar with German philosophy, and Lewes's
revisions of his Biographical History ofPhilosophy during the 1860s and 1870s
gave the sections on Kant and Hegel greater prominence.^ Spencer, who
abandoned reading Kant's Critique of Pure Reason very abruptly in 1844,
nevertheless sought a system of knowledge that could appeal to the time's
increasingly metaphysical outlook.16 He records in his autobiography how the
opening section of his First Principles (1862), which he called "The Unknowable,"
discussed "ultimate questions, metaphysical and theological" in order to repudiate
a "purely materialistic" empiricism: "My expectation was that having duly
recognized this repudiation of materialism, joined with the assertion that any
explanation which may be reached of the order of phenomena as manifested to us
throughout the Universe, must leave the Ultimate mystery unsolved, readers, and
by implication others, would go on to consider the explanation proposed."17 Many
readers failed to react as he had predicted, but Spencer felt that his division of the
'3 Hearnshaw, A Short History of British Psychology, p. 127. As Hearnshaw notes, it has been
suggested that British Kantianism can be dated from Hamilton's inaugural address in 1836.
** Mandelbaum, History, Man, and Reason, p. 219.
*5 In a letter to Sara Hennell in 1870 George Eliot writes: "Mr Lewes has got so interested in various
parts of his revision - reading and re-reading Leibnitz, Hegel, and much of Kant, and being led on to
alterations which he had not contemplated—that the business of this fourth edition is much more
important than we expected." The Letters of George Henry Lewes. (2 vols) ed. William Baker,
Victoria, BC: University of Victoria, 1995, II, pp. 167-8. For the best account of the role of Lewes and
Eliot in the transmission ofGerman philosophy in British culture, see Rosemary Ashton, The German
Idea: Four English Writers and the Reception of German Thought 1800-1860. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1980.
16 "I had in 1844 got hold of a copy of Kant's Critique, then, I believe, recently translated, and had read
its first pages: rejecting the doctrine in which, I went no further." Herbert Spencer, An
Autobiography. (2 vols) London: Williams and Northgate, 1904,1, p. 378.
17 Spencer,Autobiography, II, p. 75.
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universe into the knowable and the unknowable could be taken as expressing an
affinitywith Kant's phenomenal and noumenal realities.
Although it would be improper to say that Ruskin, Eliot, Lewes, Bain or
Spencer were actually Kantians in disguise, their work has occasionally been
interpreted in an idealist light. In Lewes's case, this is partly due to the emphasis he
places on the provisional nature of scientific knowledge, which despite historical
evidence to the contrary has been used to show that his Problems ofLife andMind
belongs to a late Kantian tradition.18 In his study of Lewes, Hock Guan Tjoa tends
towards such a conclusion: that in rejecting science as a literal transcription of
reality, Lewes necessarily embraced some version of idealism. While arguments of
this sort support the view being urged here, which is to say, that German-
influenced idealism had become an established feature of British thought before
George Eliot's death, they equally depart from it in assuming that empiricism could
not question the grounds of its knowledge without becoming in turn transcendental
philosophy. As Tjoa himself concedes, it is important to recognise that "the idealist
and the empiricist poles of thought on these [scientific] matters were agreed that
Newton's much-quoted dictum, hypotheses non fingo, was not to be taken at face
value."19
Thomas Reid and the Scottish Enlightenment
If idealism was an emerging strand in mid-nineteenth-century thought, Scottish
common sense philosophy was a far more established tradition. Whereas Hume
figures rather distantly in the rise of Victorian idealism, at several historical
removes from Green, Ward and Bradley as the philosophical inspiration for Kant,
18 Kenneth Newton suggests that, because Lewes sees science as an "ideal construction" rather than
literally true, he shares the idealist's view of the universe as fundamentally mysterious. Kenneth
Newton, George Eliot: Romantic Humanist. London: Macmillan, 1981, pp. 3-20. Rick Rylance
observes that "the idea that Lewes was at heart a Kantian has persisted," particularly for the critics
Jack Kaminsky, Michael York Mason and Peter Alan Dale. See Rylance, Victorian Psychology and
British Culture, pp. 327-30.
19 Hock Guan Tjoa, George Henry Lewes: A Victorian Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1977, pp. 93-4.
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his relation to the Scottish Enlightenment is much more direct. After Thomas Reid
(1710-96) these two traditions become increasingly hard to separate, a fact
illustrated by the phrase 'the epoch of Kant and Reid' which the Edinburgh
philosopher A. C. Fraser was able to coin in 1848.20 Even so, the common sense
philosophy which emerged from the Scottish Enlightenment constituted a coherent
body of thought and was an important influence on mid-Victorian opinion. It took
the form of a direct line of succession from Reid, who followed Adam Smith as
professor at Glasgow, to his pupil Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), who took Reid's
thought to Edinburgh where he taught moral philosophy, to Thomas Brown (1778-
1820), who replaced Stewart at Edinburgh, to finally William Hamilton (1788-
1856), who edited Reid's works in 1852 and was chiefly responsible for the impact
of the Scottish tradition on mid-nineteenth-century philosophy of mind. By no
means always in accord on psychological matters, this group developed along
different lines (Brown, for instance, proposed a theory of mental association called
suggestion that was in many ways quite unReidian), while sharing a faculty
psychology committed to the sovereignty of higher mental functions and
compatible with the premises of revealed religion.21
What distinguishes the Scottish line of development, including Hume
himself, is its purely philosophical approach to the human mind and its exclusion
of physiology from psychological enquiry. Although in the Treatise Hume argues
that no essential difference separates animal and human minds—that it is "from the
resemblance of the external actions of animals to those we ourselves perform, that
we judge their internal [actions] likewise to resemble ours"—he does not develop
this insight (which would of course later become central in evolutionary theory and
20 A. C. Fraser, "Sir William Hamilton and Dr. Reid," North British Review, 10,1848, p. 157.
21 See, for example, George Davie, The Scotch Metaphysics: A Century ofEnlightenment in Scotland.
London: Routledge, 2001; S. A. Grave, The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, i960; G. S. Brett, A History of Psychology, II; Terence Martin, The Instructed
Vision: Scottish Common Sense Philosophy and the Origins of American Fiction. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1961.
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psycho-physiological associationism) into a radical reduction of mind to matter.22
Human moral behaviour remains a special category for Hume throughout the
Treatise. Even so, for Reid such a monistic account of mind was implicit in Hume's
theory, and in return his own defence of innate faculties upheld the unique spiritual
attributes of human consciousness. As for many of the idealists a century later,
there was a deep-seated religious motivation behind this objection to Hume. Reid,
a pious Christian to his death, had been a minister in the Church of Scotland for
twenty years before writing An Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764) and feared
that Hume's associationism would lead to a godless materialism. Had he lived to
read empiricists like Bain or Lewes in the next century, Reid would doubtless have
judged his prediction well founded. His argument for the ontological priority of
consciousness, set apart from the dull world ofmatter and instead identified with
the divine mind in a static cosmological hierarchy, makes Reid's position seem far
less adventurous than Hume's ingenious scepticism, perhaps even backward
looking. Indeed, as the historian of psychology G. S. Brett remarks, Reid "often
speaks as if the shadow of the mediaeval theology was still upon him."23 Stewart
and Brown, Reid's successors, stayed faithful to his belief in the substantial
autonomy of mind, even where their own theories drew on the laws of association,
and the relationship between mental states and underlying physical events (such as
vibrations in the nerves, spinal cord and brain, which Hartley had discussed) is not
expounded at all in their work. It is an absence which amounts to a denial of any
meaningful psychophysical interaction.24 Hamilton's leanings towards Coleridge
and Kant gave this spiritual defence of consciousness a romantic or idealist
22 Even so, Hume claims: "The common defect of those systems, which philosophers have employ'd to
account for the actions of the mind, is, that they suppose such a subtility and refinement of thought,
as not only exceeds the capacity of mere animals, but even of children and the common people in our
own species; who are notwithstanding susceptible of the same emotions and affections as persons of
the most accomplished genius and understanding." See Hume, Treatise, pp. 118-20.
23 Brett,A History ofPsychology, III, p. 15.
24 Howard Warren, in his classic study of associationism, questions whether Brown's rejection of
psychophysical interaction still entitles him to be called an associationist. See Howard C. Warren, A
History of the Association Psychology from Hartley to Lewes. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University, 1921, pp. 27-8.
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inflection, but the anti-materialist thrust of these late philosophers of the Scottish
Enlightenment remained essentially the same into the nineteenth-century.
Insofar as Reid's main philosophical purpose was to provide an answer to
Hume, Hume's influence on the common-sense tradition was a negative one, just
as it was on the idealists. Looking at their respective statements of indebtedness to
Hume, there is a striking similarity between Kant and Reid's impressions of the
Treatise; a comparable sense of personal awakening and philosophical dissent,
creative inspiration and principled opposition.^ Despite referring to him as the
single most important influence on his work, Reid disagreed profoundly with
Hume's sceptical conclusions and valued them only as a point of departure for his
own philosophical vision:
Ever since the treatise of human Nature [sic] was published I respected Mr
Hume as the greatest Metaphysician of the Age, and have learned more from
his writings in matters of that kind than from all the papers put together. I
read that treatise over and over with great care, made an abstract of it and
wrote my observations upon it. I perceived that his System is all founded
upon one principle, from which his conclusions, however extraordinary, are
deduced with irresistible Evidence. The principle I mean is, That all the
objects of human thought are either Impressions or Ideas: which I was very
much disposed to believe untill I read that Treatise; but finding that if this is
true I must be an absolute Sceptic, I thought that it deserved a carefull [sic]
Examination.26
2s "I openly confess that my remembering David Hume was the very thing which many years ago first
interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a
quite new direction. I was far from following him in the conclusions to which he arrived by
considering, not the whole of his problem, but a part, which by itself can give us no information. Ifwe
start from a well-founded, hut undeveloped, thought which another has bequeathed to us, we may
well hope by continued reflection to advance further than the acute man to whom we owe the first
spark of light." Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. Paul Carus ed.
James W. Ellington. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1977, p. 5.
26 Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the HumanMind on the Principles ofCommon Sense. (1785 4th edn.)
ed. Derek R. Brookes, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000, p. 257. Earlier in the Inquiry
Reid praises Hume as the "ingenious author" of the Treatise, but then invokes the sceptical account of
personal identity to undermine Hume's authorial claim to the text itself: "but now we learn, that it is
onl}' a set of ideas which came togothcr, and arranged themselves by certain associations and
abstractions." It is a clever, if philosophically unjustified, move, which anticipates many common-
sense defences of the category of the author in twentieth-century critical discourse. See Inquiry, p. 4,
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This is not the only similarity shared by these two currents of thought. As noted
above, Scottish faculty psychology, from Reid to Hamilton, opposed physiological
explanations of mental states in much the same way that the British idealists did
later in the nineteenth century, and its development effectively ended with
Hamilton's attempt to fuse the Scottish and German traditions.27 However, within a
rigid framework of common sense principles based on a strongly intuitionist
position, Reid's mental philosophy developed along empirical lines and even
incorporated an experimental dimension.28
Reid's response to Hume was rooted in his objection to the theory of ideas.
The mediating activity of mental ideas, he argued, introduced a hiatus between our
picture of the world and the world itself. Effectively this stripped material objects of
their real concrete existence, and "by a kind of metaphysical sublimation, converted
all qualities of matter into sensations." Pre-Cartesian philosophy (the Peripatetic
"old system") may have been "commonly vague, analogical, and dark" in its
reasoning, but at least its common sense first principles "had no tendency to
scepticism," since no "Peripatetic [philosopher] thought it incumbent upon him to
prove the existence of the material world."2? Thus the defect found in Hume is a
symptom of a much larger problem that Reid diagnoses in all modern philosophy
since Descartes, including Locke and Berkeley, which is to say, the structural
understanding of consciousness as a series of simple ideas. Hume's position is not
merely an unfortunate offshoot of this tendency, Reid thinks, but its inevitable
consequence. Scepticism is the "natural issue" of the Cartesian system. (Reid here
is fond of metaphors of legitimacy; the Treatise is the "monster" born in 1739,
27 The death of Hamilton in 1856, followed by J. S. Mill's criticism of Hamilton's appropriation of
Kantianism in his Examination ofSir William Hamilton's Philosophy (1865), ended the continuity of
the Scottish common sense school. However, it enjoyed a strong influence outside Britain, especially
in America, where James McCosh (a former pupil of Hamilton's) "was largely responsible for the
enormous impact of Scottish philosophy on the American academic establishment at the end of the
nineteenth century" and whose own pupil, J. Mark Baldwin, went on to establish Princeton's
psychological laboratory and found the Psychological Bulletin. See L. S. Hearnshaw, The Shaping of
Modern Psychology. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987, pp. 93-5.
28 Hearnshaw, The Shaping ofModern Psychology, p. 94.
2? Reid, Inquiry, pp. 210-11.
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whose Cartesian parent "may be said to have carried it in its womb from the
beginning".) Without knowing it, modern proponents of the "ideal system," as Reid
calls it, "take the road that leads to scepticism" because the theory has "some
original defect; that this scepticism is inlaid in it, and reared along with it. "3° But
Hume's recognition and pursuit of this sceptical destination mark him out as a
special target in Reid's attack. Even Berkeley, who Reid thinks recognises the
scepticism inherent in the ideal system, denies matter only to insist on a universal
spiritual substance, thereby avoiding "the dreadful abyss" open before him. Hume,
in contrast, reduces mind and body to substanceless ideas alone, so that "I see
myself, and the whole frame of nature, shrink into fleeting ideas, which, like
Epicurus's atoms, dance about in emptiness."31
The troubling implications of this reductionism for any unified
understanding of the mind are Reid's main concern in the Inquiry. By taking ideas
as the basic units of mental experience, he says, an implicit analogy is advanced
between the world of mental events and that of matter: ideas function as atomic
building blocks of consciousness, as if inner reality were structurally isomorphic
with corporeal reality. Hence, the followers of Descartes
acknowledge that nature hath given us various simple ideas: These are
analogous to the matter of Des Cartes's physical system. They acknowledge
likewise a natural power by which ideas are compounded, disjoined,
associated, compared: This is analogous to the original quantity ofmotion in
Des Cartes's physical system. From these principles they attempt to explain
the phaenomena of the human understanding, just as in the physical system
the phaenomena of nature were to be explained bymatter and motion.32
The mind-matter analogy assumes, wrongly, that the laws of physical nature can be
applied to psychological processes, whereas in truth these two regimes are
3° Reid, Inquiry, p. 212; p. 210; p. 23.
31 Reid, Inquiry, p. 213; p. 22.
32 Reid, Inquiry, p. 212.
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categorically unalike: "There is a deep and dark gulf between them, which our
understanding cannot pass; and the manner of their correspondence and
intercourse is absolutely unknown." Reid concedes that at a primary level in
perceptive acts there is a point of contact between these otherwise alienated
realms; for example, light falling on the retina causes some kind of physiological
impression in the organs of sight, which in turn becomes a visual perception
belonging to the mind. Where this differs from the causal account of perception
proposed by the ideal system is Reid's strong insistence that the nature of these
original physical sensations, and the means by which they excite impressions in the
mind, cannot be discovered. All that introspection can reveal is the experience of
having these sensory states:
But how are the sensations of the mind produced by impressions upon the
body? Of this we are absolutely ignorant, having no means of knowing how
the body acts upon the mind, or the mind upon the body. When we consider
the nature and attributes ofboth, they seem to be so different, and so unalike,
that we can find no handle by which the one may lay hold of the other.ss
Reid's haziness on this point may be down to more than just inadequate
elucidation. It may indicate a full-blown weakness in his critique of Hume's theory
of ideas, for despite the "absolute ignorance" that blinds us to their interactions,
mind and matter retain in all but name a causal relationship in the cognitive
structure Reid describes. His criticisms seem to presuppose the same ideational
model of consciousness that his common sense seeks to discredit, and it is a
recurring tendency throughout the Inquiry. On the other hand, it sustains his
argument that the mind has a mysterious or even spiritual nature, loftily above the
mechanical determinations theorised by Hume. In a later work, Essays on the
Active Powers of the HumanMind (1788), this is framed starkly as a question, with
33 Reid, Inquiry, pp. 175-6.
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an equally stark reply: "What is mind? It is that which thinks. I ask not what it
does, or what its operations are, but what it is. To this I can find no answer..."34
There are, then, two objections to Hume's psychology that stand out here.
The first is that the indirect or representational conception of the mind encourages
a sceptical view of external objects, whereby real things are transformed into
transitory ideas and "my impressions and ideas are the only existences of which I
can have any knowledge or conception."35 In Essays on the Intellectual Powers of
Man (1785) Reid puts it most unequivocally: "I believe ideas, taken in this sense, to
be a mere fiction of philosophers."36 Second, even if ideas can be said truly to exist,
they provide an inadequate description of mental events. The Humean view, which
imagines the mind to be a reservoir of these simple psychic units, any ofwhich may
be recalled from storage by the principles of association, entails a mechanistic and
therefore essentially passive understanding of mind which fails to account for its
innately active properties. Its operations are self-activating powers or native
faculties, not particular instances of trains of ideas. As Reid says in the Intellectual
Powers: "But the mind is, from its very nature, a living and active being. Everything
we know of it implies life and active energy; and the reason why all its modes of
thinking are called operations, is, that in all, or in most of them, it is not merely
passive, as body is, but is really and properly active."37 This familiar objection to
empiricist accounts of ideation returns again and again during the nineteenth-
century, sometimes in slightly modified forms, to plague associationist psychology
until its more dynamic reformulations by Bain and Spencer in the 1860s.
Coleridge's famous criticism of Hartley in his Biographia Literaria, for example,
runs along similar lines, emphasising how in Hartley's system the will and its
attendant faculties are "parts and products of this blind mechanism, instead of
34 Thomas Reid, Thomas Reid's Inquiry and Essays, eds. Ronald E. Beanblossom and Keith Lehrer.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983, p. 301.
35 Reid, Inquiry, p. 4.
36 Reid, Inquiry and Essays, p. 143.
37 Reid, Inquiry and Essays, p. 133.
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being distinct powers, whose function it is to controul, determine, and modify the
phantasmal chaos of association."38 Reid's difficulty with Hume is reiterated later,
too, by William Hamilton in the mid-Victorian instalment of this long struggle
between faculty psychology and associationism.
Before turning to Stewart, Brown and Hamilton, it is worth noting briefly
the peculiarities of Reid's version of this standard criticism. One important
characteristic is its basis in his theory of language. For Reid, the structure of
language and the grammatical rules that govern its meaning provide the simplest,
yet most comprehensive, proof of common sense psychology. First, this is because
language imposes distinctions between the mind, the actions of its faculties, and
the world of objects outside it, which justify the naturalness of the common sense
position. The sentence 'I see the moon', for example, carves up the reality being
described into a self (where the action originates), a specific mental function
(belonging to the mind, but not identical with it) and a discrete material body
(experienced by the mind directly). Language shows that all perceptual, emotional
and intellectual states direct themselves towards an intentional object: seeing
implies something being seen; anger implies something at which to be angry. But
Hume's system erases these natural distinctions: "When he speaks of the ideas of
memory, the ideas of imagination, the ideas of sense, it is often impossible, by the
tenor of his discourse, to know whether, by those ideas, he means the operations of
the mind, or the objects about which they are employed. And, indeed, according to
his system, there is no distinction between the one and the other."39 Horrified
though he is, Reid grasps here an important aspect of Hume: his anti-essentialism.
Second, language always depicts mental functions as essentially vital, exactly as
common sense suggests: "In all ages, and in all languages, ancient and modern, its
operations are expressed by active verbs." Reid's view that every mental operation
38 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria. (1817) ed. George Watson, London: Everyman,
1985, P- 73-
39 Reid, Inquiry and Essays, p. 140.
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presupposes some animating power behind it finds support from the "words of
active signification" which are used in everyday language to describe the mind's
activities.40 Thus the organisation of language contradicts Hume's passive theory of
mind and seems to verify Reid's faculty psychology. (Needless to say, this entails an
evident circularity: the mind has innately active powers because language attests to
them, but language is organised the way it is because in reality the mind has
innately active powers, thus begging the question. On this point, and indeed on
most others, Reid does not get to the heart of Hume's scepticism to properly
challenge it, unlike Kant, whose legacy is consequently far stronger than Reid's
own.)
The general tone of Reid's criticism, too, is noteworthy. Occasionally its
theological principles generate an atmosphere of undisguised moral judgement.
The passive mental structure advanced by Hume, he says, reduces the "whole
mechanism of sense, imagination, memory, belief, and of all the actions and
passions of the mind" to three laws of association, so as to deny the humanness of
"the man that Nature made." He likens this to a sinful perversion of the divine
order:
If this is the philosophy of human nature, my soul enter thou not into her
secrets. It is surely the forbidden tree of knowledge; no sooner I taste it, than
I perceive myself naked, and stript of all things, yea even of my very self... If
Philosophy contradicts herself, befools her votaries, and deprives them of
every object worthy to be pursued or enjoyed, let her be sent back to the
infernal regions from which she must have had her original.41
In these biblical scenes, Hume plays Satan to Reid's commonsense God. Scepticism
perverts, corrupts and blasphemes; faculty psychology upholds dignity, order and
truth. Much of the force of Reid's whole argument comes from his claim—which is
rhetorically enriched here to an excessive degree—that mental faculties are
40 Reid, Inquiry and Essays, p. 133.
41 Reid, Inquiry, pp. 22-24.
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naturally part of the make-up of the mind. "I apprehend that the word faculty is
most properly applied to those powers which are original and natural, and which
make a part of the constitution of the mind."42 To argue against this innatism
would therefore be not merely counterintuitive but unnatural, with both moral and
religious repercussions. In this sense, the common sense philosophy is appealingly
normative, a set of natural beliefs apparently beyond negation. This is just how
Reid formulates his position in the Intellectual Powers: as a list of principles
immune to doubt, including the certainty of a thinking entity called the self, the
existence of other selves and the reality of external objects. Important to note as
well is the following statement on the mental faculties, which can stand usefully
here as a summary of Reid's psychological naturalism: "I shall take it for granted,
that I think, that I remember, that I reason, and in general, that I really perform all
those operations ofmind ofwhich I am conscious."43
Though limited in its insight into Hume, Reid's thought was the single
greatest influence on the development of Scottish philosophy in the first half of the
nineteenth century. Historians of ideas have disagreed over Reid's importance,
however. G. S. Brett praises his work for rejecting associationism, though concludes
that "for psychology it did but little, since it took from the first an unfortunate
direction"; David J. Murray, on the other hand, claims that "Reid held a vital
position in the development of British academic psychology"; and, more
emphatically, L. S. Hearnshaw credits him for offering "the most comprehensive
treatment of the subject prior to the nineteenth century" and endorses the practical
value of his common sense principles: "Such beliefs, though they may stick in the
gullets of philosophers, are perhaps not a bad set of working principles for a
psychologist."44 Despite their differences, a common theme connects these various
42 Reid, Inquiry and Essays, p. 134.
43 Reid, Inquiry and Essays, p. 152.
44 Brett, A History ofPsychology, III, pp. 13-16; David J. Murray, A History ofWestern Psychology.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1983, p. 118; Hearnshaw, The Shaping ofModern Psychology,
PP- 93-5-
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assessments. None of them mentions the impact of Reid, and that of his successors,
Stewart, Brown and Hamilton, on Victorian philosophical thought. Indeed, the
influence of these thinkers on the nineteenth century has in general been
underestimated, yet they represent a line of thought which retained a strong hold
on mainstream intellectual opinion during the period 1840-80. Considering the
extent of his influence and the depth of his learning, Hamilton's neglect, in
particular, seems most undeserved. His crucial role in the articulation of Reidian
faculty psychology in Victorian culture, which he brought up to date with mid-
century psychological trends such as phrenology, will be considered after sketching
briefly the places of Stewart and Brown in this distinctive succession.
Thomas Brown, and to a lesser extent Dugald Stewart, disagreed with Reid
on a number of important issues, but their serious treatment and further
development of his work make them his direct intellectual heirs. Stewart, whose
three-volume Elements of the Principles of the Philosophy of the HumanMind was
published between 1792 and 1827, covered the same psychological terrain as his
predecessor, and like Reid (and the rest of the so-called Scottish School) his
lectures were attended and read by a general audience, not just a narrowly
academic one. Where he departed most obviously from Reid was the greater
emphasis he placed on the association of ideas; for Stewart, two or more habitually
linked ideas can be said to share an associative bond, and some of the intellectual
faculties, such as fancy and invention, work entirely according to patterns of
association. But his divergence from Reid should not be overstated. Importantly,
Stewart does not expound specific laws of association as such, which distinguishes
him from other exponents of the associationist tradition. This vagueness casts
doubt over the centrality of associationism to his account of the mind, as for Hume
it had been a priority to establish clear regulative principles. Secondly, examples of
associated ideas, he insists, presuppose some prior capacity to produce those
associations, which is to say, he thinks of association itself as really a type of native
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faculty. And finally, like Reid, his psychology is structured around various faculties
that exist outside or before the contingent process of mental association, such as
memory and reason.45 in these ways Stewart continued to propound the Reidian
philosophy, taking a dim view of the earlier empiricists and their rejection of pre¬
existing or instinctual levels of mental organisation.
Brown, Stewart's pupil at Edinburgh, studied law and medicine before
replacing him as professor in 1810, yet his psychology did not take the thought of
his predecessors in a physiological direction. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of
the Human Mind (1820) he retained their model of consciousness as a current of
thoughts modified by reason, memory, imagination, and so on, while giving a far
more a detailed account of the principles of association. Here he specified nine
secondary laws in addition to the main law of proximity ('contiguity' in Hume's
terminology), by which Brown meant to show how varying conditions affect the
development of associative trains, such as the recentness, duration and intensity of
the mind's original ideas. He differed further from Reid in his understanding of
how the mind's functions are divided up; where Reid had split the mental powers
into two types, intellectual (or powers of the understanding) and active (including
the emotions and passions), Brown considered mental events to fall into two
different categories, which he called internal and external. External states, he said,
can be caused only by objects situated outside the mind, whereas internal states—
either intellectual or emotional—can causally modify one another without any
external stimulus. In effect, this new structural arrangement made emotional states
subordinate to their intellectual counterparts, declassifying them as active powers
45 Stewart mentions Hume's laws of association in passing, adding that associative connections are
made between words and sounds (particularly in poetry) as well as between the things to which those
signifiers refer, before concluding that "the view of the subject which I propose to take, does not
require a complete enumeration of our principles of association." On the question of the mind's
volitional control over its trains of association, he says: "Notwithstanding, however, the immediate
dependence of the train of our thoughts on the laws of association, it must not be imagined that the
will possess no influence over it. This influence, indeed, is not exercised directly and immediately...
but it is, nevertheless, very extensive in its effects; and the different degrees in which it is possessed by
different individuals, constitute some of the most striking inequalities among men, in point of
intellectual capacity." Dugald Stewart, Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. ed. G. N.
Wright. London: Thomas Tegg, 1843, pp. 153-7.
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in the sense that Reid had theorised. It is thus unsurprising that estimates vary as
to Brown's proximity to the rest of the Scottish common sense philosophers. "His
writings and teachings form a sort of foreign episode in our philosophical
literature," wrote John Veitch in the 1880s, pointing out the influence of the French
sensationalists Condillac and de Tracey on Brown's philosophy.*6 William
Hamilton, Brown's successor, thought that he had misunderstood Reid ("he has
completely misapprehended Reid's philosophy, even in its fundamental position")
and that he departed from him completely on the question of perception. Hamilton
calls Brown's theory 'hypothetical realism', by which he means an indirect or
representational view of perception contrary to Reid's firm belief in intuitional
knowledge of external objects.*? However, Hamilton's criticisms of Brown were
themselves criticised in turn by J. S. Mill, who argued that Brown's theory of
perception was functionally identical with Hamilton's own: "He assumes no
tertium quid, no object of thought intermediate between the mind and the outward
object... But if Brown's theory is not a theory ofmediate perception, it loses all that
essentially distinguishes it from SirWilliam Hamilton's own doctrine."*8 Thus Mill
returned Brown to the Reid-Hamilton line of Scottish philosophy. Indeed, despite
differences on matters of detail, Brown's system expressed at heart a common
sense view very much in the Reidian tradition, allied to the immediacy of the
perceptual faculties, resistant to the identification of mind with the brain, and
overseen by a Christian deity.
It was mainly through William Hamilton that the thought of Reid, Stewart
and Brown exerted an influence on the period of intellectual history represented by
George Eliot, Ruskin, Lewes, Bain and Spencer. Pedantically, one might object that
*6 John Veitch, Hamilton. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1882, p. 24.
47 Sir William Hamilton, Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University
Reform, Chiefly from the Edinburgh Review; Corrected, Vindicated, Enlarged, in Notes and
Appendices. London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1852, pp. 44-97.
48 John Stuart Mill, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy and of the Principal
Philosophical Questions Discussed in his Writings. (1865) London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and
Dyer, 3rd edn., 1867, pp. 192-3.
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Hamilton, who died three years before Eliot had published her first novel, Adam
Bede, in 1859, belonged to an earlier phase of nineteenth-century thought. But
there are two good reasons why this objection misses the point being argued here,
the first of which is that it is not borne out by historical context. Eliot's first printed
work, a religious poem in the Christian Observer, was published as early as 1840,
and her translations ofGerman philosophy were written whilst Hamilton was at the
height of his intellectual powers.49 Likewise, the first edition of Lewes's A
Biographical History of Philosophy appeared in four volumes in 1846 (a revised
second edition was printed in 1857), followed by Comte's Philosophy of the
Sciences (1853), and by that time Ruskin had written two volumes of Modern
Painters. In 1855, Spencer's Principles of Psychology and Bain's The Senses and
the Intellect both appeared, still four years before the posthumous publication of
Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics (1859). As these examples show, Hamilton's
career overlapped sufficiently with these writers for it to be argued that they
participated in a common intellectual culture. Even if a generational distinction is
made, it must be noted that Hamilton's influence extended into the second half of
the century by means of several devotees, such as T. S. Baynes, a professor at St
Andrews and later editor of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, who formed his direct
intellectual legacy.s° Second, because this study is less concerned with mapping
instances of personal influence, such as Eliot's familiarity with specific texts written
by Hamilton, than it is with the general circulation of ideas within a definable
community, a thinker of Hamilton's stature is crucially relevant here. It is certainly
true that his career was in its twilight when Eliot et al were just beginning to
establish their various places within mid-Victorian culture, but by then Hamilton
had spent twenty years shaping the intellectual landscape they would inherit and
49 The poem, "As O'er the Fields", was published in January 1840; her translation ofStrauss's The Life
ofJesus appeared in 1846, followed by translations of Fcuerbach's The Essence ofChristianity in 1854
(currently the only available English translation) and Spinoza's Ethics in 1856 (unpublished until
1981).
50 See Rylance, Victorian Psychology and British Culture, pp. 28-9, p. 44.
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out of which their own thought would emerged1 His ideas were absorbed into the
fabric of intellectual discussion before, during and after the time that Eliot and her
circle contributed to it themselves. For these reasons, Hamilton and the tradition of
the Scottish Enlightenment deserve to be recognised as a major part of their
intellectual inheritance.
The movement against psycho-physiology entered a new era with Hamilton,
though the humanistic style of its psychology altered very little. The old paradoxes
remained that had been typical of Reid; on the one hand, common sense was seen
to reveal straightforward psychological truths in a world of intersubjective certainty
(as opposed to Hume's private world of doubt), whilst simultaneously it preserved
the tantalising mystery of the human mind by keeping it beyond the reach of
empirical scrutiny. For Hamilton, too, the mind was both commonplace and
spiritually affiliated. Moreover, he argued, its higher faculties are not resolvable
into atomic trains of ideas formed at an anatomical level. The general expansion of
physiological knowledge in the first half of the nineteenth century, particularly in
the primitive science of neurology, represented a growing trend of materialist
psychology that Hamilton's philosophy of mind, like Reid's before him, strongly
resisted. W. B. Carpenter was typical of a new group of thinkers from medical
backgrounds who, dissatisfied with the "prevalent neglect of the mutual relations
of Mind and Body," sought to establish a physiological basis for the study of the
mind:
[T]he Mind and the Brain, notwithstanding these differences in properties
which places them in different philosophical categories, are so intimately
blended in their actions, that more valuable information is to be gained by
seeking for it at the points of contact, than can be obtained by the older
methods of research, in which the Mind has been studied by Metaphysicians
s1 Lewes, Spencer and Bain were all directly familiar with Hamilton's work Bain records attending a
seminar led by Hamilton in Edinburgh in the spring of 1841, during which students read out their
essays on the laws of association. Incidentally, all failed to impress him: "there was not a concrete
example in any one of the papers." Alexander Bain, Autobiography. London: Longmans, Green, and
Co., 1904, p. 107.
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altogether without reference to its material instrument; whilst the Brain has
been dissected by Anatomists and analyzed by Chemists, as if they expected
to map-out the course of Thought, or to weigh or measure the intensity of
Emotion.52
Carpenter may have had Hamilton in mind when he mentioned exponents of the
"older methods of research." In this respect, Hamilton's common sense
metaphysics seemed to oppose progress in the way that had been typical of the
Scottish philosophers ever since Reid, though his interest in Kantianism made him
appear uncharacteristically forward-looking with respect to developments in
philosophy. Hamilton's inflexibility on the mind-body question seemed to be
corroborated by personal experience, however. During a period of illness in 1844
the left side of his body was left temporally paralysed and his health permanently
weakened. Yet, despite enduring physical frailty, his mental strength remained
unimpaired for the rest of his life and even appeared to have improved after the
illness had passed, providing for Hamilton a concrete illustration of the mind's
autonomy over the body.53
But it was not only Carpenter's school which seemed to suggest that
intellectual opinion was moving away from Hamilton's strict metaphysical dualism.
Another psychological trend at this time expressed a shift in the public
imagination: phrenology. The science of phrenology, with its assumptions about
the close relationship between the form of the cranium and the structure of the
psyche, had begun in the 1790s with Franz Joseph Gall's theory of the brain as the
"organ of the mind," and in Britain it reached the height of its massive popularity
between 1820 and 1840.54 Its impact on the vocabulary of psychology probably
52 W. B. Carpenter, The Principles ofMental Physiology. (1875) London: Routledge/Thoemmes Press,
1993, PP- 3-4-
53 For a more detailed account of this episode, see Veitch, Hamilton, pp. 10-12.
54 Gall quoted in Sally Shuttleworth, Charlotte Bronte and Victorian Psychology. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 61.
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extended into the latter part of the nineteenth century, however.ss As late as 1880,
Charles Bray and George Eliot were still speculating about what insights a
phrenological measurement of the head of her new husband, J. W. Cross, might
reveal.56 Most of Eliot's circle, with the notable exception of Bray, came eventually
to discredit the premises and practices of this mid-century phenomenon (Lewes in
particular rejected it outright), but not without having first shown considerable
interest in the 'scientific' form of its psychological analysis. In 1844 Eliot had a cast
made of her head for Bray to examine and she allowed George Combe to conduct
another craniological study in 1851.57 Spencer, who also had his skull scrutinised
around this time, even went so far as designing devices for more accurate
phrenological measurement.58 Moreover, the phrenologists' central idea—that
there is a meaningful correspondence between external appearance and inner
moral character—is prominent throughout Eliot's fiction; one of the main ways her
characters read (and misread) the thoughts, beliefs and desires of other characters
is by interpreting outward physiological signs. The idea is expressed explicitly by
Dorothea Brooke in Middlemarch when she explains to her sister Celia how it is
possible to "see the great soul in a man's face."59 (Crucially, since the particular
man in question here is Casaubon, this advice is shown by Eliot to be less than
reliable; the psychological inferences Dorothea draws regarding her future husband
turn out to be mistaken and lead to their unhappy marriage.)
55 Shuttleworth suggests that the impact of phrenology on ways of thinking about and describing
mental experience during the Victorian period has generally been underestimated. She notices not
only the extent to which its language permeates Charlotte Bronte's fiction, but also how the
phrenological writings of J. C. Spurzheim and George Combe were "transformed into an explicit social
programme." She further points out that Combe's Constitution ofMan (1828) had sold an astonishing
90,000 copies by 1851. See Shuttleworth, Charlotte Bronte and Victorian Psychology, pp. 57-70.
s6 Katherine Hughes, George Eliot: The Last Victorian. London: Fourth Estate, 1998, p. 476.
57 Hughes, George Eliot, p. 87; p. 178.
58 Spencer's examination in 1842 by J. Q. Rumball ("a phrenologist at that time of repute") was not
entirely inaccurate; despite concluding that "such a head as this ought to be in the Church", the
evaluation found his self-esteem to be "very large" and his wit "moderate", concluding that Spencer's
moral character was "Persevering and prudent, reasonably prizing money and benevolent withal." The
ccphalograph he designed in 1846, which then he abandoned as a crude prototype, was intended to
correct the inaccuracies of conventional head reading and give phrenology greater scientific
credibility. It suggests that Spencer, like Eliot herself at the time, accepted in principle the
correspondence between organ size and human psychology which the theory espoused. Spencer,
Autobiography, I, pp. 200-2; pp. 540-3.
59 George Eliot, Middlemarch. (1871-2) ed. RosemaiyAshton. London: Penguin, 1994, p. 20.
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Hamilton's flirtation with phrenology resembled in some respects that of
Eliot and her circle. After taking some interest in the theory in the 1820s, even to
the extent of dissecting human brains to investigate the cerebellum and frontal
sinuses, he too rejected the dubious science.60 This agreement says much about
how various currents of thought at the time overlapped and collided. Lewes, a
pioneer of physiological psychology during the 1860s and 1870s, approached these
questions from a very different perspective than did Hamilton and the Scottish
Enlightenment tradition, so their common hostility towards phrenology may seem
surprising. It illustrates that the voices which made up these mid-Victorian debates
were rarely organised into clear sides or predictable groups. Interestingly, for
example, there were aspects of phrenology which should have appealed to both
Hamilton and Lewes respectively: on the one hand, its model of cerebral
localisation was still a kind of faculty psychology, where different mental functions
and attributes were assigned specific places in the brain; on the other, from Lewes's
point of view, it offered a picture of mental experience which took biological
determination properly into account. But to Hamilton its explanations seemed
materialistic, if not irreligious, and to Lewes its claims were pseudo-scientific,
especially in its popular forms.61 Hamilton likewise scorned the "facile credence
popularly accorded, in this country, to the asserted facts of Craniology."62 In papers
read before the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1825 and 1826 he put the case
publicly, in effect making himself a spokesman for the anti-phrenologist cause and
an arch opponent of Gall's disciple, J. C. Spurzheim. His refusal to attend
dissections performed by Spurzheim in the late 1820s attracted a lot of criticism
from the Scottish press, who interpreted Hamilton's silence as an admission of his
60 David de Giustino, Conquest ofMind: Phrenology and Victorian Social Thought. London: Croom
Helm Ltd, 1975, pp. 41-2; John Veitch, Memoir ofSir William Hamilton. Edinburgh and London:
William Blackwood and Sons, 1869, pp. 113-115.
61 By 1840 practitioners of phrenology in Britain and America were exploiting (often lucratively) its
practical applications, such as marriage counselling, portrait analysis and vocational guidance, none
of which reinforced phrenology's philosophical credentials. See De Giustino, Conquest ofMind, pp.
58-9-
62 Hamilton, Discussions, p. 611.
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opponent's superiority as an anatomist and therefore as a victory for phrenology.63
In his Lectures OnMetaphysics, however, he clarified his position by rehearsing an
argument which Reid had used against Hume: that to "explain the phaenomena of
mind by the phaenomena of organisation" is from the start misconceived:
That the mind, in its lower energies and affectations, is immediately
dependent on the conditions of the nervous system, and that, in general, the
development of the brain in the different species of animals is correspondent
to their intelligence,—these are conclusions established upon an induction
too extensive to admit of doubt. But when we attempt to proceed a step
farther, and to connect the mind or its faculties with particular parts of the
nervous system, we find ourselves at once checked. Observation and
experiment seem to fail; they afford only obscure and varying reports; and if,
in this uncertainty, we hazard a conclusion, this is only a theory established
upon some arbitrary hypothesis, in which fictions stand in place of fact.64
Thus Hamilton's approach remained resolutely philosophical at a time
when the mind was increasingly being discussed in non-philosophical contexts. Its
passage into areas outside the domain of philosophy, and eventually into new fields
like neuroscience and experimental psychology, is a major theme of the period as a
whole. But for Hamilton not only was consciousness very much a philosophical
matter, philosophy itself was primarily psychological. Since the existence of
phenomena can only be known by examining the contents of consciousness, he
argued, philosophical knowledge has its basis in the psyche (this was classically
Humean, of course, and a further indication of how Hume haunted these mid-
Victorian discussions). Hamilton even thought of the branches of philosophy as
different areas of psychology: philosophy of mind could be classified as Empirical
Psychology, epistemology as Rational Psychology, and metaphysics as Inferential
63 De Giustino, Conquest ofMind, p. 42.
64 Sir William Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, eds. H. L. Mansel and John Veitch. (2
vols) Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1859,1, pp. 404-5.
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Psychology.^ According to Hamilton, knowledge of the world is inseparable from
the problem of consciousness, just as it is for the mid-century empiricists, including
George Eliot, whose fiction repeatedly examines how perspective conditions the
availability of knowledge. "Consciousness," Hamilton states in the Lectures, "lies at
the root of all knowledge" and it "constitutes the fundamental form of every act of
knowledge."66 So knowledge cannot exist apart from consciousness, since, in a
certain sense, knowledge is one of its attributes:
Thus, in the present instance, consciousness and knowledge are not
distinguished by different words as different things, but only as the same
thing considered in different aspects... Knowledge is a relation, and every
relation supposes two terms. Thus, in the relation in question, there is, on the
one hand, a subject of knowledge,—that is, the knowing mind,—and on the
other, there is an object of knowledge,—that is, the thing known; and the
knowledge itself is the relation between these two terms.67
Here the influence of Kant is discernable more than anywhere else in
Hamilton's philosophy. As for Kant, the object always presupposes the conscious
subject. Thus knowledge, for Hamilton, is relative: "We know, and can know,
nothing absolutely in itself: all that we know is existence in special forms or modes,
and these, likewise, only in so far as they may be analogous to our faculties." What
he calls the "great axiom" of his philosophy is "that all human knowledge... is only
of the relative or phenomenal."68 In this way, Reid's dogmatic confidence in
common sense has been replaced by a critical, less naturalistic, approach to the
problems of philosophy. However, Hamilton's leanings towards Kant pose a crucial
question: how can his relativist theory of knowledge be reconciled with the 'natural
6s Hamilton, Lectures onMetaphysics, I, pp. 121-125.
66 Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, I, p. 191; p. 264. Unlike his predecessors, especially Reid,
Hamilton makes it clear that consciousness is not a special faculty of the mind but instead a condition
of psychological existence: "[CJonsciousness, consequently, is not one of the special modes into which
our mental activity may be resolved, but the fundamental form, - the generic condition of them all.
Every intelligent act is thus a modified consciousness; and consciousness a comprehensive term for
the complement of our cognitive energies." Hamilton, Discussions, p. 47.
57 Hamilton, Lectures onMetaphysics, I, p. 195.
68 Hamilton, Lectures onMetaphysics, I, p. 153; p. 136.
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realism' of Reid and the Scottish School? According to the former, the object-in-
itself cannot be known, whereas for the latter perception is immediate, direct and
complete. As noted above, Hamilton attacked Brown for his representational view
of consciousness ('hypothetical realism'), precisely because "the hypothetical realist
contends, that he is wholly ignorant of things in themselves" and so holds that "the
mind is blindly determined to represent, and truly to represent, the reality which it
does not know."6? Aware that this sounded strikingly similar to his own
phenomenalist argument, Hamilton thought he could resolve the problem in the
following way: "I have frequently asserted, that in perception we are conscious of
the external object immediately and in itself. This is the doctrine of Natural
Realism. But in saying that a thing is known in itself, I do not mean that this object
is known in its absolute existence, that is, out of relation to us."7°While not entirely
convincing, this explanation does illuminate a struggle at the centre of his
philosophy between two forces, one represented by the legacy of Reid and the other
by the attractions of a newer relativity.
There are two reasons why this struggle should be seen essentially as
Hamilton's attempt to rework Reid, however. First, Hamilton's purpose was to
guard against scepticism (which had always been a motivating force in Scottish
philosophy) as well as against the nihilistic tendencies of idealism. As for Reid, this
entailed returning to the basic testimony of consciousness—or intuitional belief—as
the legitimate starting-point for philosophy. It is in consciousness (or "the original
spontaneity of intelligence") that Hamilton says the "primordial facts of our
intelligent nature" can be found. In other words, common sense ("the truth of
consciousness") is the "condition of the possibility of all knowledge" and any
alternative doctrine "stands decidedly opposed to the voice of consciousness and
6? Hamilton, Discussions, p. 55; p. 65.
70 Hamilton quoted in S. V. Rasmussen. The Philosophy of William Hamilton. London: Hachette Ltd
Publishers, 1925, p. 72.
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the natural conviction of mankind."71 Even his phenomenalism has a distinctly
Reidian side, since the human mind (as a thing-in-itself) is logically inscrutable and
mysterious: "the terms mind, conscious-subject, self, and ego... are all only
expressions for the unknown basis of the mental phaenomena."72 Second,
Hamilton's reading of Kant is largely blind to the idealist implications of the critical
philosophy and, remarkably, tries to recruit Kant as a fellow Reidian. According to
Hamilton, Kant "apparently derides the common sense of mankind" without
acknowledging that his entire philosophy comes to rest "on that very principle of an
ultimate belief." Therefore, he concludes, "His Practical Reason, as far as it
extends, is, in truth, only another (and not even a better) term for Common
Sense."73
Whatever its shortcomings, Hamilton's rehabilitation of Reidianism was
undoubtedly influential. Even Herbert Spencer, who disagreed more often than not
with Hamilton's opinions, recognised how influential his thought had been on
philosophical debate in the middle of the century. His doctrine of the relativity of
knowledge, for example, attracted many mid-century sympathisers, including
Spencer himself, who remarked: "To this conclusion every thinker of note has
subscribed."74 In First Principles Spencer even makes it explicit where the theory
originates: "The demonstration of the relative character of our knowledge, as
deduced from the nature of intelligence, has been brought to its most definite shape
by Sir William Hamilton."75 His own theory of the limits of knowledge—that "the
reality existing behind all appearances is, and must ever be, unknown"—reiterates
Hamilton's position in virtually identical language, if without its Kantian
overtones.76 Thus the tradition of Scottish philosophy, as represented by Hamilton,
71 Hamilton, Discussions, p. 61; p. 63; p. 54.
72 Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, I, p. 156.
73 Hamilton, Discussions, p. 91.
74 Herbert Spencer, First Principles. (1862) London: Williams and Norgate, 6th edn., 1904, pp. 50-1.
75 Spencer, First Principles, p. 54.
76 Spencer, First Principles, p. 51.
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continued to play a significant part in the way epistemology was established in
discussion well into the intellectually turbulent nineteenth century.
It is highly probable that Eliot herself recognised the importance of Scottish
thought and the university system in which it flourished. Middlemarch makes a
passing reference to the culture of the Scottish universities through a minor
character, Christy Garth. Christy, who appears only briefly in the novel when on
vacation from his studies in Scotland, receives "cheap learning and cheap fare" at
an unnamed institution (possibly Glasgow University, as his mother remarks on his
dishevelled "Glasgow suit"), where he pursues his work with the utmost scholarly
seriousness.77 Eliot's characterisation of Christy Garth and the academic culture to
which he belongs has no dramatic purpose so far as the plot of Middlemarch is
concerned, and consequently can be read as a subtle commentary on the
intellectual tradition of the Scottish universities. In the early 1830s, when the
events of the novel take place, this tradition was shaped by the common sense
philosophy of Reid and his successors. For anybody in Christy Garth's position, the
death of Dugald Stewart would have been a very recent memory and Hamilton's
inaugural lecture at Edinburgh would have been only a few years away.78 As a
product of this philosophical and educational culture, Christy is used by Eliot as a
kind of shorthand for the qualities and values associated with Scottish thought at
the time. These are qualities that the reader is supposed to infer from a contrast
made in Chapter 57 between Christy and Fred Vincy, a character of similar age and
status whose "tailoring suggested the advantage of an English university." Unlike
Fred, who lives precariously and ultimately fails to settle on any professional
career, Christy is reported to be making "wonderful progress" by "giving lessons,
[and] carrying on hard study at the same time."7? His promising academic future
77 Eliot,Middlemarch, p. 399; p. 572.
78 For the definitive history of the Scottish universities in this period see George Davie, The
Democratic Intellect: Scotland and Her Universities in the Nineteenth Century. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1961.
79 Eliot, Middlemarch, p. 572; p. 573.
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appears already to be taking shape ("He hopes soon to get a private tutorship"),
whereas Fred is destined never to become a clergyman and ends the novel instead
as an "unswervingly steady" farmer.80 The Scottish educational culture is shown to
facilitate serious thought and shared knowledge (Christy the student becomes
Christy the teacher); the English university appears to have little intellectual or
practical value for its pupil and in fact only interrupts his search for lasting
happiness. The thumbnail of Christy Garth may be peripheral toMiddlemarch, but
importantly it expresses an attitude towards Scottish thought, and the institutional
channels through which it was dispersed, that serves as a reminder of its status and
significance more generally in mid-nineteenth-century culture.
Associationism from Hume to the Mills
Of the three movements considered in this chapter—idealism, Scottish faculty
psychology and associationism—none bears the trace ofHume more markedly than
the latter. By the time of George Eliot's mature writing the language of
associationism, as well as its habits of thought, had become a kind of unspoken
orthodoxy in psychological discourse. Even its detractors grew to acquire its
vocabulary and assumptions, as the examples of Stewart, Brown and Hamilton
have shown, and it was not until the modernist period that an alternative model for
understanding consciousness emerged to rival it. William James's 'stream'
metaphor for consciousness, which he popularised in his Principles ofPsychology
(1890), purposely carried the suggestion that subjective life flows in some
unbroken current rather than being made up of serial, discontinuous units.81
80 While Fred Vincy's marriage to Mary Garth eventually ensures them "a steady mutual happiness,"
his fate is tinged with the sense of unfulfilled promise: "But when Mary wrote a little book for her
boys, called Stories of Great Men, taken from Plutarch, and had it printed by Gripp and Co.,
Middlemarch, every one in the town was willing to give the credit of this work to Fred, observing that
he had been to the University, 'where tho ancients were studied', and might have been a clergyman if
he had chosen." Eliot, Middlemarch, p. 832.
81 "No one ever had a single sensation by itself. Consciousness, from our natal day, is of a teeming
multiplicity of objects and relations, and what we call simple sensations are results of discriminative
attention, pushed often to a very high degree." William James, The Principles ofPsychology. (2 vols)
London: Macmillan and Co., 1890,1, p. 226; see pp. 550-604.
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Associationist thinking until this time, while dominant as a psychological language,
had always been troubled by the charge of materialism, so James's metaphor
(which, he emphasised, was only a metaphor) deliberately figured mental
experience as a natural process carried along by an invisible momentum. But even
James's psychology was associational, at least in a casual sense. The narrative
experiments of literary modernists such as Woolf and Joyce, for example, which
often are said to express a Jamesian psychology, depict human minds in thrall to
unnamed laws of association (when Bloom follows the girl out of the butcher's shop
in Ulysses he is drawn to her "moving hams," a thought which arises from the
involuntary association of two images present in his mind, the girl and the meat in
the shop).82 Rather than seeing associationism as ending with the era of Eliot et al,
then, it would be more accurate to say that it underwent a transition into new,
modernist forms at the turn of the century—not least because the phrase 'stream of
consciousness' was coined before William James by G. H. Lewes himself in The
Physiology ofCommon Life (1859).8:5
Eliot's fiction, poised on the brink of the Jamesian revolution, also
investigates how ideas, memories and desires connect in associative patterns to
condition the way the world is perceived. At times in her work mental impressions
are described as having a material solidity: "[Bulstrode] felt the scenes of his earlier
life coming between him and everything else, as obstinately as when we look
through the window from a lighted room, the objects we turn our backs on are still
before us, instead of the grass and the trees." Like dense objects with physical
properties, these memories "still kept their hold in the consciousness." Yet at other
times Eliot's language seems to anticipate James's stream imagery: "But in
Dorothea's mind there was a current into which all thought and feeling were apt
sooner or later to flow."84 These competing psychological languages suggest the
82 James Joyce, Ulysses. (1922) London: Penguin, 1992, p. 71.
83 See Rylance, Victorian Psychology and British Culture, pp. 10-13.
84 Eliot, Middlemarch, p. 615; p. 202.
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different theories of consciousness that were in circulation at the time and their
different answers to common questions: what kind of language is appropriate to
subjective experience? Is there some objective structure which exists beneath the
purely phenomenological level? Eliot's contemporaries, particularly Alexander Bain
and Herbert Spencer, answered these questions by posing them in new contexts-
such as human physiology and evolutionary theory—but they did so only in order to
reformulate or modernise the classical associationist position. In this sense, the
empiricists of the mid-Victorian period were still consciously working in a Humean
tradition.
Hume was not the first philosopher to discuss the association of ideas. Its
history stretched back as far as Aristotle and Plato, and Hobbes and Locke were
among the many modern writers who mentioned the concept.85 Like many in the
nineteenth century, G. H. Lewes recognised the unity of its historical development:
"Had Aristotle really conceived the law [of association] as a law, he would have
applied it to the explanation of psychological questions, in the way the moderns
have applied it."86 Indeed, throughout this rich prehistory the theory of the
association of ideas held to a basic principle: that mental experience is derived
from simple sensory impressions, which over time form more and more complex
compounds by being associated with one another, and that determinable laws
govern the associating process which prevent it being merely random or chaotic.
Hume, who was the first to make the association of ideas central to epistemology,
proposed an imagistic theory of thought in which ideas (faint copies of original
sense-impressions) were the privileged unit of currency. This necessitated
theorising associational regularities, for without "some universal principles" these
simple ideas would be "entirely loose and unconnected" and "chance alone wou'd
85 There are relatively few dedicated studies of the history of associationism. The classic account is
Howard C. Warren, A History of the Association Psychology from Hartley to Lewes. Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University, 1921. See also Jonathan Loesberg, Fictions of Consciousness: Mill,
Newman, and the Reading ofVictorian Prose. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1986.
86 G. H. Lewes, Aristotle: A Chapter from the History of Science, Including Analyses ofAristotle's
Scientific Writings. London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1864, p. 257.
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join them." Thus, for Hume just as for Aristotle, the laws of association constituted
the mind's way of organising itself and creating cognitive order out of the raw data
it receives being in the world. Before ideas there is no innate psychological
apparatus, only the predisposition to unite ideas by the "gentle force" of
association.8?
For Hume there are three such laws: resemblance, contiguity in time and
place, and cause and effect. Collectively they account for the sequence of thoughts
passing before the mind at any given time. Resemblance works straightforwardly:
"in the constant revolution of our ideas, our imagination runs easily from one idea
to any other that resembles it."88 Since this law is most clearly applicable to cases of
visual resemblance, it indicates how Hume imagines mental experience to consist
of a series of pictorial representations. According to the second law, contiguity, no
such resemblance between ideas is required for them to be fused; rather, it states,
the mind tends to associate ideas that occur in the same spatio-temporal vicinity.
In other words, when contemplating a particular object, the mind may be led by
association to think of another object that occurred next to it or happened at the
same time. Finally, the law of causation says that ideas tend to summon the
thought of their immediate cause or effect ("when we think of the son, we are apt to
carry our attention to the father").89 If experienced habitually, the association of
one idea with another in such a causal sequence will eventually harden into a
belief.90 To this Hume adds, for reasons that will become obvious, that "there is no
relation, which produces a stronger connexion in the fancy, and makes one idea
8? Hume, Treatise, p. 12.
88 Hume, Treatise, p. 13.
89 Hume, Treatise, p. 416.
on The formation of belief, Hume says, is not "determin'd by reason, but by custom or a principle of
association." And causation, as an associating principle, is privileged over the two other types of
relation with regard to belief formation: "But tho' I cannot altogether exclude the relations of
resemblance and contiguity from operating on the fancy in this manner, 'tis observable that, when
single, their influence is very feeble and uncertain. As the relation of cause and effect is requisite to
perswade us of any real existence, so is this perswasion requisite to give force to these other
relations... Contiguity and resemblance have an effect much inferior to causation; but still have some
effect, and augment the conviction of any opinion, and the vivacity of any conception." Hume,
Treatise, p. 67; p. 76; see pp. 74-81.
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more readily recal [sic] another, than the relation of cause and effect betwixt their
objects."?1 The simultaneous operation of these three modes of mental association
(or "natural relations") thus accounts for the transitions in thought which
constitute the chain of conscious experience.
It has already been mentioned that Hume's opponents, such as Reid,
objected to the reductive aspects of this psychology. To argue that the spontaneity,
density and irregularity of mental activity can be explained away by three universal
rules seemed at best a damaging category mistake. But Hume had recognised this
in the Treatise:
These principles [of association] I allow to be neither the infallible nor the
sole causes of an union among ideas. They are not the infallible causes. For
one may fix his attention during some time on any one object without looking
farther. They are not the sole causes. For the thought has evidently a veiy
irregular motion in running along its objects, and may leap from the heavens
to the earth, from one end of creation to the other, without any certain
method or order. But tho' I allow this weakness in these relations, and this
irregularity in the imagination; yet I assert that the only general principles,
which associate ideas, are resemblance, contiguity and causation.92
In fact, even when in the "loosest reverie," the mind's thoughts are structured as a
series or thread which conforms to generalisable laws.93 Imposing such fixed
principles on mental life seemed to Reid and his followers to place limits on that
which is so restlessly variable and ultimately untheorisable. But to Hume it was
central to his wider project in the Treatise: "if any thing can entitle the author to so
glorious a name as that of an inventor, 'tis the use he makes of the principle of the
association of ideas."94 This was because his associationism has more than a
narrowly psychological application. While it does explain the course of
91 Hume, Treatise, p. 13.
92 Hume, Treatise, pp. 64-5.
93 Hume, Treatise, p. 416.
94 Hume, Treatise, p. 416.
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psychological development and the emergence of complex higher abilities, the
theory of association goes much further than describing changes in mental states.
Its confidence in unchanging laws is analogous to, and indeed complements,
Newtonian descriptions of the material world, in the sense that it applies similar
principles and concepts to nonmaterial substance. Hume's account of the "union or
cohesion" of two discrete ideas (regardless of which principle produces the bond)
implies that mental association relies on some sort of gravitational force: "Here is a
kind of ATTRACTION, which in the mental world will be found to have as
extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to show itself in as many and as various
forms."95 As both a psychological and a material concept, 'attraction' expresses a
fundamental continuity between the internal and external realms of experience—an
idea which in the nineteenth century becomes such a prominent theme throughout
intellectual discourse. In the Treatise, of course, Hume's priority is to write a
"science of human nature", but he acknowledges that the principles of association
are "the only links that bind the parts of the universe together, or connect us with
any person or object exterior to ourselves" and therefore may be considered "the
cement of the universe."96
Hume's associationism had other non-psychological consequences. Two in
particular had a profound effect on Victorian thinking: the critique of causation and
the question of free will. The former, which had far-reaching implications for
science, was undoubtedly the more radical. By using the principles of association to
dismantle the rational grounds for knowledge, Hume inaugurated a tradition of
conjectural, hypothetical science which the nineteenth century would inherit (as
will be examined in the chapters below, George Eliot's 'realist' narratives are also
built up by inferential hypotheses and provisional truths, whereby judgments are
continuously revised and open to revision; as one of her narrators puts it, "you
must know how to draw your inferences, and not be a spoon who takes things
95 Hume, Treatise, p. 14.
96 Hume Treatise, pp. 416-7.
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literally.")97 Hume argued that causation is a kind of practical fiction brought about
by the unvarying conjunction of two ideas in the same sequential orders8 Their
repeated appearance over a sufficient period of time leads, by psychological
compulsion, to a belief in their casual interrelatedness or necessary connection:
"'Tis their constant union alone, with which we are acquainted; and 'tis from the
constant union the [causal] necessity arises."^ This impression of causation,
however, is just that: an impression, which is to say, it pertains to the mind rather
than to the objects from which ideas are derived: "The several instances of
resembling conjunctions lead us into the notion of power and necessity. These
instances are in themselves totally distinct from each other, and have no union but
in the mind, which observes them, and collects their ideas. Necessity, then, is the
effect of this observation, and is nothing but an internal impression of the mind, or
a determination to carry our thoughts from one object to another."100 As a habit of
the associating mind, causation can legitimately be applied only to impressions and
ideas, not to the non-ideational world outside consciousness. The external world
may exhibit behavioural regularity, but since it is "impossible for us so much as to
conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and
impressions" there is no way of telling whether or not this is the case. Thus Hume
states, quite radically: "Upon the whole, necessity is something, that exists in the
mind, not in objects; nor is it possible for us ever to form the most distant idea of it,
consider'd as a quality in bodies."101
In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), Hume makes
clear the devastating consequences of this view for scientific discourse, which is
predicated on finding hidden causal patterns behind phenomena: "We say, for
97 Eliot,Middlemarch, p. 239
98 Only the briefest treatment of Hume's notorious concept is possible here. For a properly
philosophical discussion of it see Tom L. Beauchamp and Alexander Rosenberg, Hume and the
Problem of Causation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981; and Galen Strawson, The Secret
Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
99 Hume, Treatise, p. 257.
100 Hume, Treatise, p. ill.
101 Hume, Treatise, p. 67; p. 112.
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instance, that this string is the cause of this particular sound. But what do we mean
by that affirmation? We either mean that this vibration is followed by this sound,
and that all similar vibrations have been followed by similar sounds; or that this
vbibration is followed by this sound, and that upon the appearance of the one the
mind anticipates the senses, and forms immediately an idea of the other. We may
consider the relation of cause and effect in either of these two lights; but beyond
these, we have no idea of it."102 To infer from the succession of these two events
that one produces the other would be to go beyond the facts of experience, since
"the simple view of any two objects or actions, however related, can never give us
any idea of power, or of a connexion betwixt them."103 Moreover, such a
generalisation would utilise inductive reasoning, in so far as it would entail the
expectation that all future occurrences of the first event will be followed,
necessarily, by the second. But there are no logical grounds on which to base such a
prediction. Induction, Hume shows, rests on a groundless inference, which cannot
reasonably be justified: "There is required a medium, which may enable the mind
to draw such an inference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What
that medium is, I must confess, passes my comprehension..."104 It cannot be based
on the resemblance of past, present and future, because only experience gives
knowledge of this resemblance: "It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments
from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these
arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance."10^ Thus Hume
undermines the rational foundations of general scientific laws in two ways: first, by
demonstrating that causation is "not determin'd by reason, but by certain
principles, which associate together the ideas of these objects", and second by
102 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of
Morals. (1777) ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge rev. P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd edn.,
1975, P- 77; see pp. 60-79.
1Q3 Hume, Treatise, p. 112.
104 Hume, Enquiries, p. 34.
10s Hume, Enquiries, p. 38.
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showing that generalisations from particulars require inductive steps which defy
logical justification.106
His own "experimental" method, which is outlined in the introduction to
the Treatise, thus reconceptualises science in non-universalising terms. Science, for
Hume, regardless of its object of knowledge, has to proceed tentatively by means of
careful observation and experiment ("we cannot go beyond experience; and any
hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human
nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical"). Mid-
Victorian writers, living at a time when Hume's challenge was still radically
unanswerable, continued to be acutely conscious of scientific methodology and
knowable limits. Take this statement of Herbert Spencer's, for example: "After
concluding that we cannot know the ultimate nature of that which is manifested to
us, there arise the questions—What is it that we know? In what sense do we know
it? And in what consists our highest knowledge of it?"107 Spencer's caution here,
which has much in common with Hume's own, is typical of other mid-nineteenth-
century empiricists, despite empiricism's reputation for confident, austere,
inflexible system-building. Hume's description of the experimental method is
perhaps even more reminiscent ofGeorge Eliot's novels:
We must therefore glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious
observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common
course of the world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their
pleasures. Where the experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and
compar'd, we may hope to establish on them a science, which will not be
inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility to any other of
human comprehension.108
106 Hume, Treatise, p. 64.
107 Spencer, First Principles, p. 99.
108 Hume, Treatise, pp. 5-6.
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Eliot's narratives, when considered as simulated empirical studies, exemplify
Hume's "cautious observation of human life." This is borne out by a well-known
comment she makes in a review of Ruskin's Modern Painters III, which is close in
both tone and spirit to Hume's remarks: "The truth of infinite value that he
[Ruskin] teaches is realism - the doctrine that all truth and beauty are to be
attained by a humble and faithful study of nature, and not by substituting vague
forms, bred by imagination on the mists of feeling, in place of definite, substantial
reality. "109 This last phrase should be taken not as some naive commitment to
representationalism, not least because Ruskin's argument itself emphatically
dismisses imitation.110 In context, Eliot is referring to the idea of particulars; and
the value of particulars, she insists, does not consist in their conformity to invariant
universals (interestingly, in the opening pages ofModern Painters, Ruskin remarks
in a similar vein that "[m]uch time is wasted by human beings, in general, on
establishment of systems"111). Eliot's view becomes clearer in another essay: "The
tendency created by the splendid conquests of modern generalization, to believe
that all social questions are merged in economical science, and that the relations of
men to their neighbours may be settled by algebraic equations...—none of these
diverging mistakes can co-exist with a real knowledge of the People, with a
thorough study of their habits, their ideas, their motives."112 Such a knowledge is
always in process rather than complete, its conclusions drawn cautiously from the
'experiments' her narrators conduct rather than from the fixed categories of
rationally abstract systems.
The second non-psychological consequence of Hume's associationism—the
question of free will—had social and political ramifications for proponents of the
109 George Eliot, "John Ruskin's Modern Painters, Vol. Ill" (1856) in George Eliot, Selected Critical
Writings, ed. Rosemary Ashton. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 248.
110 Ruskin in Modern Painters III (as in all volumes) rails against art's "deceptive resemblance of
reality." John Ruskin, The Complete Works ofJohn Ruskin. (39 vols) eds. E. T. Cook and Alexander
Wedderburn, London: George Allen, 1903-12, V, p. 36. This argument is dealt with substantially in
chapter 2 below.
111 Ruskin, Complete Works, V, p. 18.
112 George Eliot, "The Natural History of German Life" (1856) in Eliot, Selected Critical Writings, p.
265.
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'experience school' which also featured prominently in mid-Victorian thought.
Associationism's unbroken chain of ideas and impressions, causes and effects,
appeared to leave no room for human agency, and in fact Hume explicitly referred
to the synthesising ego as a fiction.u3 If the self is no more than the sum of its parts,
in the same way that a republic is no more than the union of several states, then all
the volitional aspects of the human species—capacities such as will, choice and
intention—can be explained away by the vagaries of associational trains and, by
extension, the sensory world that produces associable ideas in the first place. This
picture of the mind (and, more broadly, the self or soul) was, then, doubly
deterministic, sacrificing personal agency to both psychological and environmental
imperatives. Common sense philosophy, or any other intuitionist theory of mind,
never had any such difficulty accommodating free will, of course, because the
innatist's psychological structure was stubbornly hierarchical rather than
horizontal or serial. Consequently, the question of volitional power remained a
conspicuous weak-spot for associationism, which its nineteenth-century detractors
exploited and its exponents tried to resolve.
The flip side of this question, however, had important socio-political
implications for associationists after Hume. Where it lost ground to innatists,
associationism gained favour with liberal reformers because it allowed for
modifications in human nature and therefore in social circumstances. Without an
essentialist conception of the self, which would endure regardless of the context in
which it was placed, the theory clung to the possibility of a reformable human
nature in a way that was appealing to progressivist writers and activists for a
century after Hume. As he put it in the Treatise, "the same person may vary his
character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his
"3 "The identity, which we ascribe to the mind ofman, is only a fictitious one, and of a like kind to that
which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies. It cannot, therefore, have a different origin, but
must proceed from a like a operation of the imagination upon objects." Hume, Treatise, p. 169.
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identity."11* So, while associationism had to go to some lengths to theorise moral
responsibility, it had the advantage of being oriented towards the natural, social
and political realities that Victorian liberalism sought to transform. Unsurprisingly,
therefore, as Rick Rylance has pointed out, it gained support among the "emergent
community of middle-class, freethinking, urban radicalism" to which George Eliot
and her contemporaries belonged. X1s A comparision of Eliot and Spencer is
revealing here: both came from the industrial Midlands, though eventually settled
in intellectual London, both grew up in strict non-conformist families and became
religious sceptics in their adult lives, and both were fascinated by questions of
environmental and evolutionary determination in their vision of human existence.
Furthermore, they belonged to a group whose roots lay in Benthamite
utilitarianism, which had been one of the movements most amenable to
associationism in the early part of the centuiy. Despite it famous problem of
passivity, then, Hume's psychology was peculiarly suited to progressive politics and
found its way easily into the programmes of many mid-Victorian social
reformers.116 It was, as perhaps we should recall more readily, a subtly
constructivist theory of identity.
After Hume, the theory of association split into at least two separate
traditions. One of these was represented by the post-Reidian Scottish philosophers,
especially Thomas Brown. Their gradual acceptance of its psychological premises
certainly did not signal that suspicions of materialism had been eased, but
undoubtedly it marked a turning point more generally in the way the mind was
discussed at the turn of the nineteenth century. At the same time as infiltrating
psychological discourse in this general way, associationism also developed as a
114 Hume, Treatise, p. 170.
115 Rylance, Victorian Psychology and British Culture, p. 63.
116 These ranged from William Godwin's sympathisers to Robert Owen's socialists to Mill's
utilitarianists. Ruskin, while not central to the development of associationist psychology (though, like
many, he absorbed its language), held serious and progressive views on educational reform and
reached a wide Victorian audience. See, for example, Francis O'Gorman, "Ruskin's Science of the
1870s: Science, Education, and the Nation" in Dinah Birch, ed. Ruskin and the Dawn of the Modern.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 35-56.
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specific school through the work of enthusiasts such as David Hartley (1705-57)
and his populariser Joseph Priestley (1733-1804). Hartley's Observations on Man
is a central text in the history of associationism, not only because it extended
Hume's position, but because it theorised explicit links between physiology and
psychology which anticipated (and determined) the direction of later
associationists such as Bain and Lewes. Like Hume, Hartley saw the association of
ideas as a kind of gravitational attraction, which linked simple elements into
complex clusters and thereby accounted for the formation of the psychological
landscape. The analogy with particle physics was not trivial; his whole approach to
philosophy in the Observations is self-consciously Newtonian ("This is the method
of analysis and synthesis recommended and followed by Sir Isaac Newton"), and
his theory emphasises the compatibility between materially-generated impressions
(vibrations) and purely mental ideas (which are associational): "The doctrine of
vibrations may appear at first sight to have no connexion with that of association;
however, if these doctrines be found in fact to contain the laws of the bodily and
mental powers respectively, they must be related to each other, since the body and
mind are. One may expect, that vibrations should infer association as their effect,
and association point to vibrations as it cause. "u7 This was a departure from
Humean orthodoxy, and perhaps one that Hume would not have welcomed, but
Hartley retained many of the assumptions set out in the Treatise.
Mental experience, according to Hartley, is divided into sensations and
ideas, the former leaving "certain vestiges, types, or images of themselves" in the
mind which then give rise to corresponding ideas.118 Simple ideas tend to aggregate
to form complex wholes: "Simple ideas of sensation must run into clusters and
combinations by association, and these will at last coalesce into one complex idea,
by the approach and commixture of the several compounding parts." Intellectual
117 Robert Brown (ed.), Between Ilurne andMill: An Anthology ofBritish Philosophy 1749-1843. New
York: Random House, 1970, p. 6.
118 Brown, Between Hume andMill, pp. 11-12.
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ideas, which come to be formed almost exclusively by the principle of contiguity,
and include "beauty, honour, moral qualities, &c.", are derived, in other words,
from the most basic level of motor-sensory activity. Thus the defining traits of
human psychology are acquired through experience rather than furnished natively:
One may hope, therefore, that, by pursuing and perfecting the doctrine of
association, we may at some time or other be enabled to analyse all that vast
variety of complex ideas, into their simple compounding parts, i.e. into the
simple ideas of sensation, of which they consist... The complex ideas I here
speak of, are generally excited by words, or visible objects, but they are also
connected with other external impressions, and depend upon them, as upon
symbols. In whatever way we consider them, the trains of them which are
presented to the mind seem to depend on the then present state of the body,
the external impressions, and the remaining influence of prior impressions
and associations taken together."9
Priestley, massively impressed by Hartley, took this view further. His 1775
edition of the Observations was prefaced by a sizeable commentary on Hartley's
text in which he celebrated his predecessor's extensive application of associational
principles. To those principles Priestley brought a more scientific bent, and
consequently a more materialistic development of Hartley's theory. While this
attracted predictable hostility, he saw no contradiction between a thoroughgoing
materialism and a religious cosmology, precisely because abandoning free-will can
be seen symbolically to reinforce the authority of an all-seeing God. Such a
marriage between science and religion was still a theoretical possibility in the
eighteenth century; by the nineteenth, however, associationism had to tread with
extreme caution whenever it came to theological controversy, and for this reason
the likes of Priestley may unwittingly have harmed associationism's long-term
credibility. Nonetheless, he was responsible for spreading the doctrine among the
scientific community and popularising its empiricist psychology more generally.
"9 Brown, Between Hume andMill, pp.20-1.
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Others who helped to do this included Abraham Tucker (1705-74), a London laywer
who thought of association as analogous to chemical fusion rather than particle
attraction; Archibald Alison (1757-1839), whose Essays on the Nature and
Principles of Taste (1790) placed associationism in a new aesthetic context; and
Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802), grandfather of Charles, who pursued Hartley's
interest in the motor-sensory aspects of associationism. Howard Warren
summarises their influence neatly: "Tucker spoke to the preacher and the moralist;
Alison to the artist and man of letters; Darwin to the naturalist and physician;
Priestley to the physical scientist."120 Again, this illustrates that associationism was
always much more than just a psychological model, and could be applied across the
span of intellectual disciplines.
The main early-nineteenth-century exponent of associationism, and indeed
a towering figure in its twisting history, was James Mill (1773-1836). His Analysis
of the Phenomena of the HumanMind (1829) bequeathed to the Victorian period a
classic ana enduring statement of associationist theory. Its second edition some
thirty years later, which was edited by his son, J. S. Mill, and Bain, carried many
editorial amendments and additional notes, but this suggests more the adaptability
of Mill's position than it does the redundancy of his ideas. While Hartley influenced
all nineteenth-century associationists, Hume is truly the thinker that the Analysis
recalls; its concern is for mental data, psychological organisation and the functions
of consciousness, not the physiological causes of these phenomena (though, of
course, the second edition was published at a time when such questions had
returned to the foreground, not least because of Bain himself). Thus Mill's Analysis
was a Victorian restatement of the classical Humean theory and yet,
simultaneously, a pathway to the psycho-physiology of the 1860s and 1870s. In this
sense, a tradition of associationism can be traced from Hume to the Hartley-
Priestley school (and, in a parallel line, to Dugald Stewart and Thomas Brown) and
i2°Warren, A History of theAssociation Psychology, p. 25.
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then to James Mill (who consolidated the theory) and finally to the mid-Victorian
writers contemporaneous with George Eliot: J. S. Mill, Bain, Spencer and Lewes. It
is an indirect history, but one in which the presence of Hume can always be
detected.
The continuity between James Mill's work and the later writers is pointed
out by J. S. Mill in his preface to the 1869 edition of the Analysis: "I am far from
thinking that the more recondite specimens of analysis in this work are always
successful, or that the author has not left something to be corrected as well as much
to be completed by his successors. The completion has been especially the work of
two distinguished thinkers in the present generation, Professor Bain and Mr
Herbert Spencer; in the writings of both of whom, the Association Psychology has
reached a still higher development."121 While the younger Mill recognised the
limitations of his father's physiological knowledge, the strengths of the Analysis lie
in its rigorous treatment of association and its transformation of Hume's theory
into a complete psychological vision. According to Mill, the mind is the scene of
continuous sensory activity:
Thought succeeds thought; idea follows idea incessantly. If our senses are
awake, we are continually receiving sensations, of the eye, the ear, the touch,
and so forth; but not the sensations alone. After sensations, ideas are
perpetually excited of sensations formerly received; after those ideas, other
ideas: and during the whole of our lives, a series of those states of
consciousness, called sensations, and ideas, is constantly going on.122
The division of this influx of data into sensations and ideas is thoroughly Humean.
Indeed, as the example of Hartley has shown, this classification became gradually
absorbed into mainstream psychological language after Hume's Treatise. Equally
Humean is Mill's basic principle of association: "Our ideas spring up, or exist, in
121 James Mill, Analysis of the Phenomena of the HumanMind. (1829) (2 vols) ed. J. S. Mill. London:
Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 2nd edn., 1869, pp. xviii-xix..
122 Mill,Analysis, p. 70.
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the order in which the sensations existed, of which they are the copies. "123 Ideas
form trains before the mind in a "successive" order when they reproduce the
original temporal sequence of an outward event ("The falling of the spark, and the
explosion of the gun-powder, have the successive order, or order in time").
Alternatively, ideas may appear "synchronously," which is to say, simultaneously,
just as the originals occurred ("my sight of roast beef, and my taste of roast beef,
have been frequently synchronical").124 Mill finds that he can explain Hume's laws
in terms of these two types of association, thus updating them: "Contiguity of two
sensations in time, means the successive order. Contiguity of two sensations in
place, means the synchronous order... Causation, the second of Mr Hume's
principles, is the same with contiguity in time, or the order of succession."
Resemblance, he argues, is merely the tendency to "see like things together" and so
can be explained by a secondary law of frequency.125
Like Hume, Mill's theory of the mind is therefore mechanistic. Metaphors of
matter serve to explain the realities of consciousness. It rejects innatist principles
and instead views the mind's most complex events as reducible into the simplest
elements, which are derived from experience and form a continuous series that is
determined by voluntary, semi-voluntary and involuntary associational laws. For
all its weaknesses and its moral opponents, these psychological premises became
the standard way that the Victorian imagination conjured for itself a functional
image of invisible mental life. It remained so late into the century, and arguably for
longer than that, mainly because the associationist position (like the mind it
described) was flexible and adaptable; it could accommodate changes in
intellectual culture and effect considerable change in return.
Associationism, that is to say, found itself frequently battling with all
theories of self, mind and knowledge that sprang from essentialist or innatist
123 Mill,Analysis, p. 78.
124 Mill,Analysis, pp. 71-77.
125 Mill,Analysis, pp. 110-11.
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assumptions. Usually these were 'metaphysical' opponents, as we have begun to
see. But brain localisation theories, pinning down mental powers to a fixed
psychological organisation, were also included in its list of opponents. For the
associationist, mental structures were emergent over time, rather than pre-existing
experience. Selves, minds, perceptions, categories, ideas—none to the empiricist
was essential, a priori, absolute or fixed. The point surfaces interestingly in a
passage from Lewes's early novel Ranthorpe (1847):
The tyrannous influence of fixed ideas—of thoughts which haunt the soul,
and goad the unhappy wretch to his perdition—is capable, I think, of a
physiological no less than of a psychological explanation... And precisely as
the abnormal affluence of blood towards any part of the body will produce
chronic inflammation, if it be not diverted, so will the current of thought in
excess in any one direction produce monomania. Fixed ideas may thus be
physiologically regarded as chronic inflammations of the brain.126
Lewes's novel, unsurprisingly, is greatly concerned with human psychological
habits. In this instance, the tyranny of "fixed ideas" refers to a plan settling in a
character's mind to commit a murder. So the terrible prospect of fixity signals a
failure of proper association, resulting in the hatching of a violent criminal act. We
are not supposed to miss the ethical aspect of this pattern. What is interesting
about the passage, too, among other things, is the way it introduces a physiological
vocabulary to explain the effects of mental coalescence. For Hume, this would have
been inconceivable; for Lewes, however, the physiology has both a literal and
metaphorical significance in relation to associationism. Only an improved
knowledge of circulation and respiration in the nineteenth century made writing a
passage like this possible, and the body in general becomes more prominent in
empiricist epistemology as accounts of its impressibility grow more detailed. Bain
and Lewes himself were instrumental in this. But, in a more metaphorical way, the
126 G. H. Lewes, Ranthorpe. (1847) ed Barbara Smalley. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1974, p.
203.
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narrator of Ranthorpe asks us to read his character's mind through an
understanding of bodily structures. 'Fixed' ideas are equivalent to a clotting or
calcification, and obstruct reasoned (and moral) judgments.
This moment in Lewes's novel, which overall remains tied in some ways to
the conventions of eighteenth-century romance fiction, seems poised on the cusp of
the mid-Victorian modernisation of the Humean tradition. It prefigures Lewes's
own later psychological theories, which would revitalise associationism by
grounding its processes in the knowing body. Evolutionary theory would also give a
historicising context in which to frame that human physiology. At the heart of the
parallelism of mind and body in mid-Victorian empiricism was a structural idea of
instability that had sceptical consequences, for it too (like Lewes's novel) sought to
avoid "the tyrannous influence of fixed ideas"—the fixed ideas lurking variously, for
example, in Reid's common sense philosophy and in the idealists' mystically
transcendent self—by extending Hume's powerfully critical premises of
epistemology into this new territory. The ways in which mid-Victorian writers
undertook this task remains now the focus of the following chapters, starting with
its relation to the vexed issue of the realist aesthetic.
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Chapter Two
Ruskin's Modern Painters and the
Visual Language ofReality
The Ruskin ofModern Painters (1843-60) is a writer committed, above all, to an
epistemological aesthetic.1 Even as his work weaves digressively through cultural
time and space, from mountainous Alpine landscapes to German philosophy, from
the botanical structure of leaves to Medieval chiaroscuro, its narrative constantly
enforces and exemplifies Ruskin's master theme: the specific capacity of art to
know. "I am afraid the reader must be, by this time, almost tired of hearing about
truth," he concedes midway through the third volume, acknowledging the centrality
of that commitment.2 His advocacy of Turner, so crucial to the purpose and design
ofModern Painters, is indistinguishable from a pervasive preoccupation with the
concept of truthfulness in representation. "For many a year we have heard nothing
with respect to the works of Turner but accusations of their want of truth," Ruskin
states, yetModern Painters will recognise precisely that "Turner is like nature, and
paints more of nature than any man who ever lived."3 'Truth', from the outset, then,
both sanctions and sustains the narrative of Ruskin's fragmentary work.
How can this conception of truth be understood or characterised? What
kind of a commitment to realism is at stake in Ruskin's text? The spectral presence
1 For discussion of Ruskin's developing aesthetic theory inModern Painters see for example George P.
Landow, The Aesthetic and Critical Theories ofJohn Ruskin. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1971; Robert Hewison, John Ruskin: The Argument of the Eye. London: Thames and Hudson, 1976;
Gary Wihl, Ruskin and the Rhetoric of Infallibility. New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1985.
2 John Ruskin, The Works of John Ruskin. (39 vols) eds. E. T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn,
London: George Allen, 1903-12, V, p. 149.
3 Ruskin, Works, III, pp. 51-2. Ruskin's own emphasis.
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ofWordsworth inModern Painters acts as an important reminder of its connection
to a fading era of romanticism, with its characteristic emphasis on imaginative
apprehension, intuited transcendental order, and "introvertive mysticism. "4 Yet the
truth-telling aesthetic it theorises has no significant basis in the idealist philosophy
that helped shape the development of romanticism in Britain. Ruskin, in fact,
thought the metaphysical claims of German philosophers tended quickly to turn
into nonsensical disputes over increasingly meaningless abstractions, and his
disaffection with Kant mirrored that of Herbert Spencer.s To Ruskin, idealism
meant addressing the problem of knowledge using extravagantly unworldly, if not
wildly unsound, propositions, such as "talking of a 'finite realization of the infinite'
(a phrase considerably less rational than 'a black realization of white'), and of a
triad composed of God, Man, and Humanity (which is a parallel thing to talking of
a triad of man, dog, and canineness)."6 Idealism, moreover, for Ruskin, strove
towards a position that would de-ontologise the realm of the extrasubjective,
reducing everything to a condition of possibility inside a priori forms of thought.
Existences, in effect, were assumed to be conferred by pre-experiential modes of
constructive or originary insight. He thereby imputed to it a devastating hubris.
Recalling a visit to Mont Blanc in the third volume, Ruskin imagines how his
experience of the mountain might have been construed differently by an idealist,
not himself: "The conclusion which would have been formed, upon this [sight], by a
German philosopher, would have been that the Mont Blanc was of no value; that he
and his imagination onlywere of value; that the Mont Blanc, in fact, except so far as
he was able to look at it, could not be considered as having any existence."7 For
4 This suggestive phrase, quoted by Peter Malekin in connection with Wordsworth's "abyss of
idealism," was coined originally by W. T. Stace, in a discussion relating to a purification or absolute
emptying out of consciousness: "what emerges [from introvertive mysticism] is a state of pure
consciousness—'pure' in the sense that it is not the consciousness of any empirical content. It has no
content except itself." (See W. T. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy. London: Macmillan, 1980, pp. 86-
6.) Peter Malekin, "Wordsworth and the Mind of Man" in J. R. Watson ed. An Infinite Complexity:
Essays in Romanticism. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983, p. 4.
5 Herbert Spencer,AnAutobiography. (2 vols) London: Williams and Northgate, 1904,1, p. 378.
6 Ruskin, Works, V, pp. 424-25
7 Ruskin, Works, V, p. 201; p. 184.
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such a figure, esse est percipi: only by being underwritten by a percipient
intelligence would the vast presence of Mont Blanc strictly be engendered, as if its
existence followed the formal priority of an ratiocinative act performed by an
individual human mind whose embodied physical presence it massively dwarfed.
His dismissal of idealism was impatient, sharp and sardonic, and it links
Ruskin to other mid-century writers like G. H. Lewes, Alexander Bain and Herbert
Spencer, who were united intellectually by their alignment against what John
Stuart Mill would later call the Germano-Coleridgean line of thought.8 In an
influential essay, Mill wrote unequivocally on behalf of his fellow empiricists
attacking the Kantians' belief in "intuitions of pure reason":
The nature and laws of Things in themselves, or of the hidden causes of the
phenomena which are the objects of experience, appear to us radically
inaccessible to the human faculties. We see no reason for believing that
anything can be the object of our knowledge except our experience itself; nor
that there is any idea, feeling, or power in the human mind, which, in order to
account for it, requires that its origin should be referred to any other source.
We are therefore at issue with Coleridge on the central idea of his
philosophy.9
As complicated, shifting and erratic as Ruskin's views on truth could be, this
passage points to a historical framework of empiricist thought in which decisive
aspects of his theory of realism can be contextualised. Gary Wihl has argued that
Ruskin should be regarded as "the most important epistemological critic in
English."10 The epistemological cruxes that Modern Painters turns us towards, it
will be argued in this chapter, need to be understood within this more modern,
post-romantic context. For Ruskin, as for Mill, the realm of personal experience,
sensation, and testimony provide the only genuine pathway to knowledge, and
8 John Stuart Mill, Mill on Bentham and Coleridge, ed. F. R. Leavis, London: Chatto and Windus,
1959, P-108.
9 Mill, Bentham and Coleridge, p. 114.
10 Wihl, Ruskin and the Rhetoric ofInfallibility, p. 2.
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through it our capacity for aesthetic response and feeling cumulatively emerge. At
the same time, the fullness or magnitude of the reality we experience is radically
inaccessible to our limited human faculties. As Ruskin said, "you can always see
something, but you never see all."11 In these ways, the ideal aesthetic standard
repeatedly asserted by Ruskin's theory—the "constant desire of and submissiveness
to truth" realised in Turnerian landscape12—links Modern Painters with wider
debates in mid-Victorian culture extending across the fields of science, philosophy
and literature which were preoccupied with the possibility and conditions of
sensorially-derived knowledge.
This "larger culture of realism," as Jennifer Green-Lewis calls it, which
construed the quest for knowledge in experiential rather than intuitionist terms,
identified understanding with strenuous and disciplined observation rather than
autonomous powers of thought or transcendent modes of selfhood.13 Modern
Painters, too, centrally thematises observation. It envisages its pursuit of truth not
from a position of Manfred-like alienation from the fabric of the world, but as an
obligation to observe its particular structures, contours and morphologies. Yet by
the middle of the century these assumptions were indissolubly connected to a
growing apprehension of reality—by the 'realist culture' itself—as proliferating,
multiple, even resistant to the human efforts ofmeasurement and symbolisation by
which it was understood. As Michael Timko puts it, this "interest in the
epistemological is a significant feature of the Victorian period, and serves to
distinguish it from the Romantic."14
In one sense, it is not difficult to find evidence of an anti-intuitionist strain
of empiricism inModern Painters. Ruskin's well known and often cited credo—"To
see clearly is poetry, prophecy, and religion,—all in one!"—could easily be read as
11 Ruskin, Works, III, p. 329.
12 Ruskin, Works, VII, pp. 250.
13 Jennifer Green-Lewis, Framing the Victorians: Photography and the Culture of Realism. Ithaca
and London: Cornell Univerity Press, 1996, p. 20.
14 Michael Timko, "The Victorianism ofVictorian Literature," New Literary History 6, 3,1975, p. 614.
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trying to displace traditional romantic epistemological authority in order to
establish in its place the human faculty of sight and the penetrative power of
observation.^ Humble sight, when exercised diligently, Ruskin seems to be
suggesting, is equal to these seemingly grander and more mysterious ways of
knowing—poetic, prophetic, religious— even, perhaps, more powerful than them
because not beholden to some higher, invisible or supersensible realm. That Ruskin
borrows a distinctively visionary tone from romanticism itself only serves to ironise
and intensify this gesture of displacement. Moreover, Ruskin has a deep and
unromantic preoccupation with the value and authenticity of descriptive fact, most
famously in "The Pathetic Fallacy" chapter. There, the critique of "German
dullness, and English affectation" is at its most pointed.16 Even a critic like Robert
Hewison, who sees Ruskin's aesthetic theory as securely affiliated to
Wordsworthian humanism, acknowledges that "here... Ruskin parts company with
the Romantic poets."17 But the importance of "fact" to painting and ethical life
generally is a familiar theme throughout the whole of Modern Painters. "I shall
endeavour to investigate and arrange the facts of nature with scientific accuracy,"
he announces at the start of volume one, later adding: "I shall look only for truth;
bare, clear, downright statement of facts; showing in each particular, as far as I am
able, what the truth of nature is, and then seeking for the plain expression of it, and
for that alone."18 Truth requires observational acuity, a "scientific accuracy" so
deplorably absent in Coleridge, who, Ruskin says, confuses the physical attributes
of objects with his own poetic will.1? In place of facts, Coleridge's writing
emphasises the unscientific dreaminess of his own personality. Indeed, Ruskin felt
"his best poems were feverish."20
"5 Ruskin, Works, V, p. 333.
16 Ruskin, Works, V, p. 201.
17 Hewison, John Ruskin: TheArgument of the Eye, p. 73.
18 Ruskin, Works, III, p. 48; pp. 138-39.
Ruskin, Works, V, p. 206.
20 John Ruskin, The Letters ofJohn Ruskin to Charles EliotNorton. (2 vols) ed. Charles Eliot Norton,
Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1904,1, p. 21.
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The idea of faithfulness to nature underpinning Ruskin's empiricist rhetoric
here resonates with the kind of language used by nineteenth-century scientific
naturalists like John Tyndall, who wrote in 1854 that "if a man be not capable of
this self-renunciation—this loyal surrender of himself to Nature and to fact, he
lacks, in my opinion, the first mark of the true philosopher."21 George Eliot's novels,
too, respond to this language. Echoing Tyndall, the narrator ofAdam Bede (1859)
speaks of being "obliged to creep servilely after nature and fact" during the well-
known metafictional intrusion in chapter 17.22 Like Tyndall and Eliot's narrator,
Ruskin saw the attainment of factual knowledge as a process requiring the
controlled repression of the self. In science, painting and literary narratives alike,
the subjectivity of the knower was to be left behind, made to submit respectfully to
the primacy of the external world rather than delighting in its own inspirational
insight or sublime transport. This pattern, George Levine argues, is the defining
feature of modernity's secular narrative of scientific epistemology: the discovery of
certitude depends upon the effacement of the independent subject who seeks it, a
condition he calls "dying to know."23 Impartiality, reliability and detachment all
require the extinction of personality, hence Tyndall's rhetorical theme of surrender
and self-sacrifice, the creeping after fact in Adam Bede (the knower must go
unnoticed, be silenced), and Ruskin's view that the highest truth in painting comes
at the cost of the painter, who should seek "self-annihilation."2^
Some critics have taken this demand to mean something like pure
transcription or a call for objectivity. One must be annihilated so that nature may
speak for itself; out of this annihilation, facts emerge purified of all traces of
dubious subjectivity. Patricia Ball, for example, gives the impression that Ruskin is
devoted unquestioningly to the given: "To the end Modern Painters upholds the
21 Quoted in George Levine, Dying to Know: Scientific Epistemology and Narrative in Victorian
England. London: University of Chicago Press, 2002, p. 4.
22 George Eliot, Adam Bede. (1859) ed. Stephen Gill, London: Penguin, 1980, p. 177.
23 Levine, Dying to Know, pp. 1-43.
24 Ruskin, Works, III, p. 23.
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place of fact, especially natural fact, in art, and the duty of the artist to respect it
totally. What he has to say about beauty and imagination is grounded in the
honouring of fact."25 Catherine Belsey, similarly, argues: "for Ruskin the world of
natural objects, of bare, clear, downright facts, is unproblematically given,
accessible to experience, and able to be re-presented in art."26
Without denying how Gradgrindish certain moments in Ruskin can seem,
particularly when lifted from their original contexts, it is important to recognise
that his epistemological arguments are much more nuanced and sophisticated than
Belsey, in particular, will allow. His version of realism does not entail being in
thrall to the given in the way she suggests. More careful scrutiny shows how 'truth',
that highly prized accomplishment of art, is closely bound up in Modern Painters
with a powerful critique of static imitation, mimesis, verisimilitude and objectivity.
Indeed, realism, as an aesthetic practice, turns out to depend significantly (and
paradoxically) on calling attention to its own distance from the real. The
truthfulness of the work of art is not measured by how successfully it eliminates
point of view, conceals contingency or establishes a subjectless representational
space; it depends, rather, for Ruskin, on precisely the role played in representation
by empiricist subjectivity. For, as we shall see, Ruskin's theory of realism sees truth
always originating in a view from somewhere, rather than nowhere, and continues
to invoke the presence of the very experiential selfwho would be annihilated.
It is worth just picking up this point again in relation to chapter 17 ofAdam
Bede, for closer scrutiny reveals it to share a similar position. The effect of that
chapter is cleverly self-deconstructing, returning attention to the very personality
whose repression is said to be necessary for attaining accuracy and truth. By
suspending the storytelling, the narrator only luxuriates in the flexible possibilities
of narrative itself, exploiting the freedom it gives him to halt, surprise the reader,
25 Patricia M. Ball, The Science of Aspects: The Changing Role of Fact in the Work of Coleridge,
Ruskin and Hopkins. London: Athlone Press, 1971, p. 62.
26 Catherine Belsey, Critical Practice. London: Routledge, 1980, p. 9.
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manipulate or mimic opinions, defer expectation, adopt new points of view,
disobey temporal sequence, respond to the suddenness of human whim—in short,
to swerve away from fact and nature in a manner so capricious that it complicates
his "servile" relation to truth. For the narrative language in that chapter twists and
turns relentlessly with conjecture, speculation and gossipy conditionals:
And I would not, even if I had the choice, be the clever novelist who would
create a world so much better than this... But, bless us, things may be lovable
that are not altogether handsome, I hope? I am not at all sure that the
majority of the human race have not been ugly, and even among those 'lords
of their kind', the British, squat figures, ill-shapen nostrils, and dingy
complexions are not startling exceptions. Yet there is a great deal of family
love amongst us. I have a friend or two whose class of features is such that the
Apollo curl on the summit of their brows would be decidedly trying; yet to my
certain knowledge tender hearts have beaten for them, and theirminiatures-
flattering, but still not lovely—are kissed in secret by motherly lips.27
It would not be going too far to say that the narrator revels here in the freedoms of
representational language in the very act of denying they exist. An almost joyful
momentum carries the passage forward, quite at odds with its stern advocacy of
neutral description. The whole chapter exudes this same jaunty energy, as if
suddenly exhilarated by a sense of release from duty to the story ("It is so very
rarely that facts hit that nice medium required by our own enlightened opinions
and refined taste!"), as the narrator appears to relish his chance wilfully to digress
or second-guess the reader's responses.28 But his display is not merely an example
of the famous mirror of the observer being doubtless defective, as the narrator
himself would like to think, but much more significantly an acknowledgement that
knowledge needs to arise out of these partial and prejudicial conditions if it is to be
recognisable as knowledge. This view, in fact, shapes the ethical pattern of the
whole novel. Adam Bede himself, its virtuous and honest centre, whose name
27 Eliot,Adam Bede, pp. 178-79.
28 Eliot, Adam Bede, p. 177.
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connects him Biblically to epistemology and the original fall into knowledge, is
tellingly a "partial judge" of human affairs.29 Thus the chapter's engagement with
the scientific ideal of self-effacement is highly ambiguous. The pull of subjectivity
intensifies in the very gestures that seek to eliminate its contingency from the scene
of knowledge. And, likewise, Ruskin's commitment to realism shares the ambiguity
written into Eliot's novel.
Ruskin ContraMundum
Modern Painters, in shape, texture and argument, can be considered an extended
empiricist drama. Partly its dramatic qualities are down to Ruskin's interest in
particularity rather than abstraction, evident for example in his own evocation of
landscape, and in his language of reality. In another sense, its drama occurs in the
way its epistemology is fully integrated into the chaotic fabric of the work; that is to
say, in the relation between Ruskinian 'truth' and the contingency of the text's
unfolding. Some critics have found this overall lack of cohesion problematic. As
Quentin Bell memorably put it: "the task that he set himself [in Modern Painters]
was impossible and he was bound to fail. But in the entire history of literature it
would be hard to think of a more glorious failure than this."30 Yet rather than a
failing, the incompleteness of its design carries serious significance. Later it will be
suggested that this narrative quality correlates with its evolving thematisation of
abundance, confusion and instability, its "multiple vision" of the real.31 But it also
relates to the way Ruskin imagines his own task as the advocate of Turner's truth-
oriented aesthetic.
The restlessness and sheer inclusiveness of the narrative of Modern
Painters—its almost insatiable search for fresh examples, demonstrations,
contrasts and counterarguments to illuminate Turner and the natural world—
2' Eliot, Adam Bede, p. 184.
3° Quentin Bell, Rusldn. London: Hogarth Press, 1978, p. 62.
31 Ball, The Science ofAspects, p. 96.
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dramatises the considerable imaginative effort required to apprehend truth. The
scale of the text implies the scale of the task. To appreciate the Turnerian ideal
requires the cultivation of the senses, something achievable only through the
gradual accumulation of vast visual experience, both of painting and nature, which
Ruskin's narrative seeks to enact. Its rhetoric therefore has an educative force,
inviting the reader into the work to lend assent to its growing mass of evidence ("I
have only to request that whatever I say may be tested by immediate
experiment").32 As John Rosenberg points out, Ruskin almost overwhelms us by
constantly recalling our minds to remembered or imaginable scenes: "Observe, see,
look recur with obsessive frequency," he notices, "until the eye becomes exhausted
from the sheer multiplicity of things held up before it."33 What Modern Painters
describes, in effect, is a process of steady mental growth, by implication one that
Ruskin has already undergone (presumably unlike the implied reader), and which
promises to end with an equivalent understanding of the truth embodied in
Turner's painting. But that process seems also radically open-ended or
unrealisable. In the closing paragraphs of the final volume Ruskin will declare that
"[o]nly another Turner could apprehend Turner."34
Crucial, then, to the dramatic texture of Modern Painters is a basic
narrative of discovery. But, since none of us is Turner, the fulfilment of that
narrative is ultimately in question, which points to a larger theme encircling it: the
notion of truth as struggle and deferral. Apprehending truth is difficult,
challenging, even rarefied. It is neither easy nor intuitive to accept that Turner was
the most truthful painter ever—this is the necessary assumption of the text and
crucial to its epistemological structure, for it inaugurates the dramatic pattern that
32 Ruskin, Works, III, p. 320.
33 John D. Rosenberg, "Style and Sensibility in Ruskin's Prose" in George Levine and William Madden
(eds.) TheArt ofVictorian Prose. NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 180.
34 Ruskin, Works, VII, p. 453.
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moves from doubt towards knowledge.35 Few people identify Turner with fidelity to
natural fact because their own ways of looking at the world are lazily inattentive or
underdeveloped. For Ruskin, the value of Turner's realism derives partly from its
potential to be found objectionable, to offend ordinary habits of perception and
public taste, which he says are "plunging deeper and deeper into degradation day
by day."36 Therefore Modern Painters has to engage in another struggle: a self-
conscious struggle against the pressure of critical opinion and normative aesthetic
value. Figured as a heroic battle—Ruskin contra mundum—this struggle against
prevailing values is rhetorically constructed from the start with a striking scenic
intensity.
The preface to the second edition of volume one opens on a blustering,
animated note, developed into an extended sequence ofmartial allusions:
And now I find the volume thus boldly laid before the public in a position
much resembling that of the Royal Sovereign at Trafalgar, receiving,
unsupported, the broadsides of half the enemy's fleet; while unforeseen
circumstances have hitherto prevented, and must yet for a time prevent, my
heavier ships of the line from taking any part in the action. I watched the first
moments of the struggle with some anxiety for the solitary vessel, an anxiety
which I have now ceased to feel; for the flag of truth waves brightly through
the smoke of the battle, and my antagonists, wholly intent on the destruction
of the leading ship, have lost their position, and exposed themselves in
defenceless disorder to the attack of the following columns.3?
Where his language had been modest, even apologetic, in the original 1843 preface
a year earlier, Ruskin has grown bold and rancorous. Behind these heavy-handed
metaphors ("the flag of truth waves brightly") lies the all too familiar complaint of a
writer embittered by unsympathetic reviewers. Like Turner himself, Ruskin faces a
35 Historically speaking, this assumption was entirely justified, as Turner's work was poorly received
by reviewers of the 1842 Royal Academy exhibition, who Ruskin said "carefully repressed his
perceptions of truth" (Ruskin, Works, V, p. 389). For a detailed account see E. T. Cook, The Life of
John Ruskin. (2 vols) London: George Allen and Co., 1911,1, pp. 124-30.
36 Ruskin, Works, III, p. 4.
37 John Ruskin, Works, III, pp. 7-8.
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critical world that will not understand him. But interesting here is the rhetorical
scene in which this literary commonplace is set, and through which Ruskin's
aesthetic philosophy will emerge. Gone is the polite, deferential tone of the first
preface, where Ruskin had created an atmosphere of genteel amateurism ("I now
scarcely know whether [or not] I should announce it as an Essay on Landscape
Painting, and apologize for its lengthy discussion of general principles").38 In place
of that leisurely affectation, the second preface allegorises the controversy
surrounding Modern Painters I in a vivid martial rhetoric. Now, instead, scenes of
war appear before the reader's eyes as an unfolding spectacle of epic violence. We
are thrust into a conflict already underway, and meant to feel its continuing
ferocity, positioned by the text not as neutral bystanders but as involved spectators.
We view the battle as if standing at Ruskin's side, recruited as his ally. And the
passage leaves the reader in little doubt as to the scale and importance of the
moment, for it is not merely any battle: this is Trafalgar, the most significant
encounter in English naval history. Much therefore is felt to be at stake, while the
eventual outcome of the conflict is already anticipated by the use of the historical
parallel. The studied, even laborious, extension of metaphors tells us that his truth
will prevail, but only after some heroic struggle.
Heroism, indeed, is a governing theme of the preface. While his martial
rhetoric can be seen as a response to critics who had couched arguments against
the first volume of Modern Painters in violent language themselves, such as the
Reverend John Eagles writing in Blackwood's, Ruskin achieves here a deliberate
and sustained theatrical effect quite unlike anything in the work of those
detractors.39 It is an audacious act of self-mythologising. Through the "smoke of
battle" we detect the orchestrating figure of Ruskin, dramatised as a master
38 Ruskin, Works, III, p. 4.
39 Eagles mocked that the volume had surely to be an "ironical satire" against modern landscapists
themselves: '"Their superiority to all the ancient masters'—that was too hard a hit to come from any
but an enemy! We must measure our man—a graduate of Oxford! The 'scholar armed,' without doubt.
He comes, too, vauntingly up to us, with his contempt for us and all critics that ever were, or will be;
we are all little Davids in the eye of this Goliath." J. L. Bradley (ed.), Ruskin: The Critical Heritage.
London: Routledge and Kegan Paid, 1984, pp. 34-5.
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strategist and seasoned campaigner, guiding his side to victory from a precarious
position. He thus confers upon himself the status proper to a victorious military
hero. Moreover, a markedly nationalistic discourse facilitates the expression of this
heroism. Casting himself as the commander at Trafalgar, Ruskin clearly identifies
with Nelson, an English hero unrivalled in the nineteenth-century national
imagination. In no other figure of the period was the symbolic identification ofman
and nation more powerfully suggested. According to Robert Southey, for example,
whose influential Life of Nelson (1813) conspired in the creation of this heroic
mythology, Nelson's command to attack at Trafalgar "will be remembered as long
as the language, or even the memory, of England shall endure." (Southey's own
account of the scene positively savours Nelson's battle cry—"England expects every
man to do his duty!"—and moves into an idiom of romantic nationalism to relish
the moment: "Nelson's last signal... was received throughout the fleet, with a shout
of acclamation, made sublime by the spirit which it breathed and the feeling which
it expressed.")40 Writing in the 1840s, Ruskin is therefore accessing an established
English mythology in order to personalise the narrator-hero of Modern Painters.
The grandiosity of the preface creates a heroic space in the text that will be
occupied by this authorial persona, who insists that it is "the imperative duty of all
who have any perception or knowledge ofwhat is really great in art, and any desire
for its advancement in England, to come fearlessly forward."41 In these ways, the
narrative of Modern Painters obeys a powerful autobiographical impulse, no less
invested in self-mythology than his later memoir PraeteritaA2 Subjectivity is woven
into its aesthetic theory, shaped by—and also in turn shaping—its formal design.
40 Robert Southey, The Life ofNelson. (1813) London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1951, p. 254.
41 Ruskin, Works, III, p. 4.
42 As Bruce Redford argues, in Praeterita Ruskin "spins the raw material of his past into a highly
personal adaptation of the Edenic myth." See Bruce B. Redford, "Ruskin Unparadized: Emblems of
Eden in Praeterita," Studies in English Literature 1500-1900 22, 4,1982, p. 676.
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The preface also recalls that other hero ofModern Painters, Turner himself.
Ruskin's naval scene brings to mind the vast canvas of Turner's The Battle of
Trafalgar (Fig. l), the largest of his paintings and his only Royal commission. It
was hung in St James's Palace alongside other works celebrating English victories
Fig. 1. J. M. W. Turner, The Battle ofTrafalgar (1823-4) National Maritime Museum,
Greenwich, London.
over the French, including George Jones's paintings ofWaterloo and Vittoria.43 The
centre of the composition is dominated by the colossal presence of Nelson's
flagship, the Victory, whose masts reach to the top of the canvas, bearing sails that
billow out patriotically. Behind the vessel, the horizon crowds with ships
converging on the battle, emphasising the scale of the conflict, while in the
foreground a mass of bodies flounders in the dark churning water. A fallen Union
flag floats ambiguously on the waves besides the drowning figures, at once a
patriotic reminder of Nelson's fatal wounding and a reminder of the nationalism in
whose name the carnage has taken place. The painting's use of colour also suggests
this ambiguity, its fiery tones communicating the destructive energies of battle as
43 James Hamilton, Turner: A Life. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1997, pp. 217-8.
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well as the explosive fervour of military conquest. Its lines of perspective, however,
construct the scene as a momentous spectacle. As James Hamilton rightly remarks,
"The viewpoint is low, at water level, so the ship and its backdrop of clouds tower
over the viewer."44 While it lacks what Richard Stein calls the "visible nostalgia" of
Turner's well known later painting The Fighting 'Temeraire' (1838), which depicts
the final resting place of another vessel from Nelson's fleet, its investment in a
specifically English national mythology is unmistakeable.45
By positioning itself within this frame of allusions, the founding scene of
Modern Painters I works interestingly against two main principles of Ruskin's
aesthetic programme. For one thing, these framing discourses of nationalism and
heroism create a rhetorical effect opposite to that which Ruskin admires in "great
art," which he says banishes "all that is theatrical, affected, and false."46 More
intriguingly still, Ruskin uses the preface to append a conspicuous dramatisation of
the author to a text that will argue repeatedly for an aesthetic of self-concealment.
Throughout Modern Painters it will be claimed that in the highest art the viewer's
attention is led away from signs of an originating subjectivity towards a referential
vision. That is, in the ideal work of art the figure of the artist/author should
dissolve into the representational space of the painting or text by a feat of self-
annihilation:
The artist has done nothing till he has concealed himself; the art is imperfect
which is visible; the feelings are but feebly touched, if they permit us to
reason on the methods of their excitement. In the reading of a great poem, in
the hearing of a noble oration, it is the subject of the writer, and not his skill,
his passion, not his power, on which our minds are fixed. We see as he sees,
but we see not him. We become part of him, feel with him, judge, behold with
him; but we think of him as little as of ourselves.4?
44 Hamilton, Turner, p. 217.
45 Richard L. Stein, "Remember the Temeraire: Turner's Memorial of 1839," Representations 11,1985,
pp. 165-200.
46 Ruskin, Works, III, p. 4.
47 Ruskin, Works, III, p. 22.
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As the preface testifies, the same can hardly be said of Ruskin himself. Unlike
Shakespeare, for example, whose presence he says is never felt behind the wailing
of Lear on the heath, Ruskin is a highly visible figure in his text. Rather than
receding behind a depersonalised discursive language, he steps forward from his
work as a presiding consciousness or escort, rarely allowing the reader to lose sight
of his singular narrative personality. Even in passages describing mountainous
landscapes or the properties of clouds, Ruskin's persona inscribes itself in his
imagined scenes at an intimate distance from the reader, directing our vision and
guiding our responses to the objects it conjures. His call for authorial self-
effacement occurs, then, paradoxically, within a text marked by sustained
personalisation.
Ruskin's self-inscriptive strategy is more than merely a stylistic device or a
kind of persuasive garb. Indeed, he would object strongly to seeing the form of his
writing as neutrally decorative.48 (As G. H. Lewes put it, style is "the living body of
thought, not its 'dress', which might be more or less ornamental."49) On the
contrary, the tension it introduces between visibility and concealment reaches to
the very heart of his aesthetic theory inModern Painters. The Ruskinian self acts as
a mediating presence within the work because the entire vision ofModern Painters
is tied to the idea of the developing human mind—that is, the mind of Ruskin, the
reader and even Turner:
There has been marked and constant progress in [Turner's] mind; he has not,
like some few artists, been without childhood; his course of study has been as
evidently, as it has been swiftly, progressive; and in different stages of the
struggle, sometimes one order of truth, sometimes another, has been aimed
at or omitted... As he advanced, the previous knowledge or attainment was
absorbed in what succeeded, or abandoned if incompatible, and never
abandoned without a gain; and his last works presented the sum and
48 For an insightful discussion of this point see Ball, The Science ofAspects, pp. 69-72.
49 G. H. Lewes, The Principles of Success in Literature, ed. T. Sharper Knowlson, London: Walter
Scott Ltd, 1897, p. 125.
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perfection of his accumulated knowledge, delivered with the impatience and
passion of one who feels too much, and knows too much, and has too little
time to say it in, to pause for expression, or ponder over his syllables.50
Turner's aesthetic is inseparable from his mental growth. Ruskin's emphasis, which
falls on the dynamic development of his mind and on identity as an experiential
process, is wholly empiricist on this point. He recognises how even apparently
simple of facts of nature cannot entirely be separated from evolving structures of
mind and identity. He sketches a trajectory describing Turner's aesthetic
development, a process ending with Turner truly becoming Turner, in the sense
that his later paintings (the truest, the most typically Turnerian to Ruskin's mind)
correlate with "the sum and perfection of his accumulated knowledge." And he
characterises the psychological movement explicitly as a "struggle." When we look
at a Turner landscape we see more than just a virtuoso representation of a single
visual instant; the composition also implies a vast body of innumerable perceptions
leading up to that moment, a personal history evolving out of childhood
sedimentations of memory, sensation, feeling and understanding. His whole
psychological past manifests itself presently in the picture before us. For these
earlier perceptions have been assimilated by the artistic self, stored, absorbed,
transformed, enmeshed, so they participate vitally in the knowledge of reality
expressed so adeptly in his sense of form and visual composition.
Turner's paintings attest visually to this evolved expansion of knowledge.
He would not stand "above other men in knowledge of truth" unless they testified
to a particular pattern of mental growth.51 And so the "facts" he paints are not
impersonal, affectless, or dehumanising, but instead indicate the specificity of the
personality through which this knowledge has passed, and in passing gained
authenticity: "we want the thoughts and feelings of the artist as well as the truth,
yet theymust be thoughts arising out of the knowledge of truth, and feelings arising
s° Ruskin, Works, III, p. 611.
51 Ruskin, Works, III, p. 609.
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out of the contemplation of truth."52 Truth, indeed, cannot be sought in isolation
from thought and feeling. Here, once again, Turner is exemplary. His pictures
neither disguise human partiality nor mask signs of mental inhabitation in the
painted scene; rather, they serve as graphic testimonies of unique (often indeed
consummate) moments of sentience. "[T]he distinction of his mind from that of
others," Ruskin writes in volume four, "consists in his instantly receiving such
sensations strongly and being unable to lose them; and then he sets himself as far
as possible to reproduce that impression on the mind of the spectator of his
picture."55
Ineluctably, therefore, in order to assign nature its heralded priority, realist
theory must duly enlist the work ofmemory, emotions and the intellect. 'Nature' is
exalted above the egotism of the artist, but Ruskin's work demonstrates how that
exaltation itself only arises out of considerable labour. It requires, precisely, an
intense effort of subjectivity to suppress one's own interests. It also requires
cultivation of the self. Learned rather than automatic, this labour of observation
implies a history: the eye must have a past if it is to apprehend truth. Infants, who
stare innocently at the world, see it at first falsely, because their vision is untutored,
barely formed, lacking the requisite degree of sensuous knowledge (hence the
messy scrawl they produce when asked to draw a picture, evidence for Ruskin of
their obliviousness to laws of perspective). Whole cultures or societies, too, were
similarly derided by an imperious Ruskin as primitive or infantile. The Chinese
("children in all things"), the "eye of the red Indian,"54 and the "Negro races" all
share a deficiency in this regard, he argues.55 Like children, their supposed
immaturity inhibits what their eyes can see. Both, for example, display in their
pictures an ignorance of depth and shade. On Ruskin's view, the cultivation of an
52 Ruskin, Works, III, p. 137.
53 Ruskin, Works, VI, p. 33. Emphasis added.
54 Ruskin, Works, III, pp. 144-145.
55 "[N]o importance is to be attached to opinions of [Negro] races who have never received any ideas
of beauty whatsoever (these ideas being only received by minds under some certain degree of
cultivation)." Ruskin, Works, IV, p. 69.
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individual mind and that of an entire culture thus follow one model of
development, each showing the same evolving entanglement of sight and
experience: "And all the works [of art], whether of nations or ofmen, show, by their
want of shade, how little the eye, without knowledge, is to be depended upon to
discover truth."56 True perception, on the other hand, requires that we see the
world through a moving prism of experience, or the mutable structures of the
observer's subjectivity.
Modern Painters, therefore, knowingly records the formation of his own
"long-experienced eye," to borrow a useful phrase from the natural scientist Robert
Jameson, whom Ruskin had read.57 A passage early on in the fifth volume points
directly to the way this Ruskinian identity has been formed in the course ofwriting
the work, shaped by pressures of time and change:
The first volume was the expansion of a reply to a magazine article; and was
not begun because I then thought myself qualified to write a treatise on Art;
but because I at least knew, and knew it to be demonstrable, that Turner was
right and true, and that his critics were wrong, false, and base. At that time I
had seen much of nature, and had been several times in Italy, wintering once
in Rome; but had chiefly delighted in northern art, beginning, when a mere
boy, with Rubens and Rembrandt. It was long before I got quit of a boy's
veneration for Rubens' physical art-power; and the reader will, perhaps, on
this ground forgive the strong expressions of admiration for Rubens, which,
to my great regret, occur in the first volume.58
This retrospective glance partly upbraids, partly excuses the earlier incarnation of
the author. Briefly disowned, the author's past life is readmitted evidentially as
proof of his long transformation. It encourages the reader to see the authorship of
Modern Painters as a fragmented, uneven act dispersed across historical time,
rather than as a teleological unfolding of meaning proceeding from a single and
56 Ruskin, Works, III, pp. 144-45.
57 Robert Jameson, Manual of Mineralogy. Edinburgh: A. Constable and Co., 1821, p. 363. See
Hewison, John Ruskin: TheArgument ofthe Eye, p. 15.
58 Ruskin, Works, VII, pp. 8-9.
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original intention. The text precisely does not represent a sustained or univocal
utterance, the outpouring of one long and uninterrupted breath of composition.
Instead, he draws attention to the status of its author as a historically varied,
divided, multiple figure. The earlier self is at once Ruskin and yet also not him: the
passing of time and the intervention of experience have introduced difference and
division into subject and work alike. But the distancing has an important effect:
These oscillations of temper, and progressions of discovery, extending over a
period of seventeen years, ought not to diminish the reader's confidence in
the book. Let him be assured of this, that unless important changes are
occurring in his opinions continually, all his life long, not one of those
opinions can be on any questionable subject true. All true opinions are living,
and show their life by being capable of nourishment; therefore of change.59
Ruskin, getting somewhat defensively into his stride, aspires here to a kind
of self-legitimating humility. His sentiments have a good deal in common with
what George Levine calls the "hubristic modesty" typical of modernity's
epistemological narratives.60 This condition, Levine says, serves ultimately to shore
up rather than unsettle the authority of the narrator in the story of the pursuit of
knowledge. But its purpose is to disguise the more aggrandising implications of
acquiring knowledge. Since the desire to know, in the Western tradition at least,
has often brought with it concomitant moral pressures and consequences
(mythically encoded as, say, Promethean overreaching or Faustian self-interest),
modern epistemology has had to find ways of legitimating its overweening nature
and securing trust in its intellectual authority. Descartes, in the Meditations, for
example, tried to divert attention away from the possibility of self-interest, not just
59 Ruskin, Works, VII, p. 9.
60 Levine identifies this paradoxical condition, first, with Descartes, whose early use of the trope of
modesty anticipated later strategies of self-legitimation, especially in nineteenth-century scientific
autobiographies: "He wanted to do no less than describe the world with absolute authority. But he
could so only by announcing at the very opening of the Discourse [on Method] that his mind is
"mediocre" and that anybody can do it. That rhetoric is not merely a disingenuous preliminary to his
epistemology: it is an aspect of it, as Darwin's (I believe more authentic) modesty was to be essential
to his achievements more than two hundred years later." Levine, Dying to Know, p. 49.
- 110 -
by formulating a method of pure enquiry, but by making his own personal
mediocrity a crucial part of his ambitions and stressing the quotidian simplicity of
his task, which his narrative then realises in the form of humble domestic detail
(the hearthside, the dressing-gown, the paper in his hands). In Descartes's case, as
Levine shrewdly observes, the tangibility of these details, and the rhetorical use of
the tangible in general, is "indispensable to establishing the authority of pure,
transparent consciousness, so that it is literally necessary to move epistemology
through narrative."61 Any such gambit aspiring to advance supersensibly to the
realm of essences and abstraction can only be made by also retaining a very human
humility, yet one towards which the impersonal or transcendent voice would be
utterly indifferent.
In a related way, a rhetoric of fallibility affordsModern Painters a means of
establishing and sustaining its narrative authority. That rhetoric is no more a
chance affair than it is in Descartes: it, too, constitutes an aspect of the text's
epistemology. The "oscillations of temper, and progressions of discovery" which
Ruskin says characterise the seventeen years spanned by Modern Painters are,
quite designedly, humbling admissions of imperfection. He seems only too willing
to disclose evidence of personal limitation. The vulgarity of his boyish tastes (his
"veneration for Rubens' physical art-power"), the hastiness with which he began
the unplanned work (he did not then think himself "qualified to write a treatise on
Art"), and the raw, unrefined quality of his early zeal for Turner ("his critics were
wrong, false, and base")—all of these gestures direct the reader towards the
provisional ground of the text's author(ity). The origins of Modern Painters feel
haphazard and impulsive, on the edges of authorial control and intention; modesty
thus becomes a determining trope for the very occasion of the text. Yet, as we have
seen with Ruskin's muscular preface, its aim of establishing the nature of truth in
aesthetic representation entails ambitions that are almost exaggeratedly immodest.
61 Levine, Dying to Know, p. 62.
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As in Descartes, the occlusion of subjectivity by means of the trope of
modesty succeeds only in testifying to the prominence of the self within narrative
demonstrations of the pursuit of knowledge. Both the Meditations and Modern
Painters, as different as they are as historical and formal documents, draw on
forms of autobiographical reflection to further their interest in knowledge and in
their attempt to establish the ground of certitude. Ruskin's own identity is crucial
to these tasks. As Mark Jarzombek argues, by the final volume Ruskin "has to
renegotiate his identity at every turn of the page."62 But, unlike in Descartes, the
personal realm is not invoked strategically as an acceptably modest kind of
narrative frame for its universalism. Whereas Cartesianism, importantly, has to
issue in clarity and distinctness, Modern Painters relies methodologically on
retaining rather than escaping its own historicity. Clarity and distinctness—the
achievements of a pure or transparent consciousness—do not constitute primaiy
drives of its narrative, at least not in the sense that they entail a constitutive need to
leave behind the condition of being embodied in narrative. The Ruskinian self
remains in important respects mutable, unfinished and bound by the limits of its
own writing. At virtually the close of the five long volumes, Ruskin states: "Looking
back over what I have written, I find that I have only now the power of ending this
work,—it being time that it should end, but not of 'concluding' it; for it has led me
into fields of infinite inquiry, where it is only possible to break off with such
imperfect result as may, at any given moment, have been attained."63 This
ambiguous closural moment—coinciding with a relaxing of the compulsion to write
rather than with the finalisation of meaning—suggests quite powerfully the close
interdependency of self and text. The limitations of human understanding become
incorporated into the open-ended textual structure, as the authorial voice evidently
52 Jarzombek's rather hurried argument addresses specifically the role of Turner's death (in 1851) in
the text's construction of a viable 'Ruskin', a heroic figure whose task will be to rescue him from
extinction by playing a sequence of different and contrary roles: cold scientist, impassioned admirer,
wise philosopher, humble amateur. See Mark Jarzombek, "Recognizing Ruskin: Modern Painters and
the Refractions ofSelf," Assemblage 32,1997, pp. 77-78.
63 Ruskin, Works, VII, p. 441.
- 112 -
struggles to exert control over the epistemological energies mobilised by his own
narrative. Ending arbitrarily, for reasons of sheer expediency rather than clarity or
distinctness, Modern Painters remains unable to assert its recognition of truth
unattached to the contingent plane of authorial subjectivity: "Much of [Turner's]
mind and heart I do not know;—perhaps shall never know," Ruskin has to concede
in the very last chapter.64
The trope of modesty, then, assists in the text's attempt to proceed
autobiographically from aesthetic innocence to experience, and its open narrative
shape is an important aspect of this effort of self-construction. Rather than aspiring
for some anti-corporeal conception of 'truth', as in Descartes, the empiricism of
Modern Painters conceives of the possibility of knowledge only in relation to the
limitations of human subjectivity; there is no triumphant mastery of identity
whereby the self is eclipsed in a moment of total understanding. This is in spite of
Ruskin's insistent call for the artist's self-annihilation. Just as Nelson's sacrificial
death at Trafalgar has the effect of lying him all the more powerfully to the
meaning of that battle, so in Ruskin's theory the annihilation of the artist merely
intensifies the relationship between work and subjectivity. This applies to Modern
Painters itself, as much as it does to Turner's aesthetic. As Jay Fellows puts it: "For
Ruskin, aspiring towards the condition of a whole self, is in fact nothing of the kind.
He assumes a 'biped stance' towards his worlds... Often many selves, each with
idiosyncratic preoccupations, Ruskin, with both public and private attitudes, is at
least two selves."65
For the development of consciousness everywhere inhabits Ruskin's
exploration of the external world of nature. The history of landscape is also a
reflexive history of the observing self: a bildungs story of the eye. As Fellows also
argues, his interest in natural topography answers an autobiographical impulse:
64 Ruskin, Works, VII, p. 443.
6s Jay Fellows, The Failing Distance: The Autobiographical Impulse in John Ruskin. Baltimore and
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975, p. 46.
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"Ruskin's history of the relations between landscape and its inhabitants from the
classical to the modern period is a public version of his own shifting relations and
attitudes towards landscape, from childhood to maturity."66 The descriptions of
natural scenery become testimonies of self-cultivation:
Stand for half an hour beside the Fall of Schaffhausen, on the north side
where the rapids are long, and watch how the vault of water first bends,
unbroken, in pure polished velocity, over the arching rocks at the brow of the
cataract, covering them with a dome of crystal twenty feet thick, so swift that
its motion is unseen except when a foam-globe from above darts over it like a
falling star; and how the trees are lighted above it under all their leaves, at the
instant that it breaks into foam; and how all the hollows of that foam burn
with green fire like so much shattering chrysoprase; and how, ever and anon,
startling you with its white flash, a jet spray leaps hissing out of the fall, like a
rocket, bursting in the wind and driven away in dust, filling the air with light;
and how, through the curdling wreaths of the restless crashing abyss below,
the blue of the water, paled by the foam in its body, shows purer than the sky
through white rain-cloud; while the shuddering iris stoops in tremulous
stillness over all, fading and flushing alternately through the choking spray
and shattered sunshine, hiding itself at last among the thick golden leaves
which toss to and fro in sympathy with wild water; their dripping masses
lifted at intervals, like sheaves of loaded corn, by some stronger gush from
the cataract, and bowed again upon the mossy rocks as its roar dies away; the
dew gushing from their thick branches through drooping clusters of emerald
herbage, and sparkling in white threads along the dark rocks of the shore,
feeding the lichens which chase and chequer them with purple and silver.6?
The verbal performance here is arrestingly dense and dramatic, woven intricately
into the shape of a single sentence, which forms an invitation to the reader to share
in a singularly rigorous act of perception. Ruskin's visual language of reality—so
replete with sensory information and amassed detail, with contrasts of colour and
light, with evidence of bursting, gushing, sparkling, curdling, shuddering,
66 Fellows, The Failing Distance, p. ix.
6? Ruskin, Works, III, pp. 529-30.
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dripping—appears to reconstitute in language an almost impossibly demanding
moment of observation. At the very edge of visual possibility, the wealth of detail
threatens to overwhelm us, even to exceed the writer's own descriptive powers; but,
unmistakeably, implied everywhere in the scene is a consummate eye of
experience—a self capable of organising these impressions into a coherent and
communicable vision. It is as much a dramatic account of perception itself as it is a
record of a dramatic natural spectacle; Ruskin's own exceptionally studious
dedication to describing the Schaffhausen Falls only confirms the singularity of his
perspective. That is, its exemplarity returns our attention to the subjectivity of the
viewer. Moreover, the rich, subtly ordered verbal texture points emphatically to an
unusually developed kind of consciousness from which these observations have
sprung, to mature powers of attention, memory, concentration and verbal facility,
or, we might say, to advanced signatures of feeling, to adapt a term from G. H.
Lewes. As John Rosenberg argues, the prose ofModern Painters in examples such
as this "reflects both the contours of the landscape and the inner geography of
Ruskin's mind."68 In this sense, the passage describes a moment on Ruskin's
autobiographical journey towards Turner's ideal aesthetic.6?
A further example of the interpenetration of self and landscape has been
given by George Hersey, who explains it in relation to a self-portrait by Ruskin
dating from 1874. In the picture, Ruskin renders himself in rough, blocky washes of
watercolour, very much in the style he might have chosen for rendering mountain
scenery in one of his own sketches or illustrations. Effectively, it visualises himself,
the creative artist, in terms borrowed from the natural world—"a portrait of the
artist as landscape."?0 At the same time, Hersey suggests, the painting shows
Ruskin staring back out at the viewer with an undeniable intensity, making it
68 Rosenberg, "Style and Sensibility in Ruskin's Prose," p. 187.
^ Patricia Ball examines the Turnerian aspects of the Schaffhausen Falls passage, particularly its
strong sense of visual relationship and formal urgency, pointing out that Ruskin "makes [Turner's]
work the standard for his own verbal art." Ball, The Science ofAspects, p. 86.
70 George L. Hersey, "Ruskin as an Optical Thinker" in John Dixon Hunt and Faith M. Holland, eds.
The Ruskin Polygon: Essays on the Imagination ofJohn Ruskin. Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1982, p. 44.
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equally a portrait of the artist as a seer. The portrait thus captures a kind of double
knowledge: at once it suggests the way landscape has played a decisive role in the
formation of his identity, while also seeming to claim (as he stares simultaneously
at himself and at the world) that one cannot separate what we know of physical
reality from our contingent biographical self. It becomes an irresolvable formal
tension: does the painting show the self dissolving into landscape, or vice versa? In
its problematic form, the portrait—like Modern Painters—suggests a human,
relative and conditional conception of knowledge. And this is crucial to Ruskin's
project. If it is to be attained, the 'truth' so centrally at stake in Modern Painters
rests upon a reflexivity that revives the subjective conditions purported to stand in
the way of a realistic knowledge of landscape. Or, to use a phrase of George
Levine's, Ruskin's text "explores the possibility of selflessness derived from the
energies of egoism. Egotistically annihilating egoism, the heroic figure might at last
gain access to a world that is not self, learn from and do justice to that 'other' who
lies just beyond the walls of ego."?1 Realism, as Ruskin imagines it, entails precisely
this empiricist gesture.
Against Mindless Imitation
As we have seen, 'truth' for Ruskin supplies the ultimate test for any work of art,
andModern Painters concerns itself at every turn with establishing the meaning of
that claim. At times it seems the simplest of conceivable tests: "This is still the only
question for the artist, or for us:—'Is it a fact? Are things really so?"'?2 But the
unfolding epistemology staged in Ruskin's work delegitimises the straightforwardly
referential assumptions informing this criterion, not least because 'truth' is often
aligned at a rhetorical level with struggle and deferral, not simplicity. Moreover, at
other points in the argument the primacy of realism becomes connected to a
sceptical set of claims of a philosophically nuanced kind:
?l Levine, Dying to Know, p. 177.
72 Ruskin, Works, V, p. 179.
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Truth may be stated by any signs or symbols which have a definite
signification in the minds of those to whom they are addressed, although
such signs be themselves no image nor likeness of anything. Whatever can
excite in the mind the conception of certain facts, can give ideas of truth,
though it be in no degree the imitation or resemblance of those facts. If there
be—we do not say there is,—but if there be in painting anything which
operates, as words do, not by resembling anything, but by being taken as a
symbol and substitute for it, and thus inducing the effect of it, then this
channel of communication can convey uncorrupted truth, though it do not in
any degree resemble the facts whose conception it induces. But ideas of
imitation, of course, require the likeness of the object.^
This key passage appears relatively early on (it comes from the 'Of Ideas of Truth'
chapter in the first volume), and it has several significant aspects. First, we should
note, the argument being proposed here seeks to account for truth not as property
of painting in the first instance, but as a psychological question. It deals directly
with epistemology—with the nature and possibility of knowledge—as a philosopher
of mind might deal with it, which is to say, in a manner presently unconnected to
the intrinsic formal truthfulness of a work of art. At this juncture, painted forms
themselves have a secondary importance. Certainly, the worthiest paintings, such
as those of Turner, have the propensity to give rise to ideas of truth in the mind of
the viewer, but Ruskin's immediate concern is with the nature of those ideas and
that subjective process. He is approaching the question of visual representation by
first establishing a prior theoretical framework of mental representation; 'idea',
here, it should be emphasised, carries a traditional eighteenth-century meaning in
as much as it signifies a sensory-based mental impression.74 This extension of
73 Ruskin, Works, III, pp. 104-5.
74 GaryWihl notes that W. G. Collingwood's 1893 study of Ruskin established the view that Locke, in
particular, is the philosopher Modern Painters follows here in its terminology, but Wihl reminds us
that this might be to take Ruskin's 'idea' too narrowly: "At the same time, it is equally obvious that,
properly speaking, Locke has very little to do with the opening scheme [of the work]. Locke provides
the crucial definition of the term 'Idea', on which the entire theoretical introduction rests, but hardly
the content of any of the specific ideas."Wihl, The Rhetoric ofInfallibility, p. 4.
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empiricist orthodoxy thus becomes a crucial part of the philosophical groundwork
of Ruskin's aesthetics of realism.
Secondly, the passage conveys an important sense of the arbitrariness of the
signifying medium through which ideas of truth are mobilised. Its theory of
representation, both aesthetic and mental, does not identify truthfulness with
mimetic reproduction or duplication: a painted image, or an ideational structure in
the mind, may be wholly unlike its particular signified. Truth does not consist in a
perfect resemblance between idea, image and object. Instead, truthfulness is
equivalent to "a definite signification" of symbols or signs. And to illustrate this
point, Ruskin invokes language as an example of arbitrary signification, for words
do not derive signifying power from having an intrinsic resemblance to anything in
the actual world of objects. They are not imitative in this sense, and therefore the
reader is encouraged to envisage how a similar arbitrariness may operate in the
signification of painting, too (Ruskin, long before Saussure, we should observe, has
an appreciation of the autonomy of the linguistic system). A painted composition
also may generate ideas of truth without possessing an intrinsic referential
connection to the world beyond it. That possibility, too, stems from Ruskin's
empiricist conviction that ideas of truth are not merely internal replicas of external
facts.
A third (and related) point emerges at the tail end of the passage: "But ideas
of imitation, of course, require the likeness of the object." Explicitly and
deliberately, Ruskin enforces an opposition between painting that aspires to be
truthful, or realist, and the merely imitative work. Realism, it transpires, is defined
in opposition to imitation. The distinction is retained throughout the whole of
Modern Painters, and its significance is vital to an understanding of Ruskin's
epistemological engagement. By imitation, Ruskin means a mode of art that seeks
to abolish the hiatus between the representation and the represented, between
image and object: it is a flawless art of verisimilitude, a perfectly rendered illusion
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of reality, or trompe I'oeil. It stands for a maximal 'realism' in the everyday sense of
the word. A good example of imitation would be a typical Canaletto painting, for
instance, which desires such a proximity to the real that it seems unwilling to
declare its own status as a material image applied to canvas. A Canaletto, for
Ruskin, indeed, marks "the most servile and mindless imitation. "75
As it praises Turner, then, the broader argument of Modern Painters has
also correspondingly to condemn imitation, which it sees as a coarsening and
deceptive representational claim. "The ideas and pleasures [of imitation] are the
most contemptible which can be received from art," Ruskin argues.?6 Why, we
might ask, does Ruskin find imitation so objectionable or inferior? Why should
someone so preoccupied by truth, realism, knowledge and observational sobriety
seek to condemn art that aspires for this closeness to the real? One answer is that
Ruskin considers imitation to be ultimately duplicitous. Such perfect translation
being impossible, the imitative work pretends through a feat of visual trickery to
become what it depicts. It cleverly causes the viewer of the painting to confuse
ontological realms: suddenly work and world seem ideally to coincide. However,
the fulfilment of its effect occurs at precisely the point when the ontological spell
breaks, uncovering the illusion. At this crucial moment, when aesthetic pleasure in
the picture intensifies, the image and the real regain their distinctiveness in such a
way that the act of deception can manifest itself—that is, suddenly we see the trick.
Our pleasure now derives from appreciating the technical skill that went into
creating the two-dimensional illusion of depth; it does not derive from a
heightened knowledge of the world portrayed. As Ruskin explains: "the degree of
the pleasure depends on the degree of difference and the perfection of the
resemblance, not on the nature of the thing resembled. The simple pleasure in the
75 Ruskin, Works, III, p. 215.
?6 Ruskin, Works, III, p. 101.
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imitation would be precisely of the same degree (if the accuracy could be equal),
whether the subject of it were the hero or his horse."77
Imitation therefore becomes doubly objectionable, as Ruskin defines it. On
the one hand, it effaces itself before the viewer as a mediating artifice, and then, on
the other, it revels triumphantly in its own powers of visual deception, thereby
raising the trickery into an overt theme. As Caroline Levine argues: "In short, the
more conventionally 'realistic' the image, the less the work of art will tell us about
the object it portrays. Whenever painting pretends to be the object it represents,
the pretense itself becomes the sole subject-matter of the work."78 Such is the
thrust of Ruskin's critique: ironically, the more like a real thing the painting
becomes, the less truthful it must be. At its most veracious, the work of imitation
exposes its profound falsity. And its pleasure comes, ignobly, "not from the
contemplation of a truth, but from the discovery of a falsehood."79 In contrast to the
imitative painting, a marble sculpture, say, already registers in its very form a
conscious awareness of its distance from the represented world:
[F]or a marble figure does not look like what it is not: it looks like marble,
and like the form of a man, but then it is marble, and it is the form of a man.
It does not look like a man, which it is not, but like the form of a man, which
it is. Form is form, bona fide and actual, whether in marble or in flesh—not
an imitation or resemblance of form, but real form. The chalk outline of the
bough of a tree on paper, is not an imitation; it looks like chalk and paper—
not like wood, and that which it suggests to the mind is not properly said to
be like the form of a bough, it is the form of a bough.80
Ruskin's preference for hewn marble over trompe I'oeil shows how he puts
the question of the materiality of the signifier at the heart of his critique of
imitation. Truthful art or realism, unlike this ultra-mimesis, never disguises or
77 Ruskin, Works, III, p. 101.
78 Caroline Levine, "Seductive Reflexivity: Ruskin's Dreaded Trompe l'oeil," The Journal ofAesthetics
andArt Criticism 56, 4,1998, p. 368.
79 Ruskin, Works, III, p. 108.
80 Ruskin, Works, III, p. 101.
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attempts to transcend the realm of the sign. On the contrary, the best painter,
Ruskin says, "wishes to put into his work as much truth as possible, and yet to keep
it looking un-real."81 Standing before one of Turner's canvases, we will never be
able to forget that we are examining a image constructed out of paint on a flat
surface; indeed, its 'unreality' will contribute crucially, if paradoxically, to its
successful execution of his quintessential realism. For the genuinely truthful work
always refuses to disavow its own status as artifice. This requires, Ruskin argues,
that the realist not make the representation seem real:
And thus, so far from its being at all an object to the painter to make his work
look real, he ought to dread such a consummation as the loss of one of its
most precious claims upon the heart. So far from striving to convince the
beholder that what he sees is substance, his mind should be to what he paints
as the fire to the body on the pile, burning away the ashes, leaving the
unconquerable shade—an immortal dream. So certain is this, that the
slightest local success in giving the deceptive appearance of reality—the
imitation, for instance, of the texture of a bit of wood, with its grain in relief-
will instantly destroy the charm of a whole picture.82
One of the ironies of Ruskin's position, historically speaking, is that this kind of
argument expresses a view that has since become virtually an article of faith in
postmodernist criticism, which has tended to denounce 'realism' (Ruskin's
included) as a set of pitifully naive representational strategies predicated on "a
particular way of looking at art and life as though there was a direct
correspondence between the two."83 John Mepham, for example, writes:
"Postmodernist fiction repudiates this impossible dream and does all it can to
advertise 'textuality'. It points towards the future because it is part of the grand
narrative of emancipation from past illusions (realism, mimesis) and is based on a
more sophisticated philosophical grasp of the relations between language and
81 Ruskin, Works, V, p. 186.
82 Ruskin, Works, V, p. 185.
83 Alison Lee, Realism and Power: Postmodern British Fiction. London: Routledge, 1990, p. 3.
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reality. "84 A version of this argument might easily be extended to self-referential
visual art in the twentieth century. What these criticisms fail to acknowledge is that
realism, at least for a writer like Ruskin, never entailed those alleged first-order
assumptions to begin with, however rigorously the sophisticated aesthetics of
postmodernity call them into question. Victorian literary and philosophical culture
was much too epistemologically astute and self-conscious for that to obtain. More
problematic still, Ruskin's theorisation of realism presciently shares their
scepticism towards notions of pure referentiality: the work of art, he states, "has in
some measure even an advantage with us in not being real."8s
Ruskin's own argument against imitation or trompe I'oeil has a historical
dimension, too. Rather like some postmodern criticism, he identifies modernity in
general, from the Renaissance to the nineteenth century, with the domination of
imitation as a cultural paradigm.86 "There was probably never a period in which the
influence of art over the minds of men seemed to depend less on its merely
imitative power," he claims, "than the close of the thirteenth century."87 Medieval
chiaroscuro, Ruskin notes, tended to pursue fantastical effects rather than an
authentic resemblance of reality, and openly distanced the work from the world.
But the overwhelming majority of art and criticism since then, with the rare
exception of Turner, has sought fixatedly after deceptive resemblance and
imitation. His trawling through historical examples of paintings, genres, styles and
schools confirms it: "I cannot remember any writer [on art], not professedly
artistical, who has not, more or less, in one part of his book or another,
countenanced the idea that the great end of art is to produce a deceptive
84 John Mepham, "Narratives of Postmodernism" in Edmund Smyth, ed. Postmodernism and
Contemporary Fiction. London: Batsford, 1991, p. 152.
8s Ruskin, Works, V, p. 184.
86 Elizabeth Ermarth, for example, has argued that realism belongs to the mainstream of European
humanist culture after the Renaissance, as a set of conventions assuming the homogeneity of time and
space. It thus refers to cultural shifts long before the rise of high realism in the nineteenth-century
novel, and her argument relies on a sustained contrast between Medieval and post-Renaissance
modes of representation. Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, Realism and Consensus in the English Novel.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983, pp. 3-37.
87 Ruskin, Works, V, p. 37.
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resemblance of reality."88 Canaletto is far from unique as a mindless imitator:
"everything that [Cuyp, Poussin, Claude] can do is done for deception," and they
epitomise the "melancholy and monotonous transcripts of [nature] which alone can
be received from the old school of art."89 Collectors of Dutch painting do not escape
censure, either; they merely "enjoy seeing what is flat made to look round, exactly
as a child enjoys a trick of legerdemain."90
The iconoclastic energy ofModern Painters devotes itself to uncovering this
history of deception and aesthetic falsehood, preparing the way for us to see
Turner, instead, as the apotheosis of truthful representation. Ruskin's realism thus
implies a radical historical realignment. It also demands that realism be
distinguished from other referential discourses or practices, such as photography
and topographical illustration. It has become commonplace to see photography,
especially, as closely bound up in the nineteenth century with a scientific culture of
realism and objectivity. In the sense that it seems to promise an authentic and
direct description of reality, the photograph is widely assumed to have become a
benchmark for visual representation, the medium above all others that most
fulfilled the Victorian's pervasive appetite for realism. Jennifer Tucker, for
instance, refers to "the nineteenth century's belief in the power of photographic
technology to replicate the act of unmediated seeing, to eliminate human prejudice,
and to minimize the errors that allegedly vitiated the objectivity of drawings."91
These qualities ensured that the photographic image became "the norm of
truthfulness in representation."92 Photography, the argument goes, increasingly
defined the terms in which the aesthetico-epistemological issue of realism was
debated in Victorian culture. As Jennifer Green-Lewis puts it: "What realism ought
88 Ruskin, Works, V, p. 36.
89 Ruskin, Works, III, p. 168.
90 Ruskin, Works, V, pp. 36-37.
91 Jennifer Tucker, "Photography as Witness, Detective and Imposter: Visual Representation in
Victorian Science" in Bernard Lightman, ed. Victorian Science in Context. Chicago and London:
University of Chicago Press, 1997, p. 380.
92 William Mills Ivins Jnr, Prints and Visual Communication. London: Routledge, 1953, p. 94; quoted
by Jennifer Green-Lewis, Framing the Victorians, p. 38.
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to do and what it was actually capable of were topics for which photography was
able to provide confirmation."93 Over time, the photographic image acquired
representational authority and credibility, predicated crucially on its reputation for
disinterestedness and detailed verisimilitude. It became "a yardstick of reality" for
a nineteenth-century culture "increasingly obsessed with the real."9-*
For Ruskin, and for empiricists like G. H. Lewes, however, photography did
not carry this signature of reality. For them, it was neither the norm for
truthfulness in representation, nor a paradigm on which other realisms had to be
modelled. The photographic image, in fact, embodied certain epistemological
assumptions about the nature of reality and its representation that empiricism
sought repeatedly to undermine. Like a Canaletto, it was another grave example of
mindless imitation. That is, it was a dubious enterprise precisely because it tried so
hard to neutralise the role of the human mediation in order to establish transparent
visual knowledge—and so, therefore, it was 'mindless' in the quite literal sense of
circumventing consciousness. Ruskin did recognise, to some extent, the merits of
photographic reproduction; he notes in the Preface to the third volume ofModern
Painters, for example, that the advent of photography has allowed him to include
fewer factual illustrations of landscape than in the earlier volumes.95 But while
useful for narrow factual tasks such as this, photography per se represented things
falsely, not realistically: "Photography... misses certain of the utmost subtleties of
natural effect (which are often the things that Turner has chiefly aimed at), while it
renders subtleties oiform which no human hand could achieve."96 Lewes, too, saw
that photography's referential claims rested on a suspect premise: that detailism
was equivalent in some profound way to truthfulness. Not only was this bad faith
epistemologically, Lewes thought, it was threatening the wider culture:
53 Green-Lewis, Framing the Victorians, p. 20.
94 Green-Lewis, Framing the Victorians, p. 38; p. 233.
95 "I once intended the illustrations to these volumes to be more numerous and elaborate, but the art
of photograph}' now enables my reader to obtain as many memoranda of the facts of nature as he
needs." Ruskin, Works, V, p. 9.
96 Ruskin, Works, VI, pp. 81-82.
- 124 -
There is, at the present day, a fashion in Literature, and in Art generally,
which is very deplorable... The fashion is that of coat-and-waistcoat realism, a
creeping timidity of invention, moving almost exclusively amid scenes of
drawing-room existence, with all the reticences and pettinesses of drawing-
room conventions. Artists have become photographers, and have turned the
camera upon the vulgarities of life, instead of representing the more
impassioned movements of life... [Yet] the artists have not painted what they
have seen, but have been false and conventional in their pretended realism.97
Artists have become photographers: the judgment is scathing, not celebratory. He
uses the word with a contempt that indicates how resistant empiricism could be to
this seemingly unmediated form of knowledge. Interesting to note is the echo of
Ruskin in Lewes's final phrase "pretended realism"—the more these substandard
novelists and artists approach the ideal of photorealism in their writing or on their
canvases, the more false they become. Photography, Lewes agrees, has encouraged
a standard in representational discourse which, when adhered to, produces a false
kind of knowledge precisely at the point that it imagines itself to mirror objective
reality faithfully.
Like a photographer, Canaletto, who represents for Ruskin a particular
nadir in the modern history ofWestern art, aspires to a copyism that tries to exert a
kind of mechanical mastery over the meaning of the world it represents. By
seeming to narrow the interpretative space in visual representation to almost the
zero degree, his aesthetic expresses an empowering fantasy of perfectly unified
vision and total knowledge. This epitomises the representational logic of imitation.
Ruskin, consequently, advances a two-pronged critique of Canaletto. First of all, he
sees trompe I'oeil as an ultimately self-regarding aesthetic, vainly pursuing a type of
visual deception whose only goal is gaining the spectator's admiration. In the
imitative work, the artist's own hand, not the object itself, ultimately wins our
97 G. H. Lewes, Principles ofSuccess in Literature, pp. 26-7.
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attention. And so imitation is closely bound up with egotistical pleasure, and
specificallywith the vanity that comes of having mastered the representable world;
as Caroline Levine argues, "imitative art is dangerous because it teaches us to enjoy
our own authority."98 Like much contemporary criticism today, Ruskin intuits an
important connection here between mimesis and power. In contrast, realism, as he
defines it, should attempt to overcome the vanity of the ego and the self-
aggrandisement latent within it. That requires conceding mastery over the visual
world, as he routinely reminds us: "It has been stated, over and over again, that it is
not possible to draw the whole of nature, as in a mirror."99 The incompleteness of
visual representation should even be seen as a necessary aspect of its capacity for
expressing truth: "Painting has its peculiar virtues, not only consistent with, but
even resulting from, its shortcomings and weaknesses."100
The second aspect of Ruskin's critique has to do with the way Canaletto's
work simultaneously expresses an impoverishment of subjectivity. The "power of
deceptive imitation," Ruskin argues, "requires nothing more for its attainment than
a true eye, a steady hand, and moderate industry—qualities which in no degree
separate the imitative artist from a watchmaker, pin-maker, or any other neat-
handed artificer."101 In Canaletto's painting there is a dull mechanical quality
deriving precisely from its elimination of human feeling, which its pretended
realism necessitates. He manages to render Venice, for example, as an almost alien,
inhuman, dehistoricised landscape; the buildings of San Marco seem to lack their
"ancestral dignity," and there is "no texture of stone nor character of age" in the
realisation of architectural detail, which he achieves with "a violent, black, sharp,
ruled penmanlike line."102 More artisan than artist, his concern for clarity and
intelligibility results in a peculiar numbness or inauthenticity. The laborious detail
98 Levine, "Seductive Reflexivity," p. 371.
99 Ruskin, Works, VI, p. 45.
100 Ruskin, Works, V, p. 176.
101 Ruskin, Works, III, p. 103.
102 Ruskin, Works, III, p. 215.
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and studious rendering bind his painting to what Ruskin calls the "shackles and
fetters of mere external fact."103 His is a Venice leached of all traces of human
response and sensory knowledge, an implicitly spectatorless panorama of fact. In
its effort to stabilise reality, his painting empties the representational space of its
relation to subjectivity.104 As such, Canaletto successfully executes the imitation at
the expense of truth.
Realism, then, for Ruskin, means actively opposing the tendency in art for
mindless imitation. It must openly retain its distance from the real, and finally it
must reincorporate the dangerous subjectivity that Ruskin declares should
annihilate itself before the object. Just as Ruskin himself will not be suppressed in
the narrative of Modern Painters, despite his insistence that the writer should be
invisible, so in his aesthetic theory the empiricist concept of subjectivity does not
disappear or even recede. On the contrary, the instability of identity is one of its
pervasive concerns; and it is precisely a problem with painters like Canaletto that
their work banishes the notion of reality as felt experience. A passage from volume
three neatly suggests the divide between, say, a Turner and a Canaletto:
Great art is produced by men who feel acutely and nobly; and it is in some
sort an expression of this personal feeling. We can easily conceive that there
may be a sufficiently marked distinction between such art, and that which is
produced by men who do not feel at all, but who reproduce, though ever so
accurately, yet coldly, like human mirrors, the scenes which pass before their
eyes."105
Where Canaletto is a cold human mirror, Turner incorporates subjectivity into the
form and texture of his work. The contingency of his being in the world supplies the
ground from which realism can articulate its epistemological vision. For realism, as
103 Ruskin, Works, IV, p. 278.
104 Ruskin takes this de-subjectivisation to be a symptom of a wider cultural decline: "[His] miserable,
virtueless, heartless mechanism, accepted as the representation of such various glory, is, both in its
existence and acceptance, among the most striking signs of the lost sensation and deadened intellect
of the nation at that time." Ruskin, Works, III, p. 214.
103 Ruskin, Works, V, p. 32.
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Ruskin sees it, implies a situated perspective. While not an end of realistic art in
itself, psychological point of view marks at least a condition of its possibility. "Any
topographical delineation of the facts," he argues, "must be wholly incapable of
arousing in the mind of the beholder those sensations which would be caused by
the facts themselves, seen in their natural relations to others." And herein lies the
influence of empiricism in Ruskin's theory of realism: our only real facts are those
embedded inside dynamic and relative processes of consciousness. In other words,
it is the mental sensation of facts (we might validly say feelings instead) that
realism has the burden of representing, not a transparent world independent of our
finite mutable selves. Where the mere copyist seeks self-annihilation, the realist
communicates "the far higher and deeper truth ofmental vision."106
In common with other mid-Victorian empiricists, Ruskin therefore enlists
the observer as a figure through whom knowledge must pass. Indeed, the thrust of
Modern Painters is often heavily psychologistic, both in vocabulary and vision. At
times, for instance, Turner's greatness appears to rest more on his mental stature
than it does on the intrinsic merit of his finished canvases: "Turner's mind is not
more, in my estimation, distinguished above others by its demonstrably arranging
and ruling faculties, than by its demonstrably retentive and submissive faculties;
and the longer I investigate it, the more this tenderness of perception and grasp of
memory seem to me the root of its greatness."107 Form and composition, he thinks,
have value partly because through them a historical psychological identity might be
retraced, for they can reveal "the great human spirit through which [reality] is
manifested to us."108 Rather than amounting to some crude biographism, this
argument draws much more importantly on empiricism's guiding assumption that
knowledge establishes itself within emergent psychological structures, and that
reality can only ever be encountered under relational description.
106 Ruskin, Works, VI, pp. 35-36.
107 Ruskin, Works, VI, p. 44.
108 Ruskin, Works, V, p. 187.
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Two short passages fromModern Painters, in particular, help to convey this
empiricist psychological and epistemological commitment. One appears in the first
volume, again in connection with 'Ideas of Truth':
But the highest art, being based on sensations of peculiar minds, sensations
occurring to them only at particular times... and being expressive of thoughts
which could only rise out of a mass of the most extended knowledge, and of
dispositions modified in a thousand ways by peculiarity of intellect, can only
be met and understood by persons having some sort of sympathy with the
high and solitary minds which produced it...10®
The second, from volume two, arises in a discussion of the imagination:
These sources of beauty [in nature], however, are not presented by any very
great work of art in a form of pure transcript. They invariably receive the
reflection of the mind under whose influence they have passed, and are
modified or coloured by its image. This modification is the Work of
Imagination... [I]t is very necessary... [to] distinguish its sane, healthy, and
profitable operation, from that which is erratic, diseased, and dangerous.110
The theme raised in the first passage—the particularity of the sensuous intellect-
becomes, in the second, part of a strong argument against mimesis. Ruskin's point
in both is that perception, thought, imagination and representation all share the
same contingency, in turn ideally translated into an aesthetic property of the
artwork itself. The singularity of the creative mind thus imprints itself indelibly in
the singular form of the work; imaginative activity, Ruskin says, is an indispensable
dimension of this process. While this appears to reiterate a romantic valorisation of
creativity and uniqueness, Ruskin's position actually strives to distance itself from
late eighteenth-century definitions of the imagination and also from expressive
models of authorship. At times, indeed, Ruskin treats quite contemptuously the
myth of unworldly genius which forms such an influential part of romanticism's
10® Ruskin, Works, III, p. 135-36.
110 Ruskin, Works, IV, p. 223.
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cultural legacy.111 Instead, his view of the role played by imagination in our
perception of objects connects him to mid-centuiy psychologists like Lewes and
Alexander Bain, who saw the imagination not as a quasi-transcendent mental
faculty but as a kind of inferential psychological process. Lewes, for example, who
argued that it was common both to philosophy and art, grounded the operation of
the imagination firmly in experience: "It should, however, be borne in mind that
Imagination can only recall what Sense has previously impressed. No man
imagines any detail of which he has not previously had direct or indirect
experience."112 Bain felt that imagination was a more accurate word for perception,
because, he said, its constructive agency assists in transforming the data of sense-
experience into recognisable mental images: "Such transformation of a sum-total of
association into a self-existent unit, is a frequent mental illusion. This supposed
object is an entity, not [only] of sense, but of imagination and belief, to which we
erroneously apply this word perception."115 And in Ruskin, likewise, imagination
has primarily an epistemological, not aesthetic, kind of significance: "We call the
power 'Imagination,' because it imagines or conceives the truth."114 That is to say, it
takes us towards the world of experience rather than exiling us mystically from it. A
mind that was wholly unimaginative would be, for Ruskin, figuratively blind.115
Like these other empiricists, associationism importantly informs Ruskin's
understanding of the mind. As Patricia Ball rightly says, "Ruskin exists on a plane
of emotionally-led association," which is inseparable from his language of fact.116
The imagination inModern Painters is tied especially closely to the principles and
workings of mental association, for it facilitates the apprehension of fact as such.
111 For example, from volume three ofModern Painters: "Let a man have shaggy hair, dark eyes, a
rolling voice, plenty of animal energy, and a facility of rhyming or sentencing, and—improvisatore or
sentimentalist—we call him 'inspired' willingly enough..." Ruskin, Works, V, p. 190.
112 Lewes, Principles ofSuccess in Literature, p. 49; pp. 55-56.
"3 Alexander Bain, The Emotions and the Will. (1859) London: Longmans, Green and Co., 2nd edn.,
1865, n. p. 585.
114 Ruskin, Works, V, p. 178.
115 "I believe it will be found that the entirely unimaginative mind sees nothing of the object it has to
dwell upon or describe, and is therefore utterly unable, as it is blind to itself, to set anything before the
eyes of the reader." Ruskin, Works, IV, p. 253.
116 Ball, The Science ofAspects, p. 72.
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What he calls the 'associative imagination' is, for Ruskin, "the most elevated power
ofmind," and by it "images apposite or resemblant, or ofwhatever kind wanted, are
called up quickly and in multitudes."11? As this implies, associationism supports a
multiple, relational model of psychology:
[A] powerfully imaginative mind seizes and combines at the same instant, not
only two, but all the important ideas of its poem or picture; and while it
works with any one of them, it is at the same instant working with and
modifying all in their relations to it, never losing sight of their bearings on
each other; as the motion of the snake's body goes through all parts at once,
and its volition acts at the same instant in coils that go contrary ways.118
Likened in a wonderfully suggestive metaphor to a coiled snake, the mind in the
instant of composition grasps a configuration of relations between multiple ideas;
and association, like the body of the snake, holds together these different elements
in an unlikely unity or tension. Every part interacts relationally with the whole. By
means of a process that Ruskin compares to chemistry, the associative imagination
selects otherwise dissonant ideas "which together shall be right, and of whose
unity, therefore, the idea must be formed at the instant they are seized."119 Striking
here is the way that Ruskin talks in an equivalent way about mind and picture: both
are described using a formalist language of unity, balance and harmony, as though
merging into one another. Ideas, it seems, are primarily mental qualities, yet also
elements in a painting. The ambiguity suggests that the associational moment
extends into the two-dimensional medium of the representation. Ruskin's theory
thus encourages the view that the flat painted surface of a canvas constitutes the
formal occasion of an ideational structure, realising in visual space a specific set of
psychological relations. Indeed, in Turner's pictures we "always find the associative
"? Ruskin, Works, IV, p. 232.
118 Ruskin, Works, IV, pp. 235-36.
119 Ruskin, Works, IV, p. 234.
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imagination developed in the most profuse and marvellous modes."120 Realism, on
this view, entails translating into aesthetic form the kinds of relational shifts and
connections postulated by associationist psychology.
As we shall see in the next chapter, the conditions of perception for Ruskin
are always associational, just as they are for Lewes, Bain, Herbert Spencer and
George Eliot. Their empiricism entails recognising how we have to encounter the
world through our selves—through shifting, unstable, historicised identities. And
Ruskin also shows a sensitive grasp of how consciousness shapes the 'reality' that
we see and represent under the rubric of realism. The genuine realist, he says, such
as Turner, understands these same conditions. For past associations live on in the
objects that presently we perceive, almost unconsciously. If our eye happens to fall
on the branch of a tree during conversation with a friend, a trace of that pleasurable
experience will be summoned thereafter when we experience trees in future. The
original occasion may itself be long forgotten, yet its effect will be "a pleasure so
slight, a trace of feeling so delicate, as to leave us utterly unconscious of its peculiar
power; but undestroyable by any reasoning, a part, thenceforward, of our
constitution, destroyable only by the same arbitrary process of association by which
it was created." And reason has barely any influence over this intrusion of memory
into perception. We cannot block out associational activity from our judgments
using rational will power: "there is probably no one opinion which is formed by any
of us, in matters of taste, which is not in some degree influenced by unconscious
association of this kind."121 For Ruskin, it becomes the task of the realist to grasp
these pervasive tracings of desire and memory in the mind's cognition of reality.
In fact, the historical re-evaluation of aesthetic value that Modern Painters
sets out before the reader hinges on this understanding. If Turner comes closer
than any other artist to fulfilling the goals of realism, it is because his work seems
to grasp the limitations entailed in knowing. He presents us with a reality
120 Ruskin, Works, IV, p. 246.
121 Ruskin, Works, IV, p. 73.
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comprised of blurred borders, imprecise natural contours, partially realised details
of landscape, swirling suggestions of earth and sky, and hazy mists of light and
colour. The world, to Turner's eye, is never fully knowable or rationally intelligible.
Flux and indeterminacy are its predominant motifs. Never pretending to a perfect
or even adequate grip on the physical world, he dramatises the incompleteness and
uncertainty that attend the point of view of his implied spectator, not the mastery
exerted by the act of observation. He depicts a reality shaped by excitements of the
feelings and promptings of desire, constantly evoking the world not as it might be
in itself (a speculative, bracketed question for empiricism) but as it exists when our
perspectives, too, can be admitted into the definition of reality. His paintings thus
gain their aesthetic power from enforcing what we could call a visual scepticism: a
rejection of clarity and distinctness founded on the understanding of the limits and
ignorance of all potential vantage points. To Ruskin, this was necessary: "As all
subjects have a mystery in them, so all drawing must have a mystery in it."122
Behind Turner's primacy inModern Painters, then, stands epistemology. As
Charles Reeve points out, "Ruskin wants to argue that nothing can be known with
absolute certainty"—and Turner comes to figure exactly this in his narrative.123 The
scepticism of Ruskin's position may not quite approach the radicalism of Roland
Barthes's claim that realism "has no responsibility vis-a-vis the real," but certainly
it denies the referential accessibility of a 'real' unshaped by associational desire and
conventional codes of description.1^ (An intriguing aspect of Ruskin's rejection of
huge swathes of Western painting is an argument he makes to the effect that the
general cultural imagination typically sees nature through pictorial conventions
inherited from traditionally great painters, not as it appears; in other words, people
unconsciously see reality as if it were artifice, for the history of art has (falsely)
122 Ruskin, Works, VI, p. 83.
123 Charles Reeve, "Godly Untruth," Assemblage 32,1997, p. 52.
124 "The first [proposition] is that the discourse has no responsibility vis-a-vis the real: in the most
realistic novel, the referent has no 'reality*: suffice it to imagine the disorder the most orderly
narrative would create were its descriptions taken at face value, converted into operative programs
and simply executed." Roland Barthes, S/Z. trans. Richard Miller, London: Blackwell, 1990, pp. 80-
81.
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conditioned their own perception of the world around them: "if we could examine
the conception formed in the minds of most educated persons when we talk of
clouds, it would frequently be found composed of fragments of blue and white
reminiscences of the old masters."125) Ruskin neither believes nor expects art to be
capable of aligning itself transparently with objective reality. Modern Painters, in
its quest to establish the 'truth' of Turner, forms an extended and unsystematic
refutation of the possibility of such an absolute relation. As Reeve, again, notes:
"Ruskin's truth is that there is no truth—or, at least, not one that we can hope to
understand or represent."126 This apparent crisis of knowledge inscribes itself in a
realist like Turner, in whom we sense the sheer unsurveyable excess of the visual
field and the fragility of the subjective ground where the perceptual act of knowing
has to take place. The empiricism of Modern Painters therefore leads Ruskin
increasingly to embrace a form of scepticism, which as it strives towards truth also
forces the narrative to recognise the inconceivability of full knowledge:
Knowledge is good, and light is good, yet man perished in seeking knowledge,
and moths perish in seeking light; and if we, who are crushed before the
moth, will not accept such mystery as is needful for us, we shall perish in like
manner. But accepted in humbleness, it instantly becomes an element of
pleasure; and I think that every rightly constituted mind ought to rejoice, not
so much in knowing anything clearly, as in feeling that there is infinitely
more which it cannot know.127
In the end, Modern Painters absorbs empiricism at a methodological level,
and thereby manages over its twisting course to resemble what Lewes, for example,
insisted a proper history of art and criticism should look like: "To understand
Nature, we must observe her manifestations, and trace out the laws of the co¬
existence and succession of phenomena. And in the same way, to understand Art,
125 Ruskin, Works, III, p. 345-46.
126 Charles Reeve, "Godly Untruth," p. 52.
127 Ruskin, Works, VI, p. 90.
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we must patiently examine the works of art; and from a large observation of
successful efforts, deduce general conclusions respecting the laws upon which
success depends."128 This much, arguably, Ruskin achieves. But that achievement
depends on an ambivalent, even paradoxical, view of subjectivity that is also highly
characteristic of mid-Victorian empiricist writing. According to it, the realist must
submit to the external object of knowledge in an effort of self-denial which actually
intensifies the relationship between subjectivity and representation. As Ruskin puts
it: "The refusal or reserve of a mighty painter cannot be imitated; it is only by
reaching the same intellectual strength that you will be able to give an equal dignity
to your self-denial."12? Realism aims, ultimately, not for transparency, but for an
aesthetic reproduction of the relational conditions that allow us to conceive of the
idea of 'reality', which rests in turn on the continued evidence of a conscious mind
within the represented world. Above all, realism as Ruskin sees it implies a grasp of
how perspective makes perception possible. And the scepticism built into his
theory intersects with a wider scepticism in mid-Victorian culture surrounding the
question of perception and the powers of the eye, which it is the aim of the next
chapter to elucidate.
128 G. H. Lewes, "Shakespeare's Critics: English and Foreign," Edinburgh Review XC, 1849, p. 68.




G. H. Lewes and the Problems ofPerception
Among the many epigraphs from philosophers, scientists and writers spread richly
throughout G. H. Lewes's Problems ofLife andMind (1874-9) there appears in the
third volume a brief excerpt from George Eliot's long dramatic poem "The Spanish
Gypsy" (1868):
Our nimble souls
Can spin an insubstantial universe
Suiting our mood, and call it possible,
Sooner than see one grain with eye exact,
And give strict record of it.1
The lines from Eliot's poem appear to defend a straightforward anti-Platonism:
man's metaphysical temperament, they insist, tends to convince him of his grand
cosmic or religious schemes while causing him to overlook the reality observable in
modest physical phenomena. Human nature, egotistical as it is, wrongly prefers
whimsical speculation to patient observation, the ideal to the real. It seems on the
face of it a fittingly realist creed, and one that Eliot can be found espousing in her
1855 essay on the German philosopher Otto Friedrich Gruppe, where she argues
that philosophy "must renounce metaphysics: it must renounce the ambitious
attempt to form a theory of the universe, to know things in their causes and first
1 G. H. Lewes, Problems ofLife and Mind, 2nd Series, The Physical Basis ofMind. London: Triibner
and Co., 1877, p. 137.
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principles."2 Metaphysical theorising, she says, "is an attempt to poise the universe
on one's head, and no wonder if dizziness and delusion are the consequence. "3
Unlike this early essay, however, the passage from "The Spanish Gypsy" happens to
frame the opposition of fact to speculation in noticeably psychological terms. In
doing so, it serves to undermine the certainty of the materialism it advocates. For
while its effect is carried by a vertiginous shift in physical scale, turning sharply
from the vastness of an "insubstantial universe" to the minute proportions of a
single particle, its central concern is not so much the nature of reality as the
contradictions of human psychology. It is only because the mind can understand
itself in such different ways, as rootlessly immaterial ("our nimble souls") and as a
biologically housed subject, that this spectacular spatial contrast becomes possible.
That is, the emphasis falls on the act of seeing rather than what is seen. Like so
much of Eliot's fiction, this passage refers to the psychology of the human eye, and
to the inevitable colouring of perception by the subjectivity of the viewer (we see by
"suiting our mood"). The act of visualising an outward object, however large or
small, depends upon the conditions supplied by our variable individual psychology
and the mind's instantaneous inferential activity. Even the relatively simple act of
perception that the poem privileges—a seemingly transparent and natural use of
the "eye exact"—depends initially on choosing to adopt this specific perceptual
attitude towards the world. For that reason, there lurks in these lines an anxiety
that the exactness of the eye may in fact be fallible, if not indeed a fiction, and that
even a "strict record" of the real can barely repress the play of desire, feeling and
association by which the eye is prompted.
To find in these lines an ironic unsettling of the very distinction they make
between imagining the world and truly seeing it, is not to indulge in a reckless
overreading. There are good reasons for doubting that Eliot or Lewes, or any of the
2 George Eliot, "The Future of German Philosophy" (1855) Selected Critical Writings, ed. Rosemary
Ashton. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 137
3 Eliot, "The Future ofGerman Philosophy", p. 135.
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other writers under consideration here, gave serious credence to the notion that the
human eye was capable of accessing the physical world transparently in this way, or
of reading the world so unproblematically. By the late 1860s, when Eliot is writing,
Victorian technological advances had increased the power and application of the
microscope considerably, with the important effect of demonstrating the dramatic
limitations of ordinary sight, so that it would have been unthinkable to analyse
matter such as a "grain" without auxiliary magnifying devices.4 The narrative voice
in Eliot's poem, who places great faith in the penetration of unaided sight, clearly
belongs to an earlier, perhaps pre-microscopic generation, rather than to mid-
Victorian scientific culture. The intentional anachronism ought to be understood as
Eliot quietly poking fun at stubbornly common sense views of perception and
spectatorship, as well as at the concomitant notion of science as pure transcription,
summed up in Newton's hypotheses non fingo.s Even with the aid of microscopes,
by the mid-century it was not held that a literal or final representation of particles
of matter was possible; 'simple' matter was just as much a subject for hypotheses
and conjecture as the metaphysician's spinning of universes. Thus Alexander Bain
writes in 1870: "All assertions as to the ultimate structure of the particles ofmatter
are, and ever must be, hypothetical. Yet we must not discard them because they
cannot be proved; the proper criterion for judging of their value is their aptness to
represent the phenomena."6
Moreover, the psychological theories of perception in Lewes's work (to
which Eliot's lines are appended as an epigraph), and also those developed by Bain,
Ruskin and Herbert Spencer, articulate just this kind of visual problem, recognising
how the limitations and complexities of seeing come into play at even the simplest
levels of experience. These writers call into question, in other words, the eye exact.
4 For a history of this piece of scientific apparatus see, for example, Bradbury Saville, The Evolution of
theMicroscope. London: Pergamon Press, 1967.
s For a wide ranging discussion of nineteenth century attitudes to sight, visual technologies and the
physiology of looking, and their implications across art, literature and science, see Kate Flint, The
Victorians and The Visual Imagination. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
6 Alexander Bain, Logic. (2 vols) London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 2nd edn., 1873, II, p.
132.
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They deny the clarity of the gaze, and describe the routine unreliability of the
sensory foundations of sight; they open up the psychological gap into which
memory and association insert contingent mental activity and shape what the
viewer sees; and they show how shades of feeling frequently enter into perception
in infinitesimal ordinary ways. Above all, their empiricist accounts of perception
stress the uncertainties latent in the mediating apparatuses of seeing. Such issues
were central to empiricism, which had always presupposed a close relationship
between perception and knowledge. In fact, it would be fair to say that its
reputation centres on the issue. A key feature of critiques of empiricism, for
example, especially those informed by feminist theory, has been its supposed
valorisation in coolly philosophical terms of a controlling, empowering, objectifying
gaze. A closer examination of the arguments of a mid-Victorian writer like Lewes,
however, will establish that anxieties over irrationalities of the eye, the limits of
perception, and threat of visual incoherence all multiplied the epistemological
doubt at the heart of the enterprise in the nineteenth century.
Just as theories of sight were central to nineteenth-century psychological
theory, so the language of looking is central to realist fiction. However, a generation
of critical opinion has argued that Victorian realism refuses to interrogate the
dynamics of the gaze, either theoretically or politically, as a consequence of its
silent complicity in a bourgeois ideology which reproduces the world as readily
intelligible. The seamless continuity between the omniscient consciousness of the
narrator and the narrated fictional life, it is said, encodes a common-sense notion
of spectatorship which assumes objects to be directly knowable and therefore
appropriable—a fact reinforced for the reader by the obvious intelligibility of the
text itself.7 Yet in the hands ofGeorge Eliot the language of looking encodes, not the
neutrality the gaze or the simple availability of a given 'natural' order of things, but
7 See, for example, Colin McCabe, James Joyce and the Revolution of the Word. London: Macmillan,
1978; Catherine Belsey, Critical Practice. London: Methuen, 1980; Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics of
Postmodernism. London: Routledge, 1988; Alison Lee, Realism and Power: Postmodern British
Fiction. London: Routledge, 1990.
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rather the habitual problems of perception and human interpretation. Take the
opening of "The Sad Fortunes of Amos Barton," for example, the first of Eliot's
Scenes of Clerical Life (1857) and often considered typical of her early naive
realism:
Shepperton Church was a very different-looking building five-and-twenty
years ago. To be sure, its substantial stone tower looks at you through its
intelligent eye, the clock, with the friendly expression of former days; but in
everything else what changes! Now there is a wide span of slated roof flanking
the old steeple; the windows are tall and symmetrical; the outer are
resplendent with oak-graining, the inner doors reverentially noiseless with a
garment of red-baize; and the walls, you are convinced, no lichen will ever
again effect a settlement on - they are smooth and innutrient as the summit
of the Rev. Amos Barton's head, after ten years of baldness and
supererogatory soap. Pass through the baize doors and you will see the nave
filled with well-shaped benches, understood to be free seats; while in certain
eligible corners, less directly under the fire of the clergyman's eye, there are
pews reserved for the Shepperton gentility. Ample galleries are supported on
iron pillars, and in one of them stands the crowning glory, the very clasp or
aigrette of Shepperton church-adornment - namely, an organ, not very much
out of repair, on which a collector of small rents, differentiated by the force of
circumstances into an organist, will accompany the alacrity of your departure
after the blessing, by a sacred minuet or an easy 'Gloria'.
Immense improvement! says the well-regulated mind... Mine, I fear, is
not a well-regulated mind.8
There are several points worth noting in this highly wrought proem.
Immediately striking is the pervasive rhetoric of seeing. With a curious urgency, the
narrator's first remark focuses on the variations in appearance of which the church
is capable (it has been "a very different-looking building" in the past), a gesture
which envisages possible perspectives on the object other than our present one, and
which also divides the church's identity from itself by dispersing its reality across
8 George Eliot, Scenes ofClerical Life. (1857) ed. Jennifer Gribble. London: Penguin, 1998, p. 7.
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time. The invoking of multiple vantage points is then carried further by the
suggestion that the spectator might become, by a reversal of the gaze, the object of
the church's own "intelligent eye". Again, the effect is to conjure multiple lines of
vision which traverse the scene and one another. But these overlapping gazes are
far from being ideologically neutral. The imposing presence here of the "substantial
stone tower", whose literal uprightness hints at the moral authority of the
institution it represents, looks "at you" in a manner suggesting the surveillance
function performed by the church as a socially regulatory body ('church' now a
synecdoche for the larger religious organisation, not merely a localised building).
As the passage continues, references to the organs of sight and to spaces of
spectatorship abound: there is "the fire of the clergyman's eye", which again locates
looking within an explicit discourse of power, while also introducing another
viewing subjectivity into this already crowded scene; there are the "ample galleries"
of the church's interior, a detail reminding us that the concept of sight is written
into the architectural design of this building; and there is the idiosyncratic narrator
who escorts us inside it, whose invitations to examine the church's notable features
("you will see the nave filled with well-shaped benches") culminate in a final visual
spectacle: the "crowning glory" of Shepperton's restored church organ.
Finally, this last element of the scene offers its own kind of ironic disruption
to the plane of representation. Its underlying suggestions of decay and neglect (the
organ repairs, the second-rate organist, the visitors who leave with "alacrity") open
an ironic gap between the apparent and implied meanings of the narrator's
language, between his proud ambassadorial tone and our ambiguous impressions
of the scene. The disjunction produces a particularising effect, splitting experience
into different points of view, and anchoring the disembodied voice of the narrator
within the limits of personality. The irony isolates the reader in an interpretive
position that lacks easy identifications with other perspectives, including the
narrator's own, while showing the experience of such difference to constitute any
-141-
observer's relation to the real. Neither reader nor narrator has the function of
grounding or stabilising the mass ofviewpoints that the passage evokes, only rather
exists within it. For this reason the sequence concludes with the threatened
dissolution of its organising voice: determining some final value can belong to an
imaginary "well-regulated mind" but not to the figure of the narrator, who
renounces his own reliability in the act of idealising such a viewer.
If the fascination with the eye in the opening sequence of "Amos Barton"
has an epistemological implication, it is that perspective facilitates and duly limits
the scope of perception. All of the eyes that fall on the scene, whether realised or
implied, experience and produce its reality differently. There is no guarantee that
the rational power of sight can stabilise the objects it represents, or cut through the
entangled perceptions of others to a correct account of the way reality is ordered.
The effect is to render the signified of 'Shepperton Church' radically unfinalisable:
as perspectives on it multiply, so too does the number of potential interpretations.
Reality resists being smoothly assimilated into the mind of a privileged observer. In
short, Eliot's method foregrounds sight precisely to call its rational clarity into
question. This, as we will see, is also a central feature of Lewes's work.
Visions and Revisions
Lewes's views on perception, like his views on most subjects, span the worlds of
science and literature. To which of the two Victorian 'cultures', in general, he truly
belonged is hard to say.9 A critic, novelist and playwright as well as a scientist and
historian of philosophy, Lewes was brilliant at crossing disciplines and envisaging
intellectual activity from varied standpoints.10 His versatile body of work itself
embodies a kind of restless shifting between intellectual angles and perspectives, a
Q Rick Rylance suggests that his apparent influence in the world of the latter (not least his association
with George Eliot) earned him a poor reputation in the former, and consequently he was not taken
seriously by scientific culture either in his own lifetime or thereafter. See Rick Rylance, Victorian
Psychology and British Culture 1850-1880. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 252-54.
10 The finest biography to fully explore Lewes's life beyond its ties with George Eliot is Rosemary
Ashton, G. H. Lewes: A Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
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switching between modes of apprehension that serves to embrace heterogeneity as
an article of epistemological faith. It also produces a rich and digressive textual
surface. In Lewes, one never feels very far away from an experimental or risky
moment, a sudden unexpected narrative turn or fragmentary aside, or perhaps a
collision of deductive science with particular human interests. His account of the
bloodstream, for example, in The Physiology of Common Life (1859), combines
consciously varied verbal textures, from history, myth, melodrama and biology;
and just as the blood, as a substance, turns out to contain multiple elements, so his
narrative is not one either, as we will see later in the chapter.11 Rather like Ruskin,
Lewes's work readily concedes the contingency of its own textual situation. What he
labels the problems of life and mind cannot be exhausted by the norms of scientific
description alone but need to be seen from multiple, relative positions.
This does not mean that Lewes's writing merely dances lightfootedly around
its subject, or lacks seriousness. But it does mean that interpretations of his work
and philosophical leanings differ considerably. It was noted in the first chapter that
the turn towards idealism in British intellectual life was well underway by the
1870s, and that Lewes (along with Eliot, Carlyle and earlier Coleridge) was one of
the key importers of German thought into Victorian culture. Against this backdrop,
many assume that Lewes ought therefore to be read as an idealist, most notably the
critic Hock Guan Tjoa.12 Others, however, such as Peter Allan Dale, take an almost
opposite view of Lewes, seeing him as yet another exponent of a sturdy nineteenth-
century tradition ofpost-Romantic scientific realism. Lewes, Dale argues, clung like
fellow scientists to an Aristotelian idea ofmimesis, and believed that realism in art
and science "could achieve an absolute, nonsymbolic relation with the real."^ A
glance at these contrasting views reveals that they conform to an all too familiar
11G. H. Lewes, The Physiology ofCommon Life. (2 vols) Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons,
1859-60,1, pp. 239-336.
12 Hock Guan Tjoa, George Henry Lewes: A Victorian Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1977.
13 Peter Allan Dale, In Pursuit ofa Scientific Culture: Science, Art and Society in the Victorian Age.
Madison: University ofWisconsin Press, 1989, p. 74 (see in general pp. 59-84).
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dichotomy of idealism/empiricism, whose poles continue to organise our view of
mid-nineteenth century culture. Needless to say, this binary reduces empiricism to
the status of a dogmatic, fact-gathering naturalism. As will be argued here, this
state of affairs fails to do justice to Lewes's versatility as thinker and writer, or to
empiricism as a cultural formation in the period.
Before considering the detail of Lewes's arguments regarding the problems
of perception, it will be worth placing nim in a context of growing uncertainty
surrounding the powers of the eye. It would be a mistake to proceed as though
Lewes developed a uniquely sceptical view of perception, and in fact by the time of
George Eliot's death in 1880 a significant interest had emerged in general in the
irrational aspects of human psychology, to which the topic of perception was in
places linked. The fascination with the irrational as such encompassed not only the
bodily processes beyond voluntary rational control (such as the beating of the heart
or digestion, which become known as 'unconscious' processes) but also breaks in
the mind's rational self-possession, as shown by such phenomena as delusions,
dreams and hallucinations. Though a long way from Freud's privileging of the
unconscious as a psychodynamic law, empiricism was disposed to identifying such
limitations because of its standard recourse to environmental and emotional
constraints on the individual will; indeed, the empiricist narrative of the ego's
journey into experience was not necessarily always one of heroic self-mastery in the
period's psychological theory. James Sully, for example, one of Lewes's literaiy
executors and a successful psychologist himself, devoted much of his research to
these kinds of twilight mental experience. In a work entitled Illusions (1881), Sully
begins from the outset by recognising the inconsistencies of the eye:
Hardly anybody is always consistently sober and rational in his perceptions
and beliefs. A momentary fatigue of the nerves, a little mental excitement, a
relaxation of the effort of attention by which we continually take our bearings
with respect to the real world about us, will produce just the same kind of
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confusion of reality and phantasm which we observe in the insane... Our
luminous circle of rational perception is surrounded by the misty penumbra
of illusion.14
Sully's phrasing sounds surprisingly modernist, reminiscent of Virginia
Woolfs later evocations of the enigma of consciousness. Indeed, like her now
familiar description of "an ordinary mind on an ordinary day," his psychological
portrait emphasises disorderliness through specific metaphors of indeterminacy-
shadows, mirages, mists—which like Woolfs mental image of a "semi-transparent
envelope" convey qualities of obscurity and formlessness. In capturing what she
would call "this varying, this unknown and uncircumscribed spirit" of mental
experience, which forever inhabits subjectivity, Sully does more than suggest that
the mind is capable of occasional errors caused by temporary mental dysfunction.^
Rather more radically, his argument refuses to bracket off instances of delusion,
fantasy and misrecognition as marginal forms of psychological activity. That is, it
resituates instances of non-rational visual experience inside a normative account of
perception, instead of pathologising them within a discourse of psychic or medical
abnormality. WhatWoolf will later refer to as the "dark places of psychology" exist
for Sully, too.16 He likewise utilises metaphors presupposing a spatial model of
consciousness, where the rational and non-rational are figured as overlapping and
interpenetrative regions, instead of separate regimes clearly distinguishable in the
course of ordinary thought. In this regard, Sully's repertoire of psychological
metaphors, particularly his idea of an amorphous shadow enveloping the luminous
or rational areas of consciousness, seems strikingly prescient with regard to the
modernist turn in psychological and literary language.
However, as much as it looks forward to a later generation of theory, Sully's
work on illusions is best considered as actively in dialogue with ideas and debates
14 James Sully, Illusions: A Psychological Study. London: C. Kegan Paul, 1881, pp. 2-3.
15 Virginia Woolf, "Modern Fiction," in The Common Reader. First Series (1925) London: Hogarth
Press, 1968, p. 189.
16 Woolf, "Modern Fiction," p. 192.
-145-
taking place much closer to him in time. Viewing passages like his as though they
belonged to the spirit of a different era—as untimely anticipations of a uniquely
modernist moment—only makes sense ifwe take the Victorian period and the early
twentieth century to be opposable events in cultural history. To do so, however,
would be to uncritically accept modernism's own resistance to history, concealing
its roots in nineteenth-century culture. Sully's Illusions, as it happens, read in its
mid-Victorian context, certainly does not feel like a text out of time. It extends
views on perception found in earlier writing during the nineteenth century,
notably, for example, in the work of Ruskin and Herbert Spencer. In his Principles
of Psychology (1855), Spencer had already given attention to the irrational
behaviours of the eye and the lapses in visual concentration described so vividly by
Sully. A key theme running throughout Spencer's long discussion of the visual
faculty is that the mind frequently gives inaccurate reports of the things it sees,
even (or especially) when faced with undemanding and trivial visual tasks. "The
instances in which, from mental distraction, we go on searching for something we
have in our hands, or overlook that which is directly under our eyes", he says, serve
as evidence of this pervasive unreliability.1? Like Sully, who finds that "illusion thus
has its roots in ordinary mental life," Spencer sees the potential for error, blindness
and misrepresentation forever inhabiting our visual experience of the world around
us.18 Ordinary perception turns out to be a layered, complex and fallible process.
He also shares Sully's explanation of how illusion arises. When an object or
scene is perceived, Sully insists, its corresponding mental impression (or sensation,
to be technically correct) may "go unattended to" by the visual imagination, causing
no proper perception to be created ("The sensation floats in the dim outer regions
of consciousness as a vague feeling").1? It is from these encircling, unformed
perceptions that illusions derive. Spencer makes almost the same point, drawing an
v Herbert Spencer, The Principles ofPsychology. London: Williams and Northgate, 1855, pp. 185-6.
18 Sully, Illusiojis, p. 3.
19 Sully, Illusions, pp. 20-1.
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identical distinction between sensation and perception: "the mere passive reception
of the visual image or group of sensations produced by an object, does not
constitute a perception of it. A perception of it can arise only when the group of
sensations in consciously co-ordinated and their meaning understood."20 In the
absence of adequate co-ordination and understanding, the possibility of defective
vision arises. In other words, what feels like an instantaneous recognition of an
object or person actually derives from silently inferential activity.
When Sully says with manifest understatement that "perception is not so
simple a matter as it might at first seem to be," he therefore encapsulates an idea
already well established in empiricist thinking.21 Ruskin, in the first volume of
Modern Painters (1843), similarly argues that perception entails more than the
mere physical proximity of eye and object: "The first great mistake that people
make... is the supposition that theymust see a thing if it be before their eyes."22 The
act of seeing, so crucial to Ruskin's theory of art and to the ethical urgency of his
arguments, is—as we saw in the previous chapter—an indirect, inwardly-gesturing,
multilayered activity bound strongly to a past narrative of subjective identity. The
eye provides a constant source of sensation, he argues, whereas seeing indicates a
cultivated and psychological practice involving the mind of the spectator:
[T]he eye during our waking hours, exercises constantly its function of
seeing; it is the constant habit; we always, as far as the bodily organ is
concerned, see something, and we always see in the same degree; so that the
occurrence of sight, as such, to the eye, is only the continuance of its
necessary state of action, and awakes not attention whatsoever, except by the
particular nature and quality of the sight. And thus, unless the minds ofmen
are particularly directed to the impressions of sight, objects pass perpetually
before the eyes without conveying any impression to the brain at all."23
20 Spencer, Principles ofPsychology, p. 186.
21 Sully, Illusions, p. 20.
22 John Ruskin, The Works ofJohn Ruskin. (39 vols) eds. E. T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn,
London: George Allen, 1903-12, III, p. 141. pp. 141-43.
23 Ruskin, Works, III, pp. 141-42.
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Even with the utmost effort, however, and years of dedicated visual attention, the
faculty of sight remains flawed, Ruskin insists. We do not see with absolute clarity,
and rational control over the eye cannot ever wholly eliminate the possibility of
visual error. Seeing wrongly, or only partially, is for Ruskin characteristic of our
encounter with the world. In fact, his theory of sight in Modern Painters repeats
the idea that in the field of vision, haziness and even regional blindness surround
all clearly distinguished objects: "[when you] place an object as close to the eye as
you like, there is always something in it which you cannot see..."24 One reason for
this has to do with the focusing mechanism of the eyeball and optical laws. If two
objects stand before the viewer at different distances, the eye, like any kind of lens,
is forced to adjust its focus in order to move between each object. The simultaneous
visualisation of both, as equally distinct objects, thus cannot be achieved. Due to
the "impossibility of the rays proceeding from both converging to the same focus,"
Ruskin demonstrates, "the whole impression, either of one or the other, must
necessarily be confused, indistinct, and inadequate."2s
In the context of aesthetic criticism, this means that paintings depicting the
spatial world as if foreground and background were both equally distinct, such as a
typical Canaletto, constitute untrue approximations of the visual act. The world is
not flatly surveyable by the eye, as they would imply. The best paintings, especially
those of Turner, respond to the world by conveying a necessary sense of its vast and
incomprehensible excess, its tendency to overwhelm the spectator. His unfocused
swirls of light and colour communicate, for Ruskin, the hazy effects of retinal
adjustment and optical alignment as the imaginary eye strains for clarity in its
perception of spatially distributed bodies. They represent the uncertainty and
confusion inherent in the psychological processing of sensations into perceptions.
The narrator ofRanthorpe (1847), Lewes's early novel about a young poet's
destiny in a sometimes indifferent world, has a tendency to echo some of Ruskin's
24 Ruskin, Works, III, p. 329.
2s Ruskin, Works, III, p. 320.
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convictions. He notes, for example, midway through the story: "Only as much as
the mind knows can the eye see; only so much as the mind perceives in any object,
can it attempt to represent."26 His idea suggests, like Lewes's later theory, that
seeing is not only influenced or complicated by its relationship with the mind of the
observer, but that the mind virtually defines its scope and possibility. A neutral
instrument the eye almost certainly is not. Slightly earlier, the narrator recalls how
the outer and inner aspects of experience fuse in the eye's activity, as instants of
perception join with associational feeling: "I know not why it is that lovely scenes—
or even a bit of sunshine of a spot of green—or a gush of a rivulet through a
deserted lane, always curiously affect me. These things 'overcome me like a
summer cloud'—stirring the depths of my soul; and yet so vague and shadowy the
impressions, that they seem more like the broken memories of many dreams
uniting into one, than any distinct reminiscence. Are other so affected?"2? The
narrator's position renders the last question implicitly redundant—his elevation in
Lewes's novel above plot and character makes it likely that he knows the answer to
it—and so it serves only to stress the private and subjective quality of perceptual
experience. The moment might have come from Ruskin, or it could even plausibly
mimic an instant from Turner himself; the internal response is shown to mingle
inseparably with the represented world, mutating into broken, vague, uncertain
forms and unfocused memories, and in this haziness the boundary dissolves
between the eye's outward attention and its powerful enforcement of personality.28
A similar, if more profoundly destabilising moment occurs in one of George
Eliot's most memorable passages in Middlemarch. Dorothea Brooke, enduring her
disastrous honeymoon in Rome, finds that the city repels her gaze as she surveys its
ancient topography and architectural splendour:
26 G. H. Lewes, Ranthorpe (1847) ed. Barbara Smalley, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1974, p.
186.
27 Lewes, Ranthorpe, p. 179.
28 In his discussion of unconscious association, Ruskin describes how past experience works its way
into present perceptions as "a trace of feeling." See Ruskin, Works, III, p. 73.
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Ruins and basilicas, palaces and colossi, set in the midst of a sordid present,
where all that was living and warm-blooded seemed sunk in the deep
degeneracy of a superstition divorced from reverence; the dimmer but yet
eager Titanic life gazing and struggling on the walls and ceilings; the long
vistas of white forms whose marble eyes seemed to hold the monotonous
light of an alien world; all this vast wreck of ambitious ideals, sensuous and
spiritual, mixed confusedly with the signs of breathing forgetfulness
degradation, at first jarred her as with an electric shock, and then urged
themselves upon her with that ache belonging to a glut of confused ideas
which check the flow of emotion. Forms both pale and glowing took
possession of her young sense, and fixed themselves in her memory even
when she was not thinking of them, preparing strange associations which
remained through her after-years. Our moods are apt to bring with them
images which succeed each other like the magic-lantern pictures of a doze;
and in certain states of dull forlornness Dorothea all her life continued to see
the vastness of St Peter's, the huge bronze canopy, the excited intention in the
attitudes and garments of the prophets and evangelists in the mozaics above,
and the red drapery which was being hung for Christmas spreading itself
everywhere like a disease of the retina.29
The narrative effect is dizzying and vertiginous. The passage seizes upon a moment
when the act of looking confronts the terrifying oppressiveness of the world it tries
to read. The objects constituting the visual field—a churning mass of buildings and
bodies—refuse to be synthesised into a legible unity. In psychological terms, it
suggests the over-stimulation of the visual sense, a hellish overloading from which
Dorothea's mind cannot recover a stable perception. Instead, Rome as a spectacle
remains inappropriable—defiantly other to the understanding, irreducibly alien,
ghoulishly hallucinatory. Various devices point us towards this unreality: repeated
evocations of scale, projections forward in time, references to the opaque and the
spectral, suggestions of unruly and unknown energies. Again, the psychological
register invites the dissolution of boundaries, undermining the directness of the
29 George Eliot, Middlemarch. (1871-2) ed. RosemaryAshton. London: Penguin: 1994, p. 194.
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eye's relationship with the physical world. It licenses the potential transfer of
properties across or between substances, blending consciousness with objects, the
organic with the built, the living with the dead. All of this exists in an acute tension
with the city of Rome itself, a place whose appeal for the nineteenth-century visitor
lies in its special connection to the cerebral and the universal. As the narrator
notes, it symbolises the "spiritual centre" of the world, its antiquarian grandiosity
both evidence and emblem of centuries of continuous European cultural
achievement^0 Rome promises foundations in more than the architectural sense,
signifying as it does cultural origins and order. Meaning ought to be stabilised
here—Casaubon, we recall, pursues origins of a philological kind in the city, and
assumes that it will hold the key to his grand synthetic project. Its perceived
function is to guarantee coherence of one kind or another. For Dorothea, however,
it becomes the agent of precisely the opposite: a radical decentring of meaning and
agonising visual chaos.
In the last line, Eliot's narrator likens the vision to a retinal disease. This
confirms that the scene registers a crisis of seeing. But the eye is not actually
medically dysfunctional; like Sully, Eliot's representation of perception allows for,
and normalises, its irrational habits. The significance of the simile hinges upon the
weakness of the gaze, its bewilderment, its inescapable connection to inner feeling,
and its capacity to turn in on itself—not whether it would be best for Dorothea to be
dispatched to a sanatorium. This becomes clearer further down the passage when
the narrator suggests that her future moods will recall Rome in way that resembles
the images projected by a magic-lantern. This is an intriguing reference to an item
of visual technology more often associated with later modernist writers like Proust
or T. S. Eliot, as in Prufrock's fraught exclamation: "It is impossible to say just what
3° For the argument that the scene intuits a crisis of historicity, see Jim Reilly, Shadowtime: History
and Representation in Hardy, Conrad and George Eliot. London and NewYork: Routledge, 1993-
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I mean! / But as if a magic lantern threw the nerves in patterns on a screen.'^1 As in
those writers, the magic lantern serves for George Eliot as a figure for confused
perception and a multiplier of psychological reality. She uses it to imply contact
with an uncertain, projected world, where experience is mediated by a flickering
procession of images. Popular as a form of domestic entertainment by the end of
the Victorian era, magic lanterns were used especially for imaginative entry into a
visual realm of ghouls and grotesquery, for figuring the unreal and macabre. As the
cultural historian Laurent Mannoni comments: "The 'magic' lantern... represents
the longest-lasting, most inventive, and most artistic of the 'ancestors' which were
eventually snuffed out by the birth of the cinema. For the whole length of its reign,
which extended over three centuries, it presented artificial fixed and moving
images to a public ever more filled with wonder." It was, he notes, "never so much
in demand, so widely sold, so much a la mode as in the second half of the
nineteenth century. "32
In The Sorrows ofYoung Werther (1774)—with which Eliot and Lewes were
unusually well acquainted33—Goethe's narrator asks: "What is a magic-lantern
without light? You have only to position the lamp and there you have the most
colourful pictures on your white wall! And even if there were nothing more to it all
than that, a few fleeting shadows, it would still give us happiness to stand there like
young children, delighted by the marvellous apparitions. "34 In Rome, Dorothea is
similarly confronted by apparitions, though the effect numbs her personality rather
than delighting it. There is much to detain, not entertain, her eye. Goethe's lines
show how the magic lantern's phantoms and ghosts were designed give its
31 T. S. Eliot, "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock," Collected Poems. London: Faber, 1936, p. 15; 11.
104-5.
32 Laurent Mannoni, The Great Art of Light and Shadow: Archaeology of the Cinema, trans, ed.
Richard Crangle. Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2000, p. 33; p. 264.
33 Lewes's early career, especially, was marked by his admiration for Goethe, whose life he wrote
between 1854-5. In a letter to Comte in March 1847, at the peak of his enthusiasm for Positivism,
Lewes writes: "he [Goethe] is the only poet who speaks to civilised man." G. H. Lewes, The Letters of
George Henry Lewes. (2 vols) ed. William Baker, Victoria, BC: University ofVictoria, 1995,1, p. 143.
34 Johann Wolfgang Von Goethe, The Sorrows of Young Werther. (1774) trans. Michael Hulse.
London: Penguin, 1989, p.54.
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audiences a calculated fright, but the thrill always took place at a distance behind
the safety of the viewing lens. The nightmarish proposition in the text is that
Dorothea has lost that distance between eye and image, carrying her consciousness
to a critical point where reality and fantasy border each other. The source of the
projected images is importantly both internal and external. The magic lantern
therefore signifies not so much the artist's projective power, like the lamp of
romantic poetry, but the precariousness of the visual sense.
Another piece of Victorian technology to initiate debate over the authority
of perception and the power of the eye was the microscope, as we have already
noted. Though not a recent invention, improvements in its magnifying power and
precision during the early part of the century meant that by 1875William Carpenter
could speak of the "constantly-widening field of microscopic study," and a "vast
army of microscopists."35 It played an important role in influencing ways of
thinking about observation, method and verification, and as a practising scientist
himself, Lewes was particularly attuned to these debates. At stake was nothing less
than the very nature of visual representation itself, for microscopic enquiry pushed
at the boundaries of observability. Such, indeed, is the nature of the instrument.
When we peer down a microscope, the acts of seeing, imaging and imagining
effectively begin converging, it being conceivable-at least in a theoretical way—that
whatever is encountered through the lens exists only by virtue of the action of the
visual technology itself. It forces us to ask whether what we are seeing is part of
reality, or rather its interpretation. Ian Hacking has argued that in scientific
practices generally, "one chief role of experiment is the creation of phenomena,"
and this would seem to apply especially to microscopic imaging.36 Around the time
that Lewes was developing his psychological theory of perception, the microscope—
35 William Carpenter, TheMicroscope and its Revelations. London: J &A Churchill, 5th edn, 1875, p. x
36 He adds: "Experimenters bring into being phenomena that do not naturally exist in a pure state...
Most of the phenomena, effects, and events created by the experimenter are like plutonium: they do
not exist in nature except possibly on vanishingly rare occasions." Ian Hacking, "Experimentation and
Scientific Realism" in Jarrett Leplin, ed. Scientific Realism, Berkeley: University of California Press,
1984, p. 155.
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like photography—embodied certain attitudes towards visual truth and sanctioned
particular ways of looking.3? it promised a special kind of proximity to material
reality, yet also (unlike photography) sought by it out by actively distorting the
nature of ordinary perception and altering the model of spectatorship. In doing so,
it carried the paradoxical message that reality requires alteration (enlargement,
exaggeration) in order to be known satisfactorily. The impact of this idea unfolded
in several directions.
First, it estranged the observer from reality by producing evidence of a
crowded organic life where hitherto none was assumed to exist. It thus enlarged the
definition of reality. In his 1850 study of the microscope, the doctor and geologist
Gideon Mantell, for example, marvels at the strange and complex life revealed by
magnification, speculating that if a microscopic image were shown to somebody
unfamiliar with the instrument, it would surely be "regarded as improbable and as
extravagant, as the wildest chimeras of the imagination, "a8 The images it produces
confound expectations of how reality should look, and the supposedly familiar
natural world turns out to be "teeming with numberless myriads of creatures,
which are as unknown and as unapproachable to the great mass of mankind, as are
the inhabitants of another planet."39 Carpenter, in his own study, reflects that the
microscope "finds inexhaustible life where all seems dead, constant activity where
all seems motionless, perpetual change where all seems inert."40 The microscope
summons for the eye the restless complexity of the natural world, and reports back
on its mysterious composition. In a notably vivid passage, Mantell writes:
while the Telescope enables us to see a system in eveiy star, the Microscope
unfolds to us a world in every atom. The one instructs us that this mighty
37 For a discussion of these representational cruxes in nineteenth-century photography, see Jennifer
Green-Lewis, Framing the Victorians Framing the Victorians: Photography and the Culture of
Realism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.
38 Gideon Algernon Mantell, The Invisible World Revealed by the Microscope; or, Thoughts on
Animalcules. London: John Murray, 1850, p. 84.
39 Mantell, The Invisible World Revealed, p. 7.
40 Carpenter, TheMicroscope and its Revelations, p. 24.
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globe, with the burden of its people and its countries, is but a grain of sand in
the vast field of immensity—the other, that every atom may harbour the
tribes and families of a busy population... that within and beneath all that
minuteness which the aided eye of man is able to explore, there may be a
world of invisible beings; and that could we draw aside the mysterious veil
which shrouds it from our senses, we might behold a theatre of as many
wonders as Astronomy can unfold...41
The value of penetrating this formerly hidden tier of reality was, for writers
like Mantell, the way it radically relativised looking. By referring to the telescope,
another kind of visual device, his passage looks quite literally in two directions, up
to the vastness of the heavens and down towards the immensity of invisible matter.
Both suggest the infinite, realigning his sense of our cosmic habitat. Which brings
us to the main consequence of the rise of the microscope for attitudes towards
vision: its chief result was that naked human sight—the eye exact, as it were—began
to seem increasingly arbitrary, limited and flawed. Its traditional primacy and
privilege were dramatically opened to question. The naked eye dwelled in the realm
of "the petty passions and prejudices of common life," as Mantell put it, unlike the
microscope, which soared beyond them.*2 And by helping to denaturalise ordinary
sight, the microscope intensified the mid-Victorian fascination with the processes
of looking and knowing in general, drawing critical attention to observation as an
act itself. "It cannot be too strongly or too constantly kept in view," Carpenter
writes, "that the value of the results of microscopic enquiry will depend far more
upon the sagacity, perseverance, and accuracy of the Observer, than upon the
elaborateness of his instrument."^
The microscopic spectacle could seem at once true and untrue, authentically
close to nature and yet also defamiliarising and strange—even fantastical. It made
the viewer confront an alternative, unhomely representation of a world which they
41 Mantell, The Invisible World Revealed, pp. 92-93.
42 Mantell, The Invisible World Revealed, p. 91.
43 Carpenter, The Microscope and its Revelations, p. 27.
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presumed already to understand, and forced them to consider how mediation and
interpretation participate in the representational process. This lent discussion of
the microscope an epistemological excitement. It showed that, as Ian Hacking says,
"Inference and interaction are the stuff of reality... Microscopes carry conviction
because of the great array of interactions and interpretations that are possible."44
For Lewes, as we shall see, the inferential process was inescapably part of all
perception, not just sight aided by the microscope. And where he makes explicit
reference to seeing through microscopes, Lewes seems to emphasise how it makes
perception problematic, complicating rather than simplifying phenomena. In The
Physiology ofCommon Life, for example, he points out in his account of the blood
how "the microscope reveals it to be far from a simple fluid," and shows that "the
fluid itself is constantly changing. "45 It demonstrates that what commonly we grasp
as a simple substance—the "mighty river of life," as he epically describes it, or "the
wondrous fluid we name Blood"—is actually heterogeneously mixed:
All analyses of the Blood hitherto have been only rough estimates. In fact, the
fluid itself is constantly changing... [F]or although we speak of'the blood' as if
it were always one and the same thing, it is, in truth, a system of various
fluids, a confluence of streams, each more or less differing from the other."46
Microscopic vision thus revises our understanding. And its object, here, the
blood, is deconstructed, unravelled into its many separate identities, as a result of
microscopic enlargement. There is no simple biological reality answering directly
or literally to the term blood. Analysis, in other words, does not some much pin
down its object as cause it to dissipate before the gaze. The idea which Lewes's
passage readily intuits is that perception intervenes in and problematises the real,
by providing a set of conditions which partially determine the nature of what it
44 Hacking, "Experimentation and Scientific Realism," p. 160.
45 Lewes, The Physiology ofCommon Life, I, pp. 261-63.
46 Lewes, The Physiology ofCommon Life, I p. 239; p. 284; pp. 263-65.
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perceives. Just as the blood itself is "incessantly passing through changes, which
changes are the conditions of all development and activity," so perception modifies
the things in its purview and conditions the frame of representation.47 We shall
turn now to his main writings on perception to examine this in more detail.
Problems of (Pre)Perception
Lewes's consideration of perception from a psychological point of view takes place
primarily in his Problems ofLife and Mind (1874-9). The Problems, spanning five
uneven volumes and dealing with a blend of entangled philosophical, psychological
and evolutionary subjects, make fascinating and problematic reading. It
demonstrates, as Frederic Harrison remarked in a review of volume one, how at the
time philosophy was "visibly transforming itself."48 The first two parts of the
Problems describe the scientific method, explore problems of philosophising, and
discuss the limitations of knowledge; in broad terms, they concern epistemology.
They deal with the nature of truth and the role of logic, and give an account of the
rational tools of intellectual enquiry, such as deduction, induction and judgment. In
the third volume, subtitled The Physical Basis of Mind, the subject shifts to
biological life, and treats the human as yet another organism. Here Lewes outlines
the nervous system, automatism and unconscious behaviour, the reflex theory and
natural selection. The last two volumes take up questions of psychology: the role of
the senses and the sensorium, ideation, memory, mental association, imagination,
as well as the nature and character of volition and will.
Summarised in this way, the content and organisation of the Problems
seems conventional and even orderly. However, the experience of reading Lewes's
text dispels this assumption. Its narrative thread circles around itself, in sometimes
disorienting and repetitious ways, rather than conceiving its journey as a straight
47 Lewes, The Physiology ofCommon Life, I, p.289.
48 Frederic Harrison, "Mr Lewes's Problems of Life and Mind," Fortnightly Review New Series 16,
1874, P- 89.
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line of unfolding meaning. Its style embraces detour and digression, making chance
seem an important aspect of its formal design. To an extent this reflects the
characteristic exuberance of his engagement with what are evidently urgent and
expansive questions. (Spencer, after all, covers similar evolutionary ground and
maintains an even and oddly blank narrative point of view, as we shall see.) But the
forceful and slightly chaotic propulsion of the Problems is related to wider tensions
existing beyond Lewes himself. The resistance to unity, formally, in his work points
to an epistemological trend in the thought and writing of the period which
identifies proliferation as a new dynamic of analysis—as an aspect of knowledge,
matter, consciousness, culture, and so on. More will be said about this development
in the last chapter, for it springs out of a growing mid-Victorian interest in the
effects of relativity. As Christopher Herbert suggests, relativity theories implied
that things are "rigorously bound up together in a single indivisible world," but also
that "this world is not one after all, but uncontrollably multiple."49 The restlessness
of Lewes's narrative, which itself begins in volume one by invoking the 'Principle of
Relativity', embodies this paradoxical resistance to unity.50 Harrison's review, too,
stresses the "dispersive tendencies of the spirit of detail in science," and notes a
"growing anxiety" over the question of its descriptive unity: "This thirst after an
organization of knowledge is becoming more conscious and more defined, even
whilst the daily accumulation of materials seems to make the task more severe."51 It
seems from Harrison's diagnosis that the disruptive energies might be winning out.
Rather like an organism "incessantly undergoing modifications," the
narrative of the Problems exhibits evidence of constant stimulation and change.52 It
turns and loops and radiates endlessly, enforcing meaning in reiterative patterns
and building leitmotifs, such as the theme of the limitation of our knowledge. Its
49 Christopher Herbert, Victorian Relativity: Radical Thought and Scientific Discovery. Chicago and
London: Chicago University Press, 2001, p. 50.
50 G. H. Lewes, Problems ofLife andMind, 1st Series, The Foundations ofa Creed. (2 vols) London:
Triibner and Co., 1874,1, pp. 196-455.
51 Harrison, "Mr Lewes's Problems ofLife andMind," p. 89.
52 G. H. Lewes, Problems ofLife andMind, 3rd Series, The Study ofPsychology: Its Object, Scope and
Method. (2 vols) London: Triibner and Co., 1879, H, p. 92.
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parts do not unfold as though they were pieces being fitting into a jigsaw puzzle,
gradually making up a complete picture. It has instead a rougher, unfinished, open-
ended texture. This means that it does not address subjects and then duly move
beyond them, in logical sequence, to the next topic. Despite some of the taxonomic
order implied by the headings and divisions, the story swirls around perpetually as
it encompasses different aspects of psychology and epistemology. Like in the
organic system itself, the whole is implied in each moment of the narrative. The
later concerns are there already in the early pages; and, likewise, the concern with
epistemology does not disappear in the later treatment of sensibility, consciousness
and the will. Therefore the question of perception—like everything else in the
Problems—is not limited to or contained by a specific section of the text. It is a
recurrent theme, breaking in frequently on other discussions, as well as generating
wider questions itself about the nature of knowledge. For Lewes, sight and vision
are so fundamental to the felt quality of experience that it would be both artificial
and illogical to separate them cleanly from this larger picture.
That said, his arguments concede time and again that although experience
in itself forms a seamless continuity, we are compelled by the nature of analysis to
impose distinctions on it such as Thought and Feeling. Similarly, then, perception
can be analysed as if a distinct function of the organism, even though in reality the
phenomena that fall under it are fully integrated aspects of the functioning of the
whole system:
[Ejvery perception instead of being the reaction of a single organ is the
resultant of the combined reactions of the whole Organism; the only question
in each case being the relative proportions of the parts involved, and how far
the irradiation has been restricted to certain channels. The several Senses are
no more vicarious than the several Secretions; and when we see an apple we
do not in the visual sensation include the sensations of taste, fragrance,
resistance, &c., which are all more or less excited by the irradiation of the
optical stimulus. It is the non-recognition of this which originates many of
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the difficulties touching the theory of Vision. The organic seat ofVision is too
often assumed to be the retina; whereas that is only the seat of the visual
excitation, which in the Perceptive Centre is blended with the residua of the
other excitations.55
The point being driven home here has several important aspects, all ofwhich need
to be grasped in order to comprehend Lewes's theoiy of perception.What they have
in common is a basic resistance to the naively realist or common sense belief in the
directness and simplicity of perception. First, the retina should not be considered
the centre of vision or the sole organ of sight, nor should it be assumed that its
function amounts to a kind of literal mirroring activity; second, optical sensations
radiate outwards and they incorporate responses from other senses (the perception
of the apple involves more than just visual data); and third, every perception is a
"combined reaction" of the entire mind to a particular stimulus, in other words a
deeply psychological and multifaceted phenomenon.
Starting with the retina, we shall address these points in Lewes's theory as
a whole. Developments in nineteenth-century physiology had shown that the light-
sensitive surface of the retina contains numerous responsive sites. Herbert Spencer
describes how it is "a tract of multitudinous separate sensitive agents which, by the
focalised rays cast upon it, is enabled to touch the images of surrounding objects, as
the skin touches the objects themselves."54 Its stimulations are therefore multiple,
simultaneous and relatively independent from one another, the retina's physical
structure permitting more than one reaction to take place in the instant of its
response. Spencer states: "Evidently, then, it is only by a certain license that the
internal change produced by any visual impression can be called single. It is in
reality a multitude of simultaneous changes bound together." Hence our physical
impressions from the retina are "yet in reality compound ones." And in waking life
53 G. H. Lewes, Problems ofLife and Mind, 1st Series, The Foundations of a Creed. (2 vols) London:
Triibner and Co., 1874,1, p. 132.
54 Herbert Spencer, "Our Space-Consciousness: A Reply,"Mind 15, 59,1890, p. 318.
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the retina receives these multiple impressions constantly, in differing degrees of
intensity and duration, and in such a dense manner that we have to acknowledge
the "difficulty of regarding this visually-produced consciousness as single. "5s In this
respect, the retinal surface could be thought of as comprising countless smaller
retinas, each relaying their own sensory responses.
The significance of this picture is that it raises the issue of the complexity of
sensations themselves, the very currency of empiricism. Traditionally taken to be a
sort of mental base unit, which at a higher level of psychological organisation
resolve themselves into perceptions, sensations indicate the subjective equivalent
of rudimentary physical impressions, such as those originating in the retina. But
Lewes argues that even this relatively lowly type of mental phenomena is not really
monadic at all. As Alexander Bain describes it, theirs is "a mixed mode," not a pure
element^6 This applies, Lewes says, "even in sensations of colour, commonly held
to be simple affections of the retina." Far from being rustic and honest characters in
the drama of perception, sensations draw on the cooperation of other sensory
responses in complex groupings. "Sensation, we constantly repeat," he goes on, "is
not a simple but a highly complex state: it is a feeling which is resultant of various
components, one of these being what is called the stimulation of a sense organ; and
the others being those classed under sensorial reaction. "57 Sensations can deceive;
under hypnosis, for example, they can be made report that water is wine, or that
pain is a pleasure, and to this extent they almost could be said to perform a kind of
intellectual judgment (and misjudgement). Our sensations, then, are not the raw or
neutral data of experience, but already part of an interpretative response to the
world of external stimuli.
At the heart of Lewes's theory there is a recognition that impressions and
sensations do not merely subside or pass away. They leave traces of themselves,
55 Spencer, Principles ofPsychology, p. 502-3.
s6 Alexander Bain, "On 'Association'—Controversies,"Mind 12, 46,1887, p. 169.
57 Lewes, Problems ofLife andMind, 3rd Series, II, p. 275-76.
- l6l -
mental residua which in turn play a part in shaping the course of future sensory
excitements: "each stimulation leaves behind it a tremor which does not
immediately subside," he suggests, and the "lingering effect of an impression
enables a comparison to be made with a new impression."58 Though this sounds
orderly, it threatens chaos; not only is the visual sense being constantly stimulated
by its environment in ways not even consciously registered, the complex accretion
of impressions creates a whirl of interactions and adjustments between present
sensations and traces revived from the past. Thus "the mechanism is essentially a
fluctuating one, its elements being combined, recombined, and resolved under
infinite variations of stimulation."59 The re-excitability of trace-impressions has a
lively, destabilising influence, psychologically.
What it causes, according to Lewes, is a vibrant, coursing inner life from
which perceptual experience cannot be separated. It is not so much that our vision
occasionally finds itself influenced by mood or memory, but that perception is this
process. That is to say, a single act of seeing brings into play—as a condition of its
very possibility—these chaotic and interwoven traces of earlier sensations. "Each
perception," he argues, "is itself the revival of many past experiences, and is by
them apperceived... It is by the residua, or modifications impressed by past
experiences that fresh perceptions are cognised, and old ones re-cognised."60 This
aspect of Lewes's theory is crucial. It forms what he calls 'preperception', the
conditions enabling perception to occur by binding it to a centre of personality, a
subjective identity. Who we are will determine how or what we perceive ("the more
we are, the more we see"). Echoing a very similar idea in Ruskin, Lewes proposes
that if four men gaze upon the same sunset, "all will have similar visual
impressions, but each will react on these according to his personal disposition."61
By this theory, perception becomes relativistic in more than a narrowly
58 Lewes, Problems ofLife andMind, 3rd Series, II, p. 52; p. 305.
59 Lewes, Problems ofLife and Mind, 3rd Series, II, p. 52.
60 Lewes, Problems ofLife andMind, 3rd Series, II, pp. 106-7.
61
Lewes, Problems ofLife andMind, 3rd Series, II, p. 201.
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psychological sense. It ties in closely with epistemological relativism, by appearing
to deny that any of these variously personalised angles of observation will be
preferred over any other.
In short, Lewes offers an inferential theory of perception. The content of a
particular perception always arises as the result of a process of inference and
judgment, as he explains in the first volume:
The object is a group of sensibles; any one of these is capable of reviving the
feeling of the others. Inference thus lies at the very root of mental life, for the
very combination of present feelings with past feelings, and the consequent
inference that what was formerly felt in conjunction with any one group of
feelings, will again be felt if the conditions are reinstated—that the sweetness
and fragrance formerly experienced in conjunction with the colour and form
of the apple, are again to be revived when the organs of Taste and Smell are
brought into relation with this coloured object—this act of inference is
necessary to the perception of the object 'apple', and is like in kind to all other
judgments. Inference is 'seeing with the mind's eye'...62
Spencer calls this acquired perception. Like Lewes, he argues that even the smallest
and most seemingly direct perceptions function inferentially. The simple act of
identifying the apple qualifies as a "composite state of consciousness," for it entails
on closer analysis a complex group of mental states combined and classified under
a single name.63 The symbol 'apple' serves only to indicate a set of open relations
between groups of associated conscious states; it does not have a single, necessary
or essential meaning. When we look at an object, countless rapid inferential
judgments attend the observation, most obvious being those that lend it spatial
dimensions and depth, even though physical laws mean that certain sides of the
object will be concealed from view. Or, to take an example from Spencer, if we
witness the melting of a piece of lead, the "perception of melting is, in reality, a
62 Lewes, Problems ofLife and Mind, 1st Series, I, p. 257.
63 Spencer, Principles ofPsychology, p. 202.
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rational interpretation of the appearances—a classing of them with the like
appearances before known."64 Inference, in effect, converts groups of sensations
into narratives (here a story of causality). In a Humean way, the perceived causality
strictly exists in the associating mind of the observer only.
Lewes, in the Problems, describes the process as a judgment, an intellectual
act rather than a sensory one—or rather, for him, there is no real difference:
A perception is always a judgment; the effect of the present stimulation is
combined with and ranged under the residua of past stimulations. The sight
of an object recalls its unseen qualities. We see the qualities of colour and
form, and infer the qualities of solidity, taste, scent, &c., though these once-
felt qualities are now unfelt. This is the process of Inference. We infer that
when the coloured object is brought within the range of other senses than the
eye, itwill yield certain feelings. Inference is visual sensation.6s
In some respects, the theory is an arrestingly problematic one: where does the
purely sensory end and the inferential begin? How much does the mind construe of
the world? For Lewes, there can be no way of telling, for mental states slide and
meld into each other effortlessly. Feelings, perceptions and judgments are, in the
end, similar aspects of mental life. They mix and mingle, in ways not so far
removed from the 'diseased' retina of Dorothea in Rome. Her blurrings ofmind and
world, and the strong emotional register of her perceptions, while she remains
rooted in obvious ways to her distinct physical self, all suggest that the episode can
validly be read as merely an exaggeration of what Lewes would say were the
ordinary psychological conditions of looking. All perception might to some extent
bear the kinds of pressures exerted on Dorothea so memorably in Eliot's passage;
and all vision might be affected—or, to continue the medical language, infected—by
its distorting and disorienting effects.
64 Spencer, Principles ofPsychology, pp. 187-88.
6s Lewes, Problems ofLife andMind, 3rd Series, II, p. 225.
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In fact, Lewes shows considerable awareness of the risks and shortcomings
of inferential vision. Error, he argues, is an unavoidable counterpart of how we
view the world. The mediations of past sensation and feeling, and the habitual
inferences of the mind, mean that the visual sense suffers from a significant
vulnerability. These patternings can easily cause the mind to mistakenly identify or
misrecognise the nature of the things it infers. "Since in a simple case of direct
Perception we are liable to err," he remarks, "it is intelligible how great must be the
liability in more complex mental operations."66 A crux in the plot of Lewes's novel
Ranthorpe can be read in light of this. In Book 5, entitled 'The Dream', we find
Isola, the estranged lover of the story's protagonist Percy, in a state of anguish;
having agreed mistakenly to marry the boorish Harry Cavendish, she suddenly
yearns to be reunited with the young poet. Her desire expresses itself in a vivid and
romantically charged dream, which she still seems to inhabit when she awakes the
following morning calling out for Percy. How can dreams exert such a pull over us,
asks the narrator, before noting that they are "one of the manifold, unappreciable
influences which mould and modify the condition of the mind."67 In her dreamlike
state, Isola imagines hearing Percy's voice calling back through the wall—until it is
revealed that the sounds she hears are actually real, and that he is indeed in the
neighbouring room. The discovery leads, predictably, to the two lovers' temporary
reconciliation. Despite its use of a mawkish romance plot, the scene is intriguing,
precisely because it teaches that an illusory state of mind—the one moulded and
modified and conditioned-turns out to be the more reliable and accurate. It lends
greater credence to the dreamy mode of perception, filled out with desire and
personality, not because the novel advocates walking through life in a dream but
because in reality (rather than in the plot of romantic fiction) ordinary perception
is typified by deeply irrational processes of the kind the narrator describes.
66 Lewes, Problems ofLife andMind, 1st Series, I, p. 258.
67 Lewes, Ranthorpe, p. 293.
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What, then, are the significant elements in Lewes's theory? For one thing, it
suggests a scepticism towards the rational possibilities of the eye, and seems
suspicious of its assumed primacy. "The predominance of the Eye has its
disadvantages when we endeavour to explain mental processes. It has led to the
universal explanation of mental processes by the analogy of vision. What we cannot
see clearly we are supposed not to think accurately."68 Second, the indirectness of
perception establishes an important dialectical exchange in time between mind and
object, by virtue of its having responded to the world through the visual sense. The
same self encountering the sensory world in the hope of gaining reliable knowledge
of it, is transformed in turn by that very gesture:
The Inner Life thus represents the whole of our Experience... Through it all
feelings are capable of revival even in the absence of their original stimuli:
and this revival makes preperception a factor in perception; recognition a
factor in cognition. Varying the diction in Tennyson's Ulysses—'I am part of
all that I have met'—we may say with equal truth, though not with equal
rhythm, 'I am the product of all that I have felt.'69
Experience constitutes the fabric of empiricism's knowledge, yet it also transfigures
the subject at the centre of its epistemology. The philosopher Thomas Nagel writes
that, "The most familiar scene of [epistemological] conflict is the pursuit of
objective knowledge, whose aim naturally described in terms that, taken literally,
are unintelligible: we must get outside of ourselves, and view the world from
nowhere within it. "7° Lewes's theory of perception complicates this aspiration,
however, by stressing the constructive role of the mind in perception and by
showing how the psychology of the gaze both facilitates and limits the scope of its
visual knowledge. Error and doubt are as characteristic of its perceptual reach as
unveiling and disclosure. This fact runs counter to the prevailing view that
68 Lewes, Problems ofLife andMind, 3rd Series, II, p. 358.
69
Lewes, Problems ofLife andMind, 3rd Series, II, pp. 86-87.
70 Thomas Nagel, The Viewfrom Nowhere. NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 67.
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nineteenth-century empiricism valorises both the gaze and detached observation.
As Amanda Anderson puts it: "An ideal of critical distance, itself deriving from the
project of the Enlightenment, lies behind many Victorian and aesthetic and
intellectual projects, including the emergent human sciences and allied projects of
social reform."?1 Detachment, as she argues, has multiple and often contradictory
meanings in Victorian culture; for example, its advantage of distance might afford a
more panoramic view but it might just as easily signal marginality or exclusion,
which threaten the legitimacy of the subject's position.?2 Nonetheless, for empiricist
writers like Lewes the knowability of the visual world stresses the need to take
account of the mental conditions and contingencies of perception.
It should be clarified that in his argument this commitment does not entail
a turn towards idealism. Lewes notes that idealism "reduces Existence to a mere
panorama of mental states," whereas he recognises instead, as a good empiricist,
that "Experience expresses both physical and mental aspects, and that a Not-Self is
everywhere indissolubly interwoven with Self."?3 But it should be noted here that
the pervasive uncertainty about perception—the very practice upon which
empiricism is usually said to be able to predicate confident knowledge—does not
mean for Lewes, or for a writer like George Eliot, that the material world might
vanish right before the bewildered eyes of the observer. Rather it is to illustrate that
their attitudes towards the act of seeing, and also therefore knowing, are complex,
indirect, inferential (rather than referential) and bound up in important respects
with the personality of the spectator. To some extent, the very inexactness of the
eye thereby serves somewhat to redeem it, modestly humanising its aspirations for
knowledge. In the next chapter we shall explore how this becomes attached in the
mid-century to the related question of the knower's physical embodiment.
71 Amanda Anderson, Powers of Distance: Cosmopolitanism and the Cultivation of Detachment.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 4.
72 "Foucauldian analyses of disciplinary power assert not only that forms of ostensibly impartial
knowledge were used to codify and control, but also that subjective experiences of autonomy and
critical distance are generated via a subtle ruse of modern power, which renders subjects docile by
creating illusions of freedom at the heart of interiormental life." Anderson, Powers ofDistance, p. 25.
73 Lewes, Problems ofLife andMind, 2nd Series, p. 318.
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Chapter Four
'As Deep as the Viscera':
Alexander Bain, Spinoza, and the Knowing Body
Recently it has become commonplace, perhaps even rather obvious, to point out
that the history of philosophy is marked everywhere by its exclusion of the body.1 In
Plato, Descartes and Kant, three fulcra of the Western tradition, it is now common
to recall, the body acquired its notorious status as the other of reason, idea, logos,
soul, truth, and so on, in a series of forceful articulations of that exclusion. Unable
to integrate the bodily realm satisfactorily, philosophy from the beginning cast it as
the problematic remainder of metaphysics, figuring it variously as a cave, prison,
womb or tomb from which it would be desirable and finally possible to take flight.2
In line with this critique, the task of rectifying the body's repression has become a
matter of tremendous urgency. In some circles of cultural criticism, the body has
become a highly fashionable topic (a body often gendered, sexualised, or otherwise
politically inscribed), requiring theory emphatically to supplant the traditional
discourse of the soul. As Terry Eagleton says: "If soul discourse is to be replaced by
body discourse, then one can see the point of dropping talk of having a body and
substituting talk of being one. "3 Alexander Bain, and others, however, advanced a
much longer version of exactly this sort of argument in the middle decades of the
1 For a representative selection of theoretical approaches to the question of the body, beginning with
an acknowledgement of its repression by and within the domain of the 'philosophical', and combining
a variety of approaches such as psychoanalysis, feminism, deconstruction and cultural studies, see
Juliet Flower MacCannell and Laura Zakarin, eds. Thinking Bodies. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1994.
2 This position is now widely held, but see for example Jean-Luc Nancy, "Corpus" in MacCannell and
Zakarin, eds. Thinking Bodies, pp. 17-31.
3 Terry Eagleton, The Illusions ofPostmodernism. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996, p. 74.
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nineteenth century. For Bain, a philosopher squarely in the British empiricist
tradition, we are our bodies in the sense that Eagleton suggests. Or, at least, Bain
saw that the self can only be grasped inside untranscendable bodily structures and
processes. This was a view he shared with contemporaries like G. H. Lewes and
Herbert Spencer, other key proponents of mid-Victorian 'psycho-physics'. Their
empiricism necessitated reconnecting the body to epistemology. If the history of
philosophy is said to have struggled to reconcile itself with the notion of
embodiment, then Bain's work should be acknowledged as signalling a turn
towards the body which troubles the neatness of this view. For the concept of the
body rests, as it were, at the heart of his thinking.
Born in Aberdeen to a family ofweavers in 1818, Bain was influenced in his
early career by the philosophical tradition of Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart, but
he quickly rejected the "unbridled metaphysical speculation that characterised the
Scottish School," as one intellectual obituarist put it.4 Thereafter, despite serious
opposition to his work from religious critics, which ultimately thwarted his chances
of gaining a professorship until i860, Bain's thought developed under the influence
and friendship of John Stuart Mill and his circle of London intellectuals. By the
1840s, he was contributing reviews and articles to journals like the Westminster
Review (edited at one point by George Eliot) on topics as varied as induction, logic,
mental philosophy, animal instincts and language, eventually founding Mind in
1876, perhaps his strongest and most obvious legacy. At the centre of his mature
thinking was an attempt to refute the disembodied conception of mind posited
traditionally by philosophy. "The union of Body and Mind," he argued, "has long
been considered the mystery by pre-eminence. The prevailing opinion has been
that this connexion would for ever resist and paralyze explanation.'^ Opposing such
mystification, Bain thought, was essential to a modern philosophical standpoint. A
4 William L. Davidson, "Professor Bain's Philosophy," Mind New Series 13, 50,1904, p. 161.
5 Alexander Bain, Logic. (1870) (2 vols) London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 2nd edn, 1873,
II, p. 127.
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critique of dualism thus animates the central point in his thinking. His objective
was to apply physiological analysis to mental philosophy, predicated on a
thoroughgoing relational contact between mind and body. Indeed, this principle
supplies the broad framework for his two major works of psychology, The Senses
and the Intellect (1855) and The Emotions and the Will (1859), a pair of texts that
address human psychology at the level of the nervous system as well as high-level
cognitive structures. Conveyed throughout, by the form and structure of the works
as well as their content, is the idea of an organic integration of consciousness with
impressible flesh and blood. They demonstrate how even the 'highest' faculties and
human abilities are constrained by their relation to living physical tissue.
As Bain knew all too well, though, the body poses a peculiar cluster of
difficulties for epistemology. For one thing, it is a uniquely unstable object to know,
forever just beyond the reach of observation. After all, how does one witness the
living mechanism of the body—the realm of organs, vessels and nerves hidden
beneath the covering of the skin—without interrupting or fatally arresting its
functionings? To see the blood flowing directly around the cardiovascular system,
for example, one would be required to penetrate the skin concealing it, a gesture
guaranteed to cause the cessation of the phenomenon at the very moment of its
revelation. One would, indeed, have to murder to dissect. Even then, the vital
activity occurring inside our material bodies would continue to confound the gaze.
In sum, no vantage point exists that will allow us to see the bodily mechanism
transparently alive; instead, it can only be imagined or constructed through
auxiliary devices, such as the stethoscope. G. H. Lewes embraced this idea in The
Physiology ofCommon Life: "If for a moment we could with the bodily eye see into
the frame of man, as with the microscope we see into the transparent frames of
some simpler animals, what a spectacle would be unveiled!"6 But, of course, as
Lewes senses here, we cannot directly see into the frame of man; unmediated
6 G. H. Lewes, The Physiology ofCommon Life. (2 vols) London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1859,
I, p. 271.
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access to the object described by physiology remains necessarily impossible. It
points to a realm forever cut off from us, an alien and unknowable region—yet one
that happens to exist within ourselves. Physiology thus provides a powerful
instantiation the idea of the limits of knowledge, reminding us not just that we are
routinely estranged from ourselves, but that the very principle of uncertainty
affects our relation to reality at its most quotidian and familiar. As embodied
creatures, we are walking examples of unknowability.
A further dimension of the problem for empiricists like Bain arose from the
role played by the body in a posteriori theories of knowledge. Not only was it an
enigmatic object to grasp, the body supplied the means by which knowledge of any
kind could be acquired. (At its most extreme, empiricism could logically argue that
really all our knowledge acquaints us with is the modifications of the body.) For
Bain, the act of knowing has to take place through the sensuous body. Without
bodies, his empiricism insists, there would be no mode of epistemological access to
the world of objects beyond our selves. The muscles, for example, register in a most
basic way the body's physical resistance to whatever exists that is not us, providing
the basic structural conditions which enable us even to think the possibility of a
self/world opposition. This muscular sensation of differentiation is, Bain argues, an
epistemological as much as a bodily fact: "By this experience we body forth to
ourselves a notion of the external world. In the sense of energy exerted, we arc said
to go out of self, or to constitute a something in vital contrast to all the rest of our
mental experiences, a not me as opposed to the me of passive sensibility and
thought."7 Knowledge thus commences in crude physical sensations of pressure
and energy, and more specifically pleasure and pain.8
7 Alexander Bain, The Senses and the Intellect. (1855) London: Longman, Roberts and Green, 2nd ed.,
1864, p. 98.
8 "This function of our muscular sensibility arises, in the first instance, from our being conscious of
the different degrees of it... This change of feeling is Discrimination, and is the basis of our
intelligence; [considered] as pleasure or pain, is nothing, but as the commencement of knowledge, it
is all-important." Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, p. 106.
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The previous chapter established the subjective conditions upon which the
empiricist theory of perception depends. For Bain, the related acts of seeing and
knowing incorporate the specificity of the observer's body, too. This concept of the
knowing body, and of the body as an arena in which subjectivity materialises itself,
forms the concern of the present chapter. Mid-Victorian empiricism engaged
profoundly with problems relating to embodiment, and with knowledge as
embodied within (and represented by) the bodily system. Bain's work responds
especially keenly to these issues, but they extend across the other writers as
ongoing interrelated questions surrounding mind-body interaction. And one
context for their engagement with it (even perhaps a surprising measure of it) can
be found in a sudden surge of interest in the philosophy of Spinoza which occurred
in the period. On the face of it, this might seem unlikely—perhaps especially so,
given the Victorians' reputation for scientific positivism—yet it is a feature of the
mid-century that the popularity of Spinoza suddenly took hold in British culture
alongside the careers of writers like Bain and Lewes. Why this apparently strange
coexistence should have occurred is the first question we shall address.
Spinoza in the Nineteenth Century
Between 1854 and 1856, while Bain and Spencer were publishing their first major
studies of psychology, George Eliot was immersed in the task of translating
Spinoza's Ethics (1677). Before the middle of the nineteenth century relatively little
attention had been given to Spinoza by British philosophers, in part because his
geometrical style of metaphysics was antithetical to the spirit of eighteenth-century
empiricism, and also because of his unpalatable reputation as an atheist. As Lewes
remarked, "the accusation of Spinozism was another name for atheism, and
deliberate yielding of the soul to Satan."? Although Coleridge had absorbed
Spinoza's writings as part of his immersion in Continental metaphysics, and Shelley
9 G. H. Lewes, The History ofPhilosophy from Thales to Comte. (2 vols) London: Longmans, Green,
and Co., 2nd edn., 1867, II, p. 161.
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too had been drawn to his religious radicalism, no one before Eliot's generation
championed the philosopher in the way that Goethe had done in Germany. By
1878, however, the philosopher Frederick Pollock was commenting in the journal
Mind that "in the Ethics of Spinoza we have one of the most remarkable
achievements of constructive philosophic genius ever given to the world."10 Such
keen praise was commonly accepted by this time as being neither eccentric nor
misguided. Lewes, who was among the first in Britain to give Spinoza serious
critical consideration, believed the Ethics opened "a new era in History."11 Carlyle's
literary executor, J. A. Froude, who grudgingly acknowledged in 1855 that
"Spinoza's influence over European thought is too great to be denied or set aside,"
eventually became another important channel for the dissemination of his ideas.12
At the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, the high Anglican Tory F. D.
Maurice interpreted Spinoza's system in line with his own transcendental, quasi-
theological moral philosophy.^ Indeed, so various were these importers of Spinoza
that John Caird, Principal of Glasgow University and influential Hegelian, felt it
necessary to open his 1887 monograph on the philosopher by chiding
contemporaries who made Spinoza "side in appearance" with their own political
and intellectual agendas.1^
There was, then, an increasingly widespread recognition in the second half
of the nineteenth century that Spinoza was a central figure in modern thought, an
opinion few in Britain endorsed before the 1850s. As the Victorian translator R. H.
M. Elwes remarked in 1883, "very few years ago the writings of Spinoza were
almost unknown in this country. This striking shift in attitudes was also noticed
10 Frederick Pollock, "Notes on the Philosophy of Spinoza,"Mind 3,10,1878, p. 195.
11 Lewes, The History ofPhilosophy, II, p. 225.
12 J. A. Froude, Essays in Literature and History, ed. Ernest Rhys. London: J. M. Dent, 1906, p. 226.
13 F. D. Maurice, Modern Philosophy; or A Treatise ofMoral and Metaphysical Philosophy from the
Fourteenth Century to the French Revolution with a Glimpse into the Nineteenth Century. London:
Griffin, Bohn, and Company, 1862, pp. 373-432.
"4 John Caird, Spinoza. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1887, pp. 2-3.
15 R. H. M. Elwes (trans, ed.), The Chief Works ofBenedict de Spinoza. (2 vols) London: George Bell
and Sons, 1883, p. v.
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by Matthew Arnold, who described in 1863 how historically surprising, if not
unlikely, Spinoza's newfound popularity seemed:
[I]n spite of the seclusion, in spite of the shortness of his career, in spite of
the hostility of the dispensers of renown in the 18th century—of Voltaire's
disparagement and [Pierre] Bayle's detraction—in spite of the repellent form
which he has given to his principal work, in spite of the exterior semblance of
a rigid dogmatism alien to the most essential tendencies of modern
philosophy, in spite, finally, of the immense weight of disfavour cast upon
him by the long-repeated charge of atheism, Spinoza's name has silently risen
in importance, the man and his work have attracted a steadily increasing
notice, and bid fair to become soon what they deserve to become—in the
history ofmodern philosophy the central point of interest.16
George Eliot herself had recognised Spinoza's importance some years before
Arnold paid the philosopher this elaborate double-edged compliment. In a letter to
Charles Bray in 1849 she wrote, diagnostically: "What is wanted in English is not a
translation of Spinoza's works, but a true estimate of his life and system. After one
has rendered his Latin faithfully into English, one feels that there is another yet
more difficult process of translation for the reader to effect, and that the only mode
of making Spinoza accessible to a larger number is to study his books, then shut
them out and give an analysis."1? Since she began writing fiction only months after
finishing work on the Ethics, it is plausible to consider Eliot's novels as attempting
this larger project of Spinozan translation, as Dorothy Atkins has argued.18 But the
detached voice speaking in this letter widens its import beyond the personal, for
what animates Eliot here is an issue with a much broader horizon than private
ambition: she is hinting at a more general correlation between Spinoza and
contemporary British thought. Spinoza has become a crucial figure, she is insisting,
16 MatthewArnold, "AWord More about Spinoza," Macmillan's Magazine 9,1863, pp. 136-7.
17 George Eliot, The George Eliot Letters. (9 vols) ed. Gordon S. Haight, New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1954-78, II, p. 321.
18 Dorothy Atkins, George Eliot and Spinoza. Salzburg: Institut Fur Englische Sprache Und Literatur,
Universitat Salzburg, 1978, p. 8.
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one who speaks relevantly to the intellectual predicaments and debates of the mid-
nineteenth century.
Yet we, too, like Arnold, may wonder why a thinker "alien to the most
essential tendencies of modern philosophy" was felt so suddenly to be relevant in
the 1850s, a decade which saw the new psychological theory of Bain, Spencer and
Lewes, the realist aesthetic theory of Ruskin and Eliot, and which closed on a
definitively radical note with the publication of Darwin's The Origin of Species
(1859). Why should this dawning middle phase of Victorian intellectual history
have coincided with the rehabilitation of a seventeenth-century Dutch-Jewish
philosopher seemingly rooted in the Cartesian tradition? Why was Eliot, a good
empiricist, renouncing metaphysics in her 1855 essay on Otto Friedrich Gruppe at
the same time as completing her translation of the Ethics?19
The turn towards Spinoza in the mid-Victorian period was a turn towards a
philosophical system whose logic invalidates common sense and contradicts direct
realism.20 The fundamental assumptions of Thomas Reid's realism, for example—
that the mind opens passively on to the world, that the self has an ontological
priority, that there are innate psychological faculties—find no support in Spinoza's
writings. On the contrary, because a monistic theory of substance guides his work,
he offers a picture of human existence and knowledge inconsistent in principle with
these naive intuitivist assumptions. While it would be misleading to describe Eliot
or any of these writers as disciples of Spinoza, the expanding interest in his writing
ought arguably to be framed by the broader context ofVictorian empiricist culture,
19 See George Eliot, "The Future of German Philosophy" (1855) in Selected Critical Writings, ed.
Rosemary Ashton, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 137.
20 For nineteenth-century commentary on Spinoza's philosophy see: Robert Willis, Benedict de
Spinoza: His Life, Correspondence, and Ethics. London: Triibner and Co., 1870; James Martineau, A
Study ofSpinoza. London: Macmillan and Co., 1882; John Caird, Spinoza. Edinburgh and London:
William Blackwood and Sons, 1887; Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy. London:
Duckworth and Co. 2nd ed., 1889. For more recent studies see: David Bidney, The Psychology and
Ethics of Spinoza: A Study in the History and Logic of Ideas. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1940; Edwin Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1969; Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984; R. J. Delahunty, Spinoza. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985; Alan
Donagan, Spinoza. London: HarvesterWheatsheaf, 1988.
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which rejected fixed, static and essential categorisations of self and world. In
Spinoza lay the possibility of thinking beyond traditional approaches to the issue of
epistemology, most obviously the common sense paradigm inherited from Reid,
but also the metaphysical claims of the innatist school typified by, amongst others,
William Hamilton. Furthermore, Spinoza's work seemed to push challengingly at
the limitations of a philosophical (and cultural) landscape carved up reductively
into materialist and idealist poles of thought. Like empiricism itself, it sought to
establish the ground of knowledge in terms resistant to this basic opposition.
Indeed, the root of Spinoza's appeal for mid-Victorian writers consisted
largely in what G. H. Lewes called the epistemological "crisis" introduced by his
philosophy, after which "the nature and limits of Knowledge became the most
urgent topics." The crucial outcome of the crisis, Lewes insisted, was the
transformation of the epistemological question into a psychological one, since for
Spinoza the problem of knowledge proceeds from the fact of psychological (and
even phys cal) embodiment: "The crisis, therefore, turns upon this fundamental
dispute: Can the human mind transcend the sphere of relative knowledge, and,
passing from Consciousness to Causes, explore the nature of things per se?"21 This,
as we have seen, was one of the defining questions taken up by mid-century
empiricists, and woven into the fabric of works by Ruskin, Eliot, Lewes, Spencer
and Bain, so its specific intersection with Spinoza is revealing. By looking briefly at
how Spinoza opens this question, and at the relationship outlined in his Ethics
between consciousness, knowledge and the real, it will become clear that these
writers were drawn to a position that allowed the limiting mind/body binarism to
be rethought in radically new ways. Spinoza, it will be argued, pointed towards an
epistemology freed from restrictive dualisms, where the relationship between
thought and matter could be drastically reconfigured. It will be argued, then, that
the Victorians' interest in Spinoza coincided with the resurgence of interest in the
21 Lewes, The History ofPhilosophy, II, pp. 224-5.
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human body—not just a physiological body but, importantly, a thinking body
reincorporated into the very epistemological project of empiricism.
In his most influential work, the Ethics, which is arranged according to a
Euclidian scheme of postulates and proofs, Spinoza rejects a foundational principle
of Western metaphysics and Judeo-Christian theology: mind/body dualism. The
mind and the body, the infinite and the finite, the spiritual and the material, and so
on, do not oppose one another as distinct metaphysical categories or orders, but are
aspects of a single, universal and self-subsistent ontology. Reality, expressed in
terms of substance, is strictly indivisible for Spinoza. According to this monism,
corporeal being is not surrounded and transcended by a metaphysical otherness or
absolute exteriority in the form of the familiar anthropomorphic God. Rather than
standing outside the world as its unique source, the creator is wholly identical with
the creation. All that exists does so as an aspect or attribute of this unified
substance, Deus siva Natura. Postulate 14 of Book 1, stating that "Except God, no
substance can be or be conceived," is qualified by the following scholium which
logically demonstrates this monistic claim:
Since God is an absolutely infinite being, of whom no attribute which
expresses an essence of substance can be denied, and he necessarily exists,
[then] if there were any substance except God, it would have to be explained
through some attribute of God, and so two substances of the same attribute
would exist, which is absurd. And so except God, no substance can be or,
consequently, be conceived. For if it could be conceived, it would have to be
conceived as existing. But this (by the first part of this demonstration) is
absurd. Therefore except for God no substance can be or be conceived,
q.e.d.22
Ingeniously, Spinoza justifies his monism here by applying a version of the
ontological argument: since infiniteness and existence have to pertain attributively
to the nature of a substance, then logically only one substance can exist. Just as it
22 Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics. (1677) trans, ed. Edwin Curley. London: Penguin, 1996, pp. 9-10.
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would contradict God's essence for God not to exist, so it would contradict God's
infinite nature if a further substance other than God existed. Thus, according to
Spinoza's metaphysical vision, all being exists in and through the one divine
substance, the attributes of which are infinite. Relative to the world, God is the
causa immanens omnium—"the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things"—
and so reality at its most basic structural level can be described in terms of an
impersonal God-substance ("a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes")
and its modes.23 What is striking about this theory of ontology is its avoidance of
human analogy. Substances and modes are not modelled anthropomorphically,
God bears no resemblance to a thinking, willing, judging being, and the human
subject is not a necessary or pivotal ontological category. In other words, the
sovereignty famously attributed to Cartesian subjectivity has no precedent to
mirror in either God or nature. Those who "feign a God, like man, consisting of a
body and a mind, and subject to passions," Spinoza says, "wander from the true
knowledge of God."24 Likewise, men who commonly "consider all natural things as
means to their own advantage," as if the physical scheme were essentially
sympathetic to human desires and destinies, falsely project their own image on to
nature.^ From the monistic standpoint, such anthropocentric prejudices have
neither value nor meaning.
The psychological picture that emerges in the Ethics therefore challenges
humanistic and intuitive conceptions of mental experience. Just like his image of
God, who is depersonalised into a faceless and intrinsic principle, Spinoza's theory
of psychology describes the human self in the estranging language of geometry,
treating "human actions and appetites just as if it were a question of lines, planes,
and bodies."26 In logically reasoned steps, the Ethics constructs an anti-Cartesian
image of the mind in which the traditional autonomy and immateriality of thought
23 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 16; p. 1.
24 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 10.
2s Spinoza, Ethics, p. 26.
26 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 69.
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are wholly challenged. Since the impression of independent mental and bodily
realms becomes philosophically meaningless in the monistic system, no ground
exists from which the concept of pure, monadic, invisible subjectivity might spring.
To imagine a rational soul inhabiting a corporeal body—an idealist ghost dwelling
in an earthly machine—would contradict a priori the first principles of Spinoza's
metaphysics. Instead, mind cannot be defined and explained adequately in
isolation from body, and identity cannot be considered as an irreducible interiority.
For Spinoza, Thought and Extension (the only attributes under which the finite
individual can grasp reality) constitute two forms of description, or ways of
understanding, rather than separate domains, it being possible to consider a single
phenomenon under either designation. This means that a psychological event such
as pain may be accounted for both in mental terms (the qualitative experience of
pain) and in bodily terms (the occurrence of specific physiological changes) without
either description being exhaustively valid or finally preferable. Rather like the
picture of two silhouetted human profiles whose relief pattern reveals the image of
a vase, the self must be thought of as having twin or parallel aspects. As one
commentator puts it, "although the mind and the body are to be regarded as modes
of distinguishable attributes, they are also in some sense one and the same thing:
eadem res."2?
This parallelism, or double-aspect theory, has a crucial implication
elucidated in the second book of the Ethics. As it develops, Spinoza's argument
repeatedly suggests that mental states not only correlate to physical events, but in
fact derive solely from them. In the brief yet contentious Postulate 13, which
follows an unusual plea from the author for the reader's unprejudiced attention,
Spinoza states: "The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, or
a certain mode of extension which actually exists, and nothing else."28 This radical
proposition and its qualifying scholia hold the key to Spinoza's notion of the mind-
27 R. J. Delahunty, Spinoza. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985, p .179.
28 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 39.
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body union and his psychology. If the "mind is united to the body from the fact that
the body is the object of the mind," then, in effect, mental states begin as
representations or ideas of changes ("affections") occurring within the corporeal
economy.2? It follows that the very possibility of ideas depends on there being
bodily affections, a point made explicit later on: "The human mind is capable of
perceiving a great many things, and is the more capable, the more its body can be
disposed in a great many ways."30 More forcefully still, in Postulate 23 he argues:
"The mind does not know itself, except insofar as it perceives the ideas of the
affections of the body."31 What this amounts to is a vigorous argument for the
primacy of the body in the formation of mental experience. As Errol E. Harris
remarks: "Thus the self-sentience of my body, what for Spinoza is the idea of the
body, comprehends everything of which I am ever sensuously aware, and it is from
this, and on this foundation, that all my 'ideas' of whatever kind are elaborated."32
In consequence, Spinoza's psychology stands resolutely against direct or
realist theories of visual representation. Epistemologically speaking, objects cannot
be grasped in themselves but only become known through the physical impressions
aroused by them in the human frame. "The human mind does not perceive any
external body as actually existing," he reasons, "except through the ideas of the
affections of its own body."33 In having knowledge of an object, all that our
knowledge consists of, in the strictest sense, is the idea of our own physical
responses to that proximate stimulus, such as the pressure it exerts on the muscles
or the light it reflects into the eyes. Therefore, as another critic argues, Spinoza
"would say that the idea which I have of the table informs me rather of the state of
my body than of the table. In other words the table reveals itself to me in so far as it
induces in me certain processes of body (we should say of brain) which are
29 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 48.
30 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 44.
31 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 49.
32 Errol E. Harris, "Body-Mind Relation in Spinoza's Philosophy" in James B. Wilbur (ed.), Spinoza's
Metaphysics: Essays in Critical Appreciation. Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1976, p. 15.
33 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 50.
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identical with what we call the thought of the table."34 So while a mental idea
represents a real object "insofar as the external body determines the human body in
a certain fixed way," in no way merely does it mirror outer reality passively. Rather,
Spinoza takes a conspicuously sceptical view of ideation: "The idea of any affection
of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of an external body."33
Furthermore, ideas summon other ideas associatively in thought patterns
unique to the individual. Spinoza states: "If the human body has once been affected
by two or more bodies at the same time, then when the mind subsequently
imagines one of them, it will immediately recollect the others also."36 For two
reasons this Spinozan associationism undermines the possibility of direct 'realistic'
psychological representation. First, a process of mental recombination brings past
perceptions to bear on present ideas, so that knowledge of an object never exists in
isolation from previous subjective experience. What the mind sees, and how it is
perceived, varies according to the associational habits of the viewer. Memory,
defined by Spinoza as "nothing other than the certain connection of ideas involving
the nature of things which are outside the human body," intervenes in perception
to condition and produce the world that the individual experiences:
And in this way each of us will pass from one thought to another, as each
one's association has ordered the images of things in the body. For example, a
soldier, having seen traces of a horse in the sand, will immediately pass from
the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman, and from that to the
thought of war, and so on. But a farmer will pass from the thought of a horse
to the thought of a plow, and then to that of a field, and so on. And so each
one, according as he has been accustomed to join and connect images of
things in this way or that, will pass from one thought to another.3?
34 S. H. Mallone, The Dawn of Modern Thought: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz. London: Oxford
University Press, 1930, p. 72.
35 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 50.
36 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 46.
37 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 47.
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In suggesting that existing psychological configurations influence one's
perceptions, Spinoza again places a crucial emphasis on the body. Indeed, his
theory of bodies supplies the second reason why, according to his psychology, a
knowable object cannot be grasped simply or directly. Objects (or other bodies),
described usually as unified things, are actually composites made up of smaller
parts and in turn of still smaller parts (anachronistically, Spinoza could be said to
endorse a version of atomism). Strictly speaking, the objective reality to which even
the simplest perceptual act corresponds will be multiple and complex, an intricate
"union of bodies."38 In this sense, the human body is constantly being affected by
"more than one object," and hence perceptual ideas will always be multiple and
associational. Moreover, the human body—the site of affections—is itself a "highly
composite" entity, composed of "a great many individuals of different natures," and
therefore open to complex physical interactions with its environment: "The
individuals composing the human body, and consequently, the human body itself,
are affected by external bodies in very many ways."39 This divisibility of matter
affords a profusion of physical responses to an apparently simple object like a table
which, when considered under the attribute of Thought, equate to a complex
ideational series rather than a stable and unified image imprinted on the mind.
Thus the Ethics stresses the constructive role played by the mind, or more
narrowly the imagination, in our grasp of the world under the attribute of Thought.
Qualities usually taken as inherent or objective properties of nature, for example,
can be shown to originate subjectively from physiological (one could say
neurological) responses and correlative modes of thought:
For example, if the motion the nerves receive from objects presented through
the eyes is conducive to health, the objects by which it is caused are called
beautiful; those which cause a contrary motion are called ugly. Those which
move the sense through the nose, they call pleasant-smelling or stinking;
38 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 42.
39 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 44.
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through the tongue, sweet or bitter, tasty or tasteless; those which move the
ears are said to produce noise, sound, or harmony... All of these things show
sufficiently that each one has judged things according to the disposition of his
brain; or rather, has accepted affections of the imagination as things.40
The arresting mixture of physiological and aesthetic language here carries a crucial
point: for Spinoza, there are no sharp categorical distinctions separating different
regions of reality from one another, such as sophisticated or 'high' mental
capacities (taste, intellect, moral reflection) from 'lower' level or simple physical
operations. They are distinguished on a scale of increasing complexity, not by type.
Beauty can therefore be discussed in the same breath as physiology, because for
Spinoza they share a fundamentally determinate relation. Like other absolutes, the
category of beauty springs from human attempts to codify the world rather than
from nature itself, which is to say, it has no objectively real content outside mind
and culture. Likewise, good and evil "indicate nothing positive in things, considered
in themselves, nor are they anything other than modes of thinking, or notions we
form because we compare things to one another."41 Similarly, order is preferred to
confusion, "as if order were anything in Nature more than a relation to our
imagination."42 As it resituates the categories of aesthetic, epistemological and
moral value inside the circumference of psychological experience, Spinoza's
deconstruction of metaphysical absolutes becomes a thoroughgoing assault on
essentialism. Labels and fictions shape the world as it is seen through human eyes,
and these designations have their source in inherited cultural knowledge,
association, and the basic desire for self-preservation (conatus). Unlike Reid's
neutral mirror, the mind and its perceptions must therefore be conceived as active
imaginative processes: "all the notions by which ordinary people are accustomed to
40 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 30.
41 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 115.
42 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 29.
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explain Nature are only modes of imagining, and do not indicate the nature of
anything, only the constitution of the imagination."43
Similarly, according to Spinoza, language might give the impression that we
possess discrete psychological powers, exercised freely by the will, but again this
kind of classification has a formal rather than a literal descriptive power. His view
resembles a constructivist psychological theory: "there is in the mind no absolute
faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, and the like. From this it follows that
these are and similar faculties are either complete fictions or nothing but
metaphysical beings, or universals, which we are used to forming from
particulars."44 Since minds count as examples of "finite modes," and all finite
modes are incapable of uncaused action, free will in general is also exposed as a
primitive human fiction. As the psychologist David Ballin Klein has argued, this
non-literal mental language has a curiously modern quality, for in contrast to the
phrenologists of the early nineteenth century Spinoza does not localise specific
brain functions.45
In a similar vein, the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio credits Spinoza with
thinking through the question of mind and body "in ways that were not only
profoundly opposed to the thinking of most of his contemporaries, but remarkably
current three hundred and some years later."46 This seemingly daring claim, casting
Spinoza as a "protobiologist," intriguingly centres on the issue of perception. Like
the modern neuroscientist, who understands mental images in terms of biological
changes in the human organism, Spinoza doubts that a perception held in the mind
resembles "a replica of the [real] object," Damasio says. If neurobiology has shown
43 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 30.
44 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 62.
45 He argues: "Although Spinoza employed terms like 'reason', 'emotion', 'intellect', 'will', he—like the
modern psychologist—warned against the error of regarding such nouns as references to distinct
entities or separate faculties. Instead he regarded them as convenient verbal labels for concepts or
universals obtained by abstraction from the realities of individual experience. As abstractions they
have no real existence, any more than whiteness apart from white objects or circularity apart from
circular objects." David Ballin Klein quoted in William R. Uttal, The New Phrenology: The Limits of
Localizing Cognitive Processes in the Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001, p. xiv.
46 Antonio Damasio, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain. London: William
Heineman, 2003, pp. 14.
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how "the images we experience are brain constructions prompted by an object,
rather than mirror reflections of the object," then the argument of the Ethics looks
remarkably modern.*? More importantly, in tracing this previously unexamined
legacy, Damasio finds that Spinoza's thought bears a striking resemblance to the
directions taken in nineteenth-century psychology:
Darkly, through the glass of unsentimental and unvarnished sentences,
Spinoza had gleaned an architecture of life regulation along the lines that
William James, Claude Bernard, and Sigmund Freud would pursue two
centuries later. Moreover, by refusing to recognize a purposeful design in
nature, and by conceiving of bodies and minds as made up of components
that could be combined in varied patterns across different species, Spinoza
was compatiblewith Charles Darwin's evolutionary thinking*8
The nineteenth-century writers influenced by Spinoza that Damasio lists—which
include Wilhelm Wundt, Herbert von Helmholtz, Ernst Haeckel, Hippolyte Taine,
Johannes Miiller—were all familiar to Alexander Bain and other proponents of the
newmid-century psychological theory, and allusions to their work pepper Victorian
psychology.*9 So substantial was Spinoza's influence on these nineteenth-century
French and German writers that one commentator has described him as "the
founder of the independent science of psychology."80 A central figure in the
prehistory of the mind sciences, even neurobiology, Spinoza can thus be seen to
anticipate the directions of much later psycho-physiology.
In view of this fact, the burgeoning British interest in his work in the 1850s,
60s and 70s, amongst philosophical writers inclined like Bain towards empiricism,
becomes less surprising than perhaps at first it might seem. Indeed, the rise of
Spinoza should not be read as historically unconnected to more familiar aspects of
4? Damasio, Lookingfor Spinoza, pp. 199-200.
48 Damasio, Lookingfor Spinoza, pp. 13-14.
49 Damasio, Lookingfor Spinoza, p. 259.
e° David Bidney, The Psychology and Ethics ofSpinoza: A Study in the History and Logic of Ideas.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940, p. 373
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intellectual developments in nineteenth-century culture. The empiricist writing
being examined here reflects an increasingly openness to the new frameworks
offered by Spinoza's philosophy, ways of thinking that returned the living body to
the scene of epistemological inquiry. The implications of this return, in Bain and
others, are our next concern.
Minds, Brains and Bodies
Oppressive, humourless and severe, Edward Casaubon in Middlemarch represents
a thinking mind consumed by the fantasy of disembodiment. His sober embrace of
the scholarly life, which he pursues with egotistical vigour rather than selfless
asceticism, is total and uncompromising. He defines himself, as do others, solely in
terms of his rarefiedworld of ideas, as if the physical dimension of experience were
irrelevant to his sense of self. In admitting to Mr Brooke that his "mind is
something like the ghost of an ancient, wandering about the world," Casaubon
seems as much to indulge his dream of becoming pure consciousness as apologise
for his frustrating unworldliness.51 Yet others, especially Dorothea, collude in the
fantasy: whenever she thinks of Casaubon early in the novel it is usually just an
image of his mind that she imagines (one that is "attractively labyrinthine"); and
later Sir James Chettam complains, rather brusquely, that Casaubon "has got no
good red blood in his body."52 Casaubon s relationship with his own body, and with
the physicality of life in general, is therefore a source of considerable anxiety.
The anxiety works itself out significantly within the dramatic texture of the
novel, indicating Eliot's alertness to the question of embodiment. By requesting a
reader to aid his research (a role taken gladly by Dorothea), for example, Casaubon
manages to circumvent even the minor physical labours of scholarship. The letter
he sends to her proposing marriage, which in contrast she greets with spontaneous
physical expression ("she fell on her knees, buried her face, and sobbed"), almost
51 George Eliot, Middlemarch. (1871-2) ed. Rosemary Ashton. London: Penguin, 1994, p. 18.
52 Eliot,Middlemarch, p. 24; p. 70.
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comically avoids reference to the fleshy actuality of human nature, or any tacit hint
of sexual desire. So emphatically cerebral is his unromantic prose that its author,
apparently repelled by sensuality, effectively silences the desiring body. When
acknowledging his advanced years, for example, he turns immediately to a bookish
metaphor to articulate the inexorable fact of ageing: "I can offer you... the faithful
consecration of a life which, however short in the sequel, has no backward pages
whereon, if you choose to turn them, you will find records such as might justly
cause you either bitterness or shame."53 Like the rest of the letter, the metaphor
discloses Casaubon's uneasiness towards the decaying body just as it announces the
tenor of his intellectual vocation. This is a man whose mind has lost any positive
identification with the physiological processes affecting it, generating a sustained
desire on his part to be freed from the body entirely.
The text ofMiddlemarch, however, works against this wish. Casaubon may
imagine himself as all mind, but like the psychological theories emerging in the
period, the novel questions his dualistic propensity to separate mind from matter.
He would undoubtedly pour scorn on Alexander Bain's assertion that "the
connexion of Mind and Body is not occasional or partial, but thorough-going and
complete," and to this extent his grasp of the mind-body union looks relatively
antiquated.54 But through several narrative routes the text returns and restores the
corporeal knowledge that Casaubon would repress. Firstly, considerable attention
is paid to his appearance (his sunken eye sockets, his complexion of a "cochon de
lait," or suckling pig), providing an earthy, if not comic, contrast to his classically
elevated intellect. When Dorothea sees a miniature of his aunt displayed in his
Lowick manor house, she notices that like him the woman has "deep grey eyes
rather near together," reminding Casaubon of his inescapable genetic prehistory.55
She even observes in him a likeness of John Locke, which she intends as sincere
53 Eliot,Middlemarch, p. 44.
54 Alexander Bain, Mind and Body: The Theories of their Relation. London: Henry S. King and Co.,
2nd edn., 1873, p. 6.
55 Eliot,Middlemarch, p. 20; p. 76.
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flattery, but ironically the comparison equates Casaubon with a philosopher
famous for celebrating the bodily province of the senses.
If these subtle details gently undermine his lofty self-image, then the
descriptions of his failing health later in the novel stage a second and more serious
return of the marginalised body. For eventually it begins to dawn on Casaubon that
even he happens to be fastened to a dying animal. In consultation with Dr Lydgate,
and so now an object of examination rather than in control of inquiry, he asks his
physician for details of his condition, principally to establish reliably whether its
implications will be fatal. "I should desire to know the truth without reservation,"
he instructs him. Lydgate replies, patiently but ambiguously:
'I believe you are suffering from what is called fatty degeneration of the heart,
a disease which was first divined and explored by Laennec, the man who gave
us the stethoscope, not so very many years ago. A good deal of experience—a
more lengthened observation—is wanted on the subject. But after what you
have said, it is my duty to tell you that death from this disease is often
sudden. At the same time, no such result can be predicted. Your condition
may be consistent with a tolerably comfortable life for another fifteen years,
or even more.'56
Their exchange captures two kinds of ignorance: Casaubon's long-held ignorance of
the body that has sat for years in the dusty seclusion of his library, and medical
science's relative ignorance of diseased human anatomy. Lydgate, after all, brings
with him a vigorously modern view of medicine (distrusted by many provincial
Middlemarchers) that, despite its cutting-edge status, still cannot manage anything
more decisive than an open-ended diagnosis. The ailing body will not give up its
truth easily, and moreover seems to resist full interpretation. To both, though for
different reasons, the body is an essentially unknown but crucial region. The real
importance of the scene, however, concerns Casaubon rather than Lydgate. Here is
56 Eliot, Middlemarch, p. 423.
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a man brutally reminded that a life lived in and through the mind is rooted in blood
and tissue like any other, and, moreover, that these now defective processes cannot
truly be fathomed. As it follows his demand for knowledge ("the truth without
reservation"), the scene dramatises the body's refusal to submit to rational mastery
in the way that Casaubon, perhaps rather desperately, assumes it must.
A third example of how Eliot's novel undermines the fantasy of mental
autonomy occurs in chapter 20, the same chapter that features Casaubon's esoteric
letter to Dorothea. Like most chapters in Middlemarch, the fictional narrative is
stalled and supplemented here by an epigraph, a common device for Eliot which
performs in this instance (as so often in her novels) as an ironic commentary on the
primary narrative. Neither fully inside the fictional frame nor wholly extratextual,
this secondary or supplementary discourse runs against the grain of the first (one
whose fabric is already richly heterogeneous, in that it incorporates a letter—an
additional text—written by one its characters). The epigraph is taken from Robert
Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy (1621), an encyclopaedic account of "morbid
psychology" and its attendant physical symptoms, still regarded by some Victorians
as a seminal piece of scientific literature, despite being a densely intertextual
assimilation of medical, astrological and magical sources.57 It catalogues the
gruesome ailments caused by excessive sedentary behaviour, or "over-much sitting"
as Burton calls it: "gowts, catarrhs, rheums, cachexia, bradypepsia, bad eyes, stone,
and collick, crudities, oppilations, vertigo, winds, consumptions."58 If ever there
was a man likely to suffer from these unpleasant effects of sedentariness then
surely it is Casaubon. For a deskbound bibliophile like him, falling prey to these
symptoms would be an acute professional hazard, the bodily cost of a life spent in
relative inertia. So this grisly compendium of disease, articulated literally from the
margins of the text, acts a counterweight to his persistent discourse of the mind
57 Robert Burton, The Anatomy ofMelancholy. (1621) (2 vols) eds. Thomas C. Faulkner, Nicolas K.
Kiessling and Rhonda H. Blair. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989-90.
s8 Eliot, Middlemarch, p. 43.
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and the disembodied intellect. Almost like a repository of the knowledge Casaubon
has denied, the epigraph interrupts the mentalist vision he espouses by giving voice
to the silenced physical body. It is, as it were, that body speaking back, with a nasty
if comical reminder of the proximity ofour souls and arseholes.59
Unlike Casaubon, Spinoza envisaged a philosophically tenable means of
reintegrating the divided Cartesian regimes. As one philosopher has put it, he
evolved an argument in favour of the "intrinsic belonging-together of mind and
matter, which gave causal preference neither to matter, as materialism would have
it, nor to mind, as idealism would have it, but instead stressed their interrelation on
the common ground of which they were both dependent aspects."60 Mid-Victorian
psychology, also recognising this mind-body interdependence, increasingly turned
its analyses towards the body, which as the first chapter showed had generally been
absent in eighteenth-century discussions of the mind. Bain, in particular, sought to
marry the established psychological language of associationism with a systematic
knowledge of physiology, an approach that came to characterise the new
psychological theory. Writing to John Stuart Mill in 1851, while preparing The
Senses and the Intellect, Bain said he was "satisfied that if I had that familiar and
perfect grasp that belongs to the professional Anatomist, I might do a vast more in
the way of pushing forward my own subject."61 Herbert Spencer broadly agreed
with this aspiration, and the psychological arguments in his work protest strongly
against the spiritualist orthodoxy that "the body is merely the ghost's house, having
no causal relation to it." Instead, he recognised their profound interdependence:
"Mind is not as deep as the brain only, but is, in a sense, as deep as the viscera."62
59 This memorable phrase is borrowed from Simon Critchley, who coins it in a discussion of mind and
body in the philosophy of humour, though it applies nicely here, too: "the bodily dimension of the
comic takes place in the gap between being and having, between our souls and arseholes... We cannot
simultaneously be what we have." Simon Critchley, On Humour. London: Routledge, 2002, p. 50.
60 Hans Jonas, "Spinoza and the Theory of Organism" in Stuart F. Spicker, ed. The Philosophy of the
Body: Rejections ofCartesian Dualism. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970, p. 61.
61 Bain quoted in Robert M. Young, Mind, Brain and Adaptation in the Nineteenth Century. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 103.
62 Herbert Spencer, An Autobiography. (2 vols) London: Williams and Northgate, 1904, II, p. 417; p.
421.
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These were, however, controversial and challenging views capable of upsetting
conservative and religious sensibilities, as well as informed specialist opinion. One
such critic, John Grote, who held the chair of moral philosophy at Cambridge
University from 1855 to 1866, eyed Bain's physiological descriptions with
suspicion, as he informed him in a noteworthy letter of 1859:
You have apparently a knowledge of physiology greater than most of your
predecessors, and the want of which knowledge has made me (for my own
humble part) hesitate in following out some trains of thought which have
suggested themselves... I cannot conceive that the utmost refinement of
analysis of the corporeal phenomenon of emotion will carry us beyond the
region of organs or instruments, and the self which uses them must be
something which has its realities, over and above what belongs to them.6-1'
Bain would not have been greatly surprised by this kind of reaction to his
work. Grote's criticism (directed against The Emotions and the Will but applicable
across Bain's thinking in general) crystallises an older style of psychological
argument—one often vehemently resistant to biologically centred theories—that
continued to exert considerable influence in the middle of the nineteenth century.
Its thrust is plain: no matter how detailed our anatomical vocabulary becomes, or
how accurately the organs and nerves are understood, physiology will only ever
yield knowledge of a physiological kind; the identity of the self, on the other hand,
belongs to a different order of description and cannot be discovered or explained
within these structures. As Grote frames it, the argument cleverly utilises a spatial
rhetoric to suggest the remoteness of the self from physical processes (it assumes a
"region" somewhere "beyond" the mere body), and to imply a causal hierarchy
between them (the self exists "over and above" all else). This kind of language also
appears in Eliot's novels, spoken by characters and narrators who share Grote's
psychological assumptions or who epitomise wisdom derived from common sense.
63 Alexander Bain,Autobiography. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1904, pp. 255-6.
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An example of it occurs in chapter 13 of Daniel Deronda, when Gwendolen's long
private reflection on her suitor Grandcourt is broken suddenly by the intrusion of
her mother's voice: "Gwendolen looked round, and seeming to be roused to the
consciousness of her physical self, took off her gloves and then her hat, that the soft
breeze might blow on her head."64 However fleetingly, there is a moment here when
Gwendolen implicitly figures the body as a secondary substance appended to her
real mental self, as if an essentially passive exteriority. Needless to say, she is no
Casaubon, not least because she lacks the seriousness or discipline to plough
through books and doggedly pursue ideas, but like him Gwendolen reaches for a
kind of self-masteiy (in the form of egotistical refashioning) that takes for granted
an inner/outer dualism. It expresses itself in the aloofness that they both display—
from others, from social life, even from their own embodiment.
In a similar way, one narrator in Middlemarch (an unusual figure who
urges the reader to sympathise with Casaubon's arid personality) clings to the sort
of psychological descriptions that Grote would have recognised: "Mr Casaubon had
an intense consciousness within him, and was spiritually a-hungered like the rest of
us."65 Here, again, a spatial metaphor cordons off the self as an irreducible and
inviolable category, and the narrator evidently assumes that this view is a natural
and inevitable one to hold. The recurrence of this kind of language in Eliot's novels
dramatises a style of thought that still held sway in the mid-Victorian era, but its
appeal to common sense is undermined elsewhere by her utilisation of very
different—and more Bainian—metaphors. A later narrator in Middlemarch, for
instance, aspires to a grasp of neurobiology: "I am not sure that certain fibres in Mr
Garth's mind had not resumed their old vibration towards the very end which now
revealed itself to Fred."66 Like Grote, the earlier narrator would have recoiled from
such physicalist descriptions of human will and behaviour.
64 George Eliot, Daniel Deronda. (1876) ed. Terence Cave. London: Penguin, 1995, p. 138.
65 Eliot, Middlemarch, p. 278.
66 Eliot,Middlemarch, p. 561.
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Bain's key works, however, The Senses and the Intellect and The Emotions
and the Will, both argue (by almost taking it for granted) that mind and body are
continuously connected. This continuity and relational interdependence form a
crucial aspect of his project. It is at once the radical point on which both books turn
(and on which their intellectual originality depends), and yet a commitment that
neither of them vociferously or iconoclastically declaims. Bain's radicalism takes
place quietly. In them, he seeks to develop a detailed analysis of the mind through
the body. The trajectory traced over both volumes, moving from physio-sensory
structures and stimuli to advanced cognitive states, is highly significant: one can
proceed to the latter only through the former. This basic principle or movement
gives the narrative of The Senses and the Intellect and The Emotions and the Will
its shape. The reader has to move through some three hundred pages discussing
the nervous system, cerebrum, muscles and organic processes of sensation before
reaching the psychological aspects of the sensory mechanism, eventually arriving
near the end of the second volume at the stratum encompassing volition,
consciousness and moral belief. It is in the nature of this narrative journey that the
reader cannot easily forget the bodily origins of the unfolding psychological story.
The point continually enforced by the formal design of Bain's work is not just that a
single continuous plane joins mental with physical phenomenon, but that the whole
emerging picture of development depends on rudimentary material events.
For a Victorian culture hypersensitive to distinctions between the primitive
and the civilised, this was indeed a radical mode of analysis. Collectively, Bain's two
major works daringly confront long-held dualisms central to the Western
philosophical tradition, not least the assumption that subjectivity and identity are
to be conceived in opposition to material embodiment. But, in contrast with, say,
John Ruskin, whose purpose in Modern Painters is similarly designed to trouble
settled categories and values, Bain does not openly announce the way he will
contest tradition. The tone of his writing aspires to an evenness and modesty quite
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different from the variegated texture of Ruskin's work, with all its provocations and
its conscious air of controversy. As radical as they are in some respects, neither The
Senses and the Intellect nor The Emotions and the Will take rhetorical strides to
challenge and provoke the reader by sounding a rallying cry against dualism, nor
even appear at first glance especially controversial. In fact, the reverse obtains; they
appear unflappably sturdy works, carrying out their analytical survey of the subject
with thoroughness and care, and with little Ruskinian exuberance. By no means do
they seem eager to court controversy. One practical reason for this is that Bain was
aware, as ever, of the likely charges of materialism and godlessness that went with
the territory. Opponents of psycho-physiology (even respectful and alert ones like
John Grote or James Martineau) did not need extra encouragement—the interface
of mind and matter was already a controversial enough question.
But another reason for it is that the narrative structure of Bain's two works,
and their aesthetic of continuity, corresponds to the empiricism on which his whole
psychological approach is founded. The unhurried unfolding of the subsections,
chapters and divisions, and the steady progress they make through the various
aspects of the motor-sensory, emotional, intellectual and volitional organisation,
suggest something of the way that modern empiricists like Bain understood the
mind to develop over time. It captures in a structural sense the principle driving the
incremental development of the mental landscape in each individual, mirroring the
idea of internal structural expansion. Just as the form of Bain's narratives expands
slowly and steadily, repeatedly modified by the addition of short incremental
sections rather than sudden adjustments or ruptures, so the mind is gradually built
up into a continuous and complex mature structure. One of the key principles
conveyed formally by, for example, The Senses and the Intellect, the first of the two
volumes, is the primacy of the very idea of structure itself, and not just in a
narrowly psychological sense of taxonomical correctness. Its orderly, piecemeal
way of constructing its picture of the mind discloses a more general fascination
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with structuring activity per se, with how organisational and systemic laws regulate
change within a structural entity, and with the shifting internal relationships
comprising their slow formation.
So the narrative of The Senses and the Intellect describes an accumulative
movement from simplicity into complexity. It opens with virtually the most general
definition of the mind possible (Bain merely opposes it to the external world, in a
sweeping two-fold division of all phenomena into subject or object) and then, as the
narrative ranges page by page across different zones of the sentient organisation,
the definition narrows and tightens, gathering refinement and increasing structural
depth.67 It begins by describing basic muscular feelings, progressing to sensations
of hunger, respiration and fatigue, to the operation of the five senses, including the
perceptual apparatuses, to appetites and instincts, and finally to laws regulating
intellectual association, aesthetic feelings, reasoning, memory and abstract or
logical ideas. The most sophisticated and compound of these, Bain argues, can be
found exemplified in works of scientific and imaginative literature. This long and
progressive narrative sweep thus begins from a rudimentary recognition of a link
between mind and brain, and culminates with a consideration of creativity and a
differentiation between various modes of imaginative achievement (such as those
of the poet, the sculptor, the architect) including, too, "the emotions of harmony,
beauty, sublimity."68 In between, the narrative examines diverse intermediate
subjects from locomotive energy to human selfishness; from active reflexes, like
coughing and sneezing, to the acquisition and deployment of language. At over six
hundred pages long, it amounts to an exhaustive, multi-tiered survey.
At stake is more than the sheer prospect of aggregative detail. Certainly, the
mass of detail in itself manages at some level to convey a thoroughly secular
celebration of the human mind, in all its manifest variety, subtlety and vastness. To
67 "The Internal, or Subject, World is our experience of everything not extended... Thus Mind is
defined, in the first instance, by the method of contrast, or as a remainder arising from subtracting the
External World from the totality of existence." Bain, Senses and the Intellect, p. 1.
68 Bain, Senses and the Intellect, p. 621.
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this extent, perhaps, The Senses and the Intellect and The Emotions and the Will
both humanistically venerate the psychological spectacle they describe. But they do
not just relentlessly parade raw factual minutiae, whereby density of information
becomes valued for its own sake. More importantly, the narrative strategy of The
Senses and the Intellect focuses attention on the collective structure formed by the
accretion of detail, on the system of relationships it comprises. The tendency of the
narrative is to connect, or to imply connection; that is, the complexity into which it
moves results from, not just exhaustive detail alone, but increasing connectivity
amongst its constantly expanding parts and unfolding principles. These adjust into
wider groupings and sets of interrelated phenomena. The narrative, like the mind,
implies a kind of generative power, producing new relational categories and classes
as effects of its development. As the sections and divisions proliferate, so does the
sense of their relative position within the hierarchy of a larger scheme, and their
functional dependency upon it. And they proliferate from an initial division of the
mind into three properties: its capacity to feel; its ability to act, or exert power; and
its cognitive facility, meaning primarily its awareness of difference and similarity,
and its retentive capability.69 All other subjective phenomena branch outwards,
relationally, from this primary structure. Emergent complexity is thus a dominant
theme, and Bain's writing has an acute self-consciousness about the elaborate
classificatory structure being slowly erected.
He recognises, for example, that this tendency inclines The Senses the
Intellect towards what he deems the "primitive endowments of our mental
constitution," and he strives constantly to justify the branching logic of the subsets,
such as the way it positions the appetites and instincts in "the inferior region of
mind," which broke with the tradition of Scottish philosophy.7° But at the same
time he is concerned not to isolate the intellect from these lower strata: "Although
we can hardly ever be said to exert this portion of our mental system [i.e. the
69 Bain, Senses and the Intellect, pp. 2-6.
70 Bain, Senses and the Intellect, p. xiii; p. 69.
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intellect] from the other elements, namely, Feeling and Volition, yet scientific
method requires it to be described apart."71 This point is crucial. Bain is aware of
the limits of descriptive language, in such a way that registers the artifice of his
categories. Out of methodological necessity, the narrative separates the domain of
the intellect from that of the senses, but in reality these levels of phenomena are
implied everywhere together in one integrated system. The Senses and the Intellect
tries to convey the unified plane of the sentient organism's existence, but Bain
acknowledges how in the end it remains impossible to represent that continuum
adequately, for it is in the nature of language and narrative to impose misleading
distinctions upon it. Analysis imposes inevitably artificial boundaries. All mental
activity inevitably has a corresponding bodily manifestation, expressed as some
kind of change in physical processes, yet the later sections of the text dealing with
phenomena like moral judgment do not trace these correspondences precisely or
fully—quite literally, they are not fleshed out. But the message of the first volume is
that the intellect depends constitutionally on the activity of the senses, even though
the narrative arbitrarily divides them. As G. H. Lewes argued: "What on the
physiological side is simply a neural process, is on the psychological side a sentient
process."72
Bain's work essentially sympathises with Lewes's view, which already hints
at a Spinozan conception of mind and body. But a broader point to note first is that
Bain's empiricism entails a sceptical view of language. Our ordinary language, he
argues, makes distinctions between specific mental operations and powers, such as
desire, memory, will, imagination, and so on; but, he reminds us, these are no more
than abstractions formed in language over time, conversions of real experience into
general conceptions. However familiar they seem, however intuitively real, these
labels do not actually denote truly separate faculties (as literalised, for example, by
71 Bain, Senses and the Intellect, p. 325.
72 G. H. Lewes, Problems ofLife and Mind, 1st Series, The Foundations ofa Creed. (2 vols) London:
Triibner and Co., 1874,1, p. 135.
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the phrenologists' idea of faculties physically distributed across the cranium). It is
rather the continual deployment of this language that creates this assumption. The
mind, then, does not really function in the way that psychological language seems
to suggest it does. Thomas Reid, and other common sense realists, we recall, had
argued precisely the opposite point in the eighteenth century. Language, Reid said,
provided evidence to contradict Hume's apparently passive theory of ideas, for its
grammatical structure confirmed the existence of a purposive self equipped with
active mental powers. Bain's work, however, remains suspicious of language (rather
like Hume himself, in fact), doubting that linguistic structure necessarily tells us
anything directly about the structure of reality or the functioning of our minds. He
certainly does not assume a mirror-like symmetry between the two. Whereas Reid
used language as proof of an essentially static faculty psychology, Bain's distrust of
its referentiality allows him the space in which to develop a constructivist and anti-
innatist theory. Like Spinoza, who argues in the Ethics that "there is in the mind no
absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, and the like," Bain consistently
repudiates the idea of fixed and intrinsic psychological functions.73
Instead, the mind is characteristically assimilative, aggregating, compound,
and constantly in process. The application of associationist principles in both The
Senses and the Intellect and The Emotions and the Will ensures that contingency
and historicity play central roles in Bain's understanding of mental organisation. As
suggested by the massive sections on the laws of association, much emphasis falls
on the mind's transformational and adaptive features. At the opening of the section
on 'Movement, Sense and Intellect', for example, Bain notes self-consciously: "In
the complete system of the mind the Intellect is thus placed midway between the
instinctive and the cultivated emotions and activities, being itself the instrument
for converting the one class into the other. "74 The mind thus builds itself out of its
experiences. There are no sharp boundaries, sudden divisions or breaks in the
73 Spinoza, Ethics, p. 62.
74 Bain, Senses and the Intellect, p. 70.
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structure. And this is a principle foregrounded, as we have said, by the works'
formal design, specifically by their incorporative and assimilative aesthetic. The
adhesive nature of mental association translates into a property of narrative.
But what sort of a text does this make, say, The Senses and the Intellect? To
our twenty-first century eyes it may seem, perhaps, both familiar and unusual:
familiar, because in some rather striking ways it resembles a modern psychological
textbook, especially regarding layout and design (testimony to Bain's influence on
the later development of psychology as a professional discipline). Yet it seems
unusual, too, because its concerns exceed the boundaries of a single disciplinary
subject as now understood. Indeed, one has real difficulties trying to determine its
identity or genre. Part student manual, part philosophical treatise, part overview of
physiology, its unusual status derives from a strikingly assimilative discursive
texture. It is a text of mixed genre, a hybrid narrative. The most random glance
through its pages reveals a concern with an extraordinary variety of subjects: the
workings of the larynx; the feeling of disgust; the training of army recruits; Alison's
theory of beauty; book-keeping and industry; our belief in a material world; the
acquisition of speech in children; history and narrative. The list could go on, with
continuing eclecticism. Yet, despite this variety of languages and kinds of writing,
there are no abrupt separations in the diverse texture of the narrative. One part
adjoins another, adhesively and associatively, very much in the same fashion as
psychological ideas themselves (according to Bain's characterisation of the mind).
The very spaciousness of its form means that The Senses and the Intellect
thematises diversification, abundance and integration, all key aspects of Bain's
theory. His text's hybridity reinforces the idea of internal continuity within
different regions and strata of the mind-body system.
Here the influence of a Spinozan way of addressing the mind/body question
begins to become apparent. Although he does not expressly tackle the issue, nor
even mention Spinoza directly, the sustained critique of dualism in Bain's writing
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effectively commits him to a monistic reunion ofmatter and thought. Just as there
are no absolute demarcations within the overall psychological organisation
between the mind's different functions, so there is not a radical discontinuity
between mind and body. Instead, his theory implies some version of monism,
although the precise ground or nature of this undivided substance is not carefully
specified. What is important, however, is his view (again, consistently enforced
throughout his work) that 'mind' and 'body' have to be understood merely as two
alternative ways of describing one set of phenomena. They are its twin, relational
aspects, not separate realms or categories of event. They indicate different modes
in which we can talk about changes taking place in the human organism, one a
psychical language and the other physical. Furthermore, this approach to the
question coincides closely with a view of the mind-body complex as the site of
constantly converging energy and rapid change. And for Bain, as for Lewes and
Spencer, nowhere is this complex dynamism more crucially evident than in the
functioning of the central nervous system, their treatment of which exemplifies this
Spinozan double aspect theory.
Nerves and Networks
As we have seen already, talk of the nerves and nervous energy appears in Victorian
fiction as well as in the non-fictional prose ofwriters like Bain. Its insinuation into
the language of character psychology in Middlemarch—the "certain fibres in Mr
Garth's mind" seeming to resume "their old vibration," for example—suggests the
growing shift in the culture towards a distinctively modern theory of the nervous
mind and body associated in the mid-nineteenth centuiy with empiricist writers
like Bain.75 But as Eliot's narrator's awkward syntax and double negatives suggest,
the precise nature, function and organisation of the nervous system were not
confidently known or agreed upon, even if for Bain (and also Spencer and Lewes)
75 Eliot, Middlemarch, p. 561.
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there was no doubting the centrality of nervous energy to psychology and to the
notion of individual subjectivity. Lengthy accounts of the nervous system appear
prominently in the work of all three. In The Senses and the Intellect a preliminary
chapter on the nerves and nerve centres establishes its "intimate" connection to
mental processes.?6 A similar discussion opens Spencer's Principles ofPsychology,
though its consideration of nervous tissue and brain-size ranges across a variety of
animal species, establishing its wider evolutionary purpose. Within this framework,
Spencer shares with Bain the belief that "true conclusions respecting psychical
phenomena must be based on the facts exhibited throughout organic nature."??
Lewes, too, gives an outline of the nervous system in The Physiology of Common
Life, where he generalises that "the Brain is the most important organ in a complex
apparatus of organs—the Nervous System; and this Nervous System has one
general property—Consciousness." The activity of the nerves, he says, even
participates in the production of personal identity: "Every excitement of a nerve-
centre produces a sensation; the sum total of such excitements forms the general
Consciousness, or sense of existence."?8 To this extent, he argues, the self can be
regarded as commensurate with its nervous structure.
This rather schematic account of nervous activity is developed in his later
multi-volumed work, The Problems ofLife andMind (1874-9), into a less dogmatic
assertion of correspondences between nerves and upper-level psychic phenomena.
The mature Lewes avoids making such bold leaps from tissue to consciousness,
deflecting potential accusations of materialism by remaining sceptical that the
mass of nerve pathways can ever really be known. He cites, for example, the vast
configuration of fibres in the human brain as an illustration of its daunting
?6 Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, p. 11.
?? Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Psychology. (2 vols) London: Williams and Norgate, 2nd ed.,
1870,1, p. 13.
78 G. H. Lewes, The Physiology of Common Life. (2 vols) Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons,
1859-60, II, p. 6; p. 65.
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unknowability.79 Exactly how these fibres (and the nerve centres to which they
connect) lead eventually to the production of sentience, intelligence, will, and so
on, he argues, remains unknown and perhaps may never be fully explained. Careful
not to endorse an idealist view of the mind as mysterious and 'other', Lewes treads
a subtle path between a theory of mental autonomy and its dread opposite,
materialism, which would explain mind literally through neural mechanics. "We
must learn more of the processes of Sensation, Thought, and Volition," he finally
grants, "before we can unravel the complex physiological web on which they
depend."80 The mind, including our intuition of selfhood, however, is bound up
deeply, perhaps even causally, with the physical processes of nerve force.
For Bain, too, consciousness cannot easily be translated into patterns of
nerve energy, but even the most sophisticated mental faculties are aspects of an
integrated organic life, structured and sustained by its central nervous system. His
works scrutinise the nervous system so minutely because it is the place where the
mind/body question becomes supremely focused; it represents the problematic
interface of psychic and physical realities. And in his account the nervous system is
described as a network exhibiting incessant and innumerable change. "The
function of a nerve," he argues, "is to transmit impressions, influences, or stimuli,
from one part of the system to another."81 Together the nerves form a continuous
system of transmitters and conduction, linking the brain to the spinal cord and to
the various regions and extremities of the body. The essential property of the
system is therefore motion, and hence Bain's description of it only begins to hint at
its sheer structural complexity. Here he is attempting to capture a snapshot of the
nerve architecture inferable from a single sense impression:
79 G. H. Lewes, The Problems of Life and Mind, 2nd Series, The Physical Basis ofMind. London:
Triibner and Co., 1877, p. 148.
80 Lewes, The Problems ofLife andMind, p. 159.
81 Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, p. 39.
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An impression of sound, a musical note, for example, is carried to the brain;
the result is a responsive action and excitement extending to the voice,
mouth, eyes, head, &c. This multiplex and various manifestation implies a
system of connexion among the centres of action, whereby many strings can
be touched from one point; a connexion due to the conducting nerves that
pass and repass from centre to centre, and from the centres to the muscular
apparatus over the body. Supposing the corpora quadrigemina to be a centre
for the sense of vision, an impression passing to this centre propagates a
movement towards many other centres,—to the convoluted hemispheres
upwards, to the cerebellum behind, and to the medulla oblongata and spinal
cord beneath; and through these various connexions an extensive wave of
effects may be produced, ending in a complicated chain of movements all
over the framework of the body. Such a system of intercommunication and
transmission of power is therefore an essential part of the bodily and mental
structure.82
The furious nerve action being described in this passage constantly exceeds Bain's
language. His long, sinewy sentences suggest multiple movements and reactions,
collisions and excitements, connections and transformations, whose systemic
effects seem to carry on far beyond the author's lens. It is an evocative picture of an
interactive and highly energised network. It is also a deliberately metaphorical one;
Bain invokes strings, chains and waves to visualise the proliferating process of
energy distribution, and these metaphors create an impressionistic effect rather
than a realistic or transcriptional one. That is, the sense of the passage is carried
more by suggestive images than by his deployment of technical vocabulary. Above
all, perhaps, it incites the reader to mentally visualise a literally unwitnessable and
invisible bodily event, and in that very gesture Bain both marks an epistemological
boundary and tries imaginatively to surpass it. The phrase "the transmission of
power" captures this dominant theme of the passage: language, in testifying to the
forceful and pervasive transmission of energy, must inevitably remain inadequate
to the task of describing it.
82 Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, p. 62.
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Lewes uses similarly suggestive language in his own account of the nervous
system. He argues, for example: "There is an incessant action and interaction of the
various parts of the sensitive mechanism: sensations cross and recross, exciting
and modifying each other, and the sum total is a feeling of existence."83 Again, the
movements described defy precise specification, and his language engages solely an
imaginative type of understanding. In Spencer's account, too, the nervous system is
constantly being "traversed by waves of molecular change," in turn releasing
"secondary waves" throughout the entire structure.^ The meaning of such remarks
lies in their building verbal effects, not their literal accuracy; indeed, a key part of
their effect is to suggest the impenetrable and veiled complexity of the nervous
substance itself. The common idea carried by all of these metaphors, though, is that
sensation takes place in and through a system with two distinct properties:
structural continuity and constant animation. A local change in one region of the
system (the sensitive fibres in the foot, say) will cause a transfer of nerve energy,
not only towards the brain, but across the totality of interconnected pathways and
centres distributed around the body. No part of the whole system, of necessity, will
remain static or unmodified. Bain, drawing on the latest physiological knowledge,
explains the system by using the strikingly Victorian analogy of a railway network:
the nerves, like telegraph wires running parallel with the tracks, connect all the
centres or stations with one another, if only indirectly via branch lines.85 Thus the
links connecting the cerebrum to a centre lower down the cerebrospinal axis can be
likened to the mass of wires linking London and Liverpool. In this respect, the
extended structural metaphor stresses activity and interconnection.
Lewes utilises a similar visualisation of the anatomical body as the national
body as a way of describing the nerves, though his analogy is more agrarian than
industrial: "each sensation and each motion really represents a change in the whole
83 Lewes, The Physiology ofCommon Life, p. 73.
84 Spencer, The Principles ofPsychology, I, p. 96.
85 Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, pp. 31-2.
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organism", he says, just as a bad harvest affects the whole nation.86 The different
choice of simile is illuminating. Lewes objects to Bain's popular railway analogy,
precisely because it stresses, too simplistically, the mechanical aspects of the
nervous system. It is, he says, an "old image" of nerves as passive conductors of an
electrical current, and so he dismisses it with exasperated sarcasm: "The sensory
nerve 'transmits an impression to the brain'—as the wire transmits a message to the
[telegraphic] bureau. The motor nerve, in turn, 'transmits the mandates of the
will'—and all is clear!"87 Needless to say, it was not at all clear, and an important
feature of arguments surrounding the nervous system is precisely the way they
foreground the appropriateness of language and symbol. Bain, Lewes and Spencer
all see it as comprehendible only by analogy, even if their analogies are different
and contradictory. While Bain acknowledges the value of comparing nerve force to
electrical conduction and to magnetism, these are not literal claims, as he
emphasises unequivocally in The Senses and the Intellect,88 Similarly, Lewes
objects to the voltaic comparison ("Nothing can be more unlike the conduction of
an electric current than this excitation of Neurility"), but not on that the grounds
that it is a factual error in Bain's account. Rather, it seems to him a misleading and
unhelpful analogy.89 Throughout his work, Lewes tirelessly alerts the reader to the
artifice of the physiologist's language:
Although it is now common to speak of nerves as transmitting waves of
molecular motion, and to regard nerves as the passive medium for the
'transference of force', whereby the force is thus made an abstract entity, we
must always remember that such phrases are metaphors, and that the truer
expression will not be 'transference of force', but the 'propagation of
excitation'.90
86 Lewes, The Problems ofLife andMind, 2nd Series, p. 284.
87 Lewes, The Problems ofLife andMind, 2nd Series, p. 179.
88 Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, p. 63.
89 Lewes, The Problems ofLife andMind, 2nd Series, pp. 182-3.
90 Lewes, The Problems ofLife andMind, 2nd Series, p. 176.
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His 'Excitation' may be the truer expression, but like 'Nerve Force' it too remains a
"convenient symbol" in the physiologist's repertoire rather than a literal reality.91
Lewes cautions the reader insistently on this point. Self-consciousness regarding
the provisionality of scientific description is vitally important in Lewes, as it is for
all of these empiricists. As Spencer sympathetically remarks: "our only course is
constantly to recognize our symbols as symbols only."92
Moreover, Bain views the relationship between the physical aspects of the
nervous system and its corresponding psychological side in terms of relative
symbolisation. Since the two aspects share the same dynamic structure, a similar
language is used to describe both the circulation of nervous impulses and the
sentient feelings present to consciousness. They mutually symbolise one another,
as it were, representing the two equivalent sides of the mind-body system. Thus an
incessant flow of nervous energy becomes, at a psychological level, an incessant
flow of mental energy. Bain makes the point lucidly: "when the mind is in the
exercise of its functions, the physical accompaniment is the passing and re-passing
of innumerable streams of nervous influence. Whether under a sensation of
something actual, or under an emotion or an idea, or a train of ideas, the general
operation is still the same. It seems as if we might say, no currents, no mind. The
transmission of influence along the nerve fibres from place to place, seems the very
essence of cerebral action."93 In other words, rapid neural change, considered
either physically or mentally, constantly traverses the sentient organism, and its
mental and material aspects are, to borrow a phrase from Lewes, "both simply
embodiments of Experience."94
The ability to discriminate between two different impressions, for example,
which Bain considers to be the mind's most rudimentary act, creates what he calls a
"cerebral shock" across the nerves: "The change from an existing, to a new
91 Lewes, The Problems ofLife andMind, 2nd Series, p. 169.
92 Spencer, The Principles ofPsychology, I, p. 162.
93 Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, pp. 65-6.
94 Lewes, Problems ofLife andMind, 2nd Series, p. 333.
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condition of the mind may not be very great, but if great enough to be felt at all, and
to leave a mark behind it, a certain impetus or shock must cause a thrill through the
cerebral system."95 Thus the entire nervous system exists in a state of continual re-
excitement, tension and flux. As Peter Logan has persuasively argued, a distinctly
new conception of the nerves emerged during the mid-Victorian period, and Bain's
description here accords closely with it. As Logan explains, earlier physiological
commentaries on the nerves tended to identify the brain (or sensorium) as a kind of
central authority in the body, where the nerves were understood as merely a fibrous
mechanism for relaying sensory input, or "simple pathways for sensations entering
the brain and motor impulses flowing to the muscles." This changed in the first half
of the nineteenth century, mainly due to developments in medical research, so that
by the 1840s the hierarchical and centralised structure "yielded to a new structure
of dispersed authority."96 A greater role was accorded to nerves and nervous
centres, in such a way that the sensorium ceased to have its former unifying
function. Instead, these ganglia (in the spinal cord, for example) acquired degrees
of regional autonomy, and the brain itself began to be characterised as a divisible
rather than unified entity.
An effect of this mid-century shift was to reposition the brain's relationship
with the mind. As we saw in chapter one, phrenology had proceeded from the claim
that the brain is the organ of the mind. The newer theory, including Bain's version
of it, wholly challenged that model of localisation. In The Emotions and the Will he
insists that the mind has to be explained with reference to its systemic counterparts
in the nervous body. The occurrence of a single feeling, for example, implies the
activation of the whole: "no feeling, however tranquil, is possible without a full
participation of the physical system."9? He specifically introduces a concept of
95 Alexander Bain, The Emotions and the Will. (1859) London: Longmans, Green and Co., 2nd edn.,
1865, p. 572.
96 Peter Melville Logan, Nerves and Narratives: A Cultural History of Hysteria in Nineteenth-
Century British Prose. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, p. 166.
97 Bain, Emotions and the Will, p. 5.
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'diffusion' at the beginning of The Emotions and the Will to indicate the process by
which energy is constantly distributed across the organism, applicable to both its
mental and physical realms: "the aroused currents diffuse themselves freely over
the brain, leading to a general agitation of the moving organs, as well as affecting
the viscera."98 The wave of effects ripples across the network, colliding with other
patterns of neural discharge and tremor (Lewes likens this movement to the
diffusion of actual waves across the surface of a lake, reaching the shore and then
rebounding back towards the centre). Consequently, all parts of the nervous system
affect every other part; there can be no truly localised or isolated activity in one
particular bodily region. Lewes, too, makes this point: "An isolated excitation is
impossible in a continuous nervous tissue; an isolated feeling is impossible in the
consensus or unity of the sentient organism."99 In this sense, the whole body, not
the mere brain, can be said to constitute the organ or seat of the mind.100
Bain draws upon the same network model of energy diffusion in order to
attack mind/body dualism, too. His double-aspect theory and his Spinozan
prioritisation of the body dispel any lingering transcendentalism from his theory of
mind. He wholly rejects the possibility of conscious life divorced from matter, or
what Lewes calls "a soul, a spirit, an archaeus, a vital principle, a vital force, a nisus
formativus, a plan or divine idea":101
If it so please us, we are at liberty to say that mind is a source of power; but
we must then mean by mind, the consciousness in conjunction with the
whole body; and we also be prepared to admit, that the physical energy is the
indispensable condition, and consciousness the casual... In a word, mind, as
known to us in our own constitution, is the very last thing that we should set
98 Bain, Emotions and the Will, p. 3.
99 Lewes, Problems ofLife andMind, 2nd Series, p. 366.
100 Lewes, once again, is more explicit on this point than Bain: "It is, however, one thing to recognise
the Cerebrum as having an important part in the production of psychical phenomena, another thing
to localise all the phenomena in it as their organ and seat." Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, 2nd
Series, p. 163.
101 Lewes, Problems ofLife andMind, 2nd Series, p. 22.
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up as an independent power, swaying and sustaining the powers of the
natural world.102
Two related ideas emerge here: first, once again, the mind-body complex appears
ceaselessly active, and also activating in the sense of expending energy and
initiating action upon its objects; and second, rather than deriving from some
external or transcendental source, this power is entirely contained inside the
structures of the system. Where empiricism's theory of mind had traditionally been
open to the charge of passivity, Bain's psychophysiology anticipates that criticism
by grounding its claims in mental action. Spencer's theoiy also shares this
prevailing emphasis. In the Principles of Psychology he writes, echoing Bain:
"Knowing implies something acted upon and something acting upon it."103 Again,
his theorisation of this power does not rely on invoking an extrinsic influence; it
arises with the newmid-Victorian concept of the continuous energy network.
Close parallels in George Eliot's work helpfully illuminate the idea. She
frequently shows how memory, and its spectrum of associated emotional cadences,
manifests itself in the whole fabric of the body, especially in material expressions
such as shocks and shudders. We find it in Middlemarch, for example, at an
important crux of plot late in the novel: "With memory set smarting like a reopened
wound, a man's past is not simply a dead history, an outworn preparation of the
present: it is not a repented error shaken loose from life: it is a still quivering part
of himself, bringing shudders and bitter flavours and the tinglings of a merited
shame."104 A man's past, in other words, is written into the composition of his flesh,
as the body carries its historical identity in cells, organs and nervous pathways. Our
bodies, in other words, are active repositories of knowledge. If anything, Eliot's
fictional treatment of the idea enforces Bain's argument more vividly than Bain
himself, blending as it does the different orders of language which correspond to
102 Bain, Emotions and the Will, pp. 436-37.
103 Spencer, The Principles ofPsychology, I, p. 147.
104 Eliot, Middlemarch, p. 615.
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Spinoza's twin modes of thought and matter. The "tinglings of a merited shame,"
for instance, a phrase which brilliantly captures Bulstrode's arresting fear of
embarrassment and scandal as the past comes knocking on the door of the present,
derives it impact from sharply combining these two contrasting registers. It blurs
physical properties with an inward and private psychological state, in a way that
philosophical writing or psychology cannot legitimately do. Eliot, in fact, openly
breaks Lewes's rule that "employ[ing] the terms of one class to designate the
conceptions of the other is to frustrate the very purposes of language."105 In fiction,
however, which can enjoy its freedom from such rules and responsibilities, the
effect is illuminating and instructive, not least because it enacts the idea that mind
and body can be grasped as reversible metaphorical representations of one
another—"the subjective and objective faces of the same thing," as Spencer
argues.106
In Bain and Lewes, the attack on the old hierarchical conception of the
nervous system has further radical consequences. Lewes quickly adopts a rhetoric
of disorder as he depicts the influence of energy diffusion across mind and body. Its
influence seems to tend in rebellious and disuniting directions: the system exists in
a condition of hyperstimulation, multiplicity, fluctuation, "excessive complexity"
and "chaos," he insists.10? Bain pursues the point further, doubting like Hume the
reality of a coherently organised, monadic selfbehind those animations:
The proper meaning of self can be nothing more than my corporeal existence,
coupled with my sensations, thoughts, emotions, and volitions, supposing the
classification exhaustive, and the sum of these in the past, present and,
future. Everything of the nature of a moving power belonging to this totality
is a part of self. The action of the lungs, the movements of the heart, are self-
determined; and when I go to the fire to get warm, lie down under fatigue,
105 Lewes, Problems ofLife andMind, 2nd Series, p. 343.
106 Spencer, it should be noted, adds that the 'real' nature of their connection, beneath the descriptive
level of the double-aspect theory, is unknown: "we remain utterly incapable of seeing, even imagining,
how the two are related." Spencer, Principles ofPsychology, I, p. 140.
107 Lewes, The Problems ofLife andMind, 2nd Series, p. 304.
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ascend a height for the sake of a prospect, the actions are as much self-
determined as it is possible for actions to be. I am not able to concede the
existence of an inscrutable entity in the depths of one's being, to which the
name I is to be distinctively applied, and not consisting of any bodily organ or
function, or any one mental phenomenon that can be specified. We might as
well talk of a mineral as different from the sum of all its assignable
properties.108
The evidence of physiology thus assists in Bain's ontological deconstruction of the
self. There is no stable or permanent essence to which 'self refers. Rather it is an
effect of the functioning of an increasingly complex associational network of
energy. The empiricist self, conceived always in relation to embodiment and
materiality, thus remains for Bain unfinished and in process. As well as having
close parallels with the argument of Spinoza's Ethics, the notion of the self as an
open-ended system of energy distribution also aligns Bain remarkably with an
emerging area in cognitive studies today known as connectionism.109 Like present-
day connectionists, Bain challenges the traditional inviolability of the category of
the human subject by using the nervous system as a model for understanding
consciousness. For both, the principle of systemic diffusion is key to grasping the
unfolding patterns of cognitive experience.
Bain's achievement, we might therefore conclude, includes perceiving a
profoundly important connection between the structure of the nervous body and
the structure of knowledge. Physiology and epistemology come together crucially in
his two major works. On the one hand, the possibility of knowledge begins in his
narrative of human development with a primary physical contact between our
bodies and the external world, an encounter allowing for the most basic experience
108 Bain, The Emotions and the Will, p. 509.
109 "Connectionism... does not construe cognition as involving symbolic manipulation. It offers a
radically different conception of the basic processing system of the mind-brain, one inspired by our
knowledge of the nervous system. The basic idea is that there is a network of elementary units or
nodes, each of which has some degree of activation. The units are connected to each other so that
active units excite or inhibit other units. The network is a dynamical system which, once supplied
with initial input, spreads excitements and inhibitions among its units." William Bechtel and Adele
Abrahamsen, Connectionism and the Mind: Parallel Processing, Dynamics and Evolution in
Networks. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002, pp. 1-2.
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of differentiation between self and world. He recognises that all knowledge begins
from a body in which such environmental or sensory change can be registered.
Without bodies, there can be no possibility of minds. As Bain puts it: "Our
consciousness in this life is an embodied consciousness."110 Secondly, and following
on from this point, Bain's writing formulates a notion of what we might call the
knowing body, which is to say, a body inscribed upon and altered in the course of
its worldly experience. The act of knowing changes and transforms the subject of
knowledge, and this transformation occurs not merely to the pathways of the brain,
for example, but to the entire bodily system. It engages the nervous structure linked
across the whole body. Knowledge, in the form of memory, say, is not simply held
in a specific location, as the spatial metaphor of a storage tank would suggest, but
rather in effect diffused across the mind-body complex. And this knowing body
exists in a state of perpetual excitement and activation.
The Spinozan double-aspect argument at the heart of Bain's theory (and
also detectable in writers like Lewes and Eliot) presents, then, more than a just
challenge to the traditional ontological division ofmind and body. By framing mind
and body as mutual re-descriptions of one another, his work develops a dynamic
and relational epistemology, one shaping the associational form of his writing. This
commitment, of course, generates new problems in turn. For if we do not really
occupy our bodies, but rather indeed are them, then how do we go about reliably
acquiring a knowledge of the world that might be verifiable from a position outside
them? Ifwe know only by virtue of our embodiment, as Bain argues, then what is to
be said of the traditional aspiration in Western philosophy to leave behind one's
position in order to gain a more truthful vantage point? The question of how
empiricism negotiated these difficulties in the mid-nineteenth century becomes the
topic of the last chapter.
110 Bain, The Emotions and the Will, p. 436.
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Chapter Five
'To Think is to Condition':
Herbert Spencer and the Negotiation of
Relativism
Over the preceding chapters we have been tracing the development ofwriting in the
British empiricist tradition during the middle decades of the nineteenth century,
and its central preoccupation with questions surrounding the possibility of
knowledge. All of the texts discussed so far, including the fictional works of George
Eliot, could be said to force to the surface an acute epistemological self-
consciousness in order to fulfil their particular narrative goals, or, we might say, as
a condition of their own narrative possibility. They are, consequently, richly varied
stories of knowledge. In turn, narrative imposes its own constraints upon the
epistemology with which they are so centrally concerned. Unavoidably,
philosophical ideas require narrative to body them forth. That is, they have to find
their embodiment, or what could be called their specific mode of happening, in
narrative language. In Alexander Bain, for example, the narrative journey into
knowledge is one of precarious accumulation; in Ruskin, it forms a story of
haphazard progress and fraught autobiographical engagement. Narrative thus gives
shape to empiricism's sceptical impulse, its epistemological ventures always
arriving in the form of a specific linguistic occasion, as George Levine has argued.1
While we have been tracing these important ways in which epistemology
organises and inflects each writer's different intellectual project, cutting across
1 George Levine, Dying to Know: Scientific Epistemology and Narrative in Victorian England.
London: University ofChicago Press, 2002, pp. 1-43.
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aesthetics, psychology, criticism, physiology, imaginative literature, and so on, the
direction of analysis has moved inwards, as it were, towards the knowing subject.
The concern with Ruskin pivoted on the truthful representation of the external
world and knowledge of the natural and the real; the two subsequent chapters
shifted attention, firstly, to the theory of perception and its associated psychological
issues, and then to the consideration of individual embodiment and to the body as
a site of epistemological uncertainty as well as facilitation. In advancing closer to
the psychic and material site of knowledge, the concern with concrete reality has
diminished—or, at least, it has become more problematic in the course of the
journey. What we have been describing is a tension between interiority and
exteriority, one that is crucial to the epistemological structure of empiricism itself.
To the genuine empiricist, the insideness of our view of objects cannot be anything
other than fully bound up with the outsideness of reality; and the opposite is also
true: 'consciousness' refers to more than a purely inward state or condition. As Bain
argues: "the object, or extended world, is inseparable from our cognitive faculties;
so that a word that expresses every conscious state whatever is wider than mind,
strictly so called; it comprises both matter and mind."2 The senses allow us the
chance to encounter a realm beyond our selves, to be cognisant of a world, yet also
limit and restrict what can be known of it.
Despite this, the mid-Victorian period is still often conceived to be "a
culture increasingly obsessed with the real," as one critic puts it.3 Yet empiricist
writers, such as Herbert Spencer, could remark of ultimate reality that "no logical
account can be given".4 These two positions appear plainly at odds, one seeming to
describe the irresistible lure of objectivity, the other pulling back from it. Of course,
holding a view like Spencer's does not automatically mean that one cannot at the
2 Alexander Bain, Logic. (2 vols) London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 2nd edn., 1873, II, p.
277.
3 Jennifer Green-Lewis, Framing the Victorians: Photography and the Culture ofRealism. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 233.
4 Quoted in William Henry Hudson, Herbert Spencer. London: Archibald Constable and Co., 1908, p.
16.
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same time be obsessed with the real; indeed, knowing reality to be constantly out of
reach might plausibly serve to pique the obsessive's interest in it all the more.
Desire, after all, needs a missing object. But the crucial point here is that, in
claiming that external reality lacks an objectively knowable structure, mid-
Victorian empiricists like Spencer extended a line of thinking whose roots in radical
scepticism continued to inform their approach to epistemology. Far from obsessing
fetishistically over it, this tradition preferred more or less to bracket the real object
in itself, concentrating its interest instead primarily on sequences of sensations and
chains of ideas. This can be identified in part at least with a Humean legacy,
strongly psychological and affiliated to associationism. And the upshot of this
legacy is that, in the work of thinkers like Spencer, the obsession is not so much
with 'the real' per se, but rather with asking how epistemology is both caught up in
and dependent on the contingencies of personality and position, while also aspiring
paradoxically towards an unobtainable perspective beyond the confines of
perspective.
The subject of the present chapter, then, can be summed up by the word
relativism. With reference to Spencer's work, and in particular the cornerstone of
his synthetic project, First Principles (1862), we shall be concerned with how he
marshals arguments which propose and defend a relative theory of knowledge,
including what it might mean theoretically, as well as in practice, for a Victorian
scientific thinker to viably construe the quest for truth as a process open to the
destabilising energies of relativism. It should be clear by now that these were
difficulties which impressed themselves urgently on the empiricist imagination in
general, on Ruskin, Bain, G. H. Lewes and George Eliot alike, not just Spencer in
particular. Eliot's early short story The Lifted Veil (1859) can be read as a macabre
dramatisation of the necessity of relative knowledge, as will be explored later in the
chapter. Elsewhere in her novels, narrators can be found making glancing
references to the increasingly important doctrine of relativity, as it came to be
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known after the Scottish philosopher Sir William Hamilton, as for example in The
Mill on the Floss (i860): "In natural science, I have understood, there is nothing
petty to the mind that has a large vision of relations, and to which every single
object suggests a vast sum of conditions. It is surely the same with the observation
of human life."5 The idea that one unit of knowledge implies a wider structural
context, a "large vision of relations," is a key tenet of relativist thinking in the
period. Lewes argues similarly in The Physiology ofCommon Life (1859):
In the mighty web of things there are no threads more wonderful than
Sensation and Thought; nor have any more constantly solicited the attention
of philosophers, from the earliest dawn of speculative inquiry to the angry
contests of today. They have been problems ever-alluring and ever-baffling:
one moment the threads seemed to be within the easy grasp of an
outstretched hand, only to vanish again into the inextricable confusion of
tangled mystery.6
His "mighty web of things" gives metaphorical shape to Eliot's vision of relations.
The point, however, remains the same. We grasp the meaning of a thing only by
virtue of its position in some larger scheme, and its system of relationships with
other things. Intriguingly, the 'things' Lewes is concerned with at this point in his
argument are psychological in nature, sensations and thoughts—the very stuff of
empiricism's associational, relativistic inner world. This tendency to figure non-
material phenomena as having the quality of embodied things—to treat ideas in
this way, as if objects abroad in the world—once again assists in deconstructing a
basic metaphysical inside/outside opposition in a manner highly characteristic of
empiricism. His rhetorical mode allows the passage to proceed, temporarily, as
though these threads of sensation were unattached to a particular person's mind or
a specific sense of interiority. It is notable, too, that a physical gesture—that of a
5 George Eliot, TheMill on the Floss, (i860) ed. A. S. Byatt, London: Penguin, 1985, p. 363.
6 G. H. Lewes, The Physiology ofCommon Life. (2 vols) London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1859,
II, pp. 1-2.
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flailing outstretched hand—tries (and fails) to connect with the thread. Where it all
leads is literally unclear; the threads return in the end to their relational element, to
the "inextricable confusion of tangled mystery," a reminder that the mighty web of
things may be considered a unity, but one too vast to comprehend. Things can
indeed slip away before our eyes. The tone of doubt on which Lewes's passage
finishes signals the threat of incoherence and instability often thought to plague
relativism as a philosophical enterprise. For Herbert Spencer, too, as we will see,
such problems lend knowledge its distinctive grain and texture, if not an ethically
significant note of provisionality.
Problemswith Relatives
Relativism is a notoriously problematic concept, and needs careful scrutiny. Few
philosophical issues, after all, manage to arouse the same sense of confusion and
controversy that typically accompany it. Perhaps a good way into it would be to
reflect on why this should be the case. So far as epistemology is concerned,
relativism of any kind implies rejecting all appeals to absolute or transcendental
standards of verification. Principally, it argues that since the means by which we
arrive at knowledge claims has no transcendentally secure foundation, it must be
accepted that what counts as true at a given time will be relative to some kind of
evaluative framework, context or tradition. Even if there were some unchanging
and timeless regime of truth hovering beyond experience, there would be no way of
knowing from a sublunary vantage point whether or not our judgments and ideas
corresponded to it. In its weaker forms, consequently, relativism appears
dangerously unrestrained and irresponsible: once truth is relativised, all is
permitted. Any truth might ultimately be as good as any other. Your view that
blond-haired men are stronger and more naturally suited to exercising political
power would be no more or less true, in the end, than my reasons for thinking that
two plus two equals four. An extreme relativist would say that there are no
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objective grounds on which to distinguish the validity of one judgement from the
other, unriveted as they are to any concept of absolute truth. It was, in fact, an
empiricist, J. S. Mill, who famously claimed that two plus two did not have to equal
four; he argued that while it may be conventional to accept the truth of this
equation, that does not in any way rule out the possibility that tomorrow, say, two
plus two might equal five.
Mill, though, in general, was certainly not a relativist in the extreme sense,
and few thinkers ever have been. "'Relativism' is the view that every belief on a
certain topic, or perhaps about any topic, is as good as every other," Richard Rorty
observes, "No one holds this view."7 Perhaps so, but that may say more about
Rorty's bald definition of it rather than anything insightful about the nature or
history of philosophy. As someone linked with a controversial turn in Anglo-
American philosophy, Rorty has reasons for wishing to disown relativism; yet his
own preference for seeing truth in functional terms, as tied in culturally specific
ways to different communities of belief, arguably just brings him to a more
epistemologically sophisticated version of it. The weak version he cites tends
towards total subjectivism, where all my judgments and prejudices can prosper
without the possibility of being shown to be untrue. It promises a kind of anarchic
interplay between individuals confined to private, self-justifying worlds of truth.
Rorty's view, in contrast, envisages truth arising out of intersubjective consensus.
"In short, my strategy for escaping the self-referential difficulties into which "the
Relativist" keeps getting himself is to move everything over from epistemology and
metaphysics into cultural politics, from claims to knowledge and appeals to self-
evidence to suggestions about what we should try."8 The force of his epistemology
comes from its veiy resistance to epistemology as such; the analysis of how truth
and knowledge operate should come to be viewed not as the special preserve of the
7 Richard Rorty, Consequences ofPragmatism. Brighton : Harvester, 1982, p. 166.
8 Richard Rorty, Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998, p. 57.
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philosopher but rather as manifestations and functions of culture. An important
aspect of his shift away from a rhetoric of 'philosophy' towards one of cultural
norms, vocabularies, conversational practices, socially justified belief, and so on, is
the attempt to sidestep some of the logical traps traditionally sprung by relativist
arguments in classical epistemology.
Even sophisticated forms of relativism like Rorty's, however, encounter
serious problems. Chief among them is the charge of being self-refuting. As soon as
the relativist speaks to announce their cause, inconsistency appears likely or
inevitable. What is the epistemic status of the claim that truths are relative? Or that
all knowledge is contingent upon culturally specific norms of knowledge-
legitimation? Either relativism must concede that it, too, is subject to the same
relativistic forces as those it privileges, or else it cannot avoid being charged with
failing to exercise its arguments rigorously. The former case risks inviting its own
irrelevance or dismissal, since by its own lights nothing would recommend
relativism over and above any other possible way of proceeding. Yet the latter case
would amount to a logically compromised form of exceptionalism, implying as it
does recourse to an absolute claim—that is, the necessity of relativism—which
contradicts the central thesis on which the relativist enterprise depends. As the
philosopher Christopher Norris summarises: "To say that 'all truths are relative' (or
other variations on this theme) is inherently to claim that relativism is in some
sense true, or closer to the truth than competing ideas of how to get there...
Relativism always has the last word, if only by effectively staging the debate so that
nothing would count as a challenge to its own line of reasoning. "9
The animated skirmishes between the likes of Rorty and Norris, and
between other voices contesting a postmodernist crisis in the humanities at large,
no doubt feed the perception that intellectual concern over relativism is a wholly
9 Christopher Norris, The Contest ofFaculties: Philosophy and TheoryAfter Deconstruction. London:
Methuen, 1985, pp. 193-95-
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late-twentieth-century affair.10 While it is certainly the case that the dominant
trends in critical and cultural theory over the last thirty years have all ascribed to
various forms of relativist analysis, and implicitly or otherwise held essentialism
and objectivity to account, it would nevertheless be gravely shortsighted to link
relativism exclusively with our contemporary moment. In his impressive study of
nineteenth-century scientific writing, Victorian Relativity (2001), Christopher
Herbert offers a salient reminder that "it is a mistake to suppose that the
intellectual tradition defined by polyvalency, indeterminism, constructivism,
difference, and the ideological critique of knowledge represents a radical initiative
of our own day, prefigured by a few heroic pioneers like Saussure and Nietzsche."11
Yet critics regularly make these kinds of assumptions, Herbert says.
Postmodernism, he argues, has more or less appropriated the connected ideas of
relativism and relativity, effectively occluding an entire genealogy of those concepts
from the classical era to the nineteenth century. It is as though theories of relativity
in the twentieth century, such as Einstein's in theoretical physics or Saussure's in
linguistics, just appeared ex nihilo, without any grounding in the culture and
development of earlier ideas. As a result, a significant vein of thought running
through the Victorian period has been overlooked, namely a tradition of relativist
thinking which deserves to be understood as leading directly to our contemporary
modes of intellectual scepticism. For Herbert, this trend becomes recognisably
modern from about 1850 onwards, when major Victorian thinkers such as Mill,
Matthew Arnold and Walter Pater all began acknowledging a 'relative' spirit in the
intellectual life of the period.12
In the course of his argument, Herbert also reflects usefully on some of the
reasons why relativity and relativism have the tendency to excite suspicion and
10 For a typically polemical account of the current state of critical theory, weighing up the losses and
gains of the 'cultural' and linguistic turns, including the pervasiveness of relativistic and anti-
essentialist schools of thought, see Terry Eagleton, After Theory. London: Allen Lane, 2003.
11 Christopher Herbert, Victorian Relativity: Radical Thought and Scientific Discovery. Chicago and
London: Chicago University Press, 2001, p. xii.
12 Herbert, Victorian Relativity, pp. 3-6.
- 220 -
condemnation. They attract a bad name for themselves, he argues, because, at least
in part, the thesis of relative knowledge not only looks likely to enter into absurdity
and incoherence of a philosophical kind, it makes a welcome guest of uncertainty in
a way that may indicate irreverence and subversion, even moral depravity. It
devilishly enjoys disrupting the stable and single. What is more, if relativism seems
to allow truth—or Truth—to disappear, then its detractors tend to assume that
goodness and virtue are necessarily also imperilled. For this reason, relativism
represents "a forbidden trend of thought"; it is "the philosophy that dare not speak
its name."^ It could be added, with regard to the nineteenth century specifically,
that our contemporary perception of acceptable Victorian cultural values
undoubtedly conspires in silencing relativity's presence in the period. It is harder to
reconcile relativist thinking with Victorianism when our popular images of the
latter still trade heavily on its reputation for inflexible, austere and authoritarian
cultural normativity.
For the purposes of our present argument, we might settle on an earlier
date than Herbert to mark the beginnings of mainstream relativist thought: 1837,
coincidentally the inaugural moment of the Victorian era itself, but also the year of
an article by a young G. H. Lewes entitled "Hints Towards an Essay on the
Sufferings of Truth."'4 Published in the Monthly Repository, the essay makes a
vigorous case for the merits of epistemological relativism. It will be worth dwelling
on it briefly before progressing to Herbert Spencer's writing. The article forms a
response by Lewes to an earlier critical piece by Egerton Webbe in the same
magazine. Webbe's piece, a brusque polemic against mediated theories of truth,
calls for a systematic and unified approach to knowledge in order that the threat of
scepticism and haziness can be kept at bay. Philosophy, it protests, restricts inquiry
too readily to the realm of appearances, merely following "truth's footsteps in the
13 Herbert, Victorian Relativity, p. 31; p. 27.
14 G. H. Lewes, "Hints Towards an Essay on the Sufferings ofTruth,"Monthly Repository 12,1837, pp.
311-319.
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sand."15 Surprisingly perhaps, given his impatience with philosophy, Webbe's
starting points are not simply commonsense or intuition, and in fact he argues for
the rigorous application of a scientific method wedded to universal principles: "We
want a code of laws of universal application, not a mere string of local and peculiar
regulations. We want a map of our moral world, showing where the sands lie, and
the rocks, and where the deep water—a manual for all navigation in the perilous
seas of discussion."16 The gist of the argument, carried by topographic and
cartographic imagery, if not a bracing man-of-action spirit of adventure, valorises
objectivity and heaps scorn on triflingly local or contingent aspects of knowledge.
Its appetite for utility and efficiency will not tolerate faint-hearted relativism.
Lewes's response to Webbe begins anecdotally, recalling that he, too, in his
youth was convinced by the possibility of absolute truth. Patronising Webbe, he
implies that experience, in due course, will similarly correct him: "It may be a
mortifying feeling for the young student to experience after years of study—with
their sleepless nights and the consequent ill health—that he has been pursuing a
chimera in his search after truth... I felt this. I felt as ardent after truth as the young
mind can, and after shaking off every prejudice, in the search, felt the conviction
seize me of truth's impenetrability."17 To appreciate the full effect of this, it must be
recalled that at the time of publication Lewes was not yet twenty-one years old. Yet
the ironic autobiography suits, of course, the relativistic spirit in which Lewes's
argument is conceived. The epigraph to the essay has already declared this: "Truth
is the cry of all, and the game offew."lR The words belong to Bishop Berkeley, a
writer who pushed empiricism to the point where it confronts its own latent
tendency towards solipsism (and who, it should be remembered, became an
increasingly important figure a generation after Lewes, for aestheticist and
modernist literary culture, especially perspectivists like Pater and Joyce). Mirroring
15 EgertonWebbe, "On the Sufferings ofTruth," Monthly Repository 11,1837, p. 116.
16 Webbe, "On the Sufferings ofTruth," p. 117.
17 Lewes, "Hints Towards an Essay on the Sufferings ofTruth," p. 312.
18 Lewes, "Hints Towards an Essay on the Sufferings ofTruth," p. 311.
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Lewes's allusion to the 'suffering' which accompanies the search for truth,
Berkeley's sentiment equates knowledge with philosophical effort. It has parallels,
too, with Ruskin's practice of linking truth and struggle at a formal level in Modern
Painters, as discussed in chapter two.19
As it goes on, Lewes's essay works its way through different features of the
problem, taking in phenomenalist theory, the mediation of the intellect, our
acculturated love of truth, and the degrees of attainable knowledge. He asks
rhetorically if truth in an absolute sense is possible, and an instant reply in the
negative duly serves to introduce the theme of relativism:
We arrive at the conclusion that we can never know but relative truth, our
only medium of knowledge being the senses, and this medium, with regard to
all without us, being forever a false one; but being true to us, we may put
confidence in it relatively. If then we can but attain relative truth, it follows
that truth for us, can never be more than opinion, and our inquiries must be
turned from the abstract question of truth to that of opinion.20
There are a number of aspects to the essay's relativist thesis. The first, indicated
here, centres on our habitual dependency upon the mediation of the senses, which
falsify and deceive. Like Ruskin, he agrees that the redness of a red rose is a
relative, not absolute, property of the object, only meaningful by virtue of its
relation to an observer. Colour does not inhere in things. Secondly, the fact that we
are situated in one way or another prevents us from ever achieving a God's eye view
of the world, or as Thomas Nagel calls it the view from nowhere, where our human
point view could be left behind for some ideally panoramic perspective. As Lewes
argues, "we cannot rise to that point as to survey the entire field of truth at one
19 For example, from the fifth volume: "These oscillations of temper, and progressions of discovery,
extending over a period of seventeen years, ought not to diminish the reader's confidence in the book.
Let him be assured of this, that unless important changes are occurring in his opinions continually, all
his life long, not one of those opinions can be on any questionable subject true. All true opinions are
living, and show their life by being capable of nourishment; therefore of change." John Ruskin, T7ie
Works ofJohn Ruskin. (39 vols) eds. E. T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn, London: George Allen,
1903-12, VII, p. 9.
20 Lewes, "Hints Towards an Essay on the Sufferings ofTruth", p. 314.
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glance, but can only see a small part at a time."21 A third point, following from this,
could be referred to as the spatio-temporal variability of truth. What counts as true
at one moment, or for one cultural group, may not be true at all times or for every
community. "Things may be true to us, and not be true," he states, with remarkable
boldness.22 The unscientific beliefs of millions of people who lived before Galileo,
Lewes suggests, should not be dismissed as being simply false, for example. By
exercising historical humility it must be acknowledged that their judgments once
had truthful content and consistency within their own conceptual frameworks, even
if they no longer holdwithin ours.
If this sounds disarmingly similar to Rorty's stance on cultural relativism,
Lewes goes yet further. Just as Rorty doubts that "we have, deep down inside us, a
criterion for telling whether we are in touch with reality or not, [or] when we are in
the Truth," so Lewes argues that our partiality denies us the comfort of knowing
when we have arrived at a baseline or bedrock of certainty.23 "[Truth] is not
cognizable for us," he insists, "since we have no standard by which to judge it.
Universal consent will not suffice, because there may be universal error... We
cannot know truth, and could not know that we knew it, if we did."24 Being
relatively positioned means foreclosing the possibility of any Cartesian heroism,
where sheer ratiocinative force alone could guarantee the delivery of self-evident
universal truth. Again, this sounds strikingly like Rorty's anti-foundational claim in
Consequences ofPragmatism (1982): "There is no method for knowing when one
has reached the truth, or when one is closer to it than before."23
Critics of Lewes, such as Thornton Hunt, responded to his essay with the
combination of outrage, horror and indignation often reserved for relativism. For
Hunt, his position was dangerously irrational, annihilating truth and delighting in
21 Lewes, "Hints Towards an Essay on the Sufferings ofTruth", pp. 313-14.
22 Lewes, "Hints Towards an Essay on the Sufferings ofTruth", p. 312.
23 Richard Rorty, Consequences ofPragmatism. Brighton: Harvester, 1982, p. xxxvii.
24 Lewes, "Hints Towards an Essay on the Sufferings of Truth", pp. 313-14.
23 Rorty, Consequences ofPragmatism, p. 166.
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chaos. Replying with an essay of his own, Hunt said that Lewes lent truth "a
fleeting, doubtful existence, dependent upon frail mortality, instead of being a
condition of Immortality."26 But the appeal to metaphysical categories, such as the
condition of immortality, is just what Lewes's argument will not allow. In fact, in
opening epistemology to contingency and historicity, Lewes states in a moment of
considerable daring that human beings are inveterate fiction-makers, storytellers,
fabulists:
It may be a paradox, but I am convinced that the love of truth is acquired, and
that of fiction natural. There is a tendency in the human mind to cheat itself
with specious illusions—to idealize, abstract and personify—a tendency to the
supernatural—to have recourse to hyperphysical agencies for the common
physical operations—to leave the path of certainty for speculation.2?
As human beings, we are disposed to invent and project in this way. To prevent
error, Lewes implies, we must recognise narratives of metaphysical essences as
narratives—as stories of knowledge, not necessity or immutable facts.
The critic RosemaryAshton interprets the "Sufferings of Truth" essay, along
with a series of his critical pieces in the National Magazine and Monthly Critic in
1838, as a sign of Lewes's interest in German, and specifically Kantian, ideas.28 Yet,
as even Ashton herself seems to concede, Lewes was too committed an empiricist to
easily swallow the idealist premises of Hegel, Fichte, Schelling or Kant, however
much respect he acquired for them while preparing his history of philosophy. The
source of his ideas in the essay is not to be found in idealism. (We might recall at
this point that Lewes and George Eliot were happy exploiting their acquaintance
with German philosophy for comical ends, as for example in Eliot's caustic essay on
women's middlebrow fiction: "Lady novelists, it appears, can see something else
26 Thornton Leigh Hunt, "On the Alleged Sufferings ofTruth,"Monthly Repository 12,1837, p. 409.
2? Lewes, "Hints Towards an Essay on the Sufferings ofTruth", p. 314.
28 Rosemary Ashton, The German Idea: Four English \Vritcr3 and the Reception ofGerman Thought
1800-1860. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. 126-30.
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besides matter; they are not limited to phenomena, but can relieve their eyesight by
occasional glimpses of the noumenon,"29) The more significant point is that, as
Christopher Herbert would agree, Lewes's striking recommendation of relativism
corresponds to a growing body of ideas in British intellectual culture centring on
the concept of relativity which took hold during the mid-century, and empiricism
was peculiarly open to them.
Following Herbert, it is possible to identify two important strands of this
developing body of ideas. The first, as Lewes's essay has begun to reveal, is its
commitment to scepticism, which entails a critique of scientific objectivity. Its
second important strand is the relational, or structural, quality of its mode of
understanding. "All things, in order to have identities of their own," Herbert
comments, "are enmeshed in a perpetual traffic of communication with other
things (which is one reason why relativity theorists from an early stage emphasized
the symbolic—the differential—character of reality)."3° This deserves the name
relativity, a specific mode of relativism. We have come across it already, in Eliot's
fiction, for example, and in Ruskin's theory of realism. In Modern Painters, he
argues that the chief failing in the "modern pathetic school of painting" rests
precisely on its tendency to isolate visual details rather than grasping reality
formally as a series of relationships: "it is to be remembered that the great
composers, not less deep in feeling, are in tire fixed habit of regarding as much Llie
relations and positions, as the separate nature, of things."31
Victorian theories of relativity, Herbert says, therefore carry a paradoxical
sense that knowledge proliferates and threatens unity, while simultaneously
binding all of its elements together under a common structure. It is both one and
many at the same time. An unresolvable tension between unity and abundance
lives at the heart of the theory: "Relativity [for the mid-Victorians] means that all
29 George Eliot, "Silly Novels by Lady Novelists" (1856) in George Eliot, Selected Critical Writings, ed.
Rosemary Ashton. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 305.
30 Herbert, Victorian Relativity, p. 9.
31 Ruskin, Works, VII, pp. 233-34.
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things are rigorously bound up together in a single indivisible world; it means also
that this world is not one after all, but uncontrollably multiple."32 The differential,
the shifting, the dynamic: such are relativity's recognisable motifs. We will turn
now to Spencer's writing to see how this determining tension plays a role in his
treatment of epistemological concerns.
Spencer's First Principles and the Relativity ofKnowledge
The relativity of knowledge is fundamental to the whole spirit and conception of
Spencer's First Principles (1862). This work does a significant amount of fairly
abstract philosophical labour to clear the ground in preparation for his vast,
monumental, multi-volume, 'synthetic' systematisation of knowledge—a task of
Casaubon-like ambition and scale, integrating scientific, political and moral
thought according to the evolutionary view of development. If not quite the Key to
All Mythologies, the Synthetic Philosophy (1860-93) stretches to a daunting ten
volumes and similarly bears the impress of its author's obsessive intellect.
Underpinning this immense undertaking, which one twentieth-century critic has
described as a "great extinct monster of philosophical learning," is the following
relativist argument:33
Every thought involves a whole system of thoughts and ceases to exist if
severed from its various correlatives. As we cannot isolate a single organ of a
living body, and deal with it as though it had a life independent of the rest; so,
from the organized structure of our cognitions, we cannot cut one out, and
proceed as if it had survived the separation.3*
All thinking is relational, never absolute: this conviction forms the basis of First
Principles and, by extension, the voluminous synthesis of knowledge it prefaces.
32 Herbert, Victorian Relativity, p. 50.
33 Peter B. Medawar, "Hebert Spencer and the Law of General Evolution" in The Art of the Soluble.
London: Methuen, 1967, p. 39.
34 Herbert Spencer, First Principles. (1862) London: Williams and Norgate, 6th edn., 1904, p. 106.
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First Principles, indeed, gives us a flavour of the style and direction of Spencer's
thinking on this grander scale, and its starting point is the recognition of the
constitutive role played by relativity in the synthetic project. "To think is to
condition; and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the possibility of
thought," he argues.33 The argumentwill be crucial, as we shall see.
A tension emerges at the outset, however, in First Principles, between the
implicitly destabilising effects of relativism and Spencer's aim of constructing the
solid foundations of a unified system of thought. The prospect of a towering edifice
of knowledge feels too secure, too confidently factual and necessary—and too coldly
impersonal—to be compatible with the forces of relativism. It appears to speak,
symbolically, of absolute certainty, whereas relativist thinking critically
undermines fixed categories and identities. The name of the volume, too, conveys
this impression: First Principles is, after all, only a whisker away from 'first
philosophy' and sounds similarly austere and self-legitimating, first philosophy
being—as Jonathan Dancy defines it—"a philosophical system which stands apart
from, is independently justifiable, and adjudicates on the claims of the special
sciences such as physics or, more mundanely, of sense-perception."36 Like of all of
Spencer's other writings, First Principles can therefore feel as though it was
conceived in a mood of earnest epistemological confidence, akin perhaps to the
proud iron structures ofVictorian civic engineering.37
This aspect of his work has shaped his reputation in decisive ways. Today, if
we have heard of Spencer at all, it is likely that his name will conjure an image of
constipated Victorian positivism. L. S. Hearnshaw's assessment of his legacy is
typical in this respect: "Spencer's pretentious system-building has quite gone out of
fashion. His vast scheme of synthetic philosophy was founded on the scientific
35 Spencer, First Principles, p. 55.
36 Jonathan Dancy, An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985,
P- 233-
37 The comparison is not entirely unjustified or facetious: Spencer, in his younger days, had himself
worked as a civil engineer on the development of the Midlands railway. For an account of Spencer's
life, see David Duncan, The Life and Letters ofHerbert Spencer. London: Methuen and Co., 1908.
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ideas current in the 1840's and l85o's, on von Baer's developmental law, Lyell's
Principles of Geology, and Mill's Logic. The superstructure was architectonic, and
an expression of Spencer's obsessional love of system. "38 Written forty years ago,
Hearnshaw's comment still applies today. Spencer's overarching mode of analysis
and his expectation of coherence across different fields of enquiiy mark him out as
hopelessly antiquated. This is not without irony, given that currently in the
humanities being 'interdisciplinary' is something to loudly boast about, a sign of
methodological credibility. But Spencer may be unfashionable for other reasons,
too, many of them political—his enthusiasm for evolutionary theory, for example,
does little to recommend him on ideological grounds—and, above all, it seems
likely that he has fallen from favour because his synthetic philosophy evidently
wishes to erect the grandest of narratives, a unified story of knowledge, which most
of our present literary and cultural theory cannot abide.
The view that Spencer's work tries naively to perform its analysis in a spirit
of bold, if spurious, scientific objectivity is not new. John Dewey, writing soon after
Spencer's death in 1904, observed: "It is this extraordinary objectivity of Spencer's
work, this hitherto unheard of elimination of the individual and the subjective,
which gives his philosophy its identity, which marks it off from other philosophic
projects, and is the source at once of its power and of its 'inevitable weakness'."39
System-building, in other words, diminishes or even eliminates individual
perspective, or subjectivity, making Spencer's philosophy icily remote from
personal interests or private feeling. As the title promises, First Principles does at
times seem to possess an indifferent, almost inhuman quality—though, of course,
that is not the same as having no point of view at all. For another critic, Nancy
Paxton, Spencer's prose relentlessly minimises both the evidence of feeling and the
narrative production of affect. She argues that he "rigorously excluded emotion—
38 L. S. Hearnshaw,A ShortHistory ofBritish Psychology. London: Methuen, 1964, p. 41.
39 John Offer, Herbert Spencer: Critical Assessments of Leading Sociologists. (4 vols) London:
Routledge, 2000,1, p. 33.
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and indeed, nearly all playfulness, wit, nuance, metaphor, and allusion—and thus
he chose a style that expressed his extraordinarily dogmatic and unquestioning
belief in the self-evident and enduring fact of nature. "4° She contends that for
someone extolling an experience-based view, his work is curiously affectless. Like
Dewey, Paxton identifies Spencer's writing with the aspiration to suppress
subjectivity as a means of establishing epistemological authority, resulting at a
formal level in a strangely flat aesthetic. There is arguably more than a germ of
truth in this; Spencer certainly argued that the truly philosophical selfmust repress
its own emotional existence, and found that Carlyle failed as thinker because he
"thought in a passion" rather than in the properly restrained manner of a
philosopher.41
But, as Dewey realises, Spencer's project sometimes feels like it is shot
through with contradictory energies:
We have to reckon with the apparent paradox of Spencer's rationalistic,
deductive, systematic habit of mind over against all the traditions of English
thought. How could one who thought himself the philosopher of experience
par excellence, revive under the name of a 'universal postulate,' the
fundamental conception of the formal rationalism of the Cartesian school,
which even the philosophers whom Spencer despised as purely a priori, had
found it necessary, under the attacks of Kant (whom Spencer to his last day
regarded as a sort ofbelated supernaturalist), long since to abandon?**2
Spencer perplexes Dewey: ironically, for a proponent of evolutionary theory, it is
difficult to identify which species of thinker he belongs to. Is he a rationalist, or an
English figure after all? If he rejects Kantianism, why does he effectively sneak in a
priori forms of thought by the backdoor? One senses the same feeling lurking
4° Nancy L. Paxton, George Eliot and Herbert Spencer: Feminism, Evolutionism, and the
Reconstruction ofGender. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991, p. 14.
41 Carlyle, he said, dealt in intuitions rather than rationally coherent thought, which for Spencer was
the hallmark of a philosophical mind: "It would take much seeking to find one whose intellect was
perturbed by emotion in the same degree." Herbert Spencer, An Autobiography. (2 vols) London:
Williams and Norgate, 1904,1, p. 381.
42 Offer, Herbert Spencer, p. 35.
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somewhere in George Eliot's comment that First Principles is "less barely
intellectual [than his earlier work]—the considerations are larger."43 Does this
imply greater abstraction, or the opposite? Spencer knew that his work could be
misconstrued philosophically; to him, it was one of the unfortunate, if perhaps
inevitable, side-effects of his unusually vast itinerary. In his Autobiography he
notes: "For though by some I am characterized as an a priori thinker, it will be
manifest to any one who does not set out with an a priori concept of me, that my
beliefs, when not suggested a posteriori, are habitually verified a posteriori."^ We
shall return to this point later when we examine his 'Universal Postulate', a term
Spencer coins in a bid to resolve the problem and to put theoretical weight behind
the claims of relativistic knowledge.
There is, then, a view—discernable now as well as in his own day—that
Spencer's work of 'Synthetic Philosophy', including First Principles, asserts a
dogmatic belief in positive knowledge, a kind of positivism that deals in brute facts
and rational certainty. But Spencer was against positivism, at least as conceived by
Comte and his followers. While scientific in outlook, and grandly synthetic, the
positivist creed shaded into pseudo-religion and proposed a rigidly fixed narrative
of human social development. In a letter to the New Englander magazine in 1863,
Spencer stated that "from everything which distinguishes Comtism as a system, I
dissent entirely."43 An essay the following year, bluntly titled "Reasons for
Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte" (1864), outlines his unsympathetic
feelings towards positivism.46 One of the problems the essay acknowledges is that
Comte has become so synonymous with 'Science' in general that whenever anyone
43 George Eliot to Sara Hennell, 13th November i860; see George Eliot, The George Eliot Letters. (9
vols) ed. Gordon S. Haight, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954-1978, III, p. 358.
44 Herbert Spencer, AnAutobiography. (2 vols) London: Williams and Northgate, 1904,1, p. 304.
45 "On all... points that are distinctive of his philosophy, I differ from him. I deny his hierarchy of the
Sciences. I regard his division of intellectual progress into three phases, theological, metaphysical and
positive, as superficial. I reject utterly his religion of humanity. And his ideal of society I hold in
detestation. Some of his minor views I accept; some of his incident remarks seem to me profound; but
from everything which distinguishes Comtism as a system, I dissent entirely." See Duncan, The Life
and Letters ofHerbert Spencer, p. 113.
46 Herbert Spencer, "Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte" (1864) in Essays:
Scientific, Political and Speculative. (3 vols) London: Williams and Norgate, 1901, II, pp. 118-144.
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invokes the methods of scientific thinking, or contemplates scientific ideas and
concepts in a reasonably systematic way, it is often assumed automatically that they
derive their conclusions from Comte's work or comply with the principles of
positivism. Spencer's own intellectual reputation, he says, has been affected by this
misattribution. Yet, he explains, while this association certainly exists, he does not
consciously imagine himself as a disciple of Comte's system, nor has he ever
subscribed to it; he can only be deemed a positivist in the sense that any
scientifically-minded thinker has to carry that name.47What is more, while Comte's
name continues to monopolise cultural views towards scientific enquiry, Spencer's
own methodology is the more strictly empiricist:
All knowledge is from experience, holds M. Comte; and this I also hold—hold
it, indeed, in a wider sense than M. Comte; since, not only do I believe that all
the ideas acquired by individuals, and consequently all the ideas transmitted
by past generations, are thus derived; but I also contend that the very
faculties by which they are acquired, are the products of accumulated and
organized experiences received by ancestral races of beings. But the doctrine
that all knowledge is from experience, is not originated by M. Comte; nor is it
claimed by him... And the elaboration and definite establishment of this
doctrine, has been the special characteristic of the English school of
Psychology. Nor am I aware that M. Comte, accepting this doctrine, has done
anything to make it more certain, or give it greater definiteness.48
If we amend "English school of Psychology" to the more accurate "British"—not
only because his peer Alexander Bain was an Aberdonian, but in order to signal the
important descent of ideas channelled via the Scottish Enlightenment—then
Spencer's point agreeably draws attention to the distance between his own
residually sceptical tradition and the school of Comte. It gives a fascinating insight
into Spencer's own intellectual self-image, as well as having the virtue of
disentangling two often interchangeable terms, empiricism and positivism.
47 Spencer, "Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy ofM. Comte," p. 120.
48 Spencer, "Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy ofM. Comte," p. 122.
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Rather than positivist, First Principles alerts the reader at every turn to the
ultimately fragile character of what can be known. The limits of knowledge, the
borders of the knowable world, constitute its theme and everywhere inform its
narrative pattern. Divided into two uneven parts, 'The Unknowable' and 'The
Knowable', its design dramatically reproduces the differential structure behind
every act of knowing. As in his epistemology, the knowable is seen to emerge out of
the unknowable, its dark twin. The commitment which it formally enshrines is this:
"that all things known to us are manifestations of the Unknowable."^ The known
issues forth, precariously and provisionally, from a fundamental, original and
uncognisable condition beyond experience, consciousness, culture, history,
scientific measurement and hypothesis. First Principles sets out this primary claim
alongside a narrative of evolutionary development. Evolution, whether understood
on Darwinian or Lamarckian lines, initiates a relational theory of its own,
emphasising interdependence, transformation and instability. Its challenge to the
idea of the self-sufficiency ofmeaning has close affinities with Spencer's doctrine of
the relativity of knowledge, and we will look at it in more detail towards the end of
the chapter.
The infinite, the unlimited, the unconditioned, are all similarly attempts to
gesture towards an absolute (inconceivable though it is) outside all limitation or
perspective, and these terms have wide currency in the mid-Victorian debates in
which Spencer participates. It is illuminating that First Principles chooses to settle
in particular, out of all these possibilities, on 'The Unknowable', thereby giving the
concept a self-conscious epistemological inflection, as well as reining in any of its
more metaphysical, supernatural or spiritual connotations. Spencer makes it clear,
in other words, that his excursion into a realm of mystery stays within the
imperatives of empiricism and does invite speculation over its ontological status,
over what or who it might be. The point is not its tantalising inscrutability, as if it
49 Spencer, First Principles, p. 112.
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were a narrative gap waiting to be filled by having its true identity revealed, but
rather its very blank emptiness. The unknowable, for Spencer, resists incorporation
into narrative; it is the "negative of the conceivable itself."50 It stands for an
ultimate reality that we have no hope of approaching.
The relativity thesis appears midway through the first part of First
Principles, after a kind of test run of relativist analysis regarding the conflicting
interpretative languages of religion and science. In a patient and orderly way, he
performs a conscientious deconstruction of the grounding propositions of each,
using carefully sustained relativist reasoning. In the case of religion, he disproves
the idea of a self-causing First Cause by showing that its conceivability implies the
existence of another prior relation, extending the causal sequence beyond the
supposedly fully self-present First Cause itself. Then he works a similar move in the
case of science, demonstrating that its ultimate concepts and ideas, such as space
and time, are infected by virtually identical problems of definition. In effect,
Spencer shows that both religion and science, as explanatory frameworks aspiring
to some final and exclusive truth about reality, arrive ultimately at the same point-
that is, before the unknowable. Neither can describe the nature of the reality they
predicate. Lewes, elsewhere, makes a similar argument, one that is relativist
through and through, which helps to clarify Spencer's mode of resistance to final
causes: "Nothing exists in itself and for itself; everything in others and for others:
ex-ist-ens—a standing out of relation. Hence the search after the thing in itself is
chimerical: the thing being a group of relations, it is what these are."51
Before crowning the example with his important point, Spencer briefly
concludes: "Ultimate religious ideas and ultimate scientific ideas, alike turn out to
be merely symbols of the actual, not cognitions of it."52 Here, then, in the fourth
chapter of part one, entitled 'The Relativity of All Knowledge', he sets out the
50 Spencer, First Principles, p. 54.
51 G. H. Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, 1st Series, The Foundations of a Creed. (2 vols) London:
Triibner and Co., 1874, II, pp. 26-27.
52 Spencer, First Principles, p. 50.
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sceptical argument in favour of epistemological relativism.55 Much of its detail is
borrowed from Sir William Hamilton and H. L. Mansel, but the bigger picture of
Spencer's theory launches it in a new, modern, empiricist direction. Broadly, the
argument goes as follows. We cannot ever frame, conceive or represent—in our
minds, in words, in narrative—that which is unlimited or of the 'Absolute'. Thought
confines itself to a 'conditioned' state, and also necessarily supposes conditions.
The mind cannot raise itselfbeyond its own limitation:
Thought cannot transcend consciousness; consciousness is only possible
under the antithesis of a subject and object of thought, known only in
correlation, and mutually limiting each other; while, independently of this, all
that we know either of subject or object, either of mind or matter, is only a
knowledge in each of the particular, of the plural, of the different, of the
modified, of the phenomenal.54
The infinite cannot be an object of consciousness, finiteness being one of the mind's
attributes. What we know, in an act of knowing, is always plural, since it follows
that "a thing, in consciousness, is one thing out of many."55 In this sense, the
relativity argument identifies consciousness, as a possibility, with the very notion of
relation itself, or relationality. That is, there cannot be consciousness without some
mode of relation between subject and object; and they require each other for
mutual definition. A subject is only constituted as such by the presence of an object,
and vice versa. So it would contradict this logic ifwe were to say that consciousness
can have an idea of the absolute:
It is thus manifest that, even if we could be conscious of the absolute, we
could not possibly know that it is the absolute: and, as we can be conscious of
an object as such, only by knowing it to be what it is, this is equivalent to an
admission that we cannot be conscious of the absolute at all. As an object of
53 Spencer, First Principles, pp. 50-72.
54 Spencer, First Principles, p. 55.
ss Spencer, First Principles, p. 56.
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consciousness, every thing is necessarily relative; and what a thing may be
out of consciousness no mode of consciousness can tell us.56
It all ends in mind-knotting circularity, with an attempt to conceive what an idea of
the absolute would look like if it were not an object of consciousness; or, to put it
another way, trying to imagine through the relative function of the mind a limitless
object unconditioned by a subject. The very deployment of cognitive effort denies
us access to the absolute, yet how else could it be figured? In short, "a thought
involves relation, difference, likeness," which are all antitheses of the absolute.57
These relations of similarity and contrast are also, of course, the same basic modes
of identification utilised by associationism as laws regulating mental life. Ideation
begins as the recognition of difference, as Lewes argues: "With the feeling of
difference or otherness arises the judgment of not this," he says, "which in turn
evolves the distinction of Self and Notself. These two aspects are abstractions; in
feeling they emerge simultaneously as correlations."58
If the absolute ultimately transcends these differential and relative modes of
consciousness and human point of view, Spencer's theory leads the way to a
comprehensive scepticism. Everything we know, he states, are manifestations of
the unknowable, namely impressions and ideas.59 The ways in which reality itself
constrains them cannot be known in the relative sphere. Scientific knowledge, then,
however formalised and rationally constructed it may be, has no way of securing its
referential purchase on reality in its absolute configuration. As he establishes this
point, Spencer realises that his thinking threatens to outpace his own synthetic
project, by foreclosing the very possibility of scientific knowledge before it is even
underway. What stops his theory from turning the real world into a dreamscape
projected by one mind, a Berkeleyian solipsism? If absolute reality is unknowable,
56 Spencer, First Principles, p. 57.
57 Spencer, First Principles, p. 60.
58 Lewes, Problems ofLife andMind, 1st Series, The Foundations ofa Creed, II, p. 19.
59 Spencer, First Principles, p. 112.
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how can it even be named in language as the Absolute? Spencer's argument picks
up at this point. He cleverly deploys the principle of relativity to ward off the
solipsism that relativism seems to invite. We must, he says, be able to form the
vaguest idea of the absolute, for it is implied logically by the concept of a relative
sphere, which summons its opposite. By virtue of the principle of relativity itself,
which states that the identity of things depends on a differential contrast with other
things, there must exist something outside the phenomenal world, a non-relative
world, against which it is defined. "It is impossible to conceive that our knowledge
is a knowledge of Appearances only," Spencer argues, "without at the same time
assuming a Reality of which they are appearance; for appearance without reality is
unthinkable."60 The relative is insufficient in itself, according to the logic of
relativity, hence the absolute.
According to the law of relativity, knowledge can never transcend the limits
of consciousness, but nevertheless it implies the existence of a real, independent,
wholly objective world in the same way that a subject implies an object. By
definition, the absolute remains unknowable, but we can possess positive
knowledge of its unknowability. In fact, the knowability of the known world
presupposes it. The significance of the theory rests on its view that meaning
depends on the differential or relational interaction of the two. Alice Kaminsky has
said of Lewes's theory of relativity that, "since every phenomenal manifold contains
a subjective-objective construction, every context is relational; that is, a thing is its
relationships."61 The same can be said of Spencer's position. The negation of either
relative or absolute is inconceivable: "The momentum of thought carries us beyond
conditioned existence to unconditioned existence; and this persists in us as the
body of a thought to which we can give no shape."62 The paradoxical result of this
theory, for Spencer and for mid-Victorian empiricists in general, is that contact
60 Spencer, First Principles, p. 65.
61 Alice R. Kaminsky, George Henry Lewes as Literary Critic. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
1968, p. 20.
62 Spencer, First Principles, p. 69.
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with 'reality'—with which, it is commonly said, they are obsessed—depends
fundamentally on a condition of non-knowing, for it remains unreachable except as
an ensemble of relations. The known must be shadowed perpetually in this way by
the unknowable.
Telling the Difference
The Lifted Veil (1859), George Eliot's early short story about a man cursed with the
ability to read other people's thoughts, offers a peculiarly penetrating commentary
on the concept of relativity. Often overlooked by critics, the story meditates darkly
upon questions of knowledge, detachment, consciousness and narrative, all vital
aspects of empiricism's relational theory. Its use of a fictional premise as a means
of engaging with these issues makes the story so compelling from a philosophical
point of view that it would be acceptable to see The Lifted Veil principally as a story
about epistemology. Lewes indeed praised it for being "of an imaginative
philosophical kind, quite new and piquant".63 Eliot's publisher John Blackwood
hedged slightly when asked for his opinion, but also agreed it was "full of thought"
and that it seemed to draw upon the knowledge of her scientific friends.64 Full of
thought it most certainly is: the story manages to compress an extraordinary range
of philosophical ideas into a very small narrative space, among them (as the veil in
its title suggests) that of the boundaries of perception and epistemological
limitation. It will be useful to revisit the main plotline before taking up these ideas
in more detail.
Taking the form of a fictional confession or autobiography, The Lifted Veil is
narrated in the first-person by its gloomy hero, Latimer, a man affected by—and, in
an important sense, also afflicted with—a special psychological power known as
'prevision'. Prevision gives him access to the normally private content of other
people's minds, and intermittently also allows him to see accurately into the future
63 Eliot, Letters, III, p. 55.
64 Eliot, Letters, III, p. 67.
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by means of involuntary hallucinations. Sickly and sensitive as a child, Latimer
discovers his special power in adolescence and interprets it at first as a creative gift,
an assumption reflecting his dreamy and wan self-image; he has, he thinks, "the
poet's sensibility without his voice."65 In his first attack of prevision, which occurs
while convalescing in Geneva, Latimer's mind conjures a powerful vista of a city,
Prague, which he is soon to visit with his father. The vision turns out to be vivid,
but sinister and deathly, showing ranks of desireless city-dwellers trapped in a
condition of perpetual repetition and monotony. Even so, it fills the aspiring (if
wordless) poet with hope: "For several days I was in a state of excited expectation,
watching for a recurrence ofmy new gift. I sent my thoughts ranging over my world
of knowledge, in the hope that they would find some object which would send a
reawakening vibration through my slumbering genius."66 The error of this
interpretation is revealed after a second previsional experience, in which his father
visits him accompanied by Mrs Filmore, a family friend, and a strange "pale, fatal-
eyed" woman introduced as Bertha Grant.6? A few moments after the prevision has
stopped, all three really do enter Latimer's room, making its clairvoyant property
instantly obvious. But Latimer cannot pinpoint the cause of his abnormal
experience, and wonders whether perhaps it is brief delirium, madness or disease.
Furthermore, after the second prevision he suddenly begins to see directly into
other minds, made aware of their hidden feelings and insecurities. In desperation,
he resolves that his visit to Prague will form a kind of test case, confirming whether
or not these repeated invasions into his ordinary rational life have any
correspondence with future reality.
This "jeu de melancolie," as Eliot called it, continues by compounding
Latimer's misery.68 The strange woman, Bertha, becomes uniquely alluring for him,
65 George Eliot, The Lifted Veil and Brother Jacob, ed. Sally Shuttleworth, London: Penguin, 2001, p.
7-
56 Eliot, Lifted Veil, p. 11.
67 Eliot, Lifted Veil, p. 12.
68 George Eliot described The Lifted Veil as such in a letter to John Blackwood in March 1859: "I have
a slight story of an outre kind—not a jeu d'esprit, but a jeu de melancolie... I think nothing of it, but
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only for the reason that hers turns out to be the one mind he cannot read. The very
fact that her innermost thoughts are unavailable to his special faculty ensures that
she becomes the focus of his obsessive love; but, sadly, she is also unavailable in the
more literal sense of being engaged to Latimer's brother, Alfred. Nonetheless, he
has a prevision in which he and Bertha are married, but she passionately despises
him: "she was my wife, and we hated each other. "69 The visit to Prague duly
confirms his worst fears: the hallucinations have literal and prophetic significance,
and all of his visions will become real events in the way he has experienced them
(including his own death, which he foresees painfully and vividly). This knowledge
does not deter him from pursuing Bertha's love, for her enigmatic status is too
overwhelmingly enchanting:
About Bertha I was always in a state of uncertainty: I could watch the
expression of her face, and speculate on its meaning; I could ask for opinion
with the real interest of ignorance; I could listen for her words, and watch for
her smile with hope and fear: she had for me the fascination of an unravelled
destiny.?0
Following the accidental death of Alfred, they do indeed marry. However,
once this has happened, disaster strikes for Latimer; her previously hidden mental
life now becomes transparently accessible, not only destroying her unique
attraction for him, but also revealing her to be selfish, cruel and manipulative: "The
terrible moment of complete illumination had come to me... from that evening
forth, through the sickening years which followed, I saw all round the room of this
woman's soul—saw petty artifice and mere negation where I delighted to believe in
coy sensibilities and in wit at war with latent feeling."?1 Their marriage eventually
comes to an end with a macabre twist, when a medical reanimation experiment
my private critic [Lewes] says it is very striking and original, and on the strength of that opinion, I
mention it." Eliot, Letters, III, p. 41.
69 Eliot, Lifted Veil, p. 20.
70 Eliot, Lifted Veil, p. 15.
71 Eliot, Lifted Veil, p. 32.
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involving the transfusion of blood into a corpse is tried on a recently deceased
servant. The dead body briefly comes back to life, only to reveal that Bertha has
hatched a plan to murder Latimer using poison obtained by the servant herself. He
flees, ending the story in solitude, recounting his life's events and awaiting a death
which tragically he has already foresuffered.
In spite of its oddness, George Eliot stood by the story long after it was
published. In 1873 she wrote to Blackwood: "There are many things in it which I
would willingly say over again, and I shall never put them in another form."72 For
all its bleakness, it certainly should not be dismissed as an aberrant moment in her
work. After all, Eliot's fiction rarely allows us to imagine human life thriving in
unqualified happiness: Amos Barton's fortunes are memorably cheerless; the
convivial joy of a community in the first part ofAdam Bede is displaced later in that
novel by considerable suffering, which ultimately leads to a consolatory and
restrained form of happiness; and the concluding pages ofMiddlemarch provide a
famously powerful sweep across a landscape of semi-fulfilment. What makes The
Lifted Veil different, perhaps, apart from its formal uniqueness and its gothic
departures from realism, is its apparently devastating annihilation of human
sympathy. Eliot's novels are well known for developing a view of communities of
feeling, where circles of moral sympathy radiate from individual acts, but on the
face of it such an optimistic vision seems almost entirely absent in this story.
Yet, if anything, Latimer exhibits an excess of sympathy. If we consult the
psychological theories of Eliot's peers, we find that their definitions of sympathy
closely resemble a milder version of his condition. In The Emotions and the Will,
for instance, Alexander Bain defines sympathy as "the tendency of one individual to
fall in with the emotional or active states of others, these states being known
through a certain medium of expression."^ The prolonged misery endured by
72 Eliot, Letters, V, p. 380.
73 Alexander Bain, The Emotions and the Will. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 2nd edn., 1865, p.
172.
- 241 -
Latimer derives precisely from his tendency to fall in with the emotional states of
others. People and voices rush in on him, unbidden and without warning. He is too
susceptible to their feelings, his nature too impressible, to the extent that he
experiences their emotional states as though they were his own: "my diseased
participation in other people's consciousness continued to torment me; now it was
my father, and now my brother, and now Mrs Filmore or her husband, and now our
German courier, whose stream of thought rushed upon me like a ringing in the ears
not to be got rid of."74 In Latimer, it could be said, the sympathetic mechanism
works in overdrive. Of course, the narrative tempts us to read prevision as an
abnormality, frequently couching descriptions of it in medical or diagnostic terms.
Variations of the phrase "superadded consciousness of the actual" are used several
times to describe this excessive knowledge of other selves.^ But it is interesting to
note that such phrases turn up in Eliot's realist fiction, too. The narrator of TheMill
on the Floss remarks, for example: "There is no hopelessness so sad as that of early
youth, when the soul is made up of wants, and has no long memories, no
superadded life in the life of others"76 The regret expressed here is for Maggie
Tulliver's lack of a 'superadded consciousness' of others, which can be translated as
meaning a lack of sympathetic involvement with the texture of other people's
experience, an inability to inhabit their perspectives and problems. In other words,
the universes ofMaggie and Latimer might be closer than we think.
To put it another way, and reading The Lifted Veil in light of Spencer's
epistemology, we could say that Latimer's condition does not so much signal the
abolition of human sympathy, as propose a world in which the usual imperatives of
relativity have been suspended or removed. In doing so, it underscores the
necessity of grasping the relativistic conditions which produce knowledge and
regulate knowability. Lewes, in 1878, appears to have pointed out this dimension of
74 Eliot, Lifted Veil, p. 18.
75 Eliot, Lifted Veil, p. 18.
76 Eliot,Mill on the Floss, p. 320.
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the story to Eliot and her friend Edith Simcox; according to Simcox's record of the
conversation in her autobiography, he said of the main narrative conceit: "it is only
an exaggeration of what happens—the one-sided knowing of things in relation to
the self—not whole knowledge because 'tout comprehendre est tout pardoner'."7?
And not whole knowledge, either, because, in the words of Bain, "Each man has the
full and perfect knowledge of his own consciousness; but no living being can
penetrate the consciousness of another."78 Having prevision means, however, that
Latimer can penetrate the walls of consciousness and overcome relational
limitation—to his detriment.
One of the ironies of this situation is that, unlike famous overreachers in
Western culture like Faust or Frankenstein, Latimer could not care less about the
advantages usually associated with increased knowledge. His special powers are
not gained as a result of clever scheming or bargaining; nor do they fulfil some goal
established early on in the narrative, or satisfy some original burning wish, or
realise a childhood dream. He does not use his powers for profit, financial or
otherwise, despite the obvious edge they would give him if he happened to visit a
bookmaker or play the markets.79 His quest is not to know more. In this respect,
The Lifted Veil does not take a place in that ancient narrative tradition in which the
seeker of knowledge endures terrible punishment for flying too close to the sun. As
pathetically self-absorbed as he is, Latimer cannot be accused of hubris. But Eliot's
story dwells nevertheless on the idea that an excess of knowledge is symbolically
fatal. IfMiddlemarch can be described as a novel about humans knowing too little,
then The Lifted Veil is about them knowing too much.
77 Simcox records the conversation in her autobiography (17 March 1878): "I asked [Eliot and Lewes]
about the Lifted Veil. Lewes said it came out in Blackwood without name soon after Adam Bede. He
asked what I thought of it. I was embarrassed and said—as he did—that it was not at all like her other
writings, wherefrom she differed..." See Eliot, Letters, EX, p. 220.
78 Bain, Emotions and the Will, p. 28.
79 For a Marxist interpretation of the link between scientific prediction and capitalist speculation see
Terry Eagleton, "Power and Knowledge in 'The Lifted Veil'," Literature and History 9, 1983, pp. 52-
61.
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"Lack of objectivity in the description of the outer world," Georg Lukacs
once said, "finds its complement in the reduction of reality to a nightmare."80
Precisely the opposite of this befalls Latimer: too much objectivity gives reality the
horrific sensation of a dream, or as he puts it, a "dizzy sense of unreality."81 He sees,
feels and knows too much of life; his sensory and intellectual experience is
unbearably rich, agonisingly abundant. Part of the paradox of Latimer's fraught
circumstance is that the pressures of prevision pull him simultaneously in two
opposite directions: first, away of himself, beyond the ordinary limitations of
selfhood, as he passes in and out of different consciousnesses and roves forwards
and backwards in time; and also towards himself, pushing him into social and
psychological isolation. The more intimate his knowledge of other people becomes,
the more disconnected from outward life Latimer feels. His freedoms oddly
imprison him. He achieves virtually the oldest aspiration of philosophy—that of
climbing outside one's own mind—only for it to maroon him in agonising solitude,
leaving him "longing to die, weary of incessant insight and foresight, without
delusion and without hope," as he tells us at the very start of his narrative.82 He
ends up isolated from relationships in the human sense of the word, but also
isolated increasingly from the very concept of relation itself. His suffering brings to
mind a passage from Ruskin's Modern Painters warning of this psychological risk:
"All the diseases of mind leading to fatalest ruin consist primarily in this isolation
[from relationship]. They are the concentration of man upon himself, whether his
heavenly interests or his worldly interests, matters not; it is the being his own
interests which makes the regard of them so mortal."8s Latimer is his condition,
and it reduces reality to his blighted self.
80 Georg Lukacs, The Meaning of Contemporary Realism, trans. John and Necke Mander, London:
Merlin Press, 1962, p. 31.
81 Eliot, Lifted Veil, p. 12.
82 Eliot, Lifted Veil, p. 3.
®3 Ruskin, Works, VII, pp. 263.
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He thus becomes a mockery of the epistemological ideal of detachment, a
miserable version of omniscience. Trapped in a decrepit, sickly body, his quasi-
transcendent mobility in time and space has a grotesque and parodic quality,
inverting the traditional expectation that such gifts will ennoble and transform
their bearer. Embodied in the human shape of Latimer, objectivity thus becomes a
sickness. As Terry Eagleton says of Eliot's story: "Total omniscience keels over
inexorably into solipsism. In a curious sense, if you knew everything you would
know nothing, because subjectivity would inflate to such immense proportions that
it would overwhelm and cancel its object, leaving nothing outside itself to know."8*
The Lifted Veil embraces just this kind of philosophical conundrum. It shows that
little really distinguishes omniscience from enclosed subjectivism, which explains
Latimer's simultaneous pull towards and away from the self. Prevision brings about
a doomed sense of his own missing centre. His excessive knowledge almost entirely
dissolves the primary differential intuition marking self from object; thus, in the
story's fictional world, an undifferentiated sameness threatens to prevail over the
logic of relativity theory.
The threshold it crosses is similar to the one Spencer inserts between the
knowable and unknowable realms. Prevision has the function of allowing the veil to
be lifted which screens off the unknowable, abolishing the relativism proper to
human point of view. Therefore we could say that the story depicts Latimer
journeying perilously, impossibly, towards (and eventually into) the inhuman
element of the absolute and unconditioned. Only Bertha Grant represents a
surviving link to a world where relativity still exists. Resistant to his mind-reading,
she reminds Latimer of what it means not to be burdened by knowledge; she
embodies "the blessed possibility of mystery, and doubt, and expectation. "8s
Importantly, her appeal has everything to do with the play of differential forces.
Latimer gives no indication of being drawn to any innate qualities in Bertha's
84 Eagleton, "Power and Knowledge in 'The Lifted Veil'," p. 52.
85 Eliot, Lifted Veil, p. 31.
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personality or appearance, no urgent sense of an essential attraction. She exudes,
in any case, as the narrative seems to stress, a haughty disdain that ought to repel
rather than attract him; and while there can be no accounting for tastes, surely her
cold staring countenance and cruelly manipulative nature cannot explain why
Bertha should be so sexually irresistible. The fact is that, for Latimer, her appeal
rests not on anything connected intrinsically to her, but exclusively on the fact of
her difference from everyone else. In this respect, her identity has a differential
foundation. To be persuaded of this, we need only to recount how quickly love
turns to loathing once her mind loses its resistance to prevision.
Insofar as Bertha stimulates in Latimer a longing to exist in a world where
identities are differentially or relationally determined, she comes to stand in an
important sense for the concept of difference itself. And Latimer's own way of
comprehending his romantic obsession with the woman is to translate his personal
failure into the terms of a public crisis, as if it were an epistemological problem for
the whole culture:
Conceive the condition of the human if all propositions whatsoever were self-
evident except one, which was to become self-evident at the close of a
summer's day, but in the meantime might be the subject of question, of
hypothesis, of debate. Art and philosophy, literature and science, would
fasten like bees on that one proposition which had the honey of probability in
it, and be the more eager because their enjoyment would end with sunset.86
Ironically, since at this point he is becoming increasingly locked into an isolated,
self-referential world, Latimer eloquently defends Spencer's idea of the relativity of
knowledge. Unknowability and doubt are its essential features. His speech also
recalls Ruskin's insistence on mystery: "Knowledge is good, and light is good, yet
man perished in seeking knowledge, and moths perish in seeking light; and if we,
who are crushed before the moth, will not accept such mystery as is needful for us,
86 Eliot, Lifted Veil, p. 29.
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we shall perish in like manner."87 This neatly captures Latimer's destiny, of course:
the elimination of mystery entails death. Latimer goes on to describe how we need
"something hidden and uncertain for the maintenance of that doubt and hope and
effort" which, in effect, confer meaning and identity upon the world, a remark
wholly compatible with positing a Spencerian unknowable.88
Finally, Latimer is an example of what Peter Logan has called the "nervous
narrator" of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century fiction.89 Logan's category gives us
a way of thinking about links between narrative and knowledge in The Lifted Veil,
and for reflecting on the ways in which relativism becomes incorporated at a
narrative level, specifically as a problem of language and event, narrating and
knowing. Eliot's story brilliantly exemplifies Logan's thesis (if we overlook the
gender of pronouns):
She [the nervous narrator] narrates her own sufferings, describing in the first
person the events in the past that produced her nervous condition. It is a
retelling of the narrative in the body; the narrator tells the story of how she
acquired the body with a story to tell, of how she came into being as a
narrator. This is also a self-canceling narrative, because the narrator's
authority to speak is compromised by the nervous disease that the story
reveals.90
Latimer must let his condition speak; without his unusually sensitive disposition
and mental powers, there would not be a narrative. Yet those same 'nervous'
qualities also compromise his narrative authority. The relativity of teller to tale is
central to the overall narrative effect, as well as being an aspect of its thematic
engagement with the partiality of knowledge. Latimer, we know, will die, and
thereby must arrest narrative progress. He announces in the very first lines the
87 Ruskin, Works, VI, p. 90.
88 Eliot, Lifted Veil, p. 29.
89 Peter Melville Logan, Nerves and Narratives: A Cultural History of Hysteria in Nineteenth-
Century British Prose. Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1997, p.
90 Peter Melville Logan, Nerves and Narratives: A Cultural History of Hysteria in Nineteenth-
Century British Prose. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, p. 29.
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double closure of life and narrative that is to come: "The time of my end
approaches... I shall not much longer groan under the wearisome burden of this
earthly existence."91 The final ellipses closing Latimer's narration, presumably to
signify the pen dropping from the hand of its deceased author, stand in graphically
for a death which marks the absolute convergence of the writer and the written.
Paradoxically, owing to prevision, his inevitable death, which when it comes
surpasses the narrative's own limits, has in a sense already happened.
It ushers in an eerie, aporetic silence: as it exceeds representation, his death
brings the narrative back in a circular fashion to its prophetic opening, at which
point Latimer struggled to find words adequate to his prevision of non-being:
"Darkness—darkness—no pain—nothing but darkness: but I am passing on and on
through the darkness: my thought stays in the darkness, but always with a sense of
moving onward..."92 What we are made to witness is a deferred narrative crisis, the
attempt to figure in language a post-linguistic moment, which prevision serves to
bring back inside the sphere of representation. The refusal of any stable ontological
ground outside narrative means that the story cannot avoid approaching a
perpetual solipsistic loop. It has its equivalent in the featureless darkness which
Latimer begins describing, where all relations of difference have disappeared and
differentiation cannot be recognised. Cancelling everything outside its own frame,
the narrative can only turn in on itself meaninglessly, rather as Eagleton says is
true of omniscient knowledge. In this way, we could argue, The Lifted Veil arrives
at the abyss of the absolute, where narration ceases and Latimer, literally, can no
longer tell the difference.
The Universal Postulate and Relative Ethics
Eliot's story touches on a broader conviction in mid-century empiricist writing that
the possibility of knowledge arises in perspectival, contingent conditions. When
91 Eliot, Lifted Veil, p. 3.
92 Eliot, Lifted Veil, p. 4.
- 248 -
those conditions are compromised by the fictional and hypothetical device of
prevision, catastrophe occurs. It dramatises a view similar to that described by the
philosopher Thomas Nagel, who argues that "The way the world is includes
appearances, and there is no single point of view from which they can all be fully
grasped."93 But Eliot's bleak parable of unconditioned knowledge also raises
important questions. What counts as true, according to Spencer's epistemology, if
there is no possibility of transcending our relative conditions? What, if anything,
regulates or constrains the proliferation of relations which make up phenomenal
reality? What is to be said of the ethical quality of differential experience?
In the first edition of his Principles ofPsychology (1855), Spencer opens by
asking: "Is it not then obvious that the first thing to be investigated is that mental
act whereby we recognise the validity of our convictions?"94 The question initiates
an attempt made over the first sixty pages of Spencer's work to establish a
foundational predication beneath all other know'ledge, a "primary datum" or
"Universal Postulate" that will validate inquiry. He quickly establishes that belief is
"the ultimate fact which we can never transcend," for any kind of assertion rests on
the prior assumption that the concept of belief exists.93 It would count as logically
inconsistent to deny the existence of belief, since any formulation of the denial
would itself take the form of a conviction. Those beliefs that we invariably hold,
Spencer continues, and whose negation it would be impossible to conceive, are
those to which the name 'true' is given:
Mean what we may by the word truth, we have no choice but to hold that a
belief which is proved by the inconceivableness of its negation to invariably
exist, is true... We have no other guarantee for the existence of consciousness,
of sensations, of personal existence; we have no other guarantee for any other
axiom; we have no other guarantee for any step in a demonstration. Hence as
93 Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 26.
94 Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Psychology. London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans,
1855, P. 11.
95 Spencer, Principles ofPsychology, pp. 16-17.
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being taken for granted in every act of the understanding, it must be regarded
as the Universal Postulate.96
It is impossible for the mind to contemplate, for example, the non-existence of
space. The idea of space cannot be annihilated; and so, the belief in the objective
existence of space has the highest possible degree of reliability.97 In essence, then,
the Universal Postulate provides a practical test of a statement's validity: is it
possible to conceive not believing it?
Spencer becomes edgily reticent around the word truth, but in effect his
theory agrees wholeheartedly with Alexander Bain's view that the "supreme
assumption that we can make is that the uncontradicted is true,"98 The Universal
Postulate is explicitly a response to the implications of relativism, as Spencer
indicates at the very beginning of the Principles ofPsychology." At the heart of the
theory, as formulated by Bain as well as Spencer, lies the view that truth does not
amount to a correspondence between idea and world, representation and reality,
since the relativity of knowledge will not allow confirmation of such a
correspondence to fall inside the circle of the knowable. Instead, the Universal
Postulate judges the adequacy of a belief relative to the experiential situation in
which it is articulated. Of course, the inconceivability of contradiction may vary
over time, and therefore what counts as true is open to revision. A truth remains
true until some occasion in the future which freshly contradicts it. Bain reminds us
of Hobbes's dictum, "experience concludeth nothing universally," and he endorses
it as "sound empiricism."100 In his Logic (1870), Bain notes: "This is to apply the
Universal Postulate, the primary assumption at the root of all knowledge beyond
the present—that what has never been contradicted (after sufficient search) is to be
96 Spencer, Principles ofPsychology, p. 31.
97 Spencer is careful to distance himself from Kant on the issue of space; like Kant, he agrees that it is
impossible for us think of space (or time) not existing, but uses this to draw the opposite conclusion to
Kant's subjective inference that space is a form of thought, namely, that it objectively exists. Spencer,
Principles ofPsychology, pp. 57-58.
98 Alexander Bain, "The Empiricist Position," Mind 14,55,1889, pp. 375-76.
99 Spencer, Principles ofPsychology, p. 4.
100 Bain, "The Empiricist Position," p. 376.
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received as true."101 Like Spencer, Bain accepts this as the only proper inductive
method for empiricism. "If, when the future becomes past, an exception arises," he
explains, "that case must be withdrawn from the sphere of uniformity, all else
remaining."102
Spencer's framework for validating belief therefore feels, in this temporal
respect, developmental and even Darwinian. In his study of Darwin, George Levine
says of the narrative of evolutionary change: "Current conditions imply, in the
Darwinian world, a long past narrative... Even when individual lives end,
evolutionary narrative implies further, generational change."103 Something similar
might be said of the concept of truth in Spencer's epistemology. A truth descends
through time struggling against the potential threat of contradiction and
falsification—or extinction, as it were—at the hands of experience. The formalised
systems of knowledge that we recognise as the sciences, for instance, are examples
of evolutionary artifice, developed over cultural time:
The further we carry our analysis of things, the more manifest does it
become, that divisions and classifications are essentially human inventions
which have no absolute demarcations in nature corresponding to them, but
are simply subjective—are scientific artifices by which we limit and arrange
the matter under investigation, and so facilitate our thinking.10*
The evolutionary claim central to Spencer's thinking as a whole sees all phenomena
moving from a state of homogeneity to increasing complexity and heterogeneity.
This applies to human knowledge as it does to cellular growth or the evolution of
species in the natural world. One effect of this fundamental evolutionary principle
in Spencer's philosophy, according to Kieran Egan, is that "we live in a dramatic
101 Alexander Bain, Logic. (2 vols) London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 2nd edn., p. 1873, II,
p. 7.
102 Bain, "The Empiricist Position," p. 378.
103 George Levine, Darwin and the Novelists: Patterns of Science in Victorian Fiction. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1988, p. 47.
104 Herbert Spencer, The Principles ofPsychology. London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans,
1855, P- 353-
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universe that is subject to constant change and that this change follows an
invariable development from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous or, as he
sometimes put it, from the simple to the complex."10s All truths exist in a state of
turbulent evolutionary transition.
The Universal Postulate, then, operates as if it were an a priori condition,
but in reality it posits an evolutionary scale that allows truths to pass from one
generation to the next in a similar way to physical characteristics. It belongs to the
realm of history, contingency and emergence, not necessity. Evolution, for Spencer,
amounts to a kind of grand associationism, taking in the whole history of the
human race, as if it were the development of a single mind.106 The historical
narrative linking primitive man, who lacked language or mathematics, with the
genius of Shakespeare and Newton, implies the successive inheritance of
knowledge down evolutionary time, so that the infants in each generation are born
with a successively greater and richer bequest: "the brain represents an infinitude
of experiences received during the evolution of life in general: the most uniform
and frequent of which, have been successively bequeathed... and have thus slowly
amounted to that high intelligence which lies latent in the brain of the infant."107 In
this sense, the tabula rasa—that term so beloved by critics of empiricist
psychology—shifts in Spencer's theory from describing the state of the individual's
mind to that of the entire culture or race. Ideas are passed down to us as much as
our genes. For Lewes, literature plays the same kind of role in evolutionary terms:
"It stores up the accumulated experience of the race, connecting Past and Present
into a conscious unity; and with this store it feeds successive generations, to be fed
105 Kieran Egan, Getting it Wrongfrom the Beginning: Our Progressivist Inheritancefrom Herbert
Spencer, John Dewey and Jean Piaget. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002, p 15.
i°fi T]le familiar doctrine of association here undergoes a great extension; for it is held that not only in
the individual do ideas become connected when in experience the things producing them have
repeatedly occurred together, but that such results of repeated occurrences accumulate in successions
of individuals: the effects of associations are supposed to be transmitted as modifications of the
nervous system." Spencer, AnAutobiography, I, p. 470.
107 Spencer, The Principles ofPsychology, p. 583.
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in turn by them."108 As this suggests, there is a strong narrative element to the
theory, inherited associational patterns being equivalent to mental narratives
passing from one generation to the next, adding to the long evolving structure of
consciousness. For Spencer, this was crucial to defending his epistemology from
the charge of idealism: "Implying the production of mind by natural evolution
instead of by supernatural endowment, it is at variance with that conception of the
universe with which the supernaturalism [of the Kantians] is bound up."10?
Spencer's picture of evolutionary change—encompassing minds, culture,
truth, knowledge, language—suggests a relativist world rather than one governed
by fixity and certainty. Without question, it does not support a crude realism in
philosophical terms, nor does the Universal Postulate instate an ahistoricity or a
Kantian alternative to the empiricist and associational ground of his theory of
knowledge. Instead, mutation, flux and transition are the defining qualities of
Spencer's relativised world. Even John Dewey, who earlier we saw reproaching
Spencer for his unfeeling objectivity, acknowledged that Spencer's writing stands
excitingly on the cusp of a distinctively modern, relational theory: "But the transfer
from the world of set external facts and of fixed ideal values to the world of free,
mobile, self-developing, and self-organizing reality would be unthinkable and
impossible were it not for the work of Spencer, which... served the purpose of a
medium of transition from the fixed to the moving."110 The judgment is fair, if
rather unexpected, and rightly points Spencer in the direction of late Victorian and
early modernist tendencies in narrative and epistemological terms.
We may ask, finally, what happens, in this differential and unstable world
imagined by empiricism, to the category of the ethical. First, as Bain argues, any
notion of a transcendent ethical law, or transhistorical moral necessity, must be
dispensed with in a world of relativity:
108 G. H. Lewes, The Principles of Success in Literature, ed. T. Sharper Knowlson, London: Walter
Scott Ltd, p., p. 2.
10? Herbert Spencer, "Our Space-Consciousness: A Reply," Mind 15, 59,1890, pp. 324.
110 Offer, Herbert Spencer, pp. 41-42.
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It is mere trifling to fill our imagination with an unseen, unproducible [i.e.
transcendent] standard of morality; we need only look about us and read
history, to get at the real authority that now maintains, and the one that
originally prescribed, almost any moral precept now recognised as binding...
The change that has come over men's sentiments on the subject of Slavery,
would prove an interesting example of the growth of new moral feelings.
Until less than two centuries ago, the abhorrence of the usage of holding
human beings as slaves did not exist; and now, except in the Slave States of
America, the repugnance to the practice has almost reached the height of a
moral sentiment.111
The undeniable accuracy of his historical analysis—that cultures have historically
adopted dramatically different ethical norms—probably does little to reassure us
that Bain's relativism does not merely passively condone what it describes. Of
course, his language is not without a moral register (slavery is "the abhorrence" of
holding human beings in captivity) but it does not seem satisfactorily to imply an
answer to the question of how we prevent a relative theory of knowledge from
entering ethical freefall. If ethical knowledge is relative to our context, how do we
condemn enslavement? Amanda Anderson points out in a discussion of J. S. Mill
that he "construes the search for truth as a process utterly dependent on the
capacity to comprehend and consider opposing points of view."112 This kind of
position has an ethical as well as epistemological importance. Indeed, the two are
bound up together. An openness to difference, to the very dynamic and feel of
relative experience, arguably holds the key to an ethical dimension in writers like
Spencer and Bain, too, who were heavily influenced by Mill. In Spencer, as we have
been arguing, the concept of difference has a central significance; it is the principle
driving his associational, evolutionary and philosophical theory. In Bain, too,
difference and newness carry a primary value; as well as being vital to the stream of
111 Bain, Emotions and the Will, pp. 281-82.
112 Amanda Anderson, The Powers ofDistance: Cosmopolitanism and the Cultivation ofDetachment.
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 16.
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mental life in a structural sense, they are also types of psychological excitement,
evidence of life and self almost akin to Barthesian plaisir: "Change of impression
being the condition alike of feeling, and of knowledge or intellect, the pleasure of
Novelty is mixed up with the acquisition of knowledge, and is hence called an
intellectual pleasure... This pleasure is in fact the primitive charm of all
sensation."113 Subjectivity experiences its own existence in terms of difference.
To substantiate the ethical possibilities of relativity theory, we might turn to
an example from George Eliot, who develops an extraordinary sensitivity in her
fiction towards the question of the ethical and the relational, in ways only possible
within fictional writing. According to K. K. Collins, George Eliot's view is that
"fulfilling one's duty, even in a relativistic universe, is unconditionally and
absolutely necessary for the moral life."114 Collins, however, while acknowledging
the relativity of Eliot's mid-Victorian empiricist vision, still seems to fall back on
the Leavisian celebration of her work's intuited universal wisdom and consoling
moral truth. (The ring of "unconditionally" and "absolute" transport Eliot to a
world quite unlike Spencer's, where such categories have only an indirect bearing
on what can be known.) The negotiation of the ethical in a world of relativism does
not allow for such certainties, but rather encourages Anderson's idea of refracting
experience through different points of view. Eliot's fiction seems to engage with
precisely this kind of problematic. Take this passage from The Mill on the Floss, for
example:
[Tom Tulliver] couldn't bear to think of himself living on any other spot than
this, where he knew the sound of every gate and door, and felt that the shape
and colour of every roof and weather stain and broken hillock was good,
because his growing senses had been fed on them. Our instructed vagrancy
which has hardly time to linger by the hedgerows, but runs away early to the
tropics and is at home with palms and banyans,—which is nourished on
113 Bain, Emotions and the Will, pp. 43-44.
11/1 K. K. Collins, "G. H. Lewes Revised: George Eliot and the Moral Sense," Victorian Studies 21, 4,
1978, p. 466.
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books of travel and stretches the theatre of its imagination to the Zambesi-
can hardly get a dim notion ofwhat an old-fashioned man like Tulliver felt for
this spot where all his memories centred and where life seemed like a familiar
smooth-handled tool that the fingers clutchwith loving ease.us
The limits of Tom's imagination parallel those of the community; his 'spot' of
England defines him and in turn he embodies its provincial cultural values. Place
and personal identity are linked intractably, in a way that marks him out for the
reader's attention, and even our condescension. For he entertains little curiosity
about life beyond his immediate sphere, and his contentment seems to eliminate
thoughts that could threaten familiarity or speak of existing differently. A given
span of houses, hillocks and hedgerows marks for Tom the boundary of the known
world, a world whose supporting values and wisdom derive largely from its
continuities with an inherited internal tradition. Even the intuition that home
might belong elsewhere, on some other spot, brings him pain and an anxiety of
incomprehension. His resistance to difference, it is implied, would make the idea of
the Zambesi impossibly vexing, intolerably foreign.
His attitude brings together the ethical and the epistemological. In a sense,
Tom's rootedness delivers an anti-epistemology: it denies the pressures exerted by
the unknown on identity and knowledge, and does not admit any theoretical
ground beneath its homely grasp of life. It fails, too, to recognise the
characteristically modern hiatus between man and world, culture and nature,
knower and known, since Tom finds himself aligned so symmetrically with his
environment that he does not perceive these modes of differentiation. That is to
say, the world has yet to become a problematic object of knowledge for him.
However, the reader is encouraged to see how his certainties are shadowed by the
idea of difference, in a way that demands ethical scrutiny. The question we are
invited to ask is whether Tom's apparent security rests on, or potentially allows for,
115 Eliot, Mill on the Floss, p. 352.
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exclusionary forms of cultural identity. If his evident resistance to difference means
remaining closed to the legitimacy of thinking and doing things otherwise,
presumably at some level this has to entail intolerance towards alternative
frameworks of belief, systems of value, cultural practices, rituals, rites, social codes,
and so on. In short, it presupposes a degree of opposition to the rules and truths of
another tribe, however casual or incidental. One has to consider how this
opposition might be framed ethically. For example, does the unimaginative
parochialism of a man like Tom Tulliver begin at some point to turn into more
active forms of intolerance towards the other, into resentment, hostility and
hatred? Is there a darker underside to his familiar world of benevolence and love,
belonging and kinship, which could potentially find its expression in regressive
human action?
Just as we might be framing these thoughts, Eliot's passage works an ethical
trick of its own. It tempts us cleverly into the kind of complacency perhaps all too
typical of the supposedly enlightened mind, before alerting us to the differential
axis upon which our own judgments and assumptions have probably been turning.
On the face of it, the passage describes a tension which the reader should
straightforwardly identify, between on the one hand Tom's insularity and on the
other a vast and fascinating foreign world, symbolised by palms and banyans,
which he shows no curiosity towards. Broadly speaking, it pitches the local against
the expansive, the backward against the liberal and refined. Where, we might ask,
is the reader positioned in this logic? Necessarily, it seems, on the side of
expansiveness, refinement and forward-thinking, for we are virtually invited to
scoff at Tom—as narrow, parochial, a relic of some cosier, ignorant, bygone time—
and, in so doing, to relish our distance from his limited understanding. The
narrator marks these differences in subtle ways, for example by insisting that the
mind of the reader (cultured from consuming travel literature) will be unsatisfied if
left lingering over, say, an English hedgerow and so will leap instead to
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contemplate scenes on a much grander scale such as the Zambesi river. This view of
course activates its own prejudices about cultural difference, not least the belief
that other cultures exist in a knowable and exotic relation to the spectator. Like
George Eliot, one does not need to have read all of Edward Said to appreciate that
such prejudices form merely the reverse side of the same coin as Tom's narrow-
mindedness.
Moreover, if we do side with the narrator by imagining ourselves in this
superior way, the meaning of the passage suddenly begins to look increasingly
contradictory. After all, we must recall that its wording casts Tom himself as a
curiosity, a type, an exotic specimen, an outsider from our vantage point—a man so
"old-fashioned" to us that he harbours views now alien to the implicitly enlightened
readership. In this sense, the more significant differential axis here is the one which
divides his set of values from ours, effectively 'othering' Tom. Yet if Tom is the
passage's true other, surely the narrator's invitation to condescend to him must
stand out as grossly inappropriate, as well as logically at odds with his or her
apparent toleration of difference. Paradoxically, the narrator would find Tom more
appealing if only he were a little more modern, in fact a little more like the narrator
(and, supposedly, like the reader, too). But since it is precisely the longing for
sameness and recognisibility that the narrator finds so unpalatable, and seizes
upon to patronise Tom, the basis of the narrator's ethical superiority quickly starts
to look vulnerable. In a principled attempt to embrace cultural difference, he or she
unwittingly displays a kind of historical intolerance towards the past. What Eliot
captures, in effect, is the moment when this kind of liberal consciousness collides
with its own partially hidden presuppositions and limitations. Indeed, one could
say that the passage out-relativises her relativist narrator.
The complexity of these manoeuvrings and shifts captures some of the
difficulties and advantages entailed by a differential ethical programme. It ties the
question to knowledge to human interests, in a way that Spencer, for example, does
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not perform in his own discussion of relativity. Eliot thus turns the claim that
consciousness cannot be transcended into a powerful property of the fictional
scene, into a hypothetical negotiation of relativism, transforming the relational
theory of empiricism into an ethically reflective aesthetic experience.
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Conclusion
In her Empirical Truths and Critical Fictions (1991), Cathy Caruth reflects on the
reputation of empiricist philosophy:
Unlike the self-brooding Germans, said to account for every moment of their
own speculations, the empiricists are deemed willing to give all the credit to
the sensory world and to forget the necessarily active nature of their own
thinking. English Romantic poetry, occasionally reading conjunction with the
work ofGermans such as Hegel, has always seemed to transcend this un-self-
consciousness and make its own creative act a central focus.
There has always been, she goes on, a tendency to see empiricism "as an uncritical
or non-speculative philosophical tradition."1 As her remarks suggest, empiricism
has suffered from its comparison with Continental traditions of thought. Where
German philosophy or French literary theory have appeared to combine obsessive
reflexivity, technical rigour, and sheer mind-wrenching difficulty with a kind of
tormented philosophical elan, British empiricism since Locke has acquired none of
those advantageous stereotypes. Instead, its intellectual personality has come to
revolve very much around its outmoded, buttoned-up stodginess. Above all, it is
said to lack a genuinely critical moment—to resist the risks or devastations inherent
in the truly philosophical enterprise.
This thesis has attempted to challenge this view. Engrained views are hard
to unsettle, of course, and despite the valuable work of critics like Caruth herself,
Jules David Law, George Levine and Christopher Herbert, it remains a reasonably
novel proposition to want to read the empiricist tradition differently. Yet there are
1 Cathy Caruth, Empirical Truths and Critical Fictions: Locke, Wordsworth, Kant, Freud. Baltimore
and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991, p. 3.
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extremely good and rewarding reasons for doing so, not least the fact that in
surprising ways the aspirations and register of empiricism as an intellectual
position often initiate a scepticism which calls into doubt the very certainties it
supposedly holds most dear. Among them we could count the concept of positive or
objective knowledge and the transparency of perception. By looking at the
development of ideas in empiricist narratives in the mid-Victorian period, the
intention has been to draw attention to the ways in which the traditional scope of
the epistemological problem leads empiricism to embrace a form of provisionality
with regard to knowledge, mind, self and culture, which in current terminology
would warrant giving it the name constructivism: "Constructivism, in most
informed contemporary usage of the term, refers to a particular way of
understanding the relation between what we call knowledge and what we
experience as reality. In contrast to the understanding of that relation generally
referred to as realism, constructivist accounts of cognition, science, truth and
related matters conceive of the specific features of what we experience, think of,
talk about as 'the world' (objects, entity boundaries, properties, categories, and so
forth) not as independent of our sensory, perceptual, manipulative, and
conceptual/discursive practices but, rather, as emerging from—or as it is said,
'constructed by'—those practices themselves."2
It should hopefully be clear by this point that the examination ofwriting by
George Eliot, John Ruskin, G. H. Lewes, Alexander Bain and Herbert Spencer has
attempted to draw out important ways in which they anticipate and rigorously
extend this kind of approach to the question of knowledge. As we have seen, the
questions they excite frequently extend beyond the specialist domain of philosophy,
both then and now—in the mid-Victorian context, and in our professionalised
present era. For these writers, epistemology organises and inflects their different
intellectual projects, in aesthetics, psychology, criticism, physiology, imaginative
2 Barbara Hernstein Smith, "Reply to an Analytical Philosopher" in Kenneth Surin, ed. The
Vicissitudes ofTheory, Durham: Duke University Press, 2002, p. 232.
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literature, and so on, without be obliged to identify necessarily with the discourse
of philosophy. In this sense, we have been concerned less with a discernable
philosophical position than a distinctive cultural formation or cultural language.
And as such, empiricist writing in the period everywhere invokes the fraught issue
of knowability. For "a culture increasingly obsessed with the real," as one critic
describes the mid-nineteenth century, it invested an immense effort demonstrating
how that reality was beyond the reach of representation or positive knowledge.3
The contingency of the self at the centre of empiricism—struggling for a position
outside itself that it has no hope ever of occupying—epitomises its obsession with
epistemological limitation. One of its most important consequences, then, is a
sustained endorsement of relative knowledge, perhaps nowhere better or more
vividly expressed than in these lines by Lewes: "Every Real is the complex of so
many relations, a conjecture of so many events, a synthesis of so many sensations,
that to know one Real thoroughly would only be possible through an intuition
embracing the universe."4 In remarkable moments like this, mid-Victorian writing
leaves behind its plodding stereotype, upending what Law calls the "popular
conception of empiricism as a naively dogmatic, stone-kicking positivism, hostile at
all points to rhetoric."3 It is in such narrative moments, we might say, that
empiricism seems most acutely to register the difficulties of knowing, with the
effect of calling into view the necessary impossibility of its own enterprise.
3 Jennifer Green-Lewis, Framing the Victorians: Photography and the Culture of Realism. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 233.
4 G. H. Lewes, Problems ofLife and Mind, 1st Series, The Foundations of a Creed. (2 vols) London:
Triibner and Co., 1874,1, pp. 342-43.
s Jules David Law, The Rhetoric of Empiricism: Language and Perception from Locke to I. A.
Richards. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 12.
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